MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  B.  McCLELLAN. 


UfPili 


PUBL  vie;; 


GEN 


dier:-. 


T.    B. 


THE  ,LIFE,  CAMPAIGNS, 


AND 


PUBLIC    SERVICES 


OF 


GENERAL  McCLELLAN. 

(GEOKGE  B.  McCLELLAN.) 


THE 


HERO    OF    WESTERN    VIRGINIA!     SOUTH 
MOUNTAIN!    AND    ANTIETAM ! 


With  a  full  history  of  all  his  Campaigns  and  Battles;  as  well 
as  his  Keports  and  Correspondence  with  the  "War  Department 
and  the  President  in  relation  to  them,  from  the  time  he  first  took 
the  field  in  this  war,  until  he  was  finally  relieved  from  command 
after  the  Battle  of  Antietam,  with  his  various  Speeches  to  Sol 
diers,  etc.,  made  by  him  up  to  the  present  time. 


PHILADELPHIA: 

T.    B.    PETERSON    &    BROTHERS, 

306     CHESTNUT     STREET. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1864,  by 

T.  B.  PETERSON  &  BROTHERS, 

II  th«  Cletk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States,  in  and  for  tk« 
Eastern  District  of  Pennsylvania. 


CONTENTS. 


General  McClellan's  Early  Life J9 

His  Services  in  Mexico — His  subsequent  Military  Career 20 

Important  Missions  entrusted  to  him 21 

Is  sent  to  Europe — Report  of  his  Observations  in  the  Crimea — Re 
signs  the  Service  and  becomes  a  Railroad  President 22 

"Little   Mac"  appointed  Major-General — Assumes  command  of  the 

Department  of  Ohio 23 

Address  to  the  People  of  Western  Virginia 24 

Address  to  the  Volunteer  Army— The  Fight  at  Philippi— He  takes 

the  Field  in  Person 25 

Assumes  command  in  Western  Virginia — Proclamation  to  the  Inhab 
itants  of  Western  Virginia 26 

Proclamation  to  the  Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  West 27 

The  Battle  of  Rich  Mountain — Destroys  the  Rebel  Army — Corres 
pondence,  Despatches,  and  Reports  in  relation  to  it 28 

Address  to  the  Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  West,  at  Beverly,  Va 33 

Washington  City  after  Bull  Run 34 

He  is  ordered  to  Washington — Enthusiastic  Reception  in  Philadel 
phia,  with  his  Speech 36 

Takes  command  in  Washington — His  Plans  and  first  Order 37 

Takes  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 39 

Ball's  Bluff. 40 

Retirement  of  General  Scott — "Little  Mac"  succeeds  him  in  com 
mand  of  the  Army — His  Order 41 

Presentation  of  a  Sword  by  the  City  of  Philadelphia 42 

An  Unusual  Honor — A  Midnight  Serenade — The  Observance  of  the 

Sabbath 43 

Military  Movements  projected 44 

"On  to  Richmond" 46 

Why  General  McClellan  was  interfered  with — A  short  Retrospect —      50 
The  Peninsular  Campaign — Correspondence  between  General  McClel 
lan  and  the  Government 52 

Evacuation  of  Yorktown 55 

The  Battle  of  Williamsburg 56 

Thanks  of  Congress — Excitement  in  Richmond 58 

Reinforcements  urged — Despatches  on  the  subject  to  Secretary  Stan- 
ton  and  the  President 59 

The  Advance  continued 61 

Position  of  the  Corps — Severe  Skirmishing 63 

Orders  for  crossing  the  Chickahomray 65 

Battle  of  Hanover  Court-House 66 

Battle  of  Fair  Oaks 67 

Address   to   the   Army — Further   Despatches  to  the   President   and 

Secretary  of  War,  with  their  replies 68 

The  Battle  of  Oak  Grove 75 

The  Seven  Days  Battles — Despatches  and  Official  Reports  of  General 
McClellan  to  the  Secretary  of  War  in  relation  to  them,  with  his 
replies — Preparations  to  change  Base — The  Bstttle  at -Mechan- 
icsville— The  Battle  of  Games'  Mill— The  Right  Bank  of  the 
Chickahominy — Orders,  Despatches,  etc. — Junction  of  Forces 
effected — the  movement  to  James  River — Letter  to  Secretary 
Stanton — Battle  of  Allen's  Farm — Battle  of  Savage's  Station 

17 


M111715 


18  CONTENTS. 

PAGS 

— Battle  of  Nelson's  Farm  or  Glendale— General  McCall's  Re 
port  of  it — Other  Reports  and  Despatches — Battle  of  Malvern 

Hill,  etc.,  with  the  Official  Reports 75 

His  Address  to  the  Arrny,  July  4th,  1862,  at  Harrison's  Landing Id  I 

Letter  to  the  President  from  Harrison's  Landing,  with  his  replies 102 

General  McClellan  gives  the  President  his  views  on  the  conduct  of 

the  War 105 

Despatches  to  General  Halleck,  with  their  replies 107 

General  McClellan  protests  against  leaving  the  Peninsula — General 

Halleck's  reply 109 

Evacuation  of  Harrison's  Landing 115 

The  Services  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 118 

General   McClellan  at  Alexandria — Despatches  to  General  Halleck, 

and  to  the  President,  with  their  replies 117 

"  Little  Mac"  is  requested  to  use  his  influence  with  the  Army,  and  his 

despatch  to  General  Porter 122 

The  Second  Battle  of  "  Bull  Run" 123 

What  History  will  say  of  General  McClellan 124 

The  end  of  the  Pope  Campaign- — "Little  Mac"  again  in  command.. .   127 

The  Maryland  Campaign 128 

The  Battles  of  Crampton's  Gap  and  South  Mountain — Gen.  McClel- 
lan's  Official  Report,  including  despatches  to  General  Franklin 

and  others,  with  their  replies 130 

The  Battle  of  Antietam — General  McClellan's  Official  Report  of  it...  139 

A  word  about  Antietam 158 

What  the  Rebels  had  expected ICO 

Why  the  Rebel  Army  was  not  pursued — Despatches  to  General  Hal 
leck  in  relation  to  it 163 

General  McClellan  is  ordered  to  cross  the  Potomac 165 

Stuart's  Rebel  Raid — Scarcity  of  Army  Supplies,  Horses,  and  Cloth 
ing — Report  of  Colonel  Ingalls,  Chief  Quartermaster,  on  the 

subject 166 

Correspondence  with  General  Halleck,  and  his  reply !'">£ 

A  convincing  response  to  General  Halleck 170 

General  McClellan  asks  the  General-in-Chief  how  the  Upper  Potomac 
is  to  be  guarded — His  reply  to  it — General  McClellan's  an 
swer — General  Halleck's  reply.... 172 

The  Advance  into  Virginia — Plan  of  the  Campaign — Crosses  the  Po 
tomac,  etc 176 

"  Little  Mac"  is  relieved  from  command,  and  ordered  to  report  at 
Trenton — His  Farewell  Address  to  the  Officers  and  Soldiers 

of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 178 

He  bids  adieu  to  his  Officers  and  Soldiers,  and  leaves  for  Trenton — 
General  McClellan's  Official  Report  to  the  War  Department  of 

the  Army  of  the  Potomac 179 

Ovations  tendered  to  General  McClellan  at  the  North 183 

Rumors  of  his  return  to  command,  and   its  effect  on  the  soldiers  at 

Gettysburg — The  Soldier's  love  for." Little  Mac" 184 

An  impartial  opinion  of  the  services  of  General  McClellan,  written  by 
one  of  the  best  and  most  able  Military  writers  in  the  country 

— His  plans,  Orders,  etc 186 

General  McClellnn's  latest  Speech,  February  18th,  1864,  on  the- occa 
sion  of  the  official  reception  given  by  the  city  of  New  York,  to 
the  veterans  of  the  First  New  York  Cavalry,  on  their  return 
to  that  city  —  Speech  of  Colonel  McReynolds  —  Speech  of 
Major  Hawkins— General  MoClellan  speaks  again,  etc 191 


LIFE  AM)  PUBLIC  SERVICES* . :.;. 

GENERAL  GEORGE  B.  IcCLELLAK 


It  is  difficult  to  write,  satisfactorily,  the  life  of  any 
living  general.  The  task  is  increased  in  the  case  of 
George  B.  McClellan,  because  of  the  diversity  of  opinion 
as  to  his  abilities.  By  some  persons  he  is  considered  the 
greatest  strategist  of  the  age.  By  others  he  is  regarded 
as  unfit  to  command  even  a  hundred  men.  On  two  points, 
however,  nearly  all  are  agreed.  His  capacity  for  organiza 
tion,  his  faculty  for  creating  an  efficient  army,  -few  now 
deny.  The  love  with  which  he  inspires  his  soldiers,  and 
which  seems  to  have  in  it  something  of  personal  magnet 
ism,  is,  to  say  the  least,  remarkable.  We  shall  endeavor 
to  tell  the  story  of  his  life  impartially,  relying  almost  en 
tirely  on  official  documents  for  authority.  Let  us  see 
whether,  with  such  a  purpose  before  us,  we  cannot  unravel 
many  apparent  contradictions. 

HIS  EARLY  LIFE. 

General  McClellan  was  born  in  the  city  of  Philadelphia, 
on  the  third  day  of  December,  1826.  His  father,  Dr. 
George  McClellan,  was  a  distinguished  physician  and 
surgeon,  and  was  for  a  long  time  one  of  the  Professors 
in  the  Jefferson  Medical  College  in  that  city.  The  son, 
for  a  brief  period,  was  a  student  at  the  University  of  Penn- 
gylvania,  which  venerable  institution  he  left  at  the  age 
of  sixteen,  to  enter  West  Point.  He  graduated  in  1846, 
second  in  his  class,  and  July  first,  of  that  year,  entered  the 
army  as  Brevet  Second-Lieutenant  of  Engineers. 

19 


20  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 


KIS  SE-HVJCES  IN  MEXICO. 


*Me  «yfeaA* Ordered  t&  /Mexico  immediately  thereafter, 
where,  as  Lieutenant*  'of  "Sappers,  Miners  and  Pontoniers, 
he  performed  valuable  service,  and  for  the  first  time  \yas 
afforded  the  opportunity  of  displaying  upon  the  field  of 
battle  those  military  talents  which  have  since  made  him 
so  esteemed.  For  gallantry  at  Yera  Cruz,  where  he  was 
attached  to  General  Worth's  Division,  he  was  highly  com 
mended  in  official  reports ;  at  Cerro  Gordo,  and  the  city 
of  Mexico,  he  was  connected  with  General  Twiggs's 
Division,  and  was  specially  commended  for  gallant  con 
duct  ;  at  Contreras  and  Cherubusco  he  won  the  brevet  of 
First-Lieutenant,  and  at  Molino  del  Key  was  offered  the 
additional  brevet  of  Captain,  which  he  declined.  The  offer, 
however,  being  subsequently  tendered  for  "  gallant  and 
meritorious  conduct  at  Chepultepec,"  was  accepted,  and 
in  May,  1848,  he  assumed  command  of  the  company,  in 
which  he  had  previously  been  a  subordinate  officer. 

Among  other  incidents  which  occurred  during  his 
service  in  Mexico  is  one  which  created  no  little  amuse 
ment  at  the  time.  When  about  twelve  miles  from  Puebla, 
the  young  Lieutenant  was  out  reconnoitering  unattended, 
when  he  observed  a  tall  Engineer  officer  of  the  Mexican 
army  near  by.  The  discovery  was,  however,  not  made  a 
moment  too  soon,  as  the  Mexican  had  espied  the  Lieu 
tenant  and  was  advancing  towards  him.  A  mutual 
demand  for  surrender  was  made,  and  a  hand-to-hand 
scuffle  commenced,  resulting  in  McClellan  collaring  his 
more  gigantic  opponent,  and  taking  him  into  camp. 

HIS   SUBSEQUENT   MILITARY   CAREER. 

After  the  declaration  of  peace,  he  was  ordered  to  West 
Point  as  director  of  field  labors  and  instructor  of  the 
bavonet  exercise.  While  thus  employed  at  the  Academy, 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN.  21 

he  translated  from  the  French  a  "  Manual  of  Bayonet  Ex 
ercise,"  which  became  the  text-book  of  the  service.  In 
1851  he  was  ordered  to  Fort  Delaware  to  superintend  its 
construction,  and  the  following  year  he  accompanied  Capt. 
R,  B.  Marcy  (now  his  father-in-law)  on  an  expedition  to 
explore  the  Red  river.  In  September  of  the  same  year 
he  was  assigned  to  accompany  General  Persifer  F.  Smith 
to  Texas,  as  Senior  Engineer  to  survey  the  rivers  and  har 
bors  of  that  State.  In  the  following  spring  he  was  ordered 
to  report  to  Governor  Isaac  I.  Stevens,  of  Washington 
Territory,  who  had  been  placed  in  charge  of  the  survey  of 
a  Northern  route  for  a  railroad  to  the  Pacific,  and  was 
subsequently  detailed  by  that  officer  for  the  examination 
of  the  Western  part  of  the  proposed  line.  Starting  from 
Steilacoom,  he  explored  the  Yakima  pass  and  other  por 
tions  of  the  Cascade  range,  and  the  most  direct  route  to 
Puget  Sound,  and  the  report  of  his  observations,  written 
in  a  highly  interesting  style,  formed  the  first  volume  of 
the  "Pacific  Railroad  Surveys."  He  was  subsequently 
complimented  by  the  Secretary  of  War  for  the  superior 
manner  in  which  he  had  performed  the  important  duty. 

IMPORTANT  MISSIONS    ENTRUSTED    TO    KIM. 

Soon  afterwards  he  was  detailed  to  visit  the  principal 
lines  of  railway  in  the  United  States,  and  to  thoroughly 
investigate  the  railroad  system  of  the  country,  with  a  view 
of  obtaining  such  information  relative  to  construction, 
equipment  and  management  as  might  be  of  service  in  the 
successful  operation  of  the  Pacific  railroad.  A  full  report 
of  his  investigations  was  published  in  November,  1854. 

A  secret  mission  to  the  West  Indies  was  the  next  im 
portant  duty  entrusted  to  him  by  the  Government.  Leaving 
the  United  States  in  the  frigate  Columbia,  he  proceeded 
to  San  Domingo,  and  from  there  to  some  of  the  other 
islands,  returning  with  a  vas:  amount  of  information  im 
portant  at  the  time  to  the  administration,  and  a  large 


22  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN. 

number  of  maps  and   sketches -of  the  country  he  had 

visited. 

IS  SENT  TO  EUROPE— REPORT  OP  HIS  OBSER 
VATIONS  IN  THE  CRIMEA. 

In  July,  1853,  he  was  commissioned  as  First  Lieutenant, 
and  in  March,  1855,  he  was  promoted  to  a  Captaincy  in, 
the  First  Cavalry.  One  year  later,  he  was  sent  to  Europe 
with  Majors  Delafield  and  Mordecai,  to  observe  the  opera 
tions  in  the  Crimea,  and  to  study  the  organization  of  tho 
opposing  armies. 

The  report  of  his  observations  was  printed  by  order  of 
Congress,  and  subsequently  republished  in  Philadelphia. 
It  is  full  and  complete,  and  will  be  found  invaluable  to 
officers  of  the  army.  Although  the  youngest  officer  of  the 
commission,  his  labor  in  preparing  a  statement  of  what 
he  had  seen  and  heard  in  military  circles  and  in  the  scenes 
of  strife,  was  by  no  means  less  arduous  than  that  of  his 
companions.  Although  more  attention  was  probably  paid 
to  the  Engineer  and  Cavalry  branches  of  the  service,  the 
military  student  of  the  other  departments  can  find  a  vast 
amount  of  interesting  and  instructive  matter  within  its 
pages.  He  may  not  have  been  able,  from  circumstances 
over  which  he  had  no  control,  to  practically  carry  out, 
during  the  present  rebellion,  much  of  what  he  recom 
mends  theoretically  in  this  voluminous  work,  but  that  does 
not  detract  in  the  least  from  the  merits  of  his  suggestions. 

RESIGNS    THE   SERVICE    AND   BECOMES    A 
RAILROAD  PRESIDENT. 

On  the  sixteenth  of  January,  1857,  he  resigned  from  the 
Army,  and  removing  to  Chicago,  filled  for  three  years  the 
responsible  position  of  Vice-President  and  Engineer  of  the 
Illinois  Central  railroad,  at  the  end  of  which  time  he 
resigned  and  became  General  Superintendent  of  the  Ohio 
and  Mississippi  railroad,  and,  two  months  later,  President 


LIFE   OP   MAJOR-GENERAL    McCLELLAN.  23 

of  the  Eastern  Division  of  the  same  road,  with  his  resi 
dence  at  Cincinnati,  and  with  a  salary  of  ten  thousand 
dollars  a  year — a  post  he  held  and  an  income  he  enjoyed 
when  the  rebellion  commenced. 

"LITTLE  MAC"  APPOINTED  MAJOR-GENERAL. 

With  the  patriotic  motive  and  unselfish  nature  which 
have  always  actuated  him,  he  immediately  offered  his  ser 
vices  in  whatever  capacity  he  might  be  useful.  Governor 
Curtin  expressed  his  desire  to  have  him  command  the 
troops  organized  in  Pennsylvania  for  active  service,  but 
before  the  unanimous  sentiment  of  the  authorities  and  the 
people  of  the  Keystone  State  could  be  gratified,  General 
McClellan  received  a  commission  as  Major-General  from 
the  Governor  of  Ohio,  and  proceeded  to  organize  the  nine 
months'  troops  from  that  State. 

ASSUMES    COMMAND    OF    THE    DEPARTMENT 
OP    THE    OHIO. 

On  the  tenth  of  May,  1861,  the  States  of  Ohio,  Indiana 
and  Illinois  were  formed  into  a  Department,  to  be  known 
as  the  "  Department  of  the  Ohio,"  and  "  Major-General 
McClellan,  Ohio  Volunteers,"  was  assigned  to  the  com 
mand,  with  his  head-quarters  at  Cincinnati.  Four  days 
later  he  was  appointed  Major-General  in  the  regular  army. 

On  the  twenty-sixth  of  the  same  month,  he  received 
information  that  two  bridges  on  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
railroad,  near  Farmington,  had  been  burned,  and  that 
others  were  threatened.  The  intelligence  'induced  the 
General,  who  had  been  making  arrangements  to  move  on 
Grafton,  to  hasten  his  movements  ;  and  returning  to  Cin 
cinnati,  he  directed  one  column  of  his  command  to  move 
from  Wheeling  and  Bellaire,  and  another  from  Marietta  on 
Parkersburg.  Simultaneously  with  the  advance,  the  fol 
lowing  proclamation  to  the  people  of  Western  Virginia, 
and  address  to  his  troops,  were  issued : 


24:  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN. 

"  To  THE  PEOPLE  OF  WESTERN  VIRGINIA. 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  OHIO, 

"  CINCINNATI,  Hay  26M,  1861. 
" To  the  Union  Men  of  'Western  Virginia: 

"VIRGINIANS  :• — The  General  Government  has  long  endured  the 
machinations  of  a  few  fractious  rebels  in  your  riiidst.  Armed 
traitors  have  in  vain  endeavored  to  deter  you  from  expressing1 
your  loyalty  at  the  polls  ;  having  failed  in  this  infamous  attempt 
to  deprive  you  of  the  exercise  of  your  dearest  rights,  they  now 
seek  to  inaugurate  a  reign  of  terror,  and  thus  force  you  to  yield 
to  their  schemes,  and  submit  to  the  yoke  of  the  traitorous  con 
spiracy,  dignified  by  the  name  of  Southern  Confederacy.  They 
are  destroying  the  property  of  citizens  of' your  State,  and  ruin 
ing  your  magnificent  railways.  The  General  Government  has 
heretofore  carefully  abstained  from  sending  troops  across  the 
Ohio,  or  even  from  posting  them  along  its  banks,  although  fre 
quently  urged  by  many  of  your  prominent  citizens  to  do  so.  It 
determined  to  await  the  result  of  the  late  election,  desirous  that 
no  one  might  be  able  to  say  that  the  slightest  effort  had  been 
made  from  this  side  to  influence  the  free  expression  of  your 
opinion,  although  the  many  agencies  brought  to  bear  upon  you 
by  the  rebels  were  well  known.  You  have  now  shown,  under 
the  most  adverse  circumstances,  that  the  great  mass  of  the  peo 
ple  of  Western  Virginia  are  true  and  loyal  to  that  beneficent 
Government  under  which  we  and  our  fathers  have  lived  so  long. 
As  soon  as  the  result  of  the  election  was  known,  the  traitors  com 
menced  their  work  of  destruction.  The  General  Government 
cannot  close  its  ears  to  the  demands  you  have  made  for  assist 
ance.  I  have  ordered  troops  to  cross  the  river.  They  come  as 
your  friends  and  your  brothers — as  enemies  only  to  the  armed 
rebels  who  are  preying  upon  you.  Your  homes,  your  families, 
and  your  property  are  safe  under  our  protection.  All  your  rights 
shall  be  religiously  respected. 

"  Notwithstanding  all  that  has  been  said  by  the  traitors  to  in 
duce  you  to  believe  that  our  advent  among  you  will  be  signalized 
by  interference  with  your  slaves,  understand  one  thing  clearly — • 
not  only  will  .we  abstain  from  all  such  interference,  but  we  will, 
on  the  contrary,  with  an  iron  hand,  crush  any  attempt  at  insur 
rection  on  their  part.  Now,  that  we  are  in  your  midst,  I  call 
upon  you  to  fly  to  arms  and  support  the  General  Government. 
Sever  the  connection  that  binds  you  to  traitors ;  proclaim  to  the 
world  that  the  faith  and  loyalty  so  long  boasted  by  the  Old  Do 
minion,  are  still  preserved  in  Western  Virginia,  and  that  you 
remain  true  to  the  Stars  and  Stripes. 

"GEORGE  B.   McCLELLAN, 

"Major-General  Oommlinding" 


LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN.  £6 

"ADDRESS  TO  THE  VOLUNTEER  ARMY. 

"HEAD-QUARTERS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  OHIO, 
"  CINCINNATI,  May  26th,  1861. 

"  SOLDIERS  : — You  are  ordered  to  cross  the  frontier  and  enter 
upon  the  soil  of  Virginia.  Your  mission  is  to  restore  peace  and 
confidence,  to  protect  the  majesty  of  the  law,  and  to  rescue  our 
brethren  from  the  p-rasp  of  armed  traitors.  You  are  to  act  in 
concert  with  the  Virginia  troops  and  to  support  their  advance 

'•  1  place  under  the  safeguard  of  your  honor  the  persons  and 
property  of  the  Virginians.  I  know  that  you  will  respect  their 
feelings  and  all  their  rights.  Preserve  the  strictest  discipline  ; 
remember  that  each  one  of  you  holds  in  his  keeping  the  honor 
of  Ohio  and  of  the  Union. 

"  If  you  are  called  upon  to  overcome  armed  opposition,  I  know 
that  your  courage  is  equal  to  the  task ;  but  remember  that  your 
only  foes  are  the  armed  traitors, — and  show  mercy  even  to  them 
when  they  are  in  your  power,  for  many  of  them  are  misguided. 
When,  under  your  protection,  the  loyal  men  of  Western  Vir 
ginia  have  been  enabled  to  organize  and  arm,  they  can  protect 
themselves,  and  you  can  then  return  to  your  homes,  with  the 
proud  satisfaction  of  having  preserved  a  gallant  people  from  de- 
Btructiou.  "  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

" Major-  General  Commanding." 

THE  FIGHT  AT  PHILIPPI. 

On  the  thirtieth  of  May,  Colonel  B.  F.  Kelley's  com 
mand  occupied  Grafton,  the  rebels  evacuating  the  town 
without  firing  a  gun.  On  the  second  of  June,  a  large 
Union  force  left  Grafton,  and  at  an  early  hour  on  the  fol 
lowing  morning  approached  Philippi.  At  five  o'clock 
they  encountered  the  enemy,  who  had  advanced  to  meet 
them  ;  but  after  a  short  and  sharp  engagement,  the  rebels 
fled  in  the  wildest  disorder.  In  the  fight  Colonel  Kelley 
was  badly  wounded.  On  the  twelfth  of  June  a  resolution 
was  unanimously  adopted  by  the  Western  Virginia  Con 
vention,  thanking  General  McClellan  for  sending  troops 
to  Western  Virginia;  commending  the  gallant  troops  at 
Philippi,  and  complimenting  Colonel  Kelley's  bravery. 

HE  TAKES  THE  FIELD  IN  PERSON. 

On  the  eighteenth  of  June,  the  "  Young  Napoleon"  left 
Cincinnati  to  take  personal  command  of  his  troops  in  the 


9g  LIFE    OF    MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

field,  a  change  which  had  been  ardently  desired  by  the  officers 
and  men,  and  urged  by  the  loyal  citizens  of  the  section  in 
which  the  military  operations  had  been  progressing.  His 
arrival  upon  the  field  was  the  signal  for  renewed  activity, 
and  on  all  sides  could  be  heard  the  note  of  preparation 
for  the  important  campaign  which  the  able  and  energetic 
commander  had  planned  for  immediate  prosecution. 

ASSUMES  COMMAND  IN  WESTERN  VIRGINIA. 

On  the  twentieth  of  June,  1861,  General  McClellau 
assumed  command  of  the  Union  forces  in  Western  Vir 
ginia,  and  made  immediate  arrangements  to  increase  his 
command  to  a  numerical  strength  equal  to  the  emergency. 
His  extended  fame  and  personal  popularity  soon  accom 
plished  the  desired  object.  On  the  twenty-third,  he  issued 
from  his  head-quarters  at  Grafton  the  following  procla 
mations  : 

"HEAD-QUARTERS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  OHIO, 
"GRAFTON,  (VA.,)  June  23d,  1861, 

11  To  the  Inhabitants  of  Western  Virginia: 

"  The  army  of  this  department,  headed  by  Virginia  troops,  ia 
rapidly  occupying1  all  Western  Virginia.  This  is  done  in  co 
operation  with  and  in  support  of  such  civil  authorities  of  the 
State  as  are  faithful  to  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United 
States.  The  proclamation  issued  by  me,  under  date  of  May  '26th, 
1861,  will  be  strictly  maintained.;  Your  houses,  families,  prop 
erty,  and  all  your  rights  will  be  religiously  respected.  We  are 
enemies  to  none  but  armed  rebels,  and  those  voluntarily  giving 
t4'«em  aid.  All  officers  of  this  army  will  be  held  responsible  for 
the  most  prompt  and  vigorous  action  in  repressing  disorder  and 
f,unishing  aggression  by  those  under  their  command. 

"  To  my  great  regret  I  find  that  the  enemies  of  the  United 
States  continue  .to  carry  on  a  system  of  hostilities  prohibited  by 
the  laws  of  war  among  belligerent  nations,  and  of  course  far 
more  wicked  and  intolerable  when  directed  against  loyal  citizens 
engaged  in  the  defence  of  the  common  Government  of  all.  In 
dividuals  and  marauding  parties  are  pursuing  a  guerilla  warfare, 
tiring  upon  sentinels  and  pickets,  burning  bridges,  insulting  and 
even  killing  citizens  because  of  their  Union  sentiments,  and 
committing  many  kindred  acts. 

"  1  do  now,  therefore,  make  proclamation,  and  warn  all  per- 


LIFE   OF  MAJOR  GENERAL   McCLELLAff.  27 

sons,  that  individuals  or  parties  engaged  in  this  species  of 
warfare,  irregular  in  every  view  that  can  be  taken  of  it,  thus 
attacking  sentries,  pickets,  or  other  soldiers,  destroying  public 
or  private  property,  or  committing  injuries  against  any  of  the 
inhabitants  because  of  Union  sentiments  or  conduct,  will  be 
dealt  with  in  their  persons  and  property  according  to  the 
severest  rules  of  military  law. 

•'  All  persons  giving  information  or  aid  to  the  public  enemies 
will  be  arrested  and  kept  in  close  custody;  and  all  persons  found 
oearing  arms,  unless  of  known  loyalty,  will  be  arrested  and  held 
for  examination.  "  GEORGE  B.  McCLKLLAK, 

"Major-General,  U.  S.  A.,  Commanding  Department." 

"To  the  Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  West  : 

"You  are  here  to  support  the  Government  of  your  country, 
and  to  protect  the  lives  and  liberties  of  your  brethren,  threat 
ened  by  a  rebellious  and  traitorous  foe.  No  higher  or  nobler 
duty  could  devolve  on  you,  and  1  expect  you  to  bring  to  it3 
performance  the  highest  and  noblest  qualities  of  soldiers,  dis 
cipline,  courage,  and  mercy. 

"  I  call  upon  the  officers  of  every  grade  to  enforce  the  highest 
discipline,  and  I  know  that  those  of  all  grades,  privates  and  of 
ficers,  will  display  in  battle  cool  heroic  courage,  and  will  know 
Low  to  show  mercy  to  a  disarmed  enemy.  Bear  in  mind  that 
you  are  in  the  country  of  friends,  not  of  enemies — that  you  are 
here  to  protect,  not  to  destroy.  Take  nothing,  destroy  nothing, 
unless  you  are  ordered  to  do  so  by  your  general  officers.  Re 
member  that  I  have  pledged  my  word  to  the  people  of  Western 
Virginia  that  their  rights  in  person  and  property  shall  be  re 
spected.  I  ask  every  one  of  you  to  make  good  this  promise  in 
its  broadest  sense. 

"  We  have  come  here  to  save,  not  to  upturn.  I  do  not  appeal 
to  the  fear  of  punishment,  but  to  your  appreciation  of  the 
sacredness  of  the  cause  in  which  we  are  engaged.  Carry  into 
battle  the  conviction  that  you  are  right  and  that  God  is  on  our 
side.  Your  enemies  have  violated  every  moral  law  ;  neither 
God  nor  man  can  sustain  them.  They  have  without  cause  re 
belled  against  a  mild  and  paterntil  Government ;  they  have 
seized  upon  public  and  private  property  ;  they  have  outraged 
the  persons  of  Northern  men,  merely  because  they  came  from 
the  North,  and  of  Southern  Union  men.  merely  because  they 
loved  the  Union  ;  they  have  placed  themselves  beneath  con 
tempt  unless  they  can  retrieve  some  honor  on  the  field  of  battle. 

"  You  will  pursue  a  different  course  ;  you  will  be  honest,  brave, 
and  merciful ;  you  will  respect  the  right  of  private  opinion  ;  you 
will  punish  no  man  for  opinion's  sake.  Show  to  the  world  that 
you  differ  from  our  enemies  in  these  points  of  honor,  honesty, 
and  respect  for  private  opinion,  and  that  we  inaugurate  110  reign 
of  terror  wherever  we  go. 


28  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

"  Soldiers,  I  have  heard  that  there  was  danger  here.  I  have 
come  to  place  myself  at  your  head  and  share  it  with  you.  I 
fear  now  but  one  thing,  that  you  will  not  find  foemen  worthy  of 
your  steel.  I  know  that  I  can  rely  upon  you. 

"GEORGK  B.  MCCLELLAV, 
" Major-  General  Commanding.'11 

THE  BATTLE  OP  HIGH  MOUNTAIN-DESTROYS 
THE  REBEL  ARMY. 

On  the  eleventh  of  July  was  fought  the  battle  of  Rich 
Mountain,  a  gap  in  the  Laurel  Hill  range,  where  the 
Staunton  and  Weston  turnpike  crosses  it  between  Buck- 
hannon  and  Beverly,  and  about  two  miles  east  of  Roaring 
Run.  The  enemy,  numbering  about  two  thousand  men 
under  Colonel  Pegram,  were  strongly  intrenched,  a  por 
tion  of  the  works  being  surrounded  by  dense  woods.  At 
an  early  hour  of  the  morning  the  General  commanding 
sent  General  Rosecrans,  with  his  brigade,  along  the  sum 
mit  of  the  eminence  with  a  view  of  surrounding  the 
enemy.  After  a  long  and  tedious  march  the  intrench- 
ments  were  reached,  and  after  a  short  engagement  a 
charge  was  made  and  the  works  carried,  the  rebels  fleeing 
in  the  greatest  confusion,  leaving  all  their  guns,  camp 
equipage  and  several  prisoners.  The  same  night  Pegrani 
withdrew  from  a  position  he  had  taken  near  Beverly, 
leaving  behind  him  six  guns,  a  large  number  of  horses, 
wagons  and  his  camp  equipage,  but  finding  that  the  gal 
lant  Union  commander  was  following  him  closely,  his  men 
flushed  with  victory,  he  on  the  morning  of  the  twelfth 
Sent  a  flag  of  truce  announcing  his  desire  to  surrender  his 
men  and  himself  as  prisoners  of  war.  The  request  was 
worded  in  the  following  language  : 

'NEAR  TYG ART'S  VALLEY  RIVER,  six  MILES 
"FROM  BEVERLY,  July  llth,  1861. 

"  To  Commanding  Officer  of  Northern  Forces,  Beverly,  Va.  : 

11  SIR  :  I  write  to  state  to  you  that  I  have,  in  consequence  of 
the  retreat  of  General  Garnett,  and  the  jaded  and  reduced 
condition  )f  my  comrnaui,  most  of  them  having  been  without 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR- GENERAL   M,<7LELLAff.  29 


food  for  two  days,  concluded,  with  the  concurrence  of  a  majority 
of  my  captains  and  field  officers,  to  surrender  my  command  to 
you  to-morrow,  as  prisoners  of  war.  I  have  only  to  add,  I 
trust  they  will  only  receive  at  your  hands  such  treatment  as 
has  been  invariably  shown  to  the  Northern  prisoners  by  the 
Soath.  "  I  am,  sir,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  JOHN  PEGRAM, 
"Lieutenant- Colonel  P.  A.  C.  S.,  Commanding." 

To  this  General  McClellan  replied  as  follows  : 

"HEAD-QUARTERS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  OHIO, 
"  BEVERLY,  Va.,  July  I3th,  1861. 

"  JOHN  PEGRAM,  ESQ.,  styling  himself  Lieutenant- Colonel, 

"P.  A.  C.  S.: 

"  SIR  :  Your  communication  dated  yesterday,  proposing  the 
surrender  as  prisoners  of  war  of  the  force  assembled  under  your 
command,  has  been  delivered  to  me.  As  commander  of  this  de 
partment,  I  will  receive  you  and  them  with  the  kindness  due 
to  prisoners  of  war,  but  it  is  not  in  my  power  to  relieve  you  or 
them  from  any  liabilities  incurred  by  taking  arms  against  the 
United  States. 
^  I  ana,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 
" Major-General  U.S.A.,  Commanding  Department" 

General  McClellan  then  sent  to  General  Scott  the 
following  report : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  BEVERLY,  Va.,  July  13&,  1861. 
"  COL.  E.  D.  TOWNSEND,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

"  I  have  received  from  Col.  Pegram  propositions  for  the  sur 
render,  with  his  officers  and  remnant  of  his  command — say  six 
hundred  men.  They  are  said  to  be  extremelv  penitent,  and  de 
termined  never  again  to  take  up  arms  against  the  General 
Government.  I  shall  have  near  nine  hundred  or  one  thousand 
prisoners  to  take  care  of  when  Col.  Pegram  comes  in.  The 
latest  accounts  make  the  loss  of  the  rebels  in  killed  some  one 
hundred  and  fifty.  "  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

"Major-General  Department  of  Ohio. 

Colonel  Pegram,  finding  it  impossible  to  elude  the  vigi 
lance  of  his  opponent,  and  to  extricate  himself  from  his 
position,  acceded  to  the  terms  of  surrender,  and  with  hi\ 
entire  force,  having  been  disarmed,  was  sent  to  Beverly. 
Among  the  prisoners  was  a  company  of  students,  with  a 


30  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

Professor  from  Hampden  Sidney  College.  On  the  four 
teenth,  General  Morris  overtook  at  Carrick's  Ford,  the 
rebel  forces  under  General  Robert  S.  Garnett,  who  were 
retreating  from  Laurel  Hill,  and  after  a  severe  fight 
routed  them  and  killed  their  commander,  who  was  shot  iu 
the  spine  while  rallying  his  men.  General  McClellan's 
official  despatches  give  the  following  brief  history  of  this 
important  campaign,  which,  by  the  complete  destruction 
of  the  rebel  army  in  Western  Virginia,  relieved  the  suffer 
ing  Union  people  of  that  section  from  the  presence  of 
the  implacable  rebels,  who  had  devastated  their  property 
and  slaughtered  at  will  the  defenceless  objects  of  their 
enmity : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  OHIO, 

"RICH  MOUNTAIN,  Va.,  9  A.M.,  July  12th,  1861. 

"  COL.  E.  D.  TOWNSEND  :  We  are  in  possession  of  all  the 
enemy's  works  up  to  a  point  in  the  right  of  Beverly.  I  have 
taken  all  his  guns,  a  very  large  amount  of  wagons,  tents,  etc. — 
every  thing  he  had — a  large  number  of  prisoners,  many  of 
whom  were  wounded,  and  several  officers  prisoners.  They  lost 
many  killed.  We  have  lost,  in  all,  perhaps  twenty  killed  and 
fifty  wounded,  of  whom  all  but  two  or  three  were  in  the  column 
under  Rosecrans,  which  turned  the  position.  The  mass  of  the 
enemy  escaped  through  the  woods,  entirely  disorganized, 
Among  the  prisoners  is  Dr.  Taylor,  formerly  of  the  army.  Col. 
Pegram  was  in  command. 

"  Col.  Rosecrans's  column  left  camp  yesterday  morning,  and 
marched  some  eight  miles  through  the  mountains,  reaching  the 
turnpike  some  two  or  three  miles  in  rear  of  the  enemy,  defeat 
ing  an  advanced  post,  and  taking  a  couple  of  guns.  I  had 
a  position  ready  for  twelve  guns  near  the  main  camp,  and  as 
puns  were  moving  up,  I  ascertained  that  the  enemy  had  re 
treated.  I  am  now  pushing  on  to  Beverly,  a  part  of  Colonel 
Rosecrans's  troops  being  now  within  three  miles  of  it. 

"  Our  success  is  complete,  and  almost  bloodless.  I  doubt 
whether  Wise  and  Johnson  will  unite  and  overpower  me.  The 
behavior  of  the  troops  iu  the  action  and  toward  the  prisoners 
\vasadmirable  "(JKORGE  B.  MC(JLKLLAN, 

"Major- General  Comrnan ding" 

"  BEVERLY,  July  12th,  1861. 
"Cou  E.  D.  TOWNSEND,  Washingfon,  D.  C.: 

"  The  success  of  to-day  is  all  that  I  could  desire.     We  cap- 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  3| 

tured  six  brass  cannons,  of  which  one  is  rifled,  all  the  enemy'a 
camp  equipage  and  transportation,  even  to  his  cups.  The 
number  of  tents  will  probably,  reach  two  hundred,  and  more 
than  sixty  wagons.  Their  killed  and  wounded  will  amount  to 
fully  one  hundred  and  fifty,  with  one  hundred  prisoners,  and 
more  coming  in  constantly.  I  know  already  of  ten  officers 
killed  and  prisoners.  Their  retreat  is  complete. 

"  I  occupied  Beverly  by  a  rapid  march.  Garuett  abandoned 
his  camp  early  in  the  morning,  leaving  much  of  his  equipage. 
'He  came  within  a  few  miles  of  Beverly,  but  our  rapid  march 
turned  him  back  in  great  confusion,  and  he  is  now  retreating  on 
the  road  to  St.  George.  I  have  ordered  General  Morris  to  fol- 
Icw  him  up  closely. 

"  I  have  telegraphed  for  the  two  Pennsylvania  regiments  at 
Cumberland  to  join  General  Hill  at  Rowlesburg.  The  General 
is  concentrating  all  his  troops  at  Rowlesburg,  and  he  will  cut 
off  Garnett's  retreat  near  West  Union,  or,  if  possible,  at  St. 
George. 

"  I  may  say  that  we  have  driven  out  some  ten  thousand 
troops,  strongly  intrenched,  with  the  loss  of  eleven  killed  and 
thirty-five  wounded.  The  provision  returns  here  show  Garnett'a 
force  to  have  been  ten  thousand  men.  They  were  Eastern  Vir 
ginians,  Tennesseeans,  Georgians,  and,  I  think,  Carolinians. 
To-morrow  I  can  give  full  details,  as  to  prisoners,  etc. 

"  I  trust  that  General  Cox  has,  by  this  time,  driven  Wise  out 
of  the  Kanawha  Valley.  In  that  case,  I  shall  have  accom 
plished  the  object  of  liberating  Western  Virginia. 

'*!  hope  the  General-in-Chief  will  approve  of  my  operations. 

"  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 
"Major -General  Coiridg  the  Dep.  of  Ohio." 

GENERAL  McCLELLAN'S  REPORT. 

"  HUNTONSVILLE,  VA.,  July  14£7i,  1861. 
"CoL.  E.  D.  TOWNSEND,  Assistant  Adjutant-General : 

"  General  Garnett  and  his  forces  have  been  routed  and  his 
baggage  and  one  gun  taken.  His  army  is  completely  demoral 
ized.  General  Garnett  was  killed  while  attempting  to  rally  his 
forces  at  Carrackford,  near  St.  George. 

"  We  have  completely  annihilated  the  enemy  in  Western 
Virginia. 

"Our  loss  is  but  thirteen  killed  and  not  more  than  forty 
wounded,  while  the  enemy's  loss  is  not  far  from  two  hundred 
killed,  and  the  number  of  prisoners  we  have  taken  will  amount 
to  at  least  one  thousand.  We  have  captured  seven  of  the 
enemy's  guns  in  all. 

"  A  portion  of  Garnett's  forces  retreated,  but  T  look  for  their 
capture  by  General  Hill,  who  is  in  hot  pursuit. 
2 


32  LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN. 

"  The  troops  that  Garnett  had  under  his  command  are  said  to 
be  the  crack  regiments  of  Eastern  Virginia,  aided  by  Georgians, 
Tennesseeans,  and  Carolinians. 

"  Our  success  is  complete,  and  I  firmly  believe  that  secession 
is  killed  in  this  section  of  the  country. 

"  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN. 
*'  Major- General  U.  8.  A." 

The  victories  thus  accomplished  were  not  unappreciated 
by  the  millions  of  freemen,  who  had  anxiously  awaited 
•ftidings  from  the  department  over  which  the  young 
patriot  had  taken  command.  They  knew  his  ability  and 
prophesied  success.  They  were  not  disappointed,  and 
from  Maine  to  the  Mississippi,  peans  of  praise  were  sung 
to  the  conqueror,  while  the  States  upon  the  Pacific  coast 
joined  in  the  chorus.  Congress  unanimously  adopted  a 
joint  resolution  thanking  him  with  his  officers  and  soldiers 
for  the  victories,  and  the  press  was  loud  in  its  eulogy. 
Thousands  of  extracts  might  be  given  from  the  news 
papers  of  the  day,  to  prove  the  unanimous  sentiment  that 
prevailed,  but  one  will  be  sufficient.  The  Louisville 
Journal  remarked  : 

"  It  is  a  finished  piece  of  work.  It  stands  before  us  perfect 
and  entire,  wanting  nothing;  like  a  statue  or  picture  just  leav 
ing  the  creative  hand  of  the  artist,  and  embodying  his  whole 
idea.  McClellan  set  out  to  accomplish  a  certain  definite  object. 
With  that  precise  object  in  view  he  gathers  his  forces  and  plans 
his  campaign.  Onward  he  moves,  and  neither  wood,  mountain, 
nor  stream  checks  his  march.  He  presses  forward  from  skirmish 
to  skirmish,  but  nothing  decoys  or  diverts  or  forces  him  from 
the  trail  of  the  enemy.  Outpost  after  outpost,  camp  after 
camp,  gives  way;  thx?  main  body  falls  hack,  and  is  at  last  put 
to  an  ignominious  and  disgraceful  retreat.  ITe  remains  master 
of  the  field,  and  reports  that  he  has  accomplished  his  mission. 
There  is  something  extremely  satisfactory  in  contemplating 
what  might  be  called  a  piece  of  finished  military  workmanship 
by  a  master  hnnd.  It  is  one  thing  done.  It  is,  besides,  a  poetic 
retribution,  for  it  commemorates  the  quarter  day  after  the 
bombardment  of  Sumter. 

"Thus  shall  we  go  on  from  one  step  to  another.  Easters 
Virginia  will  next  be  McClellanized  in  the  same  finished  style. 
The  triumphant  columns  of  the  Grand  Army  of  the  United 


LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GEXERAL   McCLELLAN.  33 

States  will  soon  begin  to  move  Southward  from  North  East, 
and  West,  headed  by  the  old  victor-chief  now  coming  as  the 
conquering  liberator  of  his  native  State.  Then  will  the  pseudo- 
Government  at  Richmond  either  repeat  the  flight  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  Philippi,  Martinsburg,  and  Beverly,  or,  if  it  stands  its 
ground,  fall  as  surely  before  the  concentrating  hosts  of  the  Re 
public  as  if  it  were  meshed  and  crushed  in  the  folds  of  some 
entangling  and  overwhelming  fate." 

On  the  nineteenth  of  July  he  issued  the  following  ad 
dress  to  his  gallant  men  : 

"HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  OCCUPATION,  WESTERN 

"VIRGINIA,  BEVERLY,  VA.,  July  19th,  1861. 
"Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  West: 

"  I  am  more  than  satisfied  with  you.  You  have  annihilated 
two  armies,  commanded  by  educated  and  experienced  soldiers, 
intrenched  in  mountain  fastnesses  and  fortified  at  their  leisure. 
You  have  taken  five  guns,  twelve  colors,  fifteen  hundred  stand 
of  arms,  one  thousand  prisoners,  including  more  than  forty 
officers.  One  of  the  second  commanders  of  the  rebels  is  a 
prisoner,  the  other  lost  his  life  on  the  field  of  battle.  You  have 
killed  more  than  two  hundred  and  fifty  of  the  enemy,  who  has 
lost  all  his  baggage  and  camp  equipage.  All  this  has  been  ac 
complished  with  the  loss  of  twenty  brave  men  killed  and  sixty 
wounded  on  your  part. 

"  You  have  proved  that  Union  men,  fighting  for  the  preserva 
tion  of  our  Government,  are  more  than  a  match  for  our  mis 
guided  and  erring  brothers.  More  than  this,  you  have  shown 
mercy  to  the  vanquished.  You  have  made  long  and  arduous 
marches,  with  insufficient  food,  frequently  exposed  to  the  in 
clemency  of  the  weather.  I  have  not  hesitated  to  demand  this 
of  you,  feeling  that  I  could  rely  on  your  endurance,  patriotism, 
and"  courage.  In  the  future  I  may  have  still  greater  demands 
to  make  upon  you,  still  greater  sacrifices  for  you  to  offer.  It 
shall  be  my  care  to  provide  for  you  to  the  extent  of  my  ability ; 
but  I  know  now  that,  by  your  valor  and  endurance,  you  will 
accomplish  all  that  is  asked. 

'•Soldiers!  I  have  confidence  in  yon,  and  I  trust  you  have 
learned  to  confide  in  me.  Remember  that  discipline  and  sub 
ordination  are  qualities  of  equal  value  with  courage.  I  am 
proud  to  say  that  you  have  gained  the  highest  reward  that 
American  troops  can  receive — the  thanks  of  Congress  and  the 
applause  of  your  fellow-citizens. 

"  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 
"  Major- General." 


34  LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

WASHINGTON  CITY  AFTER  "  BULL  RUN." 

"While  these  events  had  been  transacting  in  Western 
Virginia,  the  battle  of  "  Bull  Run"  had  been  fought  and 
lost  by  the  loyal  army.  The  scene  that  ensued  at  Wash 
ington  City  will  never  be  forgotten  by  those  who  wit 
nessed  it.  On  Sunday  night  the  inhabitants  had  retired 
to  their  beds,  cheered  by  intelligence  from  the  field  that 
a  decisive  victory  was  certain.  They  woke  to  learn  that 
McDowell  had  suffered  a  terrible  defeat.  When  they 
opened  their  windows  to  the  light  they  saw  the  streets 
crowded  with  demoralized  soldiers.  As  the  day  wore  on 
the  first  sentiments  of  alarm  and  terror  were  increased 
instead  of  diminished.  For  hour  after  hour  the  fugitives 
poured  over  the  Long  Bridge,  in  one  continuous  stream, 
increasing,  by  their  haggard  looks  and  their  wild  words, 
the  general  panic.  The  rain  fell  in  torrents.  It  was 
whispered  about  that  the  government  despaired  of  saving 
Washington,  and  that  a  steamer  waited,  with  her  fires  lit, 
to  carry  off  the  President  and  suite.  The  excited  crowds 
that  thronged  the  Avenue  and  swayed  to  and  fro  in  the 
hotels,  caught  up  every  rumor  that  fear  or  treason  set 
afloat.  It  was  said  that  Washington,  in  any  event,  would 
be  captured  within  forty-eight  hours.  Then  the  story  went 
that  the  advancing  enemy  could  be  seen  from  Arling 
ton  Heights ;  that  Baltimore  had  risen  ;  that  communi 
cation  with  the  North  had  been  cut  off;  that  the  gov 
ernment  was  already  seeking  safety  in  flight.  Treason, 
at  first  whispered,  was  soon  talked  openly.  A  reign  of 
general  terror  seemed  impending.  Men  began  to  suspect 
each  other.  No  one  knew  to  whom  to  look  up.  It  was 
felt,  that,  in  this  crisis,  what  was  most  wanted  was  a 
military  leader,  for  General  Scott,  though  repenting  his 
fatal  acquiescence  in  the  advance  on  Bull  Run,  was  un 
able,  from  physical  infirmity,  to  meet  the  pressing  demands 
of  the  hour.  A  younger  hand  was  needed  at  the  helm. 

At  last,  in  one  of  the  public  rooms,  some  one  suggested 


LIFE   OF   MAJOH-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  35 

McClellan.  The  hint  was  taken  up  by  acclamation.  It 
passed  from  mouth  to  mouth — it  ran  through  the  streets — 
it  flashed  over  the  telegraph  wires,  and  at  once  the  nation 
breathed  freely  again.  When  it  was  announced,  in  the 
great  cities,  that  the  conqueror  of  Western  Virginia  had 
been  called  to  command  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  stocks 
rose  immediately.  The  masses  of  the  people  remembered 
with  enthusiasm,  that  McClellan;  alone  of  all  the  loyal 
generals,  had,  as  yet,  defeated  +he  rebels ;  while  men  of 
more  reflection  saw,  in  the  masterly  strategy  which  had 
won  at  Rich  Mountain  and  at  Beverly,  the  highest  augu 
ries  for  the  future.  It  was  not,  so  went  the  talk  of  the 
hour,  that  he  had  won  these  victories,  but  it  was  the  way 
in  which  he  had  won  them,  that  was  so  encouraging.  He 
had  made  no  parade  of  preparations ;  he  had  dealt  in  no 
vain  boasts  of  crushing  rebellion  at  a  blow  ;  but  he  had 
organized  his  forces,  he  had  matured  his  plans,  he  had 
drawn  his  net  gradually  around  the  foe  :  and  then,  when 
every  thing  was  ready,  he  had  suddenly  thrown  off  his 
appearance  of  inaction,  rushed  in  from  all  quarters  on  the 
enemy,  and  finished  the  work  at  a  stroke.  If  he  could 
only  repeat,  on  a  larger  scale,  the  campaign  of  Philippi, 
the  Republic,  men  said,  could  still  be  saved. 

Simultaneously  with  the  news  of  his  appointment,  the 
North  rose  again,  like  one  man,  as  after  Sumpter.  Some 
of  the  returning  regiments  enlisted  in  a  body.  All  along 
the  great  highways,  far  over  the  prairies  of  the  West,  up 
in  the  mountains  of  New  Hampshire,  by  the  lakes  of  New 
York,  and  on  the  hills  of  Pennsylvania,  the  drum  beat, 
the  old  flag  was  flung  out,  and  men  came  thronging  to  the 
rescue  of  their  country.  In  that  hour  there  was  no  talk 
of  party  :  the  only  cry  was,  "  Stand  by  the  Union."  Every 
heart  beat  with  sterner  resolution  than  before.  While  the 
newly-summoned  general  was  speeding  along,  on  express 
trains,  to  Washington,  the  groat  North  was  rising  to  fol 
low  him,  with  a  noise  like  "  many  thunders." 


3ff  LIFE   OF  MAJOR  GENERAL  McCLELLAN". 

HE  IS  ORDERED  TO  WASHINGTON -ENTHUSI 
ASTIC  RECEPTION  IN  PHILADELPHIA. 

While  at  Beverly  resting,  preparing  for  a  campaign 
in  the  Upper  Kan  a  wh  a  Valley,  he  received  information  of 
the  disaster  at  Bull  Run,  and  later  on  the  same  day,  the 
twenty-first  of  July,  came  an  order  from  Washington 
urging  him  to  move  into  East  Virginia.  It  was  while 
making  arrangements  to  conform  to  the  instructions,  that 
another  despatch  directed  him  to  turn  over  his  command 
to  General  Rosecraris,  and  report  immediately  at  Washing 
ton.  He,  at  once,  issued  an  order  relinquishing  the  com 
mand  of  the  army  of  occupation  of  Western  Virginia, 
and  the  Department  of  Ohio,  and  hastened  to  conform 
to  the  urgent  order  for  his  immediate  presence  at  the 
Capital.  On  the  twenty-fifth  he  reached  Philadelphia, 
and  was  received  at  the  depot  by  an  immense  concourse 
of  persons,  who  escorted  him  to  the  residence  of  a 
relative,  thronging  the  streets,  making  the  air  echo  and 
re-echo  with  their  enthusiastic  cheers.  His  order  to 
report  at  Washington  had  been  caused,  as  we  have 
seen,  by  the  unanimous  call  which  had  been  made  after 
the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  by  the  people  of  the  North 
and  West  for  the  young  hero,  and  it  was  fitting  that  the 
residents  of  the  city  of  his  birth  should  give  him  a  public 
reception  as  he  passed  through  their  midst,  to  assume  the 
duties  of  a  more  exalted  position.  In  response  to  the 
numerous  demands  for  his  presence  on  the  balcony,  he 
came  forward  and  said : 

"My  friends  and  old  townsmen,  I  thank  you  for  your  recep 
tion,  and  might  reply,  if  this  were  not  a  time  for  action  and  not 
for  speech.  Your  applause,  as  T  take  it,  is  intended  for  my 
brave  soldiers  in  AVrestern  Virginia.  I  am  going  to  fulfil  new 
duties,  and  I  trust  that  your  kindness  will  give  me  courage  and 
strength.  Good-bye.'' 


LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  37 

ip 

TAKES  COMMAND   IN   WASHINGTON— HIS 
PLANS. 

On  the  25th  of  July,  the  War  Department  announced  that 
the  "  Department  of  Washington  and  the  Department  of 
Northeastern  Virginia  will  constitute  a  geographical 
division  under  General  McClellan,  United  States  Army, 
head-quarters  Washington."  Five  days  later  he  issued 
the  following  order,  the  provisions  of  which  were  imme 
diately  enforced  by  the  Provost-Marshal,  much  to  the  ad 
vantage  of  the  service : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  DIVISION  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
"WASHINGTON,  July  30th,  18til. 

"  The  General  commanding  the  Division  has,  with  much  re 
gret,  observed  that  large  numbers  of  officers  and  men  stationed 
'u  the  vicinity  of  Washington  are  in  the  habit  of  frequenting 
the  streets  and  hotels  of  the  city.  This  practice  is  eminently 
prejudicial  to  good  order  and  military  discipline,  and  must  at 
once  be  discontinued. 

''The  time  and  services  of  all  persons  connected  with  this 
division  should  be  devoted  to  their  appropriate  duties  with  their 
respective  commands.  It  is  therefore  directed  that  hereafter  no 
officer  or  soldier  be  allowed  to  absent  himself  from  his  camp  and 
visit  Washington,  except  for  the  performance  of  some  public 
duty,  or  the  transaction  of  important  private  business,  for  which 
purposes  written  permits  will  be  given  by  the  commanders  of 
brigades.  The  permit  will  state  the  object  of  the  visit. 
Brigade  commanders  will  be  held  responsible  for  the  strict  exe 
cution  of  this  order. 

"  Col.  Andrew  Porter,  of  the  16th  U.  S.  Infantry,  is  detailed 
for  temporary  duty  as  Provost  Marshal  in  Washington,  and 
will  be  obeyed  and  respected  accordingly.  Col.  Porter  will  re 
port  in  person  at  these  head-quarters  for  instructions. 

"By  command  of  "  Maj.-Geu.  MCCLELLAN. 

"S.  WILLIAMS,  Assistant  Adjutant-General.'" 

On  the  4th  of  August,  1861,  he  laid  before  the  Presi 
dent  his  scheme  of  the  war,  in  which  he  showed  that  our 
best,  if  not  our  only  hope  of  a  speedy  and  lasting  peace 
lay  in  convincing  the  disloyal  populations,  at  the  outset 
of  hostilities,  that  resistance  to  the  Government  must 
prove  impracticable. 


33  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELL4N. 

Virginia  having  been  made  the  battle-field,  it  became 
necessary  to  fight  there  ;  but,  in  order  to  success  in  the 
campaign  against  Virginia,  General  McClellan  pointed  out 
the  importance  of  opening  the  Mississippi,  of  pacifying 
Missouri,  and  of  advancing  through  Kentucky  into  Eastern 
Tennessee,  for  the  purpose  of  assisting  the  Union  men  of 
that  region,  and  of  seizing  the  railway  leading  from  Vne 
Mississippi  to  the  East. 

The  importance  of  availing  ourselves,  as  far  as  possible, 
in  every  case,  of  water  transportation,  was  strongly  urged, 
as  well  as  of  the  naval  diversions  against  the  leading  cities 
of  the  Southern  coast.  The  importance  of  these  points 
was  shown  to  be  much  enhanced  by  the  existence  of  the 
great  railway  system  of  the  South,  which  would  enable 
the  enemy  to  concentrate  rapidly  upon  interior  lines  ;  and 
the  inference  was  drawn,  that  the  operations  of  the  main 
army  ought  to  be  strictly  connected  with  all  subsidiary 
operations,  wherever  undertaken. 

One  of  these  subsidiary  operations,  through  Nebraska 
and  Kansas  into  Western  Texas,  in  connection  with  a 
movement  to  the  same  end  from  the  Pacific  through  Ari 
zona  and  New  Mexico,  was  especially  designated  for  its 
importance  ;  and  it  was  suggested  that  an  intimate  alliance 
with  Mexico  might  be  effected,  which  would  materially 
i'acilitate  the  results  of  such  a  combined  movement. 

To  effect  these  objects,  General  McClellan  estimated 
would  require  an  army  of  about  3QO,000  men.  With  this 
force,  acting  under  the  control  of  a  policy  strictly  protec 
tive  of  private  property,  and  merciful  to  private  soldiers 
taken  in  arms,  he  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  organized 
strength  of  the  rebellion  might  be  overwhelmed,  and  the 
populations  of  the  South  compelled  to  recognize  the  folly 
of  persisting  in  an  attempt  to  resist  the  Government. 

General  McClellan  found  the  army  at  Washington  at 
this  time,  thus  constituted  : 


LIFE  OF  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLlN.  39 

Infantry ." 50,000 

Cavalry 1,000 

Artillery 650 

Total 51,650 

With  nine  imperfect  field-batteries  of  thirty  guus. 

This  force  was  scattered  in  and  around  the  city  with 
no  general  organization.  The  city  was  defended  by  a  few 
insignificant  earthworks,  and  there  was  nothing  to  pre 
vent  its  being  shelled  from  heights  within  easy  range, 
which  could  be  occupied  by  a  hostile  column  almost  with 
out  resistance.  The  morale  of  the  army  was  miserable, 
and  desertions  were  the  general  order  of  the  day. 

Steps  were  at  once  taken  to  restore  order  in  the  city  of 
Washington.  Camps  of  instruction  were  located  and 
filled  with  the  new  levies,  and  fortifications  were  pushed 
forward  under  a  systematic  plan. 

TAKES  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE 
POTOMAC. 

On  the  20th  of  August,  1861,  he  issued  an  order  assum 
ing  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  comprising  the 
troops  serving  in  the  former  Department  of  Washington 
and  Northeastern  Virginia,  in  the  valley  of  the  Shenan- 
doah,  and  in  the  States  of  Maryland  and  Delaware,  and 
announcing  his  staff. 

The. better  organization  of  the  army  was  begun  as  soon 
as  practicable  after  taking  command,  and  on  the  fourth  of 
August,  1861,  the  Brigade  organization  was  effected  ;  on 
the  fifteenth  of  October,  the  Divisions  ;  and  on  the  eighth 
of  March,  1862,  by  order  of  the  President,  the  Army  Corps. 

Early  in  October,  1861,  General  McClellan  addressed 
a  letter  to  Secretary  Cameron,  in  which  he  showed  that 
the  foF?e  under  his  orders  was  greatly  inferior  to  that 
asked  for  by  him  in  August  for  the  prosecution  of  a  vigoi- 
ous  and  successful  invasion  of  the  South.  He  urged  the 
concentration  of  the  national  forces  on  Virginia  for  the 


40  LIFE   Of   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

purpose  of  "striking  the  rebellion  at  the  heart."  He 
showed  that  for  the  defence  of  Washington  there  would 
be  required — 

Of  the  engineers  and  artillery 35,000 

For  Baltimore  and  the  Potomac , . . . .   15,000 

For  operations  against  the  enemy 150,000 

For  Lower  Potomac 8,000 

Total  effectives  required 208,000 

The  actual  effective  strength  at  his  disposal  he  then 
showed  to  be,  including  all  points  held,  141,695,  with  228 
field  guns — some  of  the  batteries  being  unfit  for  active 
service,  and  the  whole  force  being  200  guns  less  than  was 
estimated  on  all  hands  as  necessary. 

General  McClellan  recommended  a  complete  and  vigor 
ous  concentration  of  all  the  forces  not  required  for  defen 
sive  purposes  upon  the  active  campaign  in  Virginia. 
11  Unity  in  councils,  the  utmost  vigor  and  energy  in  ac 
tion,"  he  added,  "  are  indispensable.  The  entire  military 
field  should  be  grasped  as  a  whole  and  not  in  detached 
parts."  *  *  *  "The  rebels,"  he  continued,  "have 
displayed  energy,  unanimity  and  wisdom  worthy  the  most 
desperate  days  of  the  French  revolution.  Should  we  do 
less  ?"  Were  such  a  concentration  as  he  proposed  to  be 
effected,  General  McClellan  expressed  his  conviction  that 
the  rebel  organization  might  still,  by  a  well-planned  and 
well-executed  movement,  be  overthrown  before  the  winter 
should  set  in. 

BALL'S   BLUFF. 

While  these  propositions  were  under  consideration,  the 
disaster  of  Ball's  Bluff  took  place.  Of  this,  General 
McClellan  states  that  the  movement  of  General  Stone  was 
ordered  by  him,  as  a  demonstration  which  he  thought  it 
possible  might  induce  the  enemy  to  abandon  Lcesburg — 
being  made,  as  it  was,  coteniporancuusly  with  rccou- 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLEELAN.  41 

noissances  in  force  toward  Drainesville  under  General 
McCall.  General  Stone  having-  accomplished,  on  the 
morning  of  October  20th,  all  that  he  was  expected  to  ac 
complish,  General  McCall  was  recalled  from  Drainesville 
to  his  camp  at  Langley.  The  fact  that  General  Stone's 
troops  were  in  action  on  the  Virginia  side,  was  telegraphed 
to  General  McClellan  on  the  21st,  and  reaching  the  ground 
the  next  day,  he  learned  the  full  extent  of  the  disaster 
which  had  followed  from  this  movement,  and  by  4  A.M. 
of  the  24th  had  caused  the  whole  command  to  recross  the 
Potomac  in  safety. 

RETIREMENT  OF  GENERAL  SCOTT— "  LITTLE 
MAC"  SUCCEEDS  HIM  IN  COMMAND  OF  THE 
ARMY. 

On  the  last  day  of  October,  1861,  Lieutenant-General 
Wiufield  Scott  addressed  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War, 
in  which  he  stated  that,  being  admonished  by  his  increasing 
infirmities  that  repose  of  mind  and  body,  with  the  appli 
ances  of  surgery  and  medicine,  were  necessary,  he  was 
compelled  to  ask  that  his  name  might  be  placed  on  the 
list  of  officers  retired  from  active  service.  The  subject  was 
considered  at  a  special  Cabinet  council  held  on  the  follow 
ing  day,  and  the  request  of  the  veteran  having  been 
granted,  General  McClellan  was,  with  the  unanimous 
consent  of  the  Cabinet,  and  to  the  great  gratification  of 
the  people  of  the  loyal  States,  called  to  the  command  of 
the  army  of  the  Union,  with  his  head-quarters  at  Wash 
ington.  As  soon  as  advised  of  the  honor  conferred  upon 
him,  he  issued  the  following  order : 

"  General  Order  No.  19. 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 
"  WASHINGTON,  1).  C.,  Nov.  1st,  1861. 

"In  accordance  with  General  Order  No.  94,  from  the  War 
Department,  I  hereby  assume  command  of  the  armies  of  the 
United  States. 
"In  the  midst  of  the  difficulties  which  encompass  aud  dividt 


42  LIFE  OF  MAJOR  GENERAL  McCLELLAJT. 

the  nation,  hesitation  and  self-distrust  may  well  accompany  the 
assumption  of  t<o  vast  a  responsibility  ;  but  confiding,  as  I  do, 
in  the  loyalty,  discipline,  and  courage  of  our  troops,  and  be 
lieving,  as  I  do,  that  Providence  will  favor  ours  as  the  just  cause, 
I  cannot  doubt  that  success  will  crown  our  efforts  and  sacrifices. 

"  The  army  will  unite  with  me  in  the  feeling  of  regret  that  the 
weight  of  many  years,  and  the  effect  of  increasing  infirmities, 
contracted  and  intensified  in  his  country's  service,  should  just 
now  remove  from  our  head  the  great  soldier  of  our  nation — the 
hero  who,  in  his  youth,  raised  high  the  reputation  of  his  country 
in  the  fields  of  Canada,  which  he  sanctified  with  his  blood;  who, 
in  more  mature  years,  proved  to  the  world  that  American  skill 
and  valor  could  repeat,  if  not  eclipse,  the  exploits  of  Corlez  in 
the  land  of  the  Montezumas  ;  whose  whole  life  has  been  devoted 
to  the  service  of  his  country;  whose  whole  efforts  have  been 
directed  to  uphold  our  honor  at  the  smallest  sacrifice  of  life  ; — a 
warrior  who  scorned  the  selfish  glories  of  the  battle-field,  when  his 
great  qualities  as  a  statesman  could  be  employed  more  profitably 
for  his  country;  a  citizen  who,  in  his  declining  years,  has  given 
to  the  world  the  most  shining  instances  of  loyalty  in  disregard 
ing  all  ties  of  birth. and  clingingto  the  causeof  truth  and  honor. 
Such  has  been  the  career  of  Winfield  Scott,  whom  it  has  long 
been  the 'delight  of  the  nation  to  honor  as  a  man  and  a  soldier. 

"  While  we  regret  his  loss,  there  is  one  thing  we  cannot  regret 
— the  bright  example  he  has  left  for  our  emulation.  Let  us  all 
hope  and  pray  that  his  declining  years  may  be  passed  in  peace 
and  happiness,  and  that  they  may  be  cheered  by  the  success  of 
the  country  and  the  cause  he  has  fought  for  and  loved  so  well. 
Beyond  all  that,  let  us  do  nothing  that  can  cause  him  to  blush 
for  us.  Let  no  defeat  of  the  army  he  has  so  long  commanded 
embitter  his  last  years,  but  let  our  victories  illuminate  the  close 
of  a  life  so  grand.  "  GEO.  B.  MC(JLELLAX, 

" Major-General  Commanding  U.  S.  A." 

PRESENTATION    OP   A  SWORD    BY    THE   CITY 
OP    PHILADELPHIA. 

On  the  following  day,  General  McClellan  was  presented 
with  a  costly  sword  by  the  City  Councils  of  Philadelphia, 
a  deputation  of  which  body  had  proceeded  to  Washington 
to  make  the  preseir.ation.  In  responding  to  the  com 
plimentary  remarks  of  the  donors,  be  said: 

"  I  ask  you,  sir,  to  give  my  wannest  and  deep  thanks  to  the 
honorable  body  you  represent  for  this  entirely  unmerited  com 
pliment.  I  could  thank  you  better  if  I  thought  that  I  deserved 
it.  but  I  do  not  feel  that  I  do.  Nothing  that  I  have  yet  accom 
plished  would  warrant  this  high  compliment.  It  is  for  the  future 


LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  43 

to  determine  whether  I  shall  realize  the  expectations  and  hopes 
that  have  been  centred  in  me.  I  trust  and  feel  that  the  day  is 
not  far  distant  when  I  shall  return  to  the  place  dearest  of  all 
others  to  me,  there  to  spend  the  balance  of  my  life  among  the 
people  from  whom  I  have  received  this  beautiful  gift.  TJie  war 
cannot  last  long.  It  may  be  desperate.  I  ask  in  the  future, 
forbearance,  patience,  and  confidence.  With  these  we  can  ac 
complish  all ;  and  while  I  know  that,  in  the  great  drama  which 
may  have  our  hearts'  blood,  Pennsylvania  will  not  play  the  least, 
I  trust  that,  on  the  other  hand,  she  will  play  the  highest  and 
noblest  part. 

"  I  again  thank  you,  and  ask  you  to  convey  to  the  Councils 
my  most  sincere  thanks  for  the  sword.  Say  to  them  that  it  will 
be  my  ambition  to  deserve  it  hereafter.  I  know  I  do  not  now." 

AN  UNUSUAL  HONOR. 

On  the  twelfth  of  November  one  of  the  most  signal 
manifestations  of  the  esteem  in  which  "  Little  Mac"  was 
held  by  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  was  witnessed — General  Blenker's  Division  that 
night  having  marched  from  their  camping-ground  to  Gen 
eral  McClellan's  residence  in  Washington,  and  tendered 
him  a  most  delightful  serenade.  The  line  of  the  procession 
was  illuminated  throughout  its  length  by  thousands  of 
torches ;  and  while  the  offering  was  in  every  way  credit 
able  to  the  participants,  and  complimentary  to  the  distin 
guished  man  they  honored,  it  was  one  of  the  most  enthu 
siastic  displays  ever  witnessed  at  the  Capital. 

THE  OBSERVANCE  OF  THE  SABBATH. 

On  the  twenty-seventh  of  November,  General  McClellan 
issued  an  additional  order  in  regard  to  the  observance  of 
the  Sabbath  by  the  army.  Fighting  in  a  holy  cause,  he 
believed  it  to  be  the  duty  of  his  men  to  deserve  the  favor 
of  the  Almighty  by  resting  from  their  labors  and,  when 
ever  practicable,  attending  Divine  service.  One  day's 
rest  in  a  week  he  considered  necessary  for  man  and  animal, 
and,  to  use  his  own  language,  "  The  observance  of  the 
holy  day  of  the  God  of  mercy  and  of  battles  is  our  sacred 
duty."  To  facilitate  the  chaplains  in  their  Sunday  duties, 


44  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

the  hour  of  company  inspections  was  changed,  and  officers 
were  notified  to  see  that  all  persons  connected  with  their 
commands,  when  not  engaged  on  important  service,  should 
have  the  opportunity  to  attend  the  religious  services. 
Respectful  deportment  towards  the  chaplains  and  a  hearty 
co-operation  with  them  was  also  enjoined. 

MILITARY  MOVEMENTS  PROJECTED. 

An  organization  of  troops  for  occupying  the  coast  line 
of  the  South  on  the  middle  Atlantic,  which  had  been  sug 
gested  by  General  McClellan  in  September,  1861,  took 
shape  in  January,  18G2,  as  an  expedition  under  General 
Burnside,  designed  to  facilitate  the  movements  of  the  main 
body  in  Eastern  Virginia  by  an  occupation  of  the  coast 
line  of  North  Carolina,  General  Burnside  being  ordered, 
when  he  should  have  seized  ISTewbern,  to  occupy  and 
destroy  the  Weldon  and  Wilmington  railroad  as  far  west 
as  Goldsboro',  and  should  circumstances  favor,  to  push  as 
far  as  Raleigh,  Wilmington  being,  however,  his  ultimate 
objective  point. 

At  the  same  time  letters  were  sent  to  General  Halleek, 
(appointed  to  the  command  of  the  Department  of  Mis 
souri),  to  General  Buell  (in  command  of  the  Department 
of  the  Ohio),  to  General  Sherman  (commanding  in  South 
Carolina  and  Georgia),  and  to  General  Butler  (command 
ing  the  Department  of  the  Gulf).  General  Halleck  was 
charged  with  the  duty  of  "reducing  chaos  to  order."  In 
respect  to  military  operations,  he  was  ordered  to  hold  the 
State  by  fortified  posts  and  concentrate  his  force  on  the 
Mississippi,  in  readiness  for  ulterior  operations. 

General  Buell  was  instructed  as  to  the  vast  importance 
of  the  military  occupation  of  Eastern  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee.  In  Kentucky  itself  he  was  advised,  "the  con 
duct  of  our  political  affairs  is  perhaps  more  important 
than  that  of  our  military  operations/'  and  he  was  urged 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  45 

to  bear  in  mind  "  that  we  shall  most  readily  suppress  this 
rebellion  and  restore  the  authority  of  the  government  by 
religiously  respecting  the  constitutional  rights  of  all.". 
Jn  accordance  "  with  the  feelings  and  opinion  of  the 
President,"  General  McClellan  requested  General  Buell 
lo  assure  "the  psople  of  Kentucky,  that  their  domestic 
institutions  will  in  no  manner  be  interfered  with  ;"  and 
"to  allow  nothing  but  the  dictates  of  military  necessity," 
to  cause  him  to  "  depart  from  the  spirit  of  his  instruc 
tions."  In  respect  to  Tennessee,  General  Buell  was 
ordered  to  throw  the  mass  of  his  troops  "  by  rapid 
marches,  by  Cumberland  or  Walker's  gap,  on  Knoxville, 
in  order  to  occupy  the  railroad  at  that  point,"  and  "cut 
the  communication  between  Eastern  Virginia  and  the 
Mississippi."  General  Buell  was  further  counselled  to 
avoid  "  widening  the  breach  existing  between  us  and  the 
rebels, " "fay  "  causeless  arrests  and  persecutions  of  indi- 
dividuals."  "I  have  always  found,"  adds  General  Mc 
Clellan,  "that  it  is  the  tendency  of  subordinates  to  make 
vexatious  arrests  on  mere  suspicion." 

General  Sherman  was  advised  that  the  favorable  mo 
ment  for  a  coup  de  main  against  Savannah  had  been  lost, 
and  that  the  best  course  before  him  would  be  to  "  isolate 
and  reduce  Fort  Pulaski."  But  the  "reduction  of 
Charleston  and  its  defences,"  was  held  up  as  the  great 
moral  advantage  to  be  sought  for,  and  this  was  stated  to 
be  an  object  for  which  General  McClellan  was  actively 
maturing  his  combinations.  General  Butler  was  instructed 
as  to  the  obstacles  to  be  encountered  in  reducing  Xew 
Orleans,  and  was  ordered,  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  fall 
of  that  city,  to  "  seize  all  the  approaches  leading  to  it 
from  the  east,"  and  particularly  "Jackson,  in  Mississippi," 
with  an  ultimate  view,  as  well  to  the  capture  of  Mobile, 
as  to  the  opening  of  the  Mississippi. 

The  instructions   thus  issued  to  the  Generals  named, 


46  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

comprehend  the  entire  scope  of  the  plans  of  General 
McClellan,  of  which  plans  the  movement  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  under  his  own  orders  was  the  central 
feature.  It  was  considered  by  him  necessary  to  the  suc 
cess  of  these  plans,  that  they  should  be  carried  out  simul 
taneously,  or  as  nearly  so  as  possible,  and  the  advance  of  the 
Potomac  army  upon  Richmond  by  the  lower  Rappahan- 
nock  was  kept  in  hand  by  him,  to  be  delivered  as  the 
decisive  blow,  in  conjunction  with  all  the  rest  of  tho 
general  movement. 

"ON  TO  RICHMOND." 

On  the  27th  of  January,  1802,  President  Lincoln 
assumed  command  of  all  the  armies  prepared  and  pre 
paring  for  these  general  movements.  He  issued  on  that 
day  his  "War  Order  No.  1,"  prescribing-  that  on  the  22<] 
of  February,  1862,  a  general  movement  of  all  the  land 
and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  should  be  made 
against  the  insurgent  forces.  This  order  was  followed 
four  days  after  by  a  second  order,  commanding  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  to  occupy  a  point  "  southwestward  of 
Manassas  Junction." 

On  the  3d  of  February,  General  McClellan  received  a 
note  from  the  President,  reasoning  with  him  on  the  choice 
he  had  made  of  a  route  to  Richmond.  General  McClel 
lan  replied  substantially,  in  a  letter  to  Secretary  Stantou, 
reciting  what  had  been  done  with  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  and  what  remained  to  be  done  with  that  and  with  all 
the  other  armies  of  the  Republic ;  stating  his  reluctance 
to  "  waste  life  in  useless  battles,"  and  his  desire  "  to  strike 
at  the  heart;"  and  pointing  out  the  military  reasons  foi 
preferring  the  base  of  the  lower  Chesapeake,  to  that  of 
Washington,  for  operations  against  the  army  intrenched 
at  Manassas. 

"  For  many  long  months/'  he  said,  "  I  have  labored  to 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN.  4.7 

prepare  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  play  its  part  in  the 
programme ;  I  have  exerted  myself  to  place  all  the  other 
armies  in  such  a  condition,  that  they  too,  could  perform 
their  alloted  duties."  "  I  know,"  he  concludes,  "  that  his 
excellency  the  President,  you,  and  I,  all  agree  in  our 
wishes,  and  that  those  wishes  are  to  bring  this  war  to  a 
close  as  promptly  as  the  means  in  our  power  will  permit. 
I  believe  that  the  mass  of  the  people  have  entire  confi 
dence  in  us.  Let  us  then  look  only  to  the  great  result  to 
be  accomplished,  and  disregard  every  thing  else." 

The  President,  subsequently,  forbore  to  urge  his  war 
orders.  Conferences  were  held,  the  base  of  the  lower 
Chesapeake  was  finally  selected  for  the  movement  against 
Richmond,  and  steps  were  taken  to  prepare  the  necessary 
transports,  under  the  exclusive  direction  of  the  Assistant- 
Secretary  of  War. 

The  Navy  Department  had  been  invited  as  early  as 
August  12,  1861,  by  General  McClellan,  to  take  steps  for 
protecting  the  navigation  of  the  Lower  Potomac.  Noth 
ing  had  been  done,  however,  and  General  Barnard,  chief 
of  engineers,  reported  that  it  would  be  "  impossible"  for 
the  army  to  prevent  the  erection  by  the  enemy,  of  bat 
teries  at  "  High  Point,  and  thence  down  to  Chopa- 
wampsic."  As  the  navy  took  no  steps  to  prevent  the 
erection  of  batteries  on  the  Virginia  shore,  nothing  was 
left  but  to  manoeuvre  so  as  to  compel  the  enemy  to 
evacuate. 

On  the  8th  of  March,  the  President  renewed  his  objec 
tions  to  the  Chesapeake  movement,  but  after  a  full  con 
versation  again  withdrew  them,  and  the  plans  of  General 
McClellan  being  laid  by  him  the  same  day  before  a  council 
of  division  generals,  they  were  by  the  majority  approved  : 
and  on  the  same  8th  of  March,  the  President  issued  two 
orders :  one  constituting  the  army  into  army  corps  ;  the 
other  limiting  the  army  of  operations  to  fifty  thousand 
3 


48  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   jlcCLELLAN. 

men,  in  the  event  of  certain  contingencies.  He  also  fixe>i 
a  date  for  the  commencement  of  operations,  and  ordered 
a  combined  land  and  naval  assault  on  the  Potomac  bat 
teries. 

The  appearance  of  the  Merrimac  modified  the  Peniu- 
sular  campaign  in  the  respect,  that  it  made  the  York, 
and  not  the  James  river,  the  line  of  the  army' 5 
communications  with  Fortress  Monroe  ;  but  the  evacua 
tion  of  Manassas  by  the  enemy  prepared  the  way  for  th«) 
full  success  of  his  plan  of  operations. 

With  the  hope  of  harassing  their  rear,  and  the  certainty 
of  employing  the  troops  usefully  in  the  interval  before 
their  embarkation  for  the  Peninsula,  General  McClellau 
ordered  an  advance  upon  Manassas,  as  soon  as  he  learned 
that  the  enemy  were  moving.  This  advance  began  on 
the  9th  of  March. 

At  that  time  the  force  of  the  enemy,  as  reported  by  tho 
chief  of  the  secret  service  corps,  was  as  follows  : 

At  Manassas   and  vicinity 80,000 

At  Lower  Occoquau  aud  vicinity 18, 000 

Leesburg 4,500 

Shenaudoah  Valley 13,000 

115,500 
With  about  300  field  gtms  and  30  siege  guns. 

On  the  eleventh  of  March,  an  order  from  the  President 
announced,  that  as  General  McClellan  had  personally 
taken  the  field,  he  was  relieved  from  the  command  of  the 
other  military  departments,  and  *  would  retain  command 
of  the  Department  of  the  Potomac. 

On  March  thirteenth,  a  council  of  Generals  commanding 
army  corps  decided  in  favor  of  the  Peninsular  campaign. 
The  President,  renewing  his  entreaties  that  Washington 
might  be  kept  perfectly  safe,  gave  his  assent  to  this 
movement.  A  few  days  afterward,  Blenker's  division  was 
ordered  to  join  General  Fremont,  and  General  McClellan 


LIFE  OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  49 

was  thus  deprived  of  10,000  of  the  troops  upon  which  he 
had  counted. 

On  the  fourteenth  he  issued  the  following  address  to 
his  troops : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
"  FAIRFAX  COURT-HOUSE,  Va.,  March  l±th,  1862 
"Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac : 

"  For  a  long  time  I  have  kept  you  inactive,  but  not  without  a 
purpose.  You  were  to  be  disciplined,  armed  and  instructed  ; 
the  formidable  artillery  you  now  have  had  to  be  created  ;  other 
armies  were  to  move  and  accomplish  certain  results.  I  have 
held  you  back  that  you  might  give  the  death-blow  to  the  rebel 
lion  that  has  distracted  our  once  happy  country.  The  patience 
you  have  shown,  and  your  confidence  in  your  General,  are  worth 
a  dozen  victories.  These  preliminary  results  are  now  accom 
plished.  I  feel  that  the  patient  labors  of  many  months  have 
produced  their  fruit;  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  is  now  a  real 
army— magnificent  in  material,  admirable  in  discipline  and  in 
struction,  excellently  equipped  and  armed — your  commanders 
are  all  that  I  could  wish.  The  moment  for  action  has  arrived, 
and  I  know  that  I  can  trust  in  you  to  save  our  country.  As  I 
ride  through  your  ranks,  I  see  in  your  faces  the  sure  presage  of 
victory ;  I  feel  that  you  will  do  whatever  I  ask  of  you.  The 
period  of  inaction  has  passed.  I  will  bring  you  now  face  to  face 
with  the  rebels,  and  only  pray  that  God  may  defend  the  right. 
In  whatever  direction  you  may  move,  however  strange  my  actions 
may  appear  to  you,  ever  bear  in  mind  that  my  fate  is  linked  with 
yours,  and  that  all  I  do  is  to  bring  you,  where  I  know  you  wish 
to  be — on  the  decisive  battle-field.  It  is  my  business  to  place 
you  there.  I  am  to  watch  over  you  as  a  parent  over  his  chil 
dren  ;  and  you  know  that  your  General  loves  you  from  the  depths 
of  his  heart.  It  shall  be  my  care,  as  it  has  ever  been,  to  gain 
success  with  the  least  possible  loss ;  but  I  know  that,  if  it  is 
necessary,  you  will  willingly  follow  me  to  our  graves,  for  our 
righteous  cause.  God  smiles  upon  us,  victory  attends  us,  yet  I 
would  not  have  you  think  that  our  aim  is  to  be  attained  without 
a  manly  struggle.  I  will  not  disguise  it  from  you  ;  you  have 
brave  foes  to  encounter,  foemen  well  worthy  of  the  steel  that  you 
will  use  so  well.  I  shall  demand  of  you  great,  heroic  exertions, 
rapid  and  long  marches,  desperate  combats,  privations,  perhaps. 
We  will  share  all  these  together ;  and  when  this  sad  war  is  over, 
we  will  return  to  our  homes,  and  feel  that  we  can  ask  no  higher 
honor  than  the  proud  consciousness  that  we  belonged  to  th« 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  "  GEO.  B.  MCCLELI.AX. 

"Major-  General  Comman< iing." 


50  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

WHY    McCLELLAN   WAS    INTERFERED   WITH. 

It  will  be  seen,  from  the  foregoing,  that,  when  General 
McClellan  began  the  Peninsular  campaign,  his  plans  had 
already  been  materially  interfered  with.  The  causes  for 
this  we  shall  dwell  on,  m  )re  at  large,  in  a  subsequent  page. 
It  is  sufficient  to  recall  the  fact,  that,  when  he  left  Wash 
ington  to  move  upon  Richmond,  he  had  already  been  de 
prived  of  the  powers  of  a  commander-in-chief,  and  that, 
consequently,  the  campaign  against  the  rebels  was  no 
longer  what  he  had  intended  it,  a  masterly  whole,  but  a 
series  of  disjointed  movements.  Even  so  far  as  the  enter 
prise  against  Richmond  was  concerned,  it  will  be  found, 
also,  that  he  was  not  allowed  to  be  "  master  of  the  situa 
tion."  Others,  higher  in  authority,  continually  interfered 
with  him,  and  practically  overruled  his  plans  by  depriving 
him  of  the  means  of  success.  This  was  not  done  from 
any  personal  dislike  to  General  McClellan,  but  from  a 
mistaken  sense  of  the  necessities  of  the  situation.  The 
general  himself  felt,  when  leaving  Washington,  the  pre 
carious  character  of  his  supports  there.  In  similar  cir 
cumstances,  many  commanders  would  have  resigned,  and 
McClellan  would,  perhaps,  have  been  justified  in  doing  so 
now.  But  he  resolved,  loyally,  to  do  the  best  he  could. 
If  he  was  properly  sustained  in  the  movement  against 
Richmond,  he  had  no  doubt  whatever  of  the  speedy  fall 
of  that  capital.  We  shall  soon  see  how  grievously  he  was 
disappointed. 

A    SHORT    RETROSPECT. 

It  must  be  remembered,  in  order  to  understand  what  is 
to  follow,  that  General  McJlellan  left  Washington  with 
powerful  influences  at  work  against  him.  It  was  publicly 
said,  by  influential  men,  that  he  ought  to  have  moved  on 
the  enemy  in  the  autumn  of  18(51,  and  that  the  President 
was  cennuraVle  for  not  having  removed  him  for  inaction. 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR  GENERAL   McCLELLAIT.  5^ 

The  answer  to  this,  as  official  documents  now  show,  is 
that  the  army  was  not  sufficiently  disciplined,  nor  even 
armed;  and  that  the  plan  of  the  general  contemplated  a 
simultaneous  advance,  from  all  quarters,  on  the  rebels  :  a 
plan  which  could  not  be  executed  until  spring.  Unfortu 
nately,  too,  in  December,  McClellan  fell  seriously  ill,  and 
continued  ill  until  the  middle  of  January.  During  this 
time,  the  opponents  of  what  they  called  "  the  do-nothing- 
policy"  were  loud  in  their  condemnation  of  the  general, 
and  even  went  so  far  as  to  say  that  he  had  no  plan  of  a 
campaign,  that  he  never  had  any,  and  that  he  was  inca 
pable  of  having  one.  The  dripping  even  of  water,  in 
time,  will  wear  the  hardest  rock.  It  is  not  surprising 
that  the  President  gradually  yielded  to  these  influences. 
While  General  McClellan  was  still  partially  an  invalid, 
bn  order  was  issued,  as  we  have  seen,  depriving  him  of 
the  chief  command,  and  directing  those  movements  in  the 
West  which,  so  brilliant,  and  apparently  so  decisive  at  the 
time,  are  now  admitted  to  have  been  premature.  That 
entire  confidence  which  a  government  ought  to  bestow  on 
its  chief  military  officer  was,  from  these  causes,  never, 
after  this,  bestowed  on  McClellan.  This  condition  of 
affairs  was  so  evident  to  well-informed  visitors  at  Wash 
ington,  in  January  and  February,  1862,  that  they  saw, 
with  sad  forebodings,  the  departure  of  the  general  on  his 
Peninsular  campaign,  and  many  even  did  not  hesitate  to 
predict  that,  do  what  he  would,  the  enterprise  would  be  a 
failure. 

It  is  too  late  to  regret  this  now.  It  is  idle  even  to  talk 
of  censure.  For  it  is  not  certain  that  any  other  general 
would  have  fared  differently.  It  was,  perhaps,  inevitable 
that  the  earlier  leaders' of  the  war,  whoever  they  might 
have  been,  should  fall  victim?  to  the  popular  impatience, 
to  the  almost  universal  ignorance  of  military  affairs,  and 
to  the  interference  which  thes3  things  involved. 


52  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   HcCLELLAN. 

THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN. 

On  the  first  of  April,  General  McClellan  estimated  the 
troops  he  had  left  in  and  near  Washington,  including 
those  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  after  embarking  the 
main  portion  of  his  army  for  Fortress  Monroe,  at  about 
seventy-three  thousand  five  hundred  men,  with  one  hun 
dred  and  nine  light  guns.  General  Barry,  Chief  of  Ar 
tillery,  states  that  thirty-two  field  pieces  were  left  at 
Washington. 

Unavoidable  delays,  not  to  be  ascribed  to  any  inatten 
tion  or  delinquency  on  his  part,  the  inability  of  the  naval 
vessels  at  the  Fortress  to  cooperate  with  him  in  the 
prosecution  of  his  plans;  the  withdrawal  of  an  important 
part  of  his  command  ;  and  other  causes,  combined  to  make 
a  remodeling  of  the  campaign  necessary.  On  the  fourth 
of  April,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  took  up  its  line  of 
march  from  the  camping  ground  near  Hampton  for  York- 
town.  At  Big  Bethel  the  enemy's  pickets  were 
encountered,  but  they  fell  back  to  Howard's  creek,  to 
which  point  they  were  followed  by  the  main  body  of  the 
army.  The  next  morning  the  column  again  advanced, 
and  in  a  few  hours  was  in  front  of  the  enemy's  works  at 
Yorktown. 

CORRESPONDENCE    BETWEEN    GEN.  McCLEL 
LAN  AND  THE   GOVERNMENT. 

General  McClellan,  immediately  upon  his  arrival  at 
Yorktown,  commenced  the  stupendous  preparations  he 
deemed  necessary  to  reduce  the  formidable  fortifications 
which  confronted  him  on  every  side,  and  as  a  part  of  the 
history  of  that  siege,  we  publish  the  following  despatches 
which  passed  between  the  President  and  General  McClellan 
in  the  early  part  of  April. 


LIFE    OF   MAJCR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  53 

At  eight  o'clock,  on  the  evening  of  the  sixth  of  April, 
the  President  sent  the  following  despatch  : 

"Yours  of  11  A.M.,  to-day,  received.  Secretary  of  War  in 
forms  me  that  the  forwarding  of  transportation,  ammunition  and 
Woodbury's  brigade,  under  your  orders,  is  not,  and  will  not  bo, 
interfered  with.  You  now  have  over  one  hundred  thousand  troops 
with  you,  independent  of  General  Wool's  command.  I  think  you 
better  breuk  the  enemy's  line  from  YorktowD  to  Warwick  river  at 
once.  This  will,  probably,  use  time  as  advantageously  as  you  can." 

On  the  following  day,  General  McClellan  sent  the  fol 
lowing  answer : 

"Your  telegram  of  yesterday  is  received.  In  reply,  I  have 
the  honor  to  state  that  my  entire  force  for  duty  amounts  to  only 
about  (85,000)  eighty-five  thousand  men.  General  Wool's  com 
mand,  as  you  will  observe  from  the  accompanying  order,  has 
been  taken  out  of  my  control,  although  he  has  most  cheerfully 
co-operated  with  me.  The  only  use  that  can  be  made  of  his 
command  is  to  protect  my  communications  in  rear  of  this 
point.  At  this  time,  only  fifty-three  thousand  men  have  joined 
me,  but  they  are  corning  up  as  rapidly  as  my  means  of  'trans 
portation  will  permit.  Please  refer  to  my  despatch  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  to-night,  for  the  details  of  our  present  situation." 

He  also  sent  the  following  to  the  Secretary  of  War  : 

"  IN  FRONT  OF  YORK-TOWN,  April  7fA — 7  P.M. — Your  telegram, 
of  yesterday,  arrived  here  while  I  was  absent  examining  the  ene 
my's  right,  which  I  did  pretty  closely.  The  whole  line  of  the 
Warwick,  which  really  heads  within  a  mile  of  Yorktown.  is 
strongly  defended  by  detached  redoubts,  and  other  fortifications, 
armed  with  heavy  and  light  guns.  The  approaches,  except  at 
Yorktown,  are  covered  by  the  Warwick,  over  which  there  is  but 
one,  or,  at  most,  two  passages,  both  of  which  are  covered  by 
strong  batteries.  It  will  be  necessary  to  resort  to  the  use  of 
heavy  guns,  and  some  siege  operations  before  we  assault. 

"All  the  prisoners  state  that  General  J.  E.  Johnston  arrived 
at  Yorktown  yesterday  with  strong  reinforcements.  It  seems  clear 
that  I  shall  have  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy  on  my  hands — 
probably  not  less  than  (100,000)"  one  hundred  thousand  men, 
and  probably  more.  In  consequence  of  the  loss  of  Bleaker'* 
division  and  the  First  Corps,  my  force  is  possibly  less  than  that 
of  the  enemy,  while  they  have  all  the  advantage  *of  position. 

"I  am  under  great  obligations  to  you  for  the  offer  that  the 
•whole  force  and  Material  of  the  Government  will  be  as  fully  and 
as  speedily  under  -ay  command  as  heretofore,  or  as  if  the  new 
Department  naj  -r>t  been  created. 


54  LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

"Since  my  arrangements  were  made  for  this  campaign,  at 
least  (50,000)  fifty  thousand  men  have  been  taken  from  my  com 
mand.  Since  my  despatch  of  the  5th  instant,  five  divisions  have 
been  in  close  observation  of  the  eneu  y,  and  frequently  ex 
changing  shots.  When  my  present  command  all  joins,  I  shall 
have  about  (85,000)  eighty-five  thousand  men  for  duty,  from 
AY h rch  a  large  force  must  be  taken  for  guards,  scouts,  etc.  With 
this  army,  1  coull  assault  the  enemy's  works,  and  perhaps  carry 
them  ;  but  were  1  in  possession  of  their  intrenchments,  and 
assailed  by  double  my  numbers,  I  should  have  no  fears  as  to  th* 
result. 

"  Under  the  circumstances  that  have  been  developed  since  we 
arrived  here,  1  feel  fully  impressed  with  the  conviction  that  here 
is  to  be  fought  the  great  battle  that  is  to  decide  the  existing 
contest.  1  shall  of  course  commence  the  attack  as  soon  as  1 
can  get  up  my  siege  train,  and  shall  do  all  in  my  power  to  carry 
the  enemy's  works ;  but  to  do  this  with  a  reasonable  degree  of 
certainty,  requires,  in  my  judgment,  that  I  should,  if  possible, 
have  at  least  the  whole  of  the  First  Corps  to  land  upon  the 
Severn  river  and  attack  Gloucester  in  the  rear. 

"  My  present  strength  will  not  admit  of  a  detachment  sufficient 
for  this  purpose,  without  materially  impairing  the  efficiency  of 
this  column.  Flag-officer  Goldsborough  thinks  the  works  too 
strong  for  his  available  vessels,  unless  1  can  turn  Gloucester.  1 
Bend  by  mail  copies  of  his  letter,  and  one  of  the  commander  of 
the  gunboats  here." 

On  the  ninth,  the  President  thus  addressed  General 
MeClellan  : 

'•Your  despatches  complaining  that  you  are  not  properly  sus 
tained,  while  they  do  not  offend  me,  do  pain  me  very  much. 
Bleuker's  division  was  withdrawn  from  you  before  you  left  here, 
and  you  know  the  pressure  under  which  I  did  it,  and  as  I  thought, 
acquiesced  in  it — certainly,  not  without  reluctance.  After  you 
left,  I  ascertained  that  less  than  twenty  thousand  unorganized 
inen,  without  a  single  field-battery,  were  all  you  designed  to  be  left 
for  the  defence  of  Washington  and  Manassas  Junction,  and  part 
of  this  even  was  to  go  to  General  Hooker's  old  position.  General 
Banks'  Corps,  once  designed  for  Manassas  Junction,  was  di 
verted,  and  tied  up  on  the  line  of  Winchester  and  Strasburgh, 
and  could  not  leave  it.  without  again  exposing  the  Upper  Potomac 
_  and  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  railroad.  This  presented  (or  would 
?  present,  when  McDowell  and  Sumner  should  be  gone)  a  great 
temptation  to  the  enemy  to  turn  back  from  the  Rappahaunock 
and  sack  Washington.  My  implicit  order  that  Washington 
should,  by  the  judgment  of  all  the  commanders  of  army  corps, 
be  left  entirely  secure,  had  been  neglected.  It  was  precisely 
this  Viat  drove  me  to  detain  McDowell. 


LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  55 

"  I  do  not  forget  that  I  was  satisfied  with  your  arrangement 
to  leave  Bunks  at  Manassas  Junction,  but  when  that  arrange, 
ment  was  broken  up,  and  nothing  was  substituted  for  it,  of  course 
]  was  constrained  to  substitute  something  for  it  myself,  and  al 
low  me  to  ask  :  Do  you  really  think  I  should  permit  the  line  from 
Richmond  via  Manassas  Junction  to  this  city  to  be  entirely  open, 
except  what  resistance  could  be  presented  by  less  than  twenty 
thousand  unorganized  troops?  This  is  a  question  which  the 
country  will  not  allow  me  to  evade. 

"There  is  a  curious  mystery  about  the  number  of  troops 
now  with  you.  When  I  telegraphed  you  on  the  6th,  saying  you 
had  over  a  hundred  thousand  with  you,  I  had  just  obtained  from 
the  Secretary  of  *War  a  statement  taken,  as  he  said,  from  your 
own  return,  making  108,000  then  with  you,  and  en  route  to  you. 
You  now  say  you  will  have  but  85,000  when  all  en  route  to  you 
shall  have  reached  you.  How  can  the  discrepancy  of  23,OUO*  be 
accounted  for? 

"As  to  General  Wool's  command,  I  understand  it  is  doing 
for  you  precisely  what  a  like  number  of  your  own  would  have  to 
do  if  that  command  was  away. 

"  I  suppose  the  whole  force  which  has  gone  forward  to  you, 
is  with  you  by  this  time,  and  if  so,  I  think  it  is  the  precise  time 
for  you  to  strike  a  blow.  By  delay  the  enemy  will  relatively 
gain  upon  you ;  that  is,  he  will  gain  faster  by  fortifications  and 
reinforcements  than  you  can  by  reinforcements  alone.  And  once 
more  let  me  tell  you,  it  is  indispensable  to  you  that  you  strike  a 
blow.  /  am  powerless  to  help  this.  You  will  do  me  the  jus 
tice  to  remember  I  always  insisted  that  going  down  the  Bay  in 
search  of  a  field,  instead  of  lighting  at  or  near  Manassas,  was 
only  shifting,  and  not  surmounting  a  difficulty;  that  we  would 
find  the  same  enemy  and  the  same  or  equal  intrenchments,  at 
either  place.  The  country  will  not  fail  to  note — is  now  noting, 
that  the  present  hesitation  to  move  upon  an  intrenched  enemy  is 
but  the  story  of  Manassas  repeated. 

"  I  beg  to  assure  you  that  I  have  never  written  you,  or  spoken 
to  you,  in  greater  kindness  of  feeling  than  now,  nor  with  a  fuller 

Purpose  to  sustain  you,  so  far  as  in  my  most  anxious  judgment 
consistently  can.     But  you  must  act." 


EVACUATION  OF  YOBKTOWN. 

On  the  first  of  May,  our  siege  batteries  opened  fire  on 
the  rebel  works,  and  during  the  night  of  the  third,  the 
rebels  evacuated  Yorktown,  leaving  their  guns  and 
ammunition.  The  following  despatches  were  seut  to 
Washington  in  reference  to  the  capture  : 


56  klFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN 

"  HEAD- QUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THK  POTOMAC, 
"  May  tth,  9  A.M. 

"To  HON.  EDWIN  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War: 

<c  We  have  the  ramparts.  Have  guns,  ammunition,  camp 
tquipage,  etc.  We  hold  the  entire  line  of  his  works,  which  the 
engineers  report  as  being  very  strong.  I  have  thrown  all  my 
cavalry  and  horse-artillery  in  pursuit,  supported  by  infantry.  I 
move  Franklin's  division,  and  as  much  more  as  I  can  transport 
by  water,  up  to  West  Point  to-day.  No  time  shall  be  lost. 
The  gunboats  have  gone  up  York  'river.  I  omitted  to  state 
that  Gloucester  is  also  in  our  possession.  I  shall  push  the 
«nemy  to  the  wall.  "  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

"  Major- General" 

"HEAD-QUAKTERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
"  MONDAY,  May  5th,  11.30  A.M. 

"*  To  HON.  E.  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War  : 

"An  inspection  just  made  shows  that  the  rebels  abandoned, 
Vt  their  works  at  Yorktown,  two  three-inch  rifled  cannon,  two 
1.  iur-and-a-half-inch  rifled  cannon,  sixteen  thirty-two-pounders, 
s.  t  forty- two-pounders,  nineteen  eight-inch  columbiads,  four 
nine-inch  Dahlgrens,  one  ten-inch  colurnbiad,  one  ten-inch 
m  >rtar,  and  one  eight-inch  siege  howitzer,  with  carriages  and 
irrplements  complete,  each  piece  supplied  with  seventy-six 
ro  mds  of  ammunition.  On  the  ramparts  there  are  also  four 
magazines,  which  have  not  yet  been  examined.  This  does  not 
include  the  guns  left  at  Gloucester  Point  and  their  other  works 
to  our  left.  "  GEORGE  B.  MOCLELLAN, 

"  Major -General.'1 

THE  BATTLE   OP  WILLIAMSBURG. 

Immediately  upon  receiving  information  that  the  works 
had  been  abandoned,  General  McOlellan  ordered  his  whole 
available  cavalry  force,  with  four  batteries  of  horse  artillery 
under  General  Stoneman,  into  pursuit  by  the  Yorktown 
and  Williamsburgroad,  Generals  Heintzclman,  Hooker  and 
Smith  being  moved  forward  to  support  Stoneman.  These 
were  afterwards  followed  up  by  the  divisions  of  Kearney, 
Couch,  and  Casey.  General  Sumner,  second  in  command 
of  the  army,  was  then  sent  to  the  front  to  take  charge  of 
\he  operations  About  two  miles  east  of  Williamsburg, 
Lreneral  Stoneman  came  upon  the  enemy's  works,  four 


LIFE  OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  57 

miles  in  extent,  nearly  three-fourths  of  their  front  being 
covered  by  the  tributaries  of  Queen's  creek  and  College 
creek.  The  main  works  were  a  large  fortification  called 
Fort  Magruder  and  twelve  other  redoubts  and  epaul-?- 
ments  for  field  guns.  The  woods  in  the  fort  were  felled, 
and  the  open  ground  dotted  with  rifle-pits.  From  this 
position  the  enemy  opened  fire  upon  General  Stoneman  as 
his  advance-guard  debouched  from  the  woods.  General 
Stoneman,  having  no  infantry,  was  fo^d  to  retire,  but 
held  the  enemy  in  check,  until  the  arrival  of  General 
Sumner,  with  part  of  General  Smith's  division,  at  half- 
past  five  P.M.  The  cross  movement  of  this  division, 
made  necessary  by  the  impassable  character  of  the  road 
on  which  it  had  been  moving,  had  delayed  the  movement 
of  General  Hooker's  column  between  three  and  four 
hours ;  but  Heintzelman  and  Keyes  reached  Sumner 
during  the  afternoon.  Early  in  the  morning  of  the  5th, 
Hooker  came  up.  General  Hooker  began  the  attack  on 
the  enemy's  works  at  7-j  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  6th, 
and  for  a  time  silenced  Fort  Magruder.  But  the  enemy 
being  heavily  reinforced  attacked  in  his  turn.  Hooker 
lost  seriously  in  men,  five  of  his  guns  were  taken,  and 
between  3  and  4  P.M.,  when  his  ammunition  was  giving 
out  and  his  men  with  it,  Kearney  came  up,  after  pushing 
through  the  deep  mud  and  dense  forest ;  and  saved 
Hooker.  About  1  P.M.,  of  the  7th,  General  McClellan, 
who  had  remained  at  Yorktown  to  move  forward  the 
whole  army,  received  information  for  the  first  time  that 
a  serious  conflict  was  going  on  in  front  of  Williamsburg. 
He  at  once  pushed  forward  to  the  front,  about  fourteen 
miles,  through  a  most  difficult  country,  and  reached  the 
front  about  half-past  4  P.M.,  and  took  a  rapid  survey 
of  the  field.  He  learned  that  there  was  no  direct  com 
municator:  between  the  centre  and  the  left  under 
Heintzelman,  and,  hearing  heavy  firing  in  the  direction 


58  LIFE   OF   MAJC3-JENERAL   McCLELLAN.1 

of  Hancock's  command,  he  moved  the  centre  forwaid, 
attempted  to  open  communication  with  Heintzelman,  and 
sent  Smith  and  Naglee  to  the  support  of  Hancock  Be 
fore  these  generals  reached  Hancock,  however,  the  latter 
general,  finding  himself  confronted  by  a  superior  force, 
had  feigned  a  retreat,  awaited  their  onset,  and  then  turn 
ing  upon  them  fiercely,  had  driven  back  the  whole  force  nt 
the  point  of  the  bayonet,  routing  them  utterly,  with  a  total 
loss  to  them  of  between  five  or  six  hundred  men,  he  him 
self  losing  but  fifty-one.  The  total  loss  of  the  army  is 
put  down  at  2,228  men.  The  troops  were  so  much  ex 
hausted  by  the  marches  and  conflict  which  resulted  in  the 
victory  at  Williamsburg,  as  to  render  an  immediate 
pursuit  of  the  enemy  impossible  in  the  then  condition 
of  the  country. 

On  the  seventh,  General  Franklin's  division,  then  landing, 
had  a  most  creditable  affair  with  the  enemy  under 
General  Whiting. 

THANKS  BY  CONGRESS. 

On  the  ninth  of  May,  the  United  States  House  of  Rep 
resentatives  adopted  a  resolution  tendering  its  thanks  to 
General  McClellan  "  for  the  display  of  those  high  military 
qualities  which  secure   important  results  with  but  little 
sacrifice  of  human  life." 

THE  EXCITEMENT  IN  RICHMOND. 

As  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  advanced  up  the  Penin 
sula,  the  greatest  excitement  prevailed  in  Richmond.  The 
people  were  wTell  aware  of  the  determined  force,  which, 
within  a  few  days,  would  probably  be  knocking  at  the 
gates  of  the  rebel  capital,  and  they  had  long  known  and 
recognized  the  skill  and  valor  of  General  McClellan,  the 
Union  commander.  The  General  Assembly  of  Virginia 
adopted  a  joint  resolution  desiring  lhat  Richmond  might 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  59 

"•W  defended  to  the  last  extremity,  and  assuring  Jefferson 
Davis  that  any  destruction  or  loss  of  property  would  be 
cheerfully  submitted  to  ;  the  rebel  President  assured  the 
Assembly  that  it  would  be  the  effort  of  his  life  to  defend 
the  soil  of  Virginia  and  to  cover  her  capital,  but  even  if 
the  capital  should  fall,  the  war  could  be  still  successfully 
maintained  in  Virginia  for  twenty  years  ;  Governor  Letcher 
declared  "the  capital  must  not  be  surrendered,"  and  the 
press  of  the  city  were  urgent  in  their  appeals  to  the  citi 
zens  to  come  forward  and  organize  for  active  service.  The 
following  from  one  of  the  journals  is  a  sample  of  the  edi 
torials  with  which  the  columns  of  the  papers  of  Richmond 
teemed  at  that  exciting  time  : 

"  The  next  few  days  may  decide  the  fate  of  Richmond.  It  is 
either  to  remain  the  capital  of  the  Confederacy,  or  to  be  turned 
over  to  the  Federal  government  as  a  Yankee  conquest.  The 
capital  is  either  to  be  secured  or  lost — it  may  be  feared  not  tem 
porarily — and  with  it  Virginia.  Then,  if  there  is  blood  to  be  • 
shed,  let  it  be  shed  here  :  no  soil  of  the  Confederacy  could  drink 
it  tip  more  acceptably,  and  none  would  hold  it  more  gratefully. 
Wife,  family  and  friends  are  nothing.  Leave  them  all  for  one 
glorious  hour  to  be  devoted  to  the  Republic.  Life,  death  and 
wounds  are  notWng,  if  we  only  be  saved  from  the  fate  of  a  cap 
tured  capital  and  a  humiliated  Confederacy.  Let  the  govern 
ment  act ;  let  the  people  act.  There  is  time  yet.  If  fate 
comes  to  its  worst,  let  the  ruins  of  Richmond  be  its  most  last 
ing  monument." 

REINFORCEMENTS    URGED. 

On  the  tenth  of  May,  head-quarters  were  established 
beyond  Williamsburg,  and  communications  established 
between  the  forces  moving  by  land  and  by  water.  The 
following  despatch  was  then  sent  by  General  McClellan  to 
Secretary  Stanton : 

"  CAMP  AT  EWELL'S  FARM, 
"  THREE  MILES  BEYOND  WILLIAMSBURG, 

"May  lOtfi— 5  A.M. 

"  From  the  information  reaching  me  from  every  source,  I  re 
gard  it  as  certain  that  the  enemy  will  meet  us  with  all  his  force 
on  or  near  the  Chickahominy.  They  can  concentrate  many 


60  £IFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLriLLAN. 

more  men  than  I  have,  and  are  collecting  troops  from  all  quar 
ters,  especially  well  disciplined  troops  1'rom  the  South.  Casual 
ties,  sickness,  garrisons  and  guards  have  much  reduced  our 
numbers,  and  will  continue  to  do  so.  I  shall  fight  the  rebel 
army  with  whatever  force  I  may  have  ;  but  duty  requires  me  to 
urge  that  every  effort  be  made  to  reinforce  me,  without  delay, 
vrith  all  the  disposable  troops  in  Eastern  Virginia,  and  that  we 
concentrate  all  our  forces,  as  far  as  possible,  to  fight  the  great 
battle  now  impending,  and  to  make  it  decisive. 

"  It  is  possible  that  the  enemy  may  abandon  Richmond  with 
out  a  serious  struggle,  but  I  do  not  believe  he  will ;  and  it  would 
be  unwise  to  count  ipou  anything  but  a  stubborn  and  desperate 
defence — a  life  and  death  contest.  I  see  no  other  hope  for  him 
than  to  fight  this  battle,  and  we  must  win  it.  I  shall  tight  them, 
whatever  their  force  may  be ;  but  I  ask  for  every  man  that  the 
department  can  send  me.  No  troops  should  now  be  left  unem 
ployed.  Those  who  entertain  the  opinion  that  the  rebels  will 
abandon  Richmond  without  a  struggle  are,  in  my  judgment, 
badly  advised,  and  do  not  comprehend  their  situation,  which  is 
one  requiring  desperate  measures. 

"  I  beg  that  the  President  and  Secretary  will  maturely  weigh 
what  I  say,  and  leave  nothing  undone  to  comply  with  my  request. 
If  I  am  not  reinforced,  it  is  probable  that  I  will  be  obliged  to 
fight  nearly  double  my  numbers  strongly  intrenched.  I  do  not 
think  it  will  be  at  all  possible  for  me  to  bring  more  than  (70,000) 
seventy  thousand  men  upon  the  field  of  battle." 

Four  days  later  he  sent  the  following  despatch  from 
his  camp  at  Cumberland,  to  the  President : 

"  I  have  more  than  twice  telegraphed  to  the  Secretary  of  War, 
stating  that  in  my  opinion  the  enemy  were  concentrating  all  their 
available  force  to  fight  this  army  in  front  of  Richmond,  and  that 
such  ought  to  be  their  policy.  I  have  received  no  reply  what 
ever  to  any  of  these  telegrams.  I  beg  leave  to  repeat  their 
substance  to  your  Excellency,  and  to  ask  that  kind  consideration 
which  you  have  ever  accorded  to  my  representations  and  views. 
All  my  information,  from  every  source  accessible  to  me,  estab 
lishes  the  fixed  purpose  of  the  rebels  to  defend  Richmond  against 
this  army,  by  offering  us  battle  with  all  the  troops  they  can  col 
lect  from  the  East,  West  and  South,  and  my  own  opinion  is 
confirmed  by  that  of  all  my  commanders  whom  I  have  been  able 
to  consult. 

"  Casualties,  sickness,  garrisons  and  guards  have  much  weak 
ened  my  force,  and  will  continue  to  do  so.  I  cannot  bring  into 
actual  battle  against  the  enemy  more  than  eighty  thousand  men 
at  the  utmost,  and  with  them  I  must  attack  in  position, probably 
intrenched,  a  much  larger  force — perhaps  double  my  number. 
It  i<  possible  thiit  Richmond  may  be  :ib;u;dom;d  without  a  SP ri- 
ous  siruggir;  but  ilu:  t'n^niv  ui'v  actually  in  great  strength  l»e- 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  61 

tween  here  and  there  und  it  would  be  unwise,  and  even  insane, 
for  me  to  calculate  up.J  any  thing1  but  a  stubborn  and  desperate 
resistance.  It'  they  should  abandon  Richmond,  it  may  we}l  be 
that  it  is  done  with  the  purpose  of  making  the  stand  at  some 
place  in  Virginia  south  or  west  of  there,  and  we  should  be  iu 
condition  to  press  them  without  delay.  The  Confederate  leaders 
must  employ  their  utmost  efforts  against  this  army  in  Virginia, 
and  they  will  be  supported  by  the  whole  body  of  their  military 
officers,  among  whom  there  may  be  said  to  be  no  Union  feeling, 
as  there  is  also  very  little  among  the  higher  class  of  citizens  in 
the  seceding  States. 

"  1  have  found  no  fighting  men  left  in  this  Peninsula  ;  are 
all  in  the  ranks  of  the  opposing  foe. 

"  Even  if  more  troops  than  1  now  have  should  prove  unneces 
sary  for  purposes  of  military  occupation,  our  greatest  display 
of  imposing  force  »in  the  capital  of  the  rebel  government  will 
have  the  best  moral  effect.  I  most  respectfully  and  earnestly 
urge  upon  your  Excellency  that  the  opportunity  has  come  for 
striking  a  fa,tal  blow  at  the  enemies  of  the  Constitution,  and  I 
beg  that  you  will  cause  this  army  to  be  reinforced  without  delay 
by  all  the  disposable  troops  of  the  Government.  I  ask  for  every 
man  that  the  War  Department  can  send  me.  Any  commander 
of  the  reinforcements  whom  your  Excellency  may  designate  will 
be  acceptable  to  me,  whatever  expression  I  may  have  heretofore 
addressed  to  you  on  that  subject. 

"I  will  fight  the  enemy,  whatever  their  force  may  be.  with 
whatever  force  I  may  have,  and  I  firmly  believe  that  we  shall 
beat  them  ;  but  our  triumph  should  be  made  decisive  and  com 
plete.  The  softiiers  of  this  army  love  their  Government,  and 
will  tight  well  in  its  support.  You  may  rely  upon  them.  They 
have  confidence  in  me  as  their  General,  and  in  you  as  their  Pres 
ident.  Strong  reinforcements  will  at  least  save  the  lives  of 
many  of  them.  The  greater  our  force,  the  more  perfect  will  be 
our  combinations,  and  the  less  our  loss. 

"  For  obvious  reasons  I  beg  you  to  give  immediate  considera 
tion  to  this  communication,  and  to  inform  me  fully  at  the  earliest 
moment  of  your  final  determination." 

THE  ADVANCE  CONTINUED. 
On  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth,  Generals  Franklin,  Smith 
and  Porter  reached  White  House,  the  roads  being  so  bad 
that  one  train  occupied  thirty-six  hours  in  passing  over 
tbe  short  distance  of  five  miles.  About  this  time  two 
Provisional  Army  Corps  were  organized — the  one  under 
Fitz  John  Porter,  the  other  under  Franklin.  Head-quar 
ters  reached  White  House  on  the  sixteenth,  aid  a  perma 
nent  depot  wa.s  at  once  organized  there. 


62  LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  - 

On  the  seventeenth,  the  advance-guard  teached  the 
Chickahominy  River  at  Bottom's  Bridge,  but  its  further 
march  was  obstructed  by  the  rebels  who  had  burned  tha 
bridge. 

On  the  following  day,  Secretary  Stanton  sent  the  follow 
iug  despatch  to  General  McClellan  : 

SECRETARY  STANTON  TO  GENERAL  MCCLELLAN. 

"May  ISth. — Your  despatch  to  the  President,  asking  reinforce 
ments,  has  been  received  and  carefully  considered  : 

"  The  President  is  not  willing  to  uncover  the  capital  entirely, 
and  it  is  believed  that,  even  if  this  were  prudent,  it  would  re 
quire  more  time  to  effect  a  junction  between  your  army  and  that 
of  the  Rappahannock,  by  the  way  of  the  Potomac  and  York 
rivers,  than  by  aland  march.  Tn  order,  therefore,  to  increase  the 
strength  of  the  attack  upon  Richmond,  at  the  earliest  moment, 
General  McDowell  has  been  ordered  to  march  upon  Richmond 
by  the  shortest  route.  He  is  ordered,  keeping  himself  always 
in  position  to  save  the  capital  from  all  possible  attack,  so  to 
operate  as  to  put  his  left  wing  in  communication  with  your 
right  wing;  and  you  are  instructed  to  co-operate  so  as  to 
establish  this  communication  as  soon  as  possible,  by  extending 
your  right  wing  to  the  north  of  Richmond.  It  is  believed  that 
this  communication  can  be  safely  established  either  north  or 
south  of  the  Pamunky  river.  In  any  event,  you  will  be  able  to 
prevent  the  main  body  of  the  enemy's  forces  from  leaving  Rich 
mond,  and  falling  in  overwhelming  force  upon  General  Mc 
Dowell.  He  will  move  with  between  thirty-five  (35,000)  and 
forty  thousand  (40.000)  men.  A  copy  of  the  instructions  to 
General  McDowell  are  with  this.  The  specific  task  assigned  to 
his  command  has  been  to  provide  against  any  danger  to  the 
capital  of  the  nation.  At  your  earnest  call  for  reinforcements, 
he  is  sent  forward  to  co-operate  in  the  reduction  of  Richmond  ; 
but,  charged,  in  attempting  this,  not  to  uncover  the  city  of  Wash 
ington.  And  you  will  give  no  order,  either  before  or  after  your 
junction,  which  can  put  him  out  of  position  to  cover  this  city. 
You  and  he  will  communicate  with  each  other  by  telegraph,  or 
otherwise,  as  frequently  as  may  be  necessary  for  sufficient  co 
operation.  When  General  McDowell  is  in  position  on  your 
right,  his  supplies  must  be  drawn  from  West  Point,  and  you  will 
instruct  your  staff  officers  to  be  prepared  to  supply  him  by  that 
route. 

"The  President  desires  that  General  McDowell  retain  the 
pommand  of  the  Department  of  the  Rappahannock,  and  of  the 
forces  with  which  he  moves  forward." 


LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  £3 


POSITION    OP   THE    CORPS— SEVERE  SKIR 
MISHING. 

On  the  nineteenth,  General  Stoneraan's  Brigade  of  Cav 
alry  left  their  camping  ground  near  White  House,  and 
pushed  on  towards  the  Chickahominy.  The  head-quarters 
and  the  corps  of  Generals  Porter  and  Franklin  also  moved 
to  Tunstall's  Station.  On  the  twenty-first,  the  position  of 
the  troops  were  as  follows :  Stoneman's  advance-guard 
one  mile  from  New  Bridge ;  Franklin's  corps  three  miles 
'from  New  Bridge,  with  Porter's  corps  in  advancing  dis 
tance  in  its  rear ;  Sumner's  corps  on  the  railroad,  about 
three  miles  from  the  Chickahominy,  connecting  the  right 
with  the  left ;  Keyes'  corps  on  New  Kent  road,  near  Bot 
tom's  Bridge,  with  Heintzelman's  corps  at  supporting 
distance  in  its  rear.  The  ford  at  Bottom's  Bridge  was  in 
our  possession,  and  the  rebuilding  of  the  bridge  was  com 
menced. 

On  the  twenty-second,  head-quarters  were  removed  to 
Coal  Harbor,  and  on  the  twenty-fourth  three  important 
skirmishes  took  place.  General  Naglee  made  a  reconnois- 
sance  in  force  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  strength 
of  the  enemy  in  the  vicinity  of  the  "Pines,-"  some  eight 
miles  from  Richmond,  and  while  engaged  in  that  import 
ant  duty  was  fired  upon  by  two  batteries,  both  of  which, 
however,  were  soon  silenced.  Another  and  a  much  smaller 
portion  of  the  army  became  engaged  near  Coal  Harbor, 
and  after  a  spirited  engagement  for  two  hours,  drove  their 
assailants  from  the  field.  In  the  third  skirmish  the  bri' 
gades  of  Generals  Stoneman  and  Davidson  were  engaged, 
and  their  gallantry  compelled  the  rebels  to  hastily  evac 
uate  Mechanicsville,  and  repair  to  a  position  where  they 
would  be  more  secure  from  the  unerring  aim  of  our  artil 
lerists.  General  Stoneman  also  sent  a  portion  of  his 
cavalry  three  miles  up  the  river,  and  destroyed  the  bridge 
4 


64  LIFE   OF   MAJOR- GENERAL   McCLBLLAN. 

of  the  Richmond   and  FreJericksburg   railroad   at   that 
point. 

On  that  day  and  the  next,  the  following  despatches 
passed  between  the  President  and  General  McClellan  : 

THK  PRESIDENT  TO  GENERAL  MCCLELLAN. 

"May  24tfi,  1862.—  After  giving  an  account  of  matters  at  Front 
Royal.  Mr.  Lincoln  says: 

"  If,  in  conjunction  with  McDowell's  movement  against  An 
derson,  you  could  send  a  force  from  your  right  to  cut  off  the 
enemy's  supplies  from  Richmond,  preserve  the  railroad  bridges 
across  the  two  forks  of  the  Pamunky,  and  intercept  the  enemy's 
retreat,  you  will  prevent  the  army  now  opposed  to  you  from  re 
ceiving  an  accession  of  numbers  of  nearly  fifteen  thousand  men  ; 
and  if  you  succeed  in  saving  the  bridges,  you  will  secure  a  line 
of  railroad  for  supplies,  in  addition  to  the  one  you  now  have. 
Can  you  not  do  this  almost  as  well  as  not,  while  you  are  building 
the  Chickahominy  bridges  ?  McDowell  and  Shields  both  say  they 
can,  and  positively  will,  move  Monday  morning.  I  wish  you  to 
move  cautiously  and  safely.  You  will  have  command  of  Mc 
Dowell  after  he  joins  you,  precisely  as  you  indicated  in  your 
long  despatch  to  us." 

"  May  24f/i. — Tu  consequence  of  General  Banks'  critical  posi 
tion,  1  have  been  compelled  to  suspend  General  McDowell's 
movement  to  join  you.  The  enemy  are  making  a  desperate  push 
upon  Harper's  Ferry,  and  we  are  trying  to  throw  General  Fre 
mont's  force,  and  part  of  General  McDowell's,  in  their  rear." 

THE  PRESIDENT  TO  GENERAL  MCCLELLAN. 

"  May  25Ji,  1862 — 2  P.M. — The  enemy  is  moving  north  in  suffi 
cient  force  to  drive  General  Banks  before  him  ;  precisely  in  what 
force  we  cannot  tell.  He  is  also  threatening  Leesburg  and  Geary 
on  the  Manassas  Gap  Railroad,  from  both  north  and  south  ;  in 
precisely  what  force  we  cannot  tell.  I  think  the  movement  is  a 
general  and  concerted  one— such  as  would  not  be  if  he  was  act 
ing  upon  the  purpose  of  a  very  desperate  defence  of  Richmond. 
I  think  the  time  is  near  when  you  must  either  attack  Richmond 
or  give  up  the  job.  and  come  to  the  defence  of  Washington. 
Let  me  hear  from  you  instantly." 

GENERAL  McCLKLLAN  TO  THB  PRESIDENT. 

"  COAL  HARBOR,  May  25th. — Telegram  received.  Indepen 
dently  of  it,  the  time  is  very  near  when  I  shall  attack  Richmond. 
The  object  of  the  movement  is  probably  to  prevent  reinforce 
meats  being  sent  to  me.  All  the  information  obtained  from 
balloons,  deserters,  prisoners,  and  contrabands,  agree  in  the  state 
ment  that  the  mass  of  the  rebel  troops  are  still  in  tha  uauediate 


LIFE   OF  MAJOR-  JENERAL  McCLELLAN.  Qfr 

vicinity  of  Richmond,  ready  to  defend  jt.  I  have  no  knowledge 
of  Banks'  position  and  force,  nor  what  there  is  at  Manassas  ; 
therefore  cannot  form  a  definite  opinion  as  to  the  force  against 
htm.  I  have  two  corps  across  Chickahominy,  within  six  milea 
of  Richmond  ;  the  others  on  this  side  at  other  crossings,  within 
same  distance,  and  ready  to  cross  when  bridges  are  completed 

ORDERS  FOR  CROSSING  THE  CHTCKAHOMHSTY 

On  the  same  day,  the  railroad  being  in  operation  as  far 
as  the  Chickahominy,  and  the  railroad  bridge  across  that 
stream  nearly  completed,  the  Commanding  General  issued 
the  folio-wing  order  to  his  troops  : 

"HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  TOE  POTOMAC, 
"  CAMP  NEAR  COAL  HARBOR,  YA.,  May  26th,  1862. 

"  1.  Upon  advancing  beyond  the  Chickahominy  the  troops  will 
go  prepared  for  battle  at  a  moment's  notice,  and  will  be  entirely 
unencumbered,  with  the  exception  of  ambulances.  All  vehicles 
will  be  left  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  and  care 
fully  packed.  The  men  will  leave  their  knapsacks,  packed,  with 
the  wagons,  and  will  carry  three  days  rations.  The  arms  will 
be  put  in  perfect  order  before  the  troops  march,  and  a  careful 
inspection  made  of  them,  as  well  as  of  the  cartridge-boxes, 
which  in  all  cases  will  contain  at  least  forty  rounds  ;  twenty 
additional  rounds  will  be  carried  by  the  men 'in  their  pockets. 
Commanders  of  batteries  will  see  that  their  limber  and  caisson- 
boxes  are  filled  to  their  utmost  capacity. 

"  Commanders  of  army  corps  will  devote  their  personal  atten 
tion  to  the  fulfilment  of  these  orders,  and  will  personally  see 
that  the  proper  arrangements  are  made  for  packing  and  prop 
erly  guarding  the  trains  and  surplus  baggage,  taking  all  the 
steps  necessary  to  insure  their  being  brought  promptly  to  the 
front  when  needed  ;  they  will  also  take  steps  to  prevent  the 
ambulances  from  interfering  with  the  movements  of  any  troops. 
Sufficient  guards  and  staff-officers  will  be  detailed  to  carry  out 
these  orders. 

"  The  ammunition-wagons  will  be  in  readiness  to  march  to 
their  respective  brigades  and  batteries  at  a  moment's  warning, 
but  will  not  cross  the  Chickahominy  until  they  are  sent  for. 
All  quartermasters  and  ordnance  officers  are  to  remain  With 
their  trains. 

'-II.  In  the  approaching  battle  the  General  Commanding 
trusts  that  the  troops  will  preserve  the  discipline  which  he  has 
been  so  anxious  to  enforce,  and  which  they  have  so  generally 
observed.  He  calls  upon  all  the  officers  and  soldiers  to  obey 
promptly  and  intelligently  all  orders  they  may  receive  ;  let  them 
bear  in  mind  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  has  never  yei  been 


66  I^FE   OF   MAJOR-GEXERAL   McCLELLATT. 

checked,  and  let  them  preserve  in  battle  perfect  coolness  and 
confidence,  the  sure  forerunners  of  success.  They  must  keep 
well  together,  throw  away  no  shots,  but  aim  carefully  and  low, 
and,  above  all  things,  rely  upon  the  bayonet.  Commanders  of 
regiments  are  reminded  of  the  great  responsibility  that  rests 
upon  them  ;  upon  their  coolness,  judgment  and  discretion  the 
destinies  of  their  regiments  and  success  of  the  day  will  depend. 

"  By  command  of  "  Major-General  MCCLELLAN. 

"  S.  WILLIAMS,  Assistant  Adjutant- General." 

BATTLE  OF  HANOVER  COURT-HOUSE. 

On  the  twenty-seventh  was  fought  the  battle  of  Han 
over  Court-House.  The  enemy  for  some  days  had  been 
throwing  forces  upon  our  right  flank  and  threatening  our 
communications  with  the  river.  To  dispose  of  this  force, 
and  also  to  cut  the  Virginia  Central  and  Richmond  and 
Fredericksburg  railroads,  a  portion  of  Fitz-John  Porter's 
Corps  was  detailed.  The  work  was  well  done.  The  rail 
road  communication  was  cut,  and  after  two  severe  engage 
ments,  the  enemy  retreated,  leaving  behind  them  several 
hundred  prisoners,  their  cannon  and  camp-equipage.  Gen 
eral  McClellan  came  up  the  next  morning,  and  was  enthu 
siastically  welcomed. 

On  the  same  day  the  following  despatch  was  sent  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  by  the  Commanding  General : 

"CAMP  NEAR  NEW  BRIDGE,  May  2Sth. — Porter  has  gained  two 
complete  victories  over  superior  forces.  Yet  I  feel  obliged  to 
move  in  the  morning  with  reinforcements,  to  secure  the  complete 
destruction  of  the  rebels  in  that  quarter.  In  doing  so  1  run 
some  risk  here,  but  I  cannot  help  it.  The  enemy  are  even  in 
greater  force  than  I  had  supposed.  I  will  do  all  that  quick  move 
ments  can  accomplish,  but  you  must  send  me  all  the  troops  you 
can,  and  leave  me  to  full  latitude  as  to  choice  of  command 
ers.  It  is  absolutely  necessary  to  destroy  the  rebels  near  Han 
over  Court-House  before  I  can  advance." 

To  which  he  received  the  following  from  the  President : 

"  May  2,8th. — I  am  very  glad  of  General  F.  J.  Porter's  victory. 
Still,  if  it  was  a  total  rout  of  the  enemy,  I  am  puzzled  to  know 
why  the  Richmond  and  Fredericksburg  railroad  was  not  seized 
again,  as  you  say  you  have  all  the  railroads  but  the  Richmond 
and  FrtUericksburg.  1  am  puzzled  to  t^ee  how,  lacking  that, 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN.  gj 

you  can  have  any,  except  the  scrap  from  Richmond  to  West 
Point,  the  scrap  of  the  Virginia  Central  from  Richmond  to  Han 
over  Junction;  without  more,  it  is  simply  nothing.  That  the 
M'hole  of  the  enemy  is  concentrating  on  Richmond,  I  think  cannot 
be  certainly  known  to  you  or  me"  Saxton,  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
informs  us  that  large  forces,  supposed  to  be  Jackson's  and  Swell's, 
forced  his  advance  from  Charlestown  to-day.  General  King  tele 
graphed  us  from  Fredericksburg  that  contrabands  give  certain 
information  that  15,000  left  Hanover  Junction  on  Monday  morn 
ing  to  reinforce  Jackson.  I  am  painfully  impressed  with  the  im 
portance  of  the  struggle  before  you,  and  shall  aid  you  all  1  can 
consistently  with  my  view  of  due  regard  to  all  points." 

Two  days  later,  General  McClellan  telegraphed  to  the 
Secretary : 

"  May  30M,  1862. — From  the  tone  of  your  despatches  and  the 
President's,  I  do  not  think  that  you  at  all  appreciate  the  value  and 
magnitude  of  Porter's  victory.  It  has  entirely  relieved  my  right 
flank,  which  was  seriously  threatened,  routed  and  demoralized  a 
considerable  portion  of  the  rebel  forces,  taken  over  seven  hun 
dred  and  fifty  prisoners,  killed  and  wounded  large  numbers  ;  one 
gun,  many  small  arms,  and  much  baggage  taken.  It  was  one 
of  the  handsomest  things  in  the  war,  both  in  itself  and  in  its 
results.  Porter  has  returned,  and  my  army  is  again  well  in  hand. 
Another  day  will  make  the  probable  field  of  battle  passable  for 
artillery.  It  is  quite  certain  that  there  is  nothing  in  front  of  Mc 
Dowell  at  Fredericksburg.  I  regard  the  burning  of  South  Anna 
Bridges  as  the  least  important  result  of  Porter's  movement." 

BATTLE  OF  FAIR  OAKS. 

On  the  thirty-first  of  May,  the  enemy,  taking  advantage 
of  a  terrible  storm  of  rain  which  had  flooded  the  valley, 
attacked  our  troops,  comprising  the  corps  of  Generals 
Sumner,  Heintzelman  and  Keyes,  in  position  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Chickahominy.  The  battle  commenced  about 
one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  and  after  three  hours  of  des 
perate  fighting,  Casey's  Division,  which  occupied  the  first 
line,  was  compelled  to  fall  back,  and  in  considerable  dis 
order,  upon  the  second  line.  This  caused  a  temporary 
confusion,  but  Generals  Heintzelman  and  Kearney  rapidly 
advanced  their  troops  and  checked  the  enemy,  who 
were  pouring  down  in  immense  force.  Sumner,  Keyes, 
Couch,  Sedgwick  and  the  other  commanders  also  labored 


(38  LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

valiantly  to  retrieve  the  injury  effected  by  the  unfortunate 
recrement  of  Casey's  command.  It  was  after  eight  o'clock 
in  the  evening  before  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks  terminated, 
for  the  day,  and  the  enemy  fell  back  to  their  defensive  line. 
During  that  night  our  lines  were  newly  formed,  and  artil 
lery  placed  in  position,  and  at  an  early  hour  of  the  follow 
ing  morning  the  rebels  again  attacked.  As  rapidly  as 
their  ranks  were  broken  by  the  shot  and  shell  from  our 
pieces,  and  the  balls  from  the  muskets  of  our  infantry, 
were  they  filled  with  fresh  troops.  Both  armies  fought 
with  determination  and  gallantry,  until  victory  again  re 
warded  General  McClellan's  brave  men. 

The  rebel  loss  was  enormous,  while  our  own  summed 
up  in  killed,  wounded  and  missing,  nearly  seven  thousand. 
A  correspondent,  describing  the  battle,  says,  "  General 
JVIcClellan  was  where  his  duty  called  him.  I  saw  him  in 
the  field  during  the  Sunday  fight,  and  afterwards  he  rode 
along  the  entire  battle-front.  During  his  progress  he  was 
greeted  with  great  enthusiasm.  It  was  a  splendid  ova 
tion." 

ADDEESS  TO  THE  ARMY— FURTHER  DES 
PATCHES. 

On  the  evening  of  the  third  of  June,  the  victorious 
commander  issued  the  following  address,  which  was  read 
the  same  evening  at  dress-parade,  and  was  received  with 
the  most  enthusiastic  cheering  from  every  regiment : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
"  CAAIP  NEAR  NEW-BRIDGE,  VA.,  June  2d,  1862. 
"  Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  !  I  have  fulfilled  at 
least  a  part  of  my  promise  to  you.  You  are  now  face  to  face 
•with  the  rebels,  who  are  held  at  bay  in  front  of  their  capital. 
The  final  and  decisive  battle  is  at  hand.  Unless  you  belie  your 
past  history,  the  result  cannot  be  fora  moment  doubtful.  If 
the  troops  who  labored  so  faithfully  and  fought  so  gallantly  at 
Yorktown,  and  who  so  bravely  won  the  hard  fights  at  Williams- 
burgh,  West  Point,  Hanover  Court-House,  and  Fair  Oaks,  now 
prove  themselves  worthy  of  their  antecedents,  the  victory  is 
surely  ours. 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   i»fcCI3LLAN.  ^9 

"The  events  of  every  day  prove  your  superiority.  Wherever 
you  have  met  the  enemy  fou  have  beaten  him.  Wherever  you 
have  used  the  bayonet  he  has  given  way  in  panic  and  disorder. 
I  ask  of  you  now  one  last  crowning  effort.  The  enemy  has 
staked  his  all  on  the  issue  of  the  coming  battle.  Let  us  meet 
him,  crush  him  here,  in  the  very  centre  of  the  rebellion. 

"Soldiers!  I  will  be  with  you  in  this  battle,  and  share  its 
dangers  with  you.  Our  confidence  in  each  other  is  now  founded 
upon  the  past.  Let  us  strike  the  blow  which  is  to  restore  peace 
and  union  to  this  distracted  land.  Upon  your  valor,  discipline, 
and  mutual  confidence,  the  result  depends. 

"GEORGE  B.  MoCr,ELLAif, 
"Major-  General  Commanding.1' 

Or.  the  same  day  the  following  despatches  passed : 

FROM  THE  PRESIDKNT. 

"  June  3d. — With  these  continuous  rains,  I  am  very  anxious 
about  the  Chickahominy,  so  close  in  your  rear,  and  crossing 
your  line  of  communication.  Please  look  to  it." 

To  THE  PRESIDENT. 

"  NEW-BRIDGE,  June  3d. — Your  despatch  of  5  P.M.  just  re 
ceived.  As  the  Chickahominy  has  been  almost  the  only  obstacle 
in  my  way  for  several  days,  your  Excellency  may  rest  assured 
that  it  has  not  been  overlooked.  Every  effort  has  been  made, 
and  will  continue  to  be,  to  perfect  the  communications  across  it. 
Nothing  of  importance,  except  that  it  is  again  raining." 

And  on  the  next  day  he  sent  the  following  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War : 

"  NEW-BRIDGE.  June  4th. — Please  inform  me  at  once  what 
reinforcements,  if  any,  I  can  count  upon  having  at  Fortress 
Monroe  or  White  House,  within  the  next  three  days,  and  when 
each  regiment  may  be  expected  to  arrive.  It  is  of  the  utmost 
importance  that  I  should  know  this  immediately. 

"  The  losses  in  the  battle  of  the  31st  and  1st  will  amount  to 
(7,000)  seven  thousand.  Regard  this  as  confidential  for  the 
present. 

"  If  I  can  have  (5)  five  new  regiments  for  Fortress  Monroe 
and  its  dependencies,  I  can  draw  (3)  three  more  old  regiments 
from  there  safely.  I  can  well  dispose  of  (4)  four  more  raw 
regiments  on  my  communications.  I  can  well  dispose  of  from 
(15)  fifteen  to  (20)  twenty  well-drilled  regiments  among  the  old 
brigades,  in  bringing  them  up  to  their  original  effective  strength. 
Recruits  are  especially  necessary  for  the  regular  and  volunteer 
batteries  of  artillery,  as  well  as  for  the  regular  and  volunteer 
recimeits  cf  infantry. 


70  LI*E   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAff. 

"After  the  losses  in  our  last  battle,  I  trust  that  I  will  no 
longer  be  regarded  as  an  alarmist.  I  believe  we  have  at  least 
one  more  desperate  battle  to  fight." 

On  the  fifth,  the  rebel  artillery  opened  upon  our  forces 
at  Xew-Bridge,  from  five  different  points,  to  prevent  them 
from  rebuilding  the  bridge,  but  after  an  engagement  of  two 
hours,  the  rebels  were  compelled  to  cease  their  fire. 

From  this  t'.me  until  the  Battle  of  Oak  Grove,  numerous 
important  reconnoissances  were  made,  and  several  skir 
mishes  of  greater  or  less  importance  occurred,  and  during 
the  same  interval  the  following  communications  passed 
between  the  authorities  at  Washington  and  the  gallant 
leader  of  the  Union  forces  : 

FROM  THE  SECRETARY  OF  AVAR. 

"June  5£/i. — I  will  send  you  (5)  five  new  regiments  as  fast  as 
transportation  can  take  them,  the  first  to  start  to-morrow  from 
Baltimore.  I  intend  sending  you  a  part  of  McDowell's  force 
as  soon  as  it  can  return  from  its  trip  to  Front  Royal,  probably 
as  many  as  you  want.  The  order  to  ship  the  new  regiments  to 
Fortress  Monroe  has  already  been  given.  I  suppose  that  they 
may  be  sent  directly  to  the  Fort.  Flease  advise  me  if  this  be  as 
you  desire." 

To  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

"  June  1th, — In  reply  to  your  despatch  of  2  P.M.,  to-day,  I  have 
the  honor  to  state  that  the  Chickahominy  river  has  risen  so  as 
to  flood  the  entire  bottoms  to  the  depth  of  three  and  four  feet ; 
I  am  pushing  forward  the  bridges  in  spite  of  this,  and  the  men 
are  working,  night  and  day,  up  to  their  waists  in  water,  to 
complete  them.  The  whole  face  of  the  country  is  a  perfect 
bog,  entirely  impassable  for  artillery,  or  even  cavalry,  except 
directly  in  the  narrow  roads,  which  renders  any  general  move 
ment,  either  of  this  or  the  rebel  army,  entirely  out  of  the  ques 
tion  until  we  have  more  favorable  weather.  I  am  glad  to  learn 
that  you  are  pressing  forward  reinforcements  so  vigorously.  I 
shall  be  in  perfect  readiness  to  move  forward  and  take  Rich 
mond  the  moment  McCall  reaches  here,  and  the  ground  will 
admit  the  passage  of  artillery.  I  have  advanced  my  pickets 
uboiit  a  mile  to-day,  driving  off  the  rebel  pickets,  and  securing 
i1  very  advantageous  position.  The  rebels  have  several  bat 
teries  established,  commanding  the  debouches  from  two  of  our 
biidcrpR.  and  fire  upon  our  w irking  parties  continually;  but  as 
yet  they  have  killed  but  very  few  of  our  men." 


LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  71 

To  THE  SECRETARY. 

"June  IMh. — I  have  again  information  that  Beauregard  has 
arrived,  and  that  some  of  his  troops  are  to  follow  him.  No 
great  reliance,  perhaps  none  whatever,  can  be  attached  to  this 
but  it  is  possible,  and  ought  to  be  their  policy.  I  am  com 
pletely  checked  by  the  weather.  The  roads  and  fields  are 
literally  impassable 'for  artillery — almost  so  for  infantry.  The 
Chickahominy  is  in  a  dreadful  state.  We  have  another  rain  storm 
on  our  hands.  I  shall  attack  as  soon  as  the  weather  and  ground 
will  permit,  but  there  will  be  a  delay,  the  extent  of  which  no  one 
can  foresee,  for  the  season  is  altogether  abnormal.  In  view  of 
these  circumstances,  I  present  for  your  consideration  the  propri 
ety  of  detaching  largely  from  Halleck's  army,  to  strengthen  this  ; 
for  it  would  seem  that  Halleck  has  now  no  large  organized  force 
in  front  of  him,  while  we  have.  If  this  cannot  be  done,  or  even 
in  connection  with  it,  allow  me  to  suggest  the  movement  of  a 
heavy  column  from  Dalton  upon  Atlanta.  If  but  the  one  can  be 
done,  it  would  better  conform  to  military  principles  to  strengthen 
this  army.  And  even  although  the  reinforcements  might  not 
arrive  in  season  to  take  part  in  the  attack  upon  Richmond,  the 
moral  effect  would  be  great,  and  they  would  furnish  valuable 
assistance  in  ulterior  movements.  I  wish  to  be  distinctly  un 
derstood  that  whenever  the  weather  permits  I  will  attack  with 
whatever  force  I  may  have,  although  a  larger  force  would  enable 
me  to  gain  much  more  decisive  results.  I  would  be  glad  to  have 
McCall's  infantry  sent  forward  by  water  at  once,  without  wait 
ing  for  his  artillery  and  cavalry.  If  General  Prim  returns  via 
Washington,  please  converse  with  him  as  to  the  condition  of 
affairs  here." 

FROM  THE  SECRETARY. 

"  June  llth. — Your  despatch  of  3.30  P.M.  yesterday  has  been 
received.  I  am  fully  impressed  with  the  difficulties  mentioned, 
and  which  no  art  or  skill  can  avoid,  but  only  endure ;  and  am 
striving  to  the  uttermost  to  render  you  every  aid  in  the  power 
of  the  Government.  Your  suggestions  will  be  immediately 
communicated  to  General  Halleck,  with  a  request  that  he  shall 
conform  to  them.  At  last  advice  he  contemplated  sending  a 
3olumn  to  operate  with  Mitchel  against  Chattanooga,  and 
thence  upon  East  Tennessee.  Buell  reports  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee  to  be  in  a  critical  condition,  demanding  immediate 
attention.  Halleck  says  the  main  body  of  Beauregard's  force 
is  with  nice  at  Oakolona.  McCall's  force  was  reported,  yester 
day,  as  having  embarked,  and  on  its  way  to  join  you.  It  ia 
intended  tc  send  the  residue  of  McDowell's  force  also  to  join  you 
as  speedily  as  possible.  Fremont  had  a  hard  fight,  day  before 
yesterday,  with  Jackson's  force  at  Union  Church,  eight  miles 
from  Harrisonburg.  He  claims  the  victory,  but  was  pretty  badly 
handled.  It  is  clear  that  a  strong  force  is  operating  with  Jack- 


72  MFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

son,  for  the  purpose  of  detaining  the  forces  here  from  you.  I  am 
urging  as  fast  as  possible  the  new  levies.  Be  assured,  General, 
that  there  never  has  been  a  moment  when  my  desire  has  been 
otherwise  than  to  aid  you  with  my  whole  heart,  mind,  and 
strength,  since  the  hour  we  first  met ;  aud  whatever  others  may 
say  for  their  own  purposes,  you  have  never  had.  and  never  caR 
have,  any  one  more  truly  your  friend,  or  more  anxious  to  sup 
port  you,  or  more  joyful  than  I  shall  be  at  the  success  which  I 
Lave  no  doubt  will  soon  be  achieved  by  your  arms." 

On  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth.  General  McCall's  division 
arrived.  On  the  thirteenth  of  June,  two  squadrons  of  the 
Fifth  United  States  Cavalry,  under  the  command  of  Cap 
tain  Royall,  stationed  near  Hanover  Old  Church,  were 
attacked  and  overpowered  by  a  force  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  numbering  about  1500  men,  with  four  guns. 
They  pushed  on  towards  our  depots,  but  at  some  distance 
from  our  main  body  ;  and,  though  pursued,  made  the  cir 
cuit  of  the  army,  repassing  the  Chickahominy  at  Long 
Bridge.  The  burning  of  two  schooners  laden  with  forage, 
and  fourteen  Government  wagons ;  the  destruction  of 
some  sutler's  stores ;  the  killing  of  several  of  the  guard 
and  teamsters  ;  some  little  damage  done  to  Tunstall's 
Station,  and  a  little  eclat,  were  the  results  of  the  expedi 
tion. 

To  THE  SECRETARY. 

"  CAMP  LINCOLN,  June  14f/i.  midnight. — All  quiet  in  every 
direction.  The  stampede  of  last  night  has  passed  away.  Weather 
now  very  favorable.  I  hope  two  days  more  will  make  the 
ground  practicable.  I  shall  advance  as  soon  as  the  bridges 
are  completed,  and  the  ground  fit  for  artillery  to  move.  At  the 
same  time,  I  would  be  glad  to  have  w  latevcr  troops  can  be  sent 
to  me.  I  can  use  several  new  regiments  to  advantage.  It  ought 
to  be  distinctly  understood  that  McDowell  and  his  troops  are 
completely  under  my  control.  I  received  a  telegram  from  him, 
requesting  that  McCall's  division  might  be  placed  so  as  to  join 
him  immediately  on  his  arrival.  That  request  does  not  breathe 
the  proper  spirit.  Whatever  troops  come  to  me  must  be  disposed 
of  so  as  to  do  the  most  good.  I  do  not  feel,  that  in  such  cir- 
sumstances  as  those  in  which  I  am  now  placed,  General  McDowell 
should  wish  the  general  interests  to  be  sacrificed  for  the  purpose 
of  increasing  his  command.  If  I  cannot  fully  control  all  his 
troops,  I  want  none  of  them,  but  would  prefer  to  fight  the 


LIFE  OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN.       73 

tattle  with  what  I  have,  and  let  others  be  responsible  for  the 
result.  The  department  lines  should  not  be  allowed  to  interfere 
with  me  ;  but  General  McDowell's  and  all  other  troops  sent  to 
me,  should  be  placed  completely  at  my  disposal  to  do  with  them 
as  I  think  best,  in  no  :>ther  way  can  they  be  of  assistance  to  me. 
I  therefore  request  that  I  may  havt  entire  and  full  control. 
The  stake  at  issue  is  too  great  to  allow  personal  considerations 
to  be  entertained.  You  know  that  I  have  none.  The  indica 
tions  are,  from  our  balloon  reconnoissances,  and  from  all  other 
sources,  that  the  enemy  are  intrenching,  daily  increasing  in  num 
bers,  and  determined  to  fight  desperately." 

To  THE  PRESIDENT. 

"  CAMP  LINCOLN,  January  20th,  2  P.M. — Your  Excellency's 
despatch  of  11  A.M.  received  ;  also  that  of  General  Sigel.  I 
have  no  doubt  that  Jackson  has  been  reinforced  from  here. 
There  is  reason  to  believe  that  General  K.  S.  Ripley  has  re 
cently  joined  Lee's  army  with  a  brigade  or  division  from 
Charleston.  Troops  have  arrived  recently  from  Goldsboro'. 
There  is  not  the  slightest  reason  to  suppose  that  the  enemy 
intends  evacuating  Richmond.  He  is  daily  increasing  his  de 
fences.  I  find  him  everywhere  in  force,  and  every  reconnois- 
sance  costs  many  lives.  Yet  I  am  obliged  to  feel  my  way — 
foot  by/oot,  at  whatever  cost — so  great  are  the  difficulties  of 
the  country.  By  to-morrow  night,  the  defensive  works  covering 
our  position  on  this  side  of  the  Chickahominy  should  be  com 
pleted.  I  am  foived  to  this  by  my  inferiority  of  numbers,  so 
that  I  may  bring  the  greatest  possible  numbers  into  action,  and 
secure  the  army  against  the  consequences  of  unforeseen  disaster. 
I  would  be  glad  to  have  permission  to  lay  before  your  Excellency, 
by  letter  or  telegraph,  my  views  as  to  the  present  state  of  military 
affairs  throughout  the  whole  country.  In  the  meantime,  I  would 
be  pleased  to  learn  the  disposition,  as  to  numbers  and  position,  of 
the  troops  not  under  my  command,  in  Virginia  and  elsewhere." 

THE  PRESIDENT'S  REPLY. 

"June  21s£. — If  it  would  not  divert  too  much  of  your  time  and 
attention  from  the  army  under  your  immediate  command,  I 
would  be  glad  to  have  your  views  as  to  the  present  state  of 
military  affairs  throughout  the  whole  country,  as  you  say  you 
would  "be  glad  to  give  them.  I  would  rather  it  should  be  by 
letter  than  by  telegraph,  because  of  the  better  chance  of 
secrecy.  As  *to  the  numbers  and  positions  of  the  troops  not 
under  your  command,  in  Virginia  and  elsewhere,  even  if  I  could 
give  it* with  accuracy,  which  I  cannot,  I  would  rather  not  trans 
mit  either  by  telegraph  or  letter,  because  of  the  chances  of  its 
reaching  the  enemy.  I  would  be  very  glad  to  talk  with  you  ;  but 
you  cannot  leave  your  camp,  and  I  cauuot  well  leave  here  " 


74  LIFE    OF  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

GENERAL  MCCLELLAN'S  REJOINDER. 

"  CAMP  LINCOLN,  June  2'2d. — Under  the  circumstances,  as 
stated  in  your  despatch,  I  perceive  that  it  will  be  better,  at  least, 
to  deter  for  the  present  the  communication  I  desired  to  make." 

To  THE  SECRETARY. 

"  June  24£7i,  12  P.M. — A  very  peculiar  case  of  desertion  has 
occurred  from  the  enemy.  The  party  states  that  'ae  left  Jackson, 
Whiting,  ai\d  Ewell  (fifteen  brigades)  at  Goraonsville  on  the 
21st;  that  they  were  moving  to  Frederickshall,  and  thai  it 
was  intended  to  attack  my  rear  on  the  28th.  I  would  be  glad 
to  learn  at  your  earliest  convenience  the  most  exact  information 
you  have  as  to  the  position  and  movements  of  Jackson,  as  veil 
as  the  sources  from  which  your  information  is  derived,  tha:  I 
may  the  better  compare  it  with  what  I  have." 

FROM  THE  SECRETARY. 

"June  25th. — We  have  no  definite  information  as  to  -.he 
numbers  or  position  of  Jackson's  force.  General  King  yester 
day  reported  a  deserter's  statement,  that  Jackson's  force  was, 
nine  days  ago,  forty  thousand  men.  Some  reports  place  ien 
thousand  rebels  under  Jackson  at  Gordonsville  ;  others  tl  at 
his  force  is  at  Port  Republic,  Harrisonburgh,  and  Luray.  Fre 
mont  yesterday  reported  rumors  that  Western  Virginia  vas 
threatened,  and  General  Kelley,  that  Ewell  was  advancing  to 
New  Creek,  where  Fremont  has  his  depots.  The  last  telega.ni 
from  Fremont  contradicts  this  rumor.  The  last  telegram  fro  m 
Banks  says  the  enemy's  pickets  are  strong  in  advance  at 
Luray.  The  people  decline  to  give  any  information  of  I  is 
whereabouts.  Within  the  last  two  days  the  evidence  is  strong, 
that  for  some  purpose  the  enemy  is  circulating  rumors  of  Jack- 
sou's  advance  in  various  directions,  with  a  view  to  conceal  the 
veal  point  of  attack.  Neither  McDowell,  who  is  at  Manassas, 
uor  Banks  and  Fremont,  who  are  at  Middletown,  appear  to  have 
any  accurate  knowledge  of  the  subject. 

"A  letter  transmitted  to  the  department  yesterday,  purport 
ing  to  be  dated  Gordonsville,  on  the  14th  instant,  stated  that 
the  actual  attack  was  designed  for  Washington  and  Baltimore, 
as  soon  as  you  attacked  Richmond  ;  but  that  the  report  was  to 
be  circulated  that  Jackson  had  gone  to  Richmond,  in  order  lo 
mislead.  This  letter  looked  very  much  like  a  blind,  and  in 
duces  me  to  suspect  that  Jackson's  real  movement  now  is  to 
wards  Richmond.  It  came  from  Alexandria,  and  is  certainly 
designed,  like  the  numerous  rumors  put  afloat,  to  mislead.  I 
think,  therefore,  that,  while  the  warning  of  the  deserter  to  you 
may  also  be  a  blind,  that  it  could  not  safely  bf  disregarded.  I 
will  transmit  to  you  any  further  information  or  this  subject  thut 
may  be  received  here." 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   MeCLELLAX.  75 

THE  BATTLE  OP  OAK  GROVE. 

On  the  twenty-fifth  of  Jane,  occurred  the  battle  of  Oak 
Grove.  General  Hooker's  Division  had  been  ordered  to 
occupy  a  new  and  important  position,  and  were  advancing 
with  that  view  through  dense  thickets  and  almost  im 
passable  swamps,  when  they  were  suddenly  attacked  and 
the  battle  commenced.  Our  gallant  men  gradually 
pushed  the  foe  back,  until  at  length  he  was  driven  to  his 
rifle-pits.  Then,  eager  for  the  fray,  they  were  rapidly 
following,  when  an  order  came  to  cease  the  pursuit. 
About  noon,  General  McClellan,  who  had  remained  at 
head-quarters  to  communicate  with  the  left  wing,  rode 
upon  the  field,  and  to  the  joy  of  his  soldiers  ordered  them 
to  again  advance.  The  order  was  cheerfully  obeyed,  and 
lifter  renewed  desperate  fighting,  at  sunset  the  day  was 
ours.  During  the  afternoon,  General  McClellan  occupied 
a  seat  on  the  parapet  of  a  redoubt  in  front  of  General 
Hooker's  intrenchments,  regardless  of  the  shells  which 
were  falling  around  him,  and  in  opposition  to  the  requests 
of  the  commanding  officers  and  others,  who  appreciated 
the  perilous  position  of  their  beloved  superior. 

THE     SEVEN     BAYS'    BATTLES  —  DESPATCHES 
AND  REPORTS    OP   GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

Of  the  celebrated  "  Seven  Days'  Fights,"  no  better 
account  can  be  given  than  that  to  be  derived  from  the 
reports  and  despatches  of  the  great  commander  who 
fought  them.  They  give  the  correct  history — the  record 
of  a  succession  of  bloody  contests,  and  of  a  subsequent 
retreat,  which  has  but  few,  if  any,  equals,  in  the  superior 
and  successful  manner  in  which  it  was  conducted,  in  the 
annals  of  warfare.  General  McClellan  was  always  to  be 
found  where  the  duties  and  responsibilities  of  his  position 
required  him  to  be.  Day  and  night  his  great  mind  was 
taxed  to  its  utmost  tension,  but  difficulties,  which  to 
others  would  have  been  deemed  insurmountable,  were 


76  klFE   OF   MAJOR  GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

grappled  and  easily  overcome,  generally  without  consulta 
tion  with  his  subordinate  commanders.  The  despatches 
sent  on  the  twenty-fifth  and  twenty-sixth  were  as  follows  : 

To  THE  SECRETARY. 

"  CAMP  LINCOLN,  June  25/7i — 6.15  P.M. — I  have  just  returne  1 
from  the  field,  and  find  your  despatch  in  regard  to  Jacksoi  . 
Several  contrabands  just  in,  give  information  confirming  tli3 
supposition  that  Jackson's  advance  is  at  or  near  Hanover  Court 
House,  and  that  Beauregard  arrived,  with  strong  reinforcements, 
in  Richmond  yesterday.  I  incline  to  think  that  Jackson  will 
attack  my  right  arid  rear.  The  rebel  force  is  stated  at  (200, 000) 
two  hundred  thousand,  including  Jackson  and  Beauregard.  3! 
shall  have  to  contend  against  vastly  superior  odds  if  thes^ 
reports  be  true.  But  this  army  will  do  all  in  the  power  of  men  to 
hold  their  position  and  repulse  any  attack.  I  regret  my  grea; 
inferiority  in  numbers,  but  feel  that  I  am  in  no  way  responsible 
for  it,  as  I  have  not  failed  to  represent,  repeatedly,  the  necessity 
of  reinforcements  ;  that  this  was  the  decisive  point,  and  tha: 
all  the  available  means  of  the  Government  should  be  concen 
trated  here.  I  will  do  all  that  a  general  can  do  with  tin 5 
splendid  army  I  have  the  honor  to  command,  and  if  it  is  de 
stroyed  by  overwhelming  numbers,  can  at  least  die  with  it  and 
share  its  fate.  But  if  the  result  of  the  action,  which  will  proba 
bly  occur  to-morrow,  or  within  a  short  time,  is  a  disaster,  the 
responsibility  cannot  be  thrown  on  my  shoulders  :  it  must  resi, 
where  it  belongs.  Since  I  commenced  this,  I  have  receiver 
additional  intelligence,  confirming  the  supposition  in  regard  to 
Jackson's  movements  and  Beauregard's  arrival.  1  shall  proba 
bly  be  attacked  to-morrow,  and  now  go  to  the  other  side  of  the 
Chickahorniny  to  arrange  for  the  defence  on  that  side.  I  feel 
that  there  is  no  use  in  again  asking  for  reinforcements. 

"  The  report  of  the  Chief  of  the  Secret  Service  Corps,  herewith 
forwarded  and  dated  the  26th  of  June,  shows  the  estimated 
strength  of  the  enemy  at  the  time  of  the  evacuation  of  Yorktown 
to  have  been  from  100,000  to  120,000  men.  The  same  report, 
put  his  numbers  on  the  26th  of  June  at  about  180,000,  and  the 
specific  information  obtained  regarding  their  organization  war 
rants  the  belief  that  this  estimate  did  not  exceed  his  actual 
strength.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  evidence  contained  in 
the  report  shows  the  following  organizations,  viz  :  200  regiments 
of  infantry  and  cavalry,  including  the  forces  of  Jackson  and 
Evvell,  just  arrived  ;  eight  battalions  of  independent  troops  ;  five 
battalions  of  artillery;  twelve  companies  of  infantry  and  inde 
pendent  cavalry,  besides  forty-six  companies  of  artillery,  amount 
ing  in  all  to  from  forty  to  fifty  brigades.  There  were,  undoubt 
edly,  many  others  whose  designations  we  did  not  learn.  The 
report  also  shows  that  numerous  and  heavy  earthworks  had 


LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERA!    McCLELLAN. 


77 


been  completed  for  the  defence  of  Richmond,  and  that  in  thirty- 
six  of  these  were  mounted  some  two  hundred  guns." 

FKOM  THE   SECRETARY. 

"  June  25th — 11.20  P.M. — Your  telegram  of  6.15  has  just  been 
received.  The  circumstances  that  have  hitherto  rendered  i 
impossible  for  the  Government  to  send  you  any  more  reinforce 
ments  than  has  been  done,  have  been  so  distinctly  stated  to  yoL 
by  the  President,  that  it  is  naedless  for  me  to  repeat  them. 
Every  effort  has  been  made  by  the  President  and  myself  to 
strengthen  you.  King's  division  has  reached  Falmouth.  Shields's 
and  Ricketts's  divisions  are  at  Manassas.  The  President  designs 
to  send  a  part  of  that  force  to  aid  you  as  speedily  as  it  can  be 
done.", 

To  THE  SECRETARY. 

"  CAMP  LINCOLN,  Jane  26th — 12  M. — I  have  just  heard  that 
our  advanced  cavalry  pickets,  on  the  left  bank  of  Chickaho- 
miny,  are  being  driven  in.  It  is  probably  Jackson's  advance 
guard.  If  this  be  true,  you  may  no^hear  from  me  for  some 
days,  as  my  communications  will  probably  be  cut  off.  The  ca?e 
is,  perhaps,  a  difficult  one ;  but  I  shall  resort  to  desperate 
measures,  and  will  do  my  best  to  outmancevre,  outwit,  and  out 
fight  the  enemy.  Do  not  believe  reports  of  disaster,  and  do  not 
be  discouraged  if  you  learn  that  my  communications  are  cut  off, 
and  even  Yorktown  in  possession  of  the  enemy.  Hope  for  the 
best,  and  I  will  not  deceive  the  hopes  you  formerly  placed  in  me." 

To  THE  SECRETARY. 

"CAMP  LINCOLN,  June  26th — 2.30  P.M. — Your  despatch  and 
that  of  the  President  received.  Jackson  is  driving  in  my 
pickets,  etc.,  on  the  other  side  of  Chickahominy.  It  is  impossible 
to  tell  where  reinforcements  ought  to  go,  as  I  am  yet  unable  to 
predict  result  of  approaching  battle.  It  will  proba'bly  be  better 
that  they  should  go  to  Fortress  Monroe,  and  thence  according 
to  state  of  affairs  when  they  arrive.  It  is  not  probable  that  I  can 
maintain  telegraphic  communication  more  than  an  hour  or  two 
longer." 

FROM  THE  SECRETARY. 

" June  26th — 6  P.M. — Arrangements  are  being  made  as  rapidly 
as  possible  to  send  you  5,000  men  as  fast  as  they  can  be  brought 
from  Manassas  to  Alexandria  and  embarked,  which  can  be  done 
sooner  than  to  wait  for  transportation  at  Fredericksburgh. 
They  will  be  followed  by  more  if  needed.  McDowell,  Banks, 
und  Fremont's  force  will  be  consolidated  as  the  Army  of  Vir 
ginia,  and  will  operate  promptly  in  your  aid  by  land.  Nothing 
will  be  spared  to  sustain  you.  and  I  have  undoubting  faith  ill 
your  success.  Keep  me  adv:.sed  fully  cf  your  condition." 


78  LltfK   OF   MAJOR  GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

From  the  report  of  General  McClellan,  we  extract  the 
following  details.  General  McClellan  says  : 

"  Up  to  the  26th  of  June,  the  operations  against  Richmond 
had  been  conducted  along1  the  roads  leading  to  it  from  the  east 
and  northeast.  The  reason  (the  President's  anxiety  about 
covering  Washington  from  Fredericksburg,  McDowell's  prom 
ised  co-operation,  partial  advance,  and  immediate  withdrawal) 
which  compelled  the  choice  of  this  line  of  approach,  and  our 
continuance  upon  it,  have  been  attended  to  above." 

PREPARATIONS  TO  CHANGE  BASE. 

"The  superiority  of  the  James  River  route,  as  a  line  of 
attack  and  supply,  is  too  obvious  to  need  exposition.  My  own 
opinion  on  that  subject  had  been  early  given,  and  need  not  be 
repeated  here.  The  dissipation  of  all  hope  of  the  co-operation 
by  land  of  General  McDowell's  forces,  deemed  to  be  occupied 
in  the  defence  of  Washington,  their  inability  to  hold  or  defeat 
Jackson,  disclosed  an  opportunity  to  the  enemy  and  a  new  dan 
ger  to  my  right,  and  to  the  long  line  of  supplies  from  the 
White  House  to  the  Chickahominy.  and  forced  an  immediate 
change  of  base  across  the  Peninsula,  To  that  end.  from  the 
evening  of  the  26th,  every  energy  of  the  army  was  bent.  Such 
a  change  of  base  in  the  presence  of  a  powerful  enemy  is 
one  of  the  most  difficult  undertakings  in  war.  I  was  con 
fident  of  the  valor  and  discipline  of  my  brave  army,  and  knew 
that  it  could  be  trusted  equally  to  retreat  or  advance,  and  to 
fight  the  series  of  battles  now  inevitable,  whether  retreating 
from  victories  or  marching  through  defeats  ;  and,  in  short,  I 
had  no  doubt  whatever  of  its  ability,  even  against  superior  num 
bers,  to  fight  its  way  through  to  the  James  river,  and  get  a 
position  whence  a  successful  advance  upon  Richmond  would 
be  again  possible.  Their  superb  conduct  through  the  next 
seven  days  justified  my  faith.  On  the  same  day  General  Van 
Vliet,  chief  quartermaster  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  by  my 
orders,  telegraphed  to  Colonel  Ingalls,  quartermaster,  at  the 
White  House,  as  follows  : 

"  '  Run  the  cars  to  the  last  moment  and  load  th:m  with  pro 
visions  and  ammunition.  Load  every  wagon  you  have  with 
subsistence  and  send  them  to  Savage's  station,  by  way  of  Bot 
tom's  bridge.  If  you  are  obliged  to  abandon  WThite  House, 
burn  every  thing  that  you  cannot  get  off.  You  must  throw  all 
our  supplies  up  the  James  river  as  soon  as  possible,  and  accom 
pany  them  yourself,  with  all  your  force.  It  will  be  of  vast  im 
portance  to  establish  our  depots  on  James  river,  without  delay, 
if  we  abandon  White  House.  I  will  keep  you  advised  of  every 
movement,  so  long  as  the  wires  work ;  after  that  you  must  exer 
cise  your  own  judgment.' 

"  All  these  commands  were  obeyed.     So  excellent  were  the 


LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAff.  79 

dispositions  of  the  different  officers  in  command  of  the  troops, 
depots,  and  gunboats,  and  so  timely  the  warning  of  the  approach 
of  the  enemy,  that  almost  every  thing  was  saved,  and  but  a 
Email  amount  of  stores  destroyed  to  prevent  their  falling  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy.  General  Stoneman's  communications 
idth  the  main  army  being  cut  off,  he  fell  back  upon  the  White 
House,  and  thence  to  Yorktown,  when  the  White  House  was 
evacuated.  On  the  26th,  orders  were  sent  to  all  the  corps  com 
manders  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Chickahominy  to  be  prepared 
to  send  as  many  troops  as  they  could  spare  on  the  following 
day  to  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  as  will  be  seen  by  the 
appended  telegrams.  General  Franklin  received  instructions  to 
hold  General  Slocum's  division  in  readiness  by  daybreak  on  the 
27th,  and  if  heavy  firing  should  at  that  time  be  heard  in  the 
direction  of  General  Porter,  to  move  at  once  to  his  assistance, 
without  further  orders.  At  noon  on  the  26th  the  approach  of 
the  enemy,  who  had  crossed  above  Meadow  bridge,  was  dis 
covered  by  the  advanced  pickets  at  that  point,  and  at  12.30  P.M. 
they  were  attacked  and  driven  in.  All  the  pickets  were  now 
called  in,  and  the  regiment  and  battery  at  Mechauicsvilla 
withdrawn." 

THE  BATTLE  AT  MECHANICSVILLE^ 

"  Meade's  brigade  was  ordered  up  as  a  reserve,  in  rear  of  the 
line,  and  shortly  after  Martindale's  and  Griffin's  brigades,  of 
Morrell's  division,  were  moved  forward  and  deployed  on  the  right 
of  McCall's  division,  toward  Shady  Grove  church,  to  cover  that 
flank.  Neither  of  these  three  brigades,  however,  were  warmly 
engaged,  though  two  of  Griffin's  regiments  relieved  a  portion  of 
Reynolds'  line  just  at  the  close  of  the  action.  The  position  of 
our  troops  was  a  strong  one,  extending  along  the  left  bank  of 
Beaver  Dam  creek,  the  left  resting  on  the  Ohickahominy,  and 
the  right  in  thick  wood  beyond  the  upper  road  from  Mechanics- 
ville  to  Coal  harbor.  The  lower  or  river  road  crossed  the  creek 
at  Ellison's  mills.  Seymour's  brigade  held  the  left  of  the  lina 
from  the  Chickahominy  to  beyond  the  mill,  partly  in  woods  and 
partly  in  cleared  ground,  and  Reynolds's  the  right,  principally  iu 
the  woods,  and  covering  the  upper  road.  The  artillery  occupied 
positions  commanding  the  roads  and  the  open  ground  across 
the  creek.  Timber  had  been  felled,  rifle-pits  dug,  and  the  posi 
tion  generally  prepared  with  a  care  that  greatly  contributed  to 
the  success  of  the  day.  The  passage  of  the  creek  was  difficult 
along  the  whole  front  and  impracticable  for  artillery,  except  by 
the  two  roads  where  the  main  efforts  of  the  enemy  were  directed. 
At  3  P.M.  he  formed  his  line  of  battle,  rapidly  advanced  hia 
skirmishers,  and  soon  attacked  our  whole  line,  making,  at  the 
same  time,  a  determined  attempt  to  force  the  passage  of  tho 
•jpper  road,  which  was  successfully  resisted  by  General  Reynolds. 
After  a  severe  struggle  he  was  forced  to  retire  with  very  heavy 
5 


30  LIFE   OP   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

loss.  A  rapid  artillery  fire,  with  desultory  skirmishing,  was 
maintained  along  the  whole  front,  while  the  enemy  massed  hia 
troops  for  another  effort  at  the  lower  road  about  two  hours  later, 
which  was  likewise  repulsed  by  General  Seymour,  with  heavy 
slaughter.  The  firing  ceased,  and  the  enemy  retired  abo"  i  ') 
P.M.,  the  action  having  lasted  six  hours,  with  entire  success  to 
our  arms.  But  few,  if  any,  of  Jackson's  troops  were  engaged 
on  this  day.  The  portion  of  the  enemy  encountered  were 
chiefly  from  the  troops  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  who 
crossed  near  Meadow-bridge  and  at  Mechanicsville.  The  in 
formation  in  my  possession  soon  after  the  close  of  this  action, 
convinced  me  that  Jackson  was  really  approaching  in  large 
force.  The  position  on  Beaver  Darn  creek,  although  so  suc- 
c*  ssfully  defended,  had  its  right  flank  too  much  in  the  rear,  and 
\vas  too  far  from  the  main  army  to  make  it  available  to  retain  it 
longer.  I  therefore  determined  to  send  the  heavy  guns  at  Ho- 
gan's  and  Gaines'  houses  over  the  Chickahominy  during  the 
night,  with  as  many  of  the  wagons  of  the  Fifth  corps  as  possible, 
and  to  withdraw  the  corps  itself  to  a  position  stretching  around 
the  bridges,  where  its  flanks  would  be  reasonably  secure,  and  it 
would  be  within  supporting  distance  of  the  main  arrny.  General 
Porter  carried  out  my  orders  to  that  effect.  It  was  not  ad 
visable  at  that  time,  even  had  it  been  practicable,  to  withdraw 
the  Fifth  corps  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Chickahominy.  Such 
a  movement  would  have  exposed  the  rear  of  the  army,  placed  us 
between  two  fires,  and  enabled  Jackson's  fresh  troops  to  inter 
cept  the  movement  to  James'  river,  by  crossing  the  Chicka 
hominy  in  the  vicinity  of  Jones's  bridge,  before  we  could  reach 
Malvern  hill  with  our  trains.  I  determined  then  to  resist  Jack 
son  with  the  Fifth  corps,  reinforced  by  all  our  disposable  troops 
in  the  new  position  near  the  bridge  heads,  in  order  to  cover  the 
withdrawal  of  the  trains  and  heavy  guns,  and  to  give  time  for 
the  arrangements  to  secure  the  adoption  of  the  James  river  as 
our  line  of  supplies,  in  lieu  of  the  Pamunky.  The  greater  part 
of  the  heavy  guns  and  wagons  having  been  removed  to  the 
right  bank  of  the  Chickahominy,  the  delicate  operation  of  with 
drawing  the  troops  from  Beaver  Dam  creek  was  commenced 
shortly  before  daylight,  and  successfully  executed.  Meade's  and 
Griffin's  brigades  were  the  first  to  leave  the  ground  ;  Seymour's 
brigade  covered  the  rear,  with  the  horse-batteries  of  Captains 
Kobertson  and  Tidball ;  but  the  withdrawal  was  so  skilful  and 
gradual,  and  the  repulse  of  the  preceding  day  so  complete,  that 
although  the  enemy  followed  the  retreat  slowly  and  some  skir- 
irishing  occurred,  he  did  not  appear  in  front  of  the  new  line  in 
force  till  about  noon  of  the  27th,  when  we  were  prepared  to  re 
ceive  him.  About  this  time  General  Porter,  believing  that 
General  Stoneman  would  be  cut  off  from  him,  sent  him  orders 
to  fall  back  on  the  White  House,  and  afterwards  rejoin  the  arrny 
a*,  befit  he  could." 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-3EXERAL   McCLELLAN.  #} 

THE  BATTLE  OF  GAINES'  MILL. 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  27th  of  June,  during  the  withdrawal 
of  his  troops  from  Mechanicsville  to  the  selected  position  already 
mentioned,  General  Porter  telegraphed  as  follows  : 

"'  I  hope  to  do  without  aid,  though  I  request  that  Franklin. 
or  some  other  command,  be  held  ready  to  reinforce  me.  Th«3 
enemy  are  so  close  that  I  expect  to  be  hard  pressed  in  front,  i 
hope  to  have  a  portion  in  position  to  cover  the  retreat.  Tha 
is  a  delicate  movement;  but  relying  on  the  good  qualities  of  the 
commanders  of  divisions  aud  brigades,  I  expect  to  get  back  and 
hold  the  new  line.' 

"  This  shows  how  closely  Porter's  retreat  was  followed.  Not 
withstanding  all  the  efforts  used  during  the  entire  night  to  re 
move  the  heavy  guns  and  wagons,  some  of  the  siege-guns  were 
still  in  position  at  Gaines's  house  after  sunrise,  and  were  finally 
hauled  off  by  hand.  The  new  position  of  the  Fifth  corps  was 
about  an  arc  of  a  circle,  covering  the  approaches  to  the  bridges 
which  connected  our  right  wing  with  the  troops  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  river.  Merrill's  divison  held  the  left  of  the  line  in 
a  strip  of  woods  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Gaines's  mill  stream, 
resting  its  left  flank  on  the  descent  to  the  Chickahorniny,  which 
was  swept  by  our  artillery  on  both  sides  of  the  river,  and  extend 
ing  into  open  ground  on  the  right  towards  New  Coal  harbor.  In 
this  line,  General  Butterfield's  brigade  held  the  extreme  left, 
General  Martindale's  joined  his  right,  and  General  Griffin,  still 
further  to  the  right,  joined  the  left  of  General  Sykes's  division, 
which,  partly  in  woods  and  partly  in  open  grout?'l,  extended  in 
rear  of  Coal  harbor.  Each  brigade  had  in  reserve  two  of  its  own 
regiments.  McCall's  division  having  been  engaged  on  the  day 
before,  was  formed  in  a  second  line  in  the  rear  of  the  first,  Meade'a 
brigade  on  the  left,  near  the  Chickahominy,  Reynolds's  brigade 
on  the  right,  covering  the  approaches  from  Coal  harbor  and  Dis 
patch  station  to  Sumner's  bridge,  and  Seymour's  in  reserve  to 
the  second  line,  still  further  in  rear.  General  P.  St.  George 
Cooke,  with  five  companies  of  the  Fifth  regular  cavalry,  two 
squadrons  of  the  First  regulars,  and  three  squadrons  of  the 
Sixth  Pennsylvania  cavalry  (Lancers),  was  posted  behind  a  hill 
in  rear  of  the  position  and  near  the  Chickahominy,  to  aid  in 
•watching  the  left  flank  and  defending  the  slope  to  the  river.  The 
troops  were  all  in  position  by  noon,  with  the  artillery  on  the 
commanding  ground,  and  in  the  intervals  between  the  divisions 
and  brigades.  Besides  the  division  batteries,  there  were  Robert- 
eon's  and  Tidball's  horse  batteries,  from  the  artillery  reserve  ; 
the  latter  posted  on  the  right  of  Sykes's  division,  and  the  former 
on  the  extreme  left  of  the  line,  in  the  valley  of  the  Chicka 
hominy.  Shortly  after  noon,  the  enemy  was  discovered  ap 
proaching  in  force,  and  it  soon  became  evident  that  the  entire 
position  was  to  be  attacked.  His  skirmishers  advanced  rapidly, 
and  soon  Xhe  tiring  became  heavy  along  our  whole  iroiit.  At*2 


g2  LIFE   OF   i-iAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

P.M.  General  Porter  asked  for  reinforcements.  Slocum's  divi 
sion,  of  the  Sixth  corps,  was  ordered  to  cross  to  the  left  bank  of 
the  river,  by  Alexander's  bridge,  and  proceed  to  his  support. 
General  Porter's  first  call  for  reinforcements,  through  General 
Barnard,  did  not  reach  me,  nor  his  demand  for  more  axes,  through 
the  same  officer.  By  3  P.M.  the  engagement  had  become  so 
severe,  and  the  enemy  were  so  greatly  superior  in  numbers,  that 
the  entire  second  line  and  reserves  had  been  moved  forward  to 
sustain  the  first  line  against  repeated  and  desperate  assaults 
along  our  whole  front.  At  3.30  P.M.  Slocum's  division  reached 
the  field,  and  was  immediately  brought  into  action  at  the  weak 
points  of  our  line.  On  the  left  the  contest  was  for  the  strip  0? 
woods  running  almost  at  right  angles  to  the  Chickahominy  in 
front  of  Adams's  house,  or  between  that  and  Gaines's  house  ; 
the  enemy  several  times  charged  up  to  this  wood,  but  were  each 
time  driven  back  with  heavy  loss.  The  regulars  of  Sykes's  divi 
sion  on  the  right  also  repulsed  several  strong  attacks.  But  our 
own  loss,  under  the  tremendous  fire  of  such  greatly  superior 
numbers,  was  very  severe,  and  the  troops,  most  of  whom  had 
been  under  arms  more  than  two  days,  were  rapidly  becoming 
exhausted  by  the  masses  of  fresh  men  constantly  brought  against 
them.  When  General  Slocum's  division  arrived  on  the  ground 
it  increased  General  Porter's  force  to  some  thirty-five  thousand, 
who  were  probably  contending  against  about  seventy  thousand  of 
the  enemy.  The  line  was  severely  pressed  in  several  points,  and  as 
its  being  pierced  at  any  one  would  have  been  fatal,  it  was  una 
voidable  for  General  Porter,  who  was  required  to  hold  his  posi 
tion  until  night,  to  divide  Slocum's  division,  and  send  parts  of 
it.  even  single  regiments,  to  the  points  most  threatened.  About 
5  P.M.,  General  Porter  having  reported  his  position  as  critical, 
French's  and  Meagher's  brigades,  of  Richardson's  division 
(Third  corps),  were  ordered  to  cross  to  his  support.  The  enemy 
attacked  again,  in  great  force,  at  6  P.M.,  but  failed  to  break  our 
lines,  though  our  loss  was  very  heavy.  About  7  P.M.,  they 
threw  fresh  troops  against  General  Porter  with  still  greater 
fury,  and  finally  gained  the  woods-  held  by  our  left.  This  re 
verse,  aided  by  the  confusion  that  followed  an  unsuccessful 
charge  by  five  companies  of  the  Fifth  cavalry,  and  followed  as 
it  was  by  more  determined  assaults  on  the  remainder  of  our 
lines,  now  outflanked,  caused  a  general  retreat  from  our  position 
to  the  hill  in  rear  overlooking  the  bridge.  French's  and 
Meagher's  brigades  now  appeared,  driving  before  them  the 
stragglers  who  were  thronging  towards  the  bridge.  These  bri 
gades  advanced  boldly  to  the  front,  and  by  their  example  as  well 
as  by  the  steadiness  of  their  bearing,  reanimated  our  own  troops 
and  warned  the  enemy  that  reinforcements  had  arrived.  It  wag 
DOW  dusk.  The  enemy,  already  repulsed  several  times  with  terri 
ble  slaughter,  and  hearing  tl  e  shouts  of  the  fresh  troops,  failed 
to  follow  up  their  advantage  This  gave  an  opportunity  to  rally 


LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN.  §3 

our  men  behind  the  brigades  of  Generals  French  and  Mcagner, 
and  they  again  advanced  up  the  hill,  ready  to  repulse  another 
attack.  During  the  night  our  thinned  and  exhausted  regiments 
were  all  withdrawn  in  safety,  and  by  the  following  morning  all 
had  reached  the  other  side  of  the  stream.  The  regular  infantry 
formed  the  rear  guard,  and  about  6  o'clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  28th,  crossed  the  river,  destroying  the  bridge  behind  them. 
Our  loss  in  this  battle,  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  was  very 
heavy,  especially  in  officers,  many  of  whom  were  killed,  wounded, 
or  taken  prisoners  while  gallantly  leading  on  their  men,  or  rally 
ing  them  to  renewed  exertions.  It  is  impossible  to  arrive  at  the 
exact  numbers  lost  in  this  desperate  engagement,  owing  to  the 
series  of  battles  which  followed  each  other  in  quick  succession, 
and  in  which  the  whole  array  was  engaged.  No  general  returns 
were  made  until  after  we  had  arrived  at  Harrison's  landing, 
when  the  losses  during  the  whole  seven  days  were  estimated  to 
gether.  Although  we  were  finally  forced  from  our  first  line 
after  the  enemy  had  been  repeatedly  driven  back,  yet  the  objects 
sought  for  had  been  obtained.  The  enemy  was"  held  at  bay, 
our  siege-guns  and  material  were  saved,  and  the  right  wing 
had  now  joined  the  main  body  of  the  army.  The  number  of 
guns  captured  by  the  enemy  at  this  battle  was  twenty-two,  three 
of  which  were  lost  by  being  run  off  the  bridge  during  the  final 
withdrawal.  Great  credit  is  due  for  the  efficiency  and  bravery 
with  which  this  important  arm  of  the  service  (the  artillery)  was 
fought,  and  it  was  not  until  the  last  successful  charge  of  the 
enemy  that  the  cannoneers  were  driven  from  their  pieces  or 
struck  down,  and  the  guns  captured.  Diedrich's,  Knierim's, 
and  Grimm's  batteries  took  position  during  the  engagement  in  the 
front  of  General  Smith's  line,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  stream, 
and  with  a  battery  of  siege-guns,  served  by  the  First  Connecti 
cut  Artillery,  helped  to  drive  back  the  enemy  in  front  of  General 
Porter." 


THE  RIGHT  BANK  OP  THE  CmcKAHOMixr. 

"  So  threatening  were  the  movements  of  the  enemy  on  both 
banks  of  the  Chickahominy,  that  it  was  impossible  to  decide, 
until  the  afternoon,  where  the  real  attack  would  be  made.  Larue 
forces  of  infantry  were  seen,  during  the  day,  near  the  old  tavern, 
on  Franklin's  right,  and  threatening  demonstrations  were  fre 
quently  made  along  the  entire  line  on  this  side  of  the  river, 
which  rendered  it  necessary  to  hold  a  considerable  force  in 
position  to  meet  them.  On  the  26th  a  circular  was  sent  to  the 
corps  commanders  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  asking  them 
how  many  of  their  troops  could  be  spared  to  reinforce  General 
Porter,  after  retaining  sufficient  to  hold  their  positions  for 
twenty-four  hours. 

"  To  this  the  following  replies  were  received : 


81  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLE^LAff. 

"  ;  HEAD-QUARTERS,  THIRD  CORPS, 

"  'June  26£/i — 4  P.M. 
"'General  P.  B.Marcy: 

"  1  think  I  can  hold  the  intrenchments  with  four  brigades  for 
tvt  mty-four  hours.  That  would  leave  two  brigades  disposable 
fcn  service  on  the  other  side  of  the  river;  but  the  r<"en  are  so 
tit  d  and  worn  out  that  I  Tear  they  would  not  be  in  a  condition 
to  .-ight  after  making  a  march  of  any  distance. 

"  '  S.  P.  HEINTZELMAN,  Brigadier-General.1 

"  Telegrams  from  General  Heintzelman,  on  the  25th  and  26th, 
had  indicated  that  the  enemy  was  in  large  force  in  front  of 
Gei  erals  Hooker  and  Kearney,  and  on  the  Charles  City  road 
(Lo  'gstreet,  Hill,  and  Huger),  and  General  Heintzelman  ex- 
prea  ed  the  opinion,  on  the  night  of  the  25th,  that  he  could  not 
bold  his  advanced  position  without  reinforcements. 

"  ( ;eneral  Keys  telegraphed:  'As  to  how  many  men  will  be 
able  :.o  hold  this  position  for  twenty- four  hours,  I  must  answer, 
all  I  <ave,  if  the  enemy  is  as  strong  as  ever  in  front,  it  having 
at  all  times  appeared  to  me  that  our  forces  on  this  flank  are 
Email  enough.' 

"  0  t  the  morning  of  the  27th,  the  following  despatch  was 
ecni  to  General  Sumner: 

"  '  HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

"'June  27^/1—8.45  A.M. 
"'Gmeral  E.  V.  Sumner,  commanding  Second  Army  Corps: 

"  '  General  Smith  just  reports  that  six  or  eight  regiments  have 
moved  down  to  the  woods  in  front  of  General  Sumner. 

'' '  (Signed)  " '  K.  13.  MARCY,  Chief  of  Staff.' 

"At  11  o'clock,  A.M.,  General  Sumner  telegraphed  as  follows  : 
'The  enemy  threaten  an  attack  on  my  right,  near  Smith.'  At 
12.30  P.M.,  he  telegraphed  :  '  Sharp  shelling  on  both  sides.'  At 
2.45  P.M.:  'Sharp  musketry  firing  in  front  of  Burns;  we  are 
replying  with  artillery  and  infantry.  The  man  on  the  lookout 
reports  some  troops  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle  about  opposite 
my  right  and  Smith's  left ;  the  number  cannot  be  made  out.' 

"  In  accordance  with  orders  given  on  the  night  of  the  26th, 
General  Slocum's  division  commenced  crossing  the  river,  to 
support  General  Porter,  soon  after  daybreak  on  the  morning  of 
the  27th  ;  but,  as  the  firing  in  front  of  General  Porter  ceased; 
the  movement  was  suspended.  At  2  P.M.,  General  Porter  called 
for  reinforcements.  I  ordered  them  at  once,  and  at  3.25  P.M.,, 
Bent  him  the  following  : 

'"  Slocum  is  now  crossing  Alexander's  bridge  with  his  whole 
command.  Enemy  has  commenced  an  infantry  attack  on 
Smith's  left.  I  have  ordered  down  Sumner's  and  Ilcintzelman's 
reserves,  and  you  can  count  on  the  whole  of  Slocuin's.  Go  on 
RS  you  have  begun 


LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL    McCLELLAN.  85 

"  During  the  day  t  ,e  follc-vinsr  despatches  were  received,  which 
will  show  the  condition  ot  affairs  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Chickahominy  : 

"  'June  21th,  1862., 
"  ' To  Colonel  A.V.  Colburn,  A.A.G.: 

"'General  Smith  thinks  the  enemy  are  massing  heavy 
columns  in  the  clearings  to  the  right  of  James  Garnett's  house 
and  on  the  other  side  of  the  river,  opposite  it.  Three  regiments 
are  reported  to  be  moving  from  Sumner's  to  Smith's  front.  The 
arrangements  are  very  good — .made  by  Smith. 

"  '(Signed)  "  '  W.  B.  FRANKLI.V,  Brigadier-General' 

"Afterwards  he  telegraphed  :  '  The  enemy  has  begun  an  attack 
on  Smith's  left  with  infantry.  I  know  no  details.'  Afterwards  the 
following  :  '  The  enemy  has  opened  on  Smith  from  a  battery  of 
three  pieces  to  the  right  of  the  White  House.  Our  shells  are  burst 
ing  well,  and  Smith  thinks  Sumner  will  soon  have  a  cross-tire 
upon  them  that  will  silence  them.'  Afterwards  (at  5.50  P.M.)  the 
following  was  sent  to  General  Keyes  : 

"  'Please  send  one  brigade  of  Couch's  division  to  these  head 
quarters  without  a  moment's  delay.  A  staff-officer  will  be  here 
to  direct  the  brigade  where  to  go.' 

"  Subsequently  the  following  was  sent  to  Generals  Sumner  and 
Franklin  : 

"  '  Is  there  any  sign  of  the  enemy  being  in  force  in  your  front  T 
Can  you  spare  any  more  force  to  be  sent  to  General  Porter  ? 
Answer  at  once.' 

"  At  5.15,  P.M.,  the  following  was  received  from  General 
Franklin  : 

"  '  I  do  not  think  it  prudent  to  take  any  more  troops  from  here 
at  present.' 

"  General  Sumner  replied  as  follows  : 

"  '  If  the  General  desires  to  trust  the  defence  of  my  position  to 
my  front  line  alone,  I  can  send  French  with  three  regiments 
and  Meagher  with  his  brigade  to  the  right — every  thing  is  so 
uncertain,  that  1  think  it  would  be  hazardous  to  do  it.' 

'•  These  two  brigades  were  sent  to  reinforce  General  Porter,  as 
has  been  observed. 

"At  5.25  P.M.,  I  sent  the  following  to  General  Franklin : 
"  '  Porter  is  hard  pressed.  It  is  not  a  question  of  prudence, 
but  of  possibilities.  Can  you  possibly  maintain  your  position 
until  dark  with  two  brigades?  I  have  ordered  eight  regiments 
of  Sumner's  to  support  Porter,  one  brigade  of  Couch's  to  this 
place.  Heiutzelrnan's  reserve  to  go  in  rear  of  Sumner.  If  pos 
sible,  send  a  brigade  to  support  Porter.  It  should  follow  the 
regiments  ordered  from  Sunnier.' 


86  klFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN. 

"At  7.35,  P.M.,  the  following  was  sent  to  General  Sumner: 
"'  If  it  is  possible,  send  another  brigade  to  reinforce  General 
Smith.     It  is  said  three  heavy  columns  of  infantry  are  moving  on 
him.' 

*'  From  the  foregoing  despatches  it  will  be  seen  that  all  disposa 
ble  troops  were  sent  from  the  right  bank  of  the  river  to  reinforce 
General  Porter,  and  that  the  corps  commanders  were  left  ^vith 
smaller  forces  to  hold  their  positions  than  they  deemed  adequate. 
To  have  done  more,  even  though  Porter's  reverse  had  been 
prevented,  would  have  had  the  still  more  disastrous  result  of 
imperiling  the  whole  movement  across  the  Peninsula  " 

JUNCTION  OF  FORCES  EFFECTED. 

"The  operations  of  this  day  proved  the  numerical  superiority 
of  the  enemy,  and  made  it  evident  that  while  he  had  a  large 
army  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Chickahomiuy,  which  had  already 
turned  our  right,  and  was  in  position  to  intercept  the  communi 
cations  with  our  depot  at  the  White  House,  he  was  also  in 
large  force  between  our  army  and  Richmond.  I  therefore 
effected  a  junction  of  our  forces.  This  might  probably  have 
been  executed  on  either  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  and  if  the 
concentration  had  been  effected  on  the  left  bank,  it  is  possible 
we  might,  with  our  entire  force,  have  defeated  the  enemy  there  ; 
but  at  that  time  they  held  the  roads  leading  to  the  "White 
House,  so  that  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  have  sent 
forward  supply  trains  in  advance  of  the  army  in  that  direction, 
and  the  guarding  of  those  trains  would  have  seriously  embar 
rassed  our  operations  in  the  battle  ;  we  would  have  been  compel 
led  to  fight,  if  concentrated  on  that  bank  of  the  river.  Moreover, 
\ve  would  at  once  have  been  followed  by  the  enemy's  forcra 
upon  the  Richmond  side  of  the  river,  operating  upon  our  rear 
art!  if  in  the  chances  of  war,  we  had  been  ourselves  defeated  in 
the  effort,  we  would  Uiave  been  forced  to  fall  back  to  the  White 
House,  and,  probably,  to  Fortress  Monroe.  And  as  both  our 
flank  and  rear  would  then  have  been  entirely  exposed,  our 
entire  supply  train,  if  not  the  greater  part  of  the  army  itself, 
might  have  been  lost.  The  movements  of  the  enemy  showed 
that  they  expected  this,  and  as  they  themselves  acknowledge, 
they  were  prepared  to  cut  off  our  retreat  in  that  lirection.  I, 
therefore,  concentrated  all  our  forces  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
river.  During  the  night  of  the  26th,  and  morning  of  the  271  h, 
all  our  wagons,  heavy  guns,  etc.,  were  gathered  there.  It  may 
be  asked  why,  after  the  concentration  of  our  forces  on  the  right 
bajiik  of  the  Chickahominy  with  a  large  part  of  the  enemy  drawn 
away  from  Richmond,  upon  the  opposite  side,  I  did  not,  instead 
of  striking  for  James  river,  fifteen  miles  below  that  place,  at  once 
march  directly  on  Richmond.  It  will  be  remembered  that  at  this 
junction  the  enemy  was  on  our  rear,  and  there  was  every 
reason  to  believe  that  he  wo  :ld  sever  our  communications  with 


LIFE   OP  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  #7 

the  supply  depot  at  the  White  House.  We  had  on  hand  but 
a  limited  amount  of  rations,  and  if  we  had  advanced  directly  on 
Richmond,  it  would  have  required  considerable  time  to  carry 
the  strong  works  around  that  place,  during  which  our  men 
would  have  been  destitute  of  food,  and  even  if  Richmond  had 
fallen  before  our  arms,  the  enemy  would  still  have  occupied  our 
supply  communications  between  that  place  and  the  gunboats 
and  turned  the  disaster  into  victory.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
enemy  had  concentrated  all  his  forces  at  Richmond  during  the 
progress  of  our  attack  and  we  had  been  defeated,  we  must,  in 
all  probability,  have  lost  our  trains  before  reaching  the  flotilla. 
The  battles  which  continued  day  after  day  in  the  progress  of  our 
flank  movement  to  the  James  river,  with  the  exception  of  the 
one  at  Gaines's  mill  were  successes  to  our  arms,  and  the  closing 
engagement  at  Malvern  Hill  was  the  most  decisive  of  all." 

THE  MOVEMENT  TO  JAMES  RIVER. 

"  On  the  evening  of  the  27th  of  June  I  assembled  the  corps 
commanders  at  my  head-quarters  and  informed  them  of  my  plan, 
its  reasons,  and  my  choice  of  route  and  method  of  execution. 
Gen.  Keyes  was  directed  to  move  his  corps,  with  its  artillery  and 
baggage,  across  the  White  Oak  swamp  bridge,  and  to  seize 
strong  positions  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  swamp,  to  cover  the 
passage  of  the  other  troops  and  trains.  This  was  executed  on 
the  28th  by  noon.  Before  daybreak  on  the  28th  I  went  to  Sav 
age's  station,  and  remained  there  during  the  day  and  night,  di 
recting  the  withdrawal  of  the  trains  and  supplies  of  the  army. 
Orders  were  given  to  the  different  commanders  to  load  their 
wagons  with  ammunition  and  provisions  and  the  necessary  bag- 
gage  of  the  officers  and  men,  and  to  destroy  all  property  which 
could  not  be  transported  with  the  army.  Orders  were  also  given 
to  leave  with  those  of  the  sick  and  wounded  who  could  not  be 
transported,  a  proper  complement  of  surgeons  and  attendants, 
with  a  bountiful  supply  of  rations  and  medical  stores.  The  large 
herd  of  2,500  beef-cattle  was,  by  the  chief  commissary,  Colonel 
Clarke,  transferred  to  the  James  river  without  loss.  On  the 
morning  of  the  28th,  while  General  Franklin  was  withdrawing 
nis  command  froiu  Golding's  farm,  the  enemy  opened  upon  Gen 
eral  Smith's  division  from  Garnett's  hill,  from  the  valley  above, 
and  from  Gaines's  hill  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Chickahominy, 
and  shortly  afterward  two  Georgia  regiments  attempted  to  carry 
the  works  about  to  be  vacated  ;  but  this  attack  was  repulsed  by 
the  Twenty-third  New  York  and  the  Forty-ninth  Pennsylvania 
Volunteers,  on  picket,  and  a  section  of  Mott's  battery*  For- 
ter's  corps  was  moved  across  White  Oak  swamp  during  the  day 
and  night,  and  took  up  positions  covering  the  roads  leading 
from  Richmond  towards  White  Oak  swamp  and  Long  bridge. 
McCall's  division  was  ordered  on  the  night  of  the  28th  to  move 
across  the  swamp  and  take  a  proper  position  to  assist  in  cover- 


88  LIFE    OF    .ilAJCR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN 

ing  the  remaining  troops  and  trains.  During  the  same  night 
the  corps  of  Sunnier  and  Heintzelman,  and  the  division  of  Smith, 
were  ordered  to  an  interior  line,  the  left  resting  on  Keyes'  old 
iutrenchments  and  curving  to  the  right,  so  as  to  cover  Savage's 
station.  General  Slocum's  division  of  Franklin's  corps  was  or 
dered  to  Savage's  station  in  reserve.  They  w.ere  ordered  to  hold 
this  position  until  dark  of  the  29th,  in  order  to  cover  the  with 
drawal  of  the  trains,  and  then  to  fall  back  across  the  swamp  and 
unite  with  the  remainder  of  the  army." 

LETTER  TO  SECRETARY  STANTON, 

"  On  the  night  of  the  28th  I  sent  the  following  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War : 

"  '  HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
"'  SAVAGE'S  STATION,  June  2Sth,  1862—12.20  A.M. 
' '  I  know  the  full  history  of  the  day.  On  this  side  of  the  river — 
the  right  bank — we  repulsed  several  strong  attacks.  On  the 
left  bank  our  men  did  all  that  men  could  do,  all  that  soldiers 
could  accomplish  ;  but  they  were  overwhelmed  by  vastly  superior 
numbers,  even  after  I  brought  my  last  reserves  into  action.  The 
loss  on  both  sides  is  terrible.  I  believe  it  will  prove  to  be  the 
most  desperate  battle  of  the  war.  The  sad  remnants  of  my  men 
behave  as  men  ;  those  battalions  who  fought  most  bravely,  and 
suffered  most,  are  still  in  the  best  order.  My  regulars  were 
superb,  and  I  count  upon  what  are  left  to  turn  another  battle  in 
company  with  their  gallant  comrades  of  the  volunteers.  Had  I 
twenty  thousand  (20,000)  or  even  ten  thousand  (10,000)  fresh 
troops  to  use  to-morrow,  I  could  take  Richmond  ;  but  I  have 
not  a  man  in  reserve,  and  shall  be  glad  to  cover  my  retreat  and 
save  the  material  and  personnel  of  the  army.  If  we  have  lost 
the  day,  we  have  yet  preserved  our  honor,  and  no  one  need  blush 
for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  I  have  lost  this  battle  because 
my  force  was  too  small.  I  again  repeat  that  I  am  not  respon 
sible  for  this,  and  I  say  it  with  the  earnestness  of  a  General  who 
feels  in  his  heart  the  loss  of  every  brave  man  who  has  been  need 
lessly  sacrificed  to-day.  I  still  hope  to  retrieve  our  fortunes  ; 
but  to  do  this  the  Government  must  view  the  matter  in  the  same 
earnest  light  that  I  do.  You  must  send  me  very  large  reinforce 
ments,  and  send  them  at  once.  I  shall  draw  back  to  this  side 
of  the  Chickahominy,  and  think  I  can  withdraw  all  our  mate 
rial.  Please  understand  that  in  this  battle  we  have  lost  nothing 
but  men,  and  those  the  best  we  have.  In  addition  to  what  I 
have  already  said,  I  only  wish  to  say  to  the  President  that  I 
think  he  is  wrong  in  regarding  me  as  ungenerous  when  I  said 
that  my  force  was  too  weak — [  merely  intimated  a  truth  which 
to-day  has  been  too  plainly  proved.  If,  at  this  instant,  1  could 
dispose  of  (10,000)  ter  thousand  fresh  men,  I  could  gain  the  vic 
tory  to-morrow.  I  know  that  a  few  thousand  more  men  would 
have  changed  this  battle  from  a  defeat  to  a  victory.  As  it  is, 


LIFE   OF  MAJOR- GENERAL    McCLELLAN".  gg 

the  Government  must  not,  and  cannot  hold  me  responsible  for 
the  result.  I  feel  too  earnestly  to-night — I  have  seen  too  many 
dead  and  wounded  comrades  to  feel  otherwise,  than  that  the 
Government  has  not  sustained  this  army.  If  you  do  not  do  so 
now,  the  game  is  lost.  If  I  save  this  army  now,  I  tell  you 
plainly  that  I  owe  no  thanks  to  you,  or  to  any  other  persons  in 
Washington.  You  have  done  your  best  to  sacrifice  this  army. 

"  '  (jr.  B.  MCCUSLLAN. 

"  '  To  HON.  E.  M.  STANTON.'  " 

"  The  head-quarters  camp  at  Savage's  station  was  broken  up 
early  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  and  moved  across  White  Oak 
Swamp.  As  the  essential  part  of  this  day's  operations  was 
the  passage  of  the  trains  across  the  swamp  and  their  protection 
against  attack  from  the  direction  of  New  Market  and  Rich 
mond,  as  well  as  the  immediate  and  secure  establishment  of  our 
communications  with  the  gunboats,  I  passed  the  day  in  examin 
ing  the  ground,  directing  the  posting  of  troops,  and  securing 
the  uninterrupted  movement  of  the  trains.  In  the  afternoon 
I  instructed  General  Iveyes  to  move  during  the  night  to  James 
river,  and  occupy  a  defensive  position  near  Malvern  Hill,  to  se 
cure  our  extreme  left  flank.  General  F.  J.  Porter  was  ordered 
to  follow  him  and  prolong  the  line  towards  the  right.  The  trains 
were  to  be  pushed  on  toward  James  river  in  rear  of  these  corps 
and  placed  under  the  protection  of  the  gunboats  as  they  arrived 
A  sharp  skirmish  with  the  enemy's  cavalry  early  this  day, 
on  the  Quaker  road,  showed  that  his  efforts  were  about  to  ba 
directed  towards  impeding  our  progress  to  the  river,  and  rendered 
my  presence  in  that  quarter  necessary." 

•BATTLE  OP  ALLEN'S  FARM. 

*'  General  Sumner  vacated  his  works  at  Fair  Oaks  on  June 
29th,  at  daylight,  and  marched  his  command  to  Orchard  station, 
halting  at  Allen's  Field,  between  Orchard  and  Savage's  station. 
The  divisions  of  Richardson  and  Sedgwick  were  formed  on  the 
right  of  the  railroad,  facing  towards  Richmond,  Richardson 
holding  the  right,  and  Sedgwick  joining  the  right  of  Heintzel- 
man's  corps.  The  first  line  of  Richardson's  division  was  held 
by  General  French,  General  Caldwell  supporting  in  the  second. 
A  log  building  in  front  of  Richardson's  division  was  held  by 
Colonel  Bropks  with  one  regiment  (Fifty-third  Pennsylvania 
volunteers),  with  Hazzard's  battery,  on  an  elevated  piece  of 
ground,  a  little  in  rear  of  Colonel  Brooks'  command.  At  9 
A.M.,  the  enemy  commenced  a  furious  attack  on  the  right  of 
General  Sedgwick.  but  were  repulsed.  The  left  of  General 
Richardson  was  next  attacked,  the  enemy  attempting  in  vain  to 
carry  the  position  of  Colonel  Brooks.  Captain  Hazzard's  bat 
tery,  and  Captain  Pettit's  battery,  which  afterwards  replaced  it, 


90  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  MeCLELLAN. 

were  served  with  great  effect,  while  the  Fifty-third  Pennsylvania 
kept  up  a  steady  fire  on  the  advancing  enemy,  compelling  them 
at  last  to  retire  in  disorder.  The  enemy  renewed  the  attack 
three  times,  but  were  as  often  repulsed." 

BATTLE  OF  SAVAGE'S  STATION. 

"  General  Slocum  arrived  at  Savage's  station  at  an  early  hou* 
on  the  29th,  and  was  ordered  to  cross  White  Oak  swamp,  ant', 
relieve  General  Keyes's  corps.  As  soon  as  General  Keyes  was 
thus  relieved,  he  moved  towards  James  river,  which  he  reached 
in  safety  with  all  his  artillery  and  baggage  early  on  the  morning 
of  the  30th,  and  took  up  a  position  below  Turkey  Creek  bridge. 
During  the  morning  General  Franklin  heard  that  the  enemy, 
after  having  repaired  the  bridges,  was  crossing  the  Ghickahominy 
in  large  force,  and .  advancing  toward  Savage's  station.  He 
communicated  this  information  to  General  Sumner,  at  Allen's 
farm,  and  moved  Smith's  division  to  Savage's  station.  A  little 
after  noon  General  Sumner  united  his  forces  with  those  of  Gen 
eral  Franklin,  and  assumed  command.  I  had  ordered  Genera 
Heintzelrnan,  with  his  corps,  to  hold  the  Williarnsburg  roue 
until  dark,  at  a  point  where  were  several  field-works,  and  a  skirl 
of  timber  between  these  works  and  the  railroad  ;  but  he  fell  bad 
before  night,  and  crossed  White  Oak  Swamp  at  Brackett's  ford. 

General  Sumner,  in  his  report  of  the  battle  of  Savage's 
station,  says  : 

"'When  the  enemy  appeared  on  the  Williamsburg  road,  I 
could  not  imagine  why  General  Heintzelman  did  not  attack  him, 
and  not  till  sometime  afterwards  did  1  learn  to  my  utter  amaze 
ment,  that  General  Heintzelman  had  left  the  field,  and  retreated 
with  his  whole  corps  (about  fifteen  thousand  men)  before  the 
action  commenced.  This  defection  might  have  been  attended 
with  the  most  disastrous  consequences,  and,  although  we  beat 
the  enemy  signally,  and  drove  him  from  the  field,  we  should 
certainly  have  given  him  a  more  crushing  blow  if  General 
Heintzelman  had  been  there  with  his  corps." 

General  Heintzelman,  in  his  report  of  the  operations  of  his 

corps,  says  : 

"  '  On  the  night  of  the  28th  of  June  I  received  orders  to 
withdraw  the  troops  of  my  corps  from  the  advanced  position  they 
had  taken  on  the  25th  of  June,  and  to  occupy  the  intrenched 
lines  about  a  mile  in  rear.  A  map  was  sent  me  showing  the 
positions  General  Sumner's  and  General  Franklii  's  corps  would 
occupy.  About  sunrise  the  next  day,  our  troops  slowly  fell  back 
to  the"  new  position,  cautiously  followed  by  the  enemy,  taking 
possession  of  our  camps  as  soon  as  we  left  them.  From  some 
misapprehension,  General  Sumner  held  a  more  advanced  posi 
tion  Uiau  was  indicated  oil  the  map  furnished  rue,  thus  leaving  a 


LIFE  OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  MCCLELLAN.          9^ 

space  of  about  three- fourths  of  £  mile  between  the  right  of  his 
corps  and  General  Smith's  division  of  General  Franklin's 
corps.  *  *  *  * 

"  'At  11,  A.M.,  on  the  29th,  the  enemy  commenced  an  attack 
on  General  Sumner's  troops,  a  few  shells  falling  within  my  lines. 
Late  in  the  forenoon  reports  reached  me  that  the  rebels  were  in 
possession  of  Doctor  Trent's  house,  only  a  mile  and  a  half  from 
Savage's  station.  I  sent  several  cavalry  reconnoissances,  and 
finally  was  satisfied  of  the  fact.  General  Franklin  came  to  my 
head-quarters  when  I  learned  of  the  interval  between  his  left 
and  General  Sumuer's  right,  in  which  space  Dr.  Trent's  house 
is.  Also,  that  the  rebels  had  repaired  one  of  the  bridges  across 
the  Chickahominy,  and  were  advancing. 

"  '  I  rode  forward  to  see  General  Sumner,  and  met  his  troops 
falling  back  on  the  Williamsburg  road,  through  my  lines.  Gen 
eral  Sumner  informed  rne  that  he  intended  to  make  a  stand  at 
Savage's  station,  and  for  me  to  join  him,  to  determine  upon  the 
position. 

"  'This  movement  of  General  Sumner's  uncovering  my  right 
flank,  it  became  necessary  for  me  to  at  once  withdraw  my 
troops. 

"'I  rode  back  to  find  General  Sumner.  After  some  delay, 
from  the  mass  of  troops  in  the  field,  I  found  him,  and  learned 
that  the  course  of  action  had  been  determined  on  ;  so  I  returned 
to  give  the  necessary  orders  for  the  destruction  of  the  railroad 
cars,  ammunition,  and  provisions  still  remaining  on  the  ground. 

"  '  The  whole  open  space  near  Savage's  station  was  crowded 
with  troops,  more  than  I  supposed  could  be  brought  into  action 
judiciously.  An  aid  from  the  commanding  general  had,  in  the 
morning,  reported  to  me  to  point  out  a  road  across  the  White 
Oak  swamp,  starting  from  the  left  of  General  Kearney's  position, 
and  leading  by  Brackett's  ford.  The 

advance  of  the  column  reached  the  Charles  City  road  at  6£  P.M., 
and  the  rear  at  10  P.M.,  without  accident.'" 

"  The  orders  given  by  me  to  Generals  Sumner,  Heintzelman, 
and  Franklin  were  to  hold  the  positions  assigned  them  until  dark. 
As  stated  by  General  Heintzelman,  General  Sumner  did  not 
occupy  the  designated  position  ;  but  as  he  was  the  senior 
officer  present  on  that  side  of  the  White  Oak  swamp,  he  may 
have  thought  that  the  movements  of  the  enemy  justified  a  de 
viation  from  the  letter  of  the  orders.  It  appears  from  his 
report  that  he  assumed  command  of  all  the  troops  near  Savage's 
Station,  and  determined  to  resist  the  enemy  there,  and  that  he 
gave  General  Heiutzelman  orders  to  hold  the  same  position  as  I 
had  assigned  him.  The  aid  sent  by  me  to  General  Heintzelman, 
to  point  out  the  road  across  the  swamp,  was  to  guide  him  in  re 
tiring  after  dark.  On  reaching  Savage's  Station,  Sumner's  und 
Franklin's  commands  weiv  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle,  in  the 
large  ope,i  field  to  the  left  of  the  railroad,  the  lei't  resting  on 


92  LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

the  edge  of  the  woods,  and  the  right  extending  down  to  the  rail 
road.  General  Brooks,  with  his  brigade,  held  the  woods  to  the 
left  of  the  field,  where  he  did  excellent  service,  receiving  a 
wound,  but  retaining  his  command.  General  Hancock's  brigade 
was  thrown  into  the  woods  on  the  right  and  front.  At  4  P.M., 
the  eiiemy  commenced  his  attack  in  large  force,  by  the  Wil 
liams  burg  road.  It  was  gallantly  met  by  General  Burns's  brigade1, 
supported  and  reinforced  by  two  lines  in  reserve,  and  finally  by 
tl)^  New  York  Sixty-ninth,  Hazzard's  and  Pettet's  batteries  again 
doing  good  service.  Osborn's  and  Bramhall's  batteries  also  took 
part  effectively  in  this  action,  which  was  continued  with  gmit 
obstinacy  until  between  8  and  9  P.M.,  when  the  enemy  were 
driven  from  the  field.  Immediately  after  the  battle,  the  orders 
were  repeated  for  all  the  troops  to  fall  back  and  cross  White 
Oak  swamp,  which  we  accomplished  during  the  night  in  good 
order.  By  midnight  all  the  troops  were  on  the  road  to  White 
Oak  swamp  bridge,  General  French,  with  his  brigade,  acting  as 
rear-guard,  and  at  5  A.M.,  on  the  30th,  all  had  crossed,  and  the 
bridge  was  destroyed. 

OPERATIONS  ON  THE  30TH. 

"  On  the  afternoon  of  the  29th,  I  gave  to  the  corps  com 
manders  their  instructions  for  the  operations  of  the  following 
day.  As  stated  before,  Porter's  corps  was  to  move  forward  to 
James  river,  and  with  the  corps  of  General  Keyes,  to  occupy  a 
position  at  or  near  Turkey  Bend,  on  a  line  perpendicular  to  the 
river,  thus  covering  the  Charles  City  road  to  Kichmond,  opening 
communication  with  the  gunboats,  and  covering  the  passage  of 
the  supply  trains,  which  were  pushed  forward  as  rapidly  as  possi 
ble  upon  HaxalPs  plantation.  The  remaining  corps  were 
pressed  onward  and  posted  so  as  to  guard  the  approaches  from 
Kichmond,  as  well  as  the  crossings  of  the  White  Oak  Swamp, 
over  which  the  army  had  passed.  General  Franklin  was  ordered 
to  hold  the  passage  of  White  Oak  Swamp  bridge,  and  cover  the 
withdrawal  of  the  trains  from  that  point.  His  command  con 
sisted  of  his  own  corps,  with  General  Richardson's  division,  and 
General  Naglee's  brigade,  placed  under  his  orders  for  the  occa 
sion.  General  Slocum's  division  was  on  the  right  of  the  Charles 
City  road.  On  the  morning  of  the  30th  I  again  gave  to  the  corps 
commanders  within  reach  instructions  for  posting  their  troops. 
T  found  that,  notwithstanding  all  the  efforts  of  my  personal 
B'.aff  and"  other  officers,  the  roads  were  blocked  by  wagons,  and 
there  was  great  difficulty  in  keeping  the  trains  in  motion.  The 
engineer  officers  whom  I  had  sent  forward  on  the  28th  to 
reconnoitre  the  roads,  had  neither  returned  nor  sent  me  any  re 
ports  or  guides.  Generals  Keyes  and  Porter  had  been  delayed 
— one  by  losing  the  road,  am]  the  other  by  repairing  an  old  road 
— and  had  not  been  able  to  send  any  information.  We  then 
knew  of  but  ow  road  for  th«  movement  of  the  troops  and  our 


LIFE    OF   MAJOE-GENERAL   UcCLELLAN.  93 

Immense  trains.  It  was  therefore  necessary  to  post  the  troops 
in  advance  of  this  road  as  well  as  our  limited  knowledge  of  the 
ground  permitted,  so  as  to  cover  the  movement  of  the  trains  in 
the  rear.  I  then  examined  the  whole  line  from  the  swamp  to 
the  left,  giving  final  instructions  for  the  posting  of  the  troops, 
ond  the  obstructions  of  the  roads  toward  Richmond  ;  and  all 
corps  commanders  were  directed  to  bold  their  positions  "ntil  the 
trains  had  passed,  after  which  a  more  concentrated  position  was 
to  be  taken  up  near  James  river.  Our  force  was  too  small  to 
occupy  and  hold  the  entire  line  from  the  White  Oak  Swamp  to 
the  river,  exposed  as  it  was,  to  be  taken  in  reverse  by  a  move 
ment  across  the  lower  part  of  the  swamp,  or  across  the  Chicka- 
hoininy  below  the  swamp.  Moreover,  the  troops  were  then 
greatly  exhausted,  and  required  rest  in  a  more  secure  position. 
I  extended  my  examinations  of  the  country  as  far  as  Haxall's, 
looking  at  all  the  approaches  to  Malvern,  which  position  I 
perceived  to  be  the  key  to  our  operations  in  this  quarter,  and  was 
thus  enabled  to  expedite  very  considerably  the  passage  of  the 
trains,  and  to  rectify  the  positions  of  the  troops. 

"  Every  thing  being  then  quiet,  I  sent  aids  to  the  different 
corps  commanders  to  inform  them  what  I  had  done  on  the 
left,  and  to  bring  me  information  of  the  condition  of  affairs  on 
the  right.  I  returned  from  Malvern  to  Haxall's,  and  having 
made  arrangements  for  instant  communication  from  Malvern  by 
signals,  went  on  board  of  Captain  Rodgers's  gunboat,  lying  near, 
to  confer  with  him  in  reference  to  the  condition  of  our  supply 
vessels,  and  the  state  of  things  on  the  river.  It  was  his  opinion 
that  it  would  be  necessary  for  the  army  to  fall  back  to  a  posi 
tion  below  City  Point,  as  the  channel  there  was  so  near  the 
southern  shore  that  it  would  not  be  possible  to  bring  up  the 
transports,  should  the  enemy  occupy  it.  Harrison's  Landing 
was,  in  his  opinion,  the  nearest  suitable  point.  Upon  the 
termination  of  this  interview,  I  returned  to  Malvern  Hill,  aud 
remained  there  till  shortly  before  daylight." 

BATTLE  OF  NELSON'S  FARM  OR  GLEXPALE. 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  30th,  General  Sumner  was  ordered 
to  march  with  Sedgwick's  division  to  Glendale  (Nelson's  farm.) 
General  McCalPs  division  (Pennsylvania  reserves)  was  halted 
during  the  morning  on  the  New  Market  road,  just  in  advance 
of  the  point  where  the  road  turns  off  to  Quaker  Church.  This 
line  was  formed  perpendicularly  to  the  New  Market  road,  with 
Msade's  brigade  on  the  right,  Seymour's  on  the  left,  and 
Reynold's  brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  8.  G.  Simmons,  of 
the  Fifth  Pennsylvania,  in  reserve;  Randall's  regular  Lattery 
on  the  right,  Kern's  and  Cooper's  batteries  opposite  the  rentre, 
and  Deitrich's  and  Kanerhun's  batteries,  of  the  artillery  re- 
lerve,  on  the  left — all  in  front  of  the  infantry  line.  The  coun 
try  iu  General  McCall'a  front  was  an  open  field,  intersected 


94  LIFE    OF    MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAHT. 

towards  the  right  by  the  New  Market  road,  and  a  small  strip  of 
timber  parallel  to  it.  The  open  front  was  about  eight  hundred 
yards  ;  its  depth  about  one  thousand  yards.  On  the  morning 
of  the  30th,  General  Heintzelmaii  ordered  the  bridge  at 
Brackett's  Ford  to  be  destroyed,  and  trees  to  bjj  felled  across 
that  road  and  the  Charles  City  road.  General  Slocum's  divi 
sion  was  to  extend  to  the  Charles  City  road.  General  Kear 
ney's  left  to  connect  with  General  Slocum's  left.  General 
McCall's  positior  was  to  the  left  of  the  Long  Bridge  road,  in 
connection  with  General  Kearney's  left.  General  Hooker 
was  on  the  left  of  General  McCall.  Between  12  and  1  o'clock 
the  enemy  opened  a  fierce  cannonade  upon  the  divisions  of 
Smith  and  Richardson,  and  Naglee's  brigade,  at  White  Oak 
Swamp  bridge.  This  artillery  fire  was  continued  by  the  enemy 
through  the  day,  and  he  crossed  some  infantry  below  our  posi 
tion.  Richardson's  division  suffered  severely.  Captain  Ay  re  3 
directed  our  artillery  with  great  effect.  Captain  Hazzard's 
battery,  after  losing  many  cannoneers,  and  Captain  liaz/ard 
being  mortally  wounded,  was  compelled  to  retire.  It  was 
replaced  by  Fettet's  battery,  which  partially  silenced  the 
enemy's  guns.  General  Franklin  held  his  position  until  after 
dark,  repeatedly  driving  back  the  enemy  in  their  attempts  to 
cross  the  White  Oak  Swamp.  At  2  o'clock  in  the  day  the 
enemy  were  reported  advancing  in  force  by  the  Charles  City 
road,  and  at  2£  o'clock  the  attack  was  made  down  the  road  on 
General  Slocum's  left,  but  was  checked  by  his  artillery.  After 
this  the  enemy,  in  large  force,  comprising  the  divisions  of 
Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill,  attacked  General  McCall,  whose 
division,  after  severe  fighting,  was  compelled  to  retire. 

General  McCall,  in  his  report  of  the  battle,  says: 

"  '  About  2£  o'clock  my  pickets  were  driven  in  by  a 
strong  advance,  after  some  skirmishing,  without  loss  on  our  part. 
"  'At  H  o'clock  the  enemy  sent  forward  a  regiment  on  the  left 
centre,  and  another  on  the  right  centre,  to  feel  for  a  weak  point. 
They  were  under  cover  of  a  shower  of  shells,  and  boldly  ad 
vanced,  but  were  both  driven  back — on  the  left  by  the  Twelfth 
regiment,  and  on  the  right  by  the  Seventh  regiment.  For 
nearly  two  hours  the  battle  raged  hotly  here.  *  *  *  *  At 
last  the  enemy  was  compelled  to  retire  before  the  well-directed 
musketry  fire  of  the  reserves.  The  German  batteries  were 
driven  to  the  rear,  but  I  rode  up  and  sent  them  back.  It  was, 
however,  of  little  avail,  and  they  were  soon  after  abandoned  by 
the  cannoneers.  *  *  *  *  The  batteries  in  front  of  the 
centre  weiv  boldly  charged  upon,  but  the  enemy  were  speedily 
forced  back.  *  *  *  *  Soon  after  this  a  most  determined 
charge  was  made  on  Randall's  battery  by  a  full  brigade,  ad 
vancing  in  wedge  shape,  without  order,  but  in  perfect  reckless- 
ness.  Somewhat  similar  charges  had,  I  have  stated,  been,  pre- 


LIFE   OF  MAJOR-G^NLRAL  McCLELLAff.  95 

viuasly  made  on  Cooper's  and  Kern's  batteries  by  single  regi 
ments  without  success,  they  having  recoiled  before  the  etnrm  of 
cannister  hurled  against  them.  A  like  result  fras  anticipated  by 
Randall's  battery,  and  the  Fourth  regiment  was  requested  not  to 
fire  until  the  battery  had  done  with  them.  Its  gallant  comman 
der  did  not  doubt  his  ability  to  repel  the  attack,  and  his  guns 
did  indeed  mow  down  the  advancing  host,  but  still  the  gaps 
were  closed,  and  the  enemy  came  in  upon  a  run  to  the  very 
muzzle  of  his  guns.  It  was  a  perfect  torrent  of  men,  and  they 
were  in  his  battery  before  the  guns  could  be  removed.  Two 
guns  that  were,  indeed,  successfully  limbered  had  their  horses 
killed  and  wounded,  and  were  overturned  on  the  spot,  and  the 
enemy,  dashing  past,  drove  the  greater  part  of  the  Fourth  re 
giment  before  them.  The  left  company  (B),  nevertheless,  stood 
its  ground,  with  its  Captain,  Fred.  A.  Conrad,  as  did  likewise 
certain  men  of  other  companies.  I  had  ridden  into  the  regi 
ment  and  endeavored  to  check  them,  but  with  only  partial  suc 
cess.  *  *  *  *  *  * 

"  *  There  was  no  running,  but  my  division,  reduced  by  the  pre 
vious  battles  to  less  than  6,000,  had  to  contend  with  the  divisions 
of  Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill,  considered  two  of  the  strongest 
and  best  among  many  of  the  Confederate  Army,  numbering  that 
day  18,000  or  20,000  men,  and  it  was  reluctantly  compelled  to 
give  way  before  heavier  force  accumulated  upon  them.'  " 

"  General  Heintzelman  states  that  about  5  o'clock,  P.M.,  Gen 
eral  McCall's  division  was  attacked  in  large  force,  evidently  the 
principal  attack;  that  in  less  than  an  hour  the  division  gave  way, 
and  adds : 

"  '  General  Hooker  being  on  his  left,  by  moving  to  his  right  re 
pulsed  the  rebels  in  the  handsomest  manner,  with  great  slaugh 
ter.  General  Sumner,  who  was  with  General  Sedgwick  in  Mc 
Call's  rear,  also  greatly  aided  with  his  artillery  and  infantry  in. 
driving  back  the  enemy.  They  now  renewed  their  attack  with 
vigor  on  General  Kearney's  left,  and  were  again  repulsed  with 
heavy  loss.  *  * 

"  'This  attack  commenced  about  4  P.M.,  and  was  pushed  by 
heavy  masses  with  the  utmost  determination  and  vigor.  Captain 
Thompson's  battery,  directed  with  great  precision,  firing  double 
charges,  swept  them  back.  The  whole  open  space,  two  hundred 
paces  wide,  was  filled  with  the  enemy  ;  each  repulse  brought 
fresh  troops.  The  third  attack  was  only  repulsed  by  the  rapid 
volleys  and  determined  charge  of  the  Sixty-third  Pennsylvania, 
Colonel  Hayes,  and  half  of  the  Thirty-seventh  New  York  Vol 
unteers.'  " 

"  General  McCall's  troops  soon  began  to  emerge  from  the 

woods   into  the  open  field.     Several  batteries  were  in  position. 

and  began  to  tire  into  the  woods  over  the  heads  of  our  men  in 

front.     Captain  DeKussey's  battery  was  placed  en  the  right  of 

6 


96  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAIC. 

General  Sumner's  artillery,  with  orders  to  shell  the  woods.  Gen. 
eral  Burns' s  brigade  was  then  advanced  to  meet  the  enemy,  and 
eoon  drove  him  back ;  other  troops  began  to  return  from  the 
White  Oak  swamp.  Late  in  the  day,  at  the  cull  of  Genera. 
Kearney,  General  Taylor's  First  New  Jersey  brigade,  Slocum's 
division,  was  sent  to  occupy  a  portion  of  General  Me  Call's  de 
serted  position,  a  battery  accompanying  the  brigade.  They 
Boon  drove  back  the  enemy,  who  shortly  after  gave  up  the  at 
tack,  contenting  themselves  with  keeping  up  a  desultory  firing 
till  late  at  night.  Between  12  and  1  o'clock  at  night,  Genera 
Heintzelman  commenced  to  withdraw  his  corps,  and  soon  ai'tei 
daylight  both  of  his  divisions,  with  General  Slocum's  division 
and  a  portion  of  General  Sumner's  command,  reached  Malven: 
Hill.  On  the  morning  of  the  30th,  General  Sunnier,  in  obedi 
ence  to  orders,  had  moved  promptly  to  Glendale,  and  upon  a 
call  from  General  Franklin  for  reinforcements,  sent  him  twc 
brigades,  which  returned  in  time  to  participate  and  render  good 
service  in  the  battle  near  Glendale." 

"  General  Sumner  says  of  this  battle  : 

"  '  The  battle  of  Glendale  was  the  most  severe  action  since 
the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks.  About  3  o'clock,  P.M.,  the  action  com 
menced,  and  after  a  furious  contest,  lasting  till  after  dark,  the 
enemy  was  routed  at  all  points,  and  driven  from  the  fluid. ' 

"  The  rear  of  the  supply  trains  and  the  reserve  artillery  of  the 
army  reached  Malvern  Plill  about  4  P.M.  At  about  this  1/ime 
the  enemy  began  to  appear  in  General  Porter's  front,  and  at 
5  o'clock  advanced  in  large  force  against  his  left  flank,  posting 
artillery  under  cover  of  a  skirt  of  timber,  with  a  view  to  engage 
our  force  on  Malvern  Hill,  while,  with  his  infantry,  and  some 
artillery,  he  attacked  Colonel  Warren's  brigade.  A  concen 
trated  tire  of  about  thirty  guns  was  brought  to  bear  on  the 
enemy,  which  with  the  infantry  fire  of  Colonel  Warren's  com 
mand,  compelled  him  to  retreat,  leaving  two  guns  in  the  hands 
of  Colonel  Warren.  The  gunboats  rendered  most  efficient  aid  at 
this  time,  and  helped  to  drive  back  the  enemy.  It  was  very 
late  at  night  before  my  aids  returned  to  give  me  the  results 
of  the  day's  fighting  along  the  whole  line,  and  the  true  position 
of  affan>.  While  waiting  to  hear  from  General  Franklin  before 
lending  orders  to  Generals  Sunnier  and  Heintzelman,  I  received 
a  message  from  the  latter  that  General  Franklin  was  falling 
back,  whereupon  I  sent  Colonel  Colburn,  of  my  staff,  with' 
ordcrti  to  verify  this,  and  if  it  were  true,  to  order  in  Generals 
Sumner  and  Heintzelman  at  once.  He  hud  not  gone  ftir  when 
lie  met  two  officers  sent  from  General  Franklin's  head-quarters, 
with  the  information  that  he  was  falling  back.  Orders  were 
then  sent  to  Generals  Sumner  and  Heintzelman  to  Call  back 
also,  and  definite  instructions  were  given  as  to  the  movement, 
which  was  to  commence  on  the  right.  The  orders  met  these 
troops  already  en  route  to  Malvern.  Instructions  were  also  sent 


LIFE   OF    MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  97 

to  General  Franklin  as  to  the  route  he  was  to  follow.  General 
Barnard  then  received  full  instructions  for  posting  the  troops 
as  they  arrived.  I  then  returned  to  Haxall's,  and  again  left  for 
Mulvern  soon  tfter  daybreak.  Accompanied  by  several  general 
officers,  I  once  more  made  the  entire  circuit  of  the  position  and 
then  returned  to  Haxall's,  whence  I  went  with  Captain  Rod- 
gers  to  select  the  final  location  for  the  army  and  its  depots.  I 
returned  to  Malvern  before  the  serious  fighting  commenced, 
and  after  riding  along  the  lines,  and  seeing  most  cause  to  feel 
anxious  about  the  right,  remained  in  that  vicinity."  * 

BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL. 

"The  position  selected  for  resisting  the  further  advance  of  the 
enemy  on  the  first  of  July,  was  with  the  left  and  centre  of  our 
lines  resting  on  Malvern  Hill,  while  the  right  curved  backward 
through  a  wooded  country  towards  a  point  below  Haxall's,  on 
James  river.  Malvern  Hill  is  an  elevated  plateau,  about  a 
mile  and  a  half  by  three-fourths  of  a  mile  in  area,  well  cleared  of 
timber,  and  with  several  converging  roads  running  over  it.  In 
front  are  numerous  defensible  ravines,  and  the  ground  slopes 
gradually  toward  the  north  and  east  to  the  woodland,  giving  clear 
ranges  for  artillery  in  those  directions.  Towards  the  northwest 
the  plateau  falls  off  more  abruptly  into  a  ravine  which  extends 
to  James  river.  From  the  position  of  the  enemy,  his  most  ob 
vious  lines  of  attack  would  come  from  the  direction  of  Richmond 
and  White  Oak  swamp,  and  would  almost  of  necessity  strike  us 
upon  our  left  wing.  Here,  therefore,  the  lines  were  strengthened 
by  massing  the  troops  and  collecting  the  principal  part  of  the 
artillery.  Porter's  corps  held  the  left  of  the  line — Sykes' 
division  on  the  left,  Morrell's  on  the  right,  with  the  artillery  of 
his  two  divisions  advantageously  posted,  and  the  artillery  of  the 
reserve  so  disposed  on  the  high  ground  that  a  concentrated  fire 
of  some  sixty  guns  could  be  brought  to  bear  on  any  point  in  his 
front  or  left.  Colonel  Tyler  also  had,  with  great  exertion,  suc 
ceeded  in  getting  ten  of  his  siege-guns  in  position  on  the 
highest  point  of  the  hill.  Couch's  division  was  placed  on  the 
right  of  Porter ;  next  came  Kearney  and  Hooker ;  next 
Sedgwick  and  Richardson  ;  next  Smith  and  Slocum,  then  the 
remainder  of  K eyes'  corps,  extending  by  a  backwood  carve  nearly 
to  the  river.  The  Pennsylvania  Reserve  corps  was  held  iu 
reserve,  and  stationed  behind  Porter's  and  Couch's  position. 
One  brigade  of  Porter's  was  thrown  to  the  left,  on  the  low 
ground,  to  protect  that  flank  from  any  movement  direct  from 
the  Richmond  road.  The  line  was  very  strong  along  the  whole 
front  of  the  open  plateau,  but  from  thence  to  the  extreme  right, 
the  troops  were  more  deployed.  This  formation  was  imperative, 
as  an  attack  would  probably  be  made  upon  our  left.  The  right 
was  rendered  as  secur3  as  possible  by  slashing  the  timber,  and 
by  barricading  the  raids.  Commodore  Rodgers,  commanding 


98  LIFE   OP   MAJOR-GENERAL   Mc'.LELLAN. 

the  flotilla  on  James  river,  placed  his  gunboats  so  as  to  protect 
our  flank  and  to  command  the  approaches  from  Richmond. 
Between  9  and  10  A.M.,  the  enemy  commenced  feeling  along 
our  whole  left  wing  with  his  artillery  and  skirmishers,  as  far  to  the 
right  as  Hooker's  division.  About  two  o'clock  a  column  of  the 
enemy  was  observed  moving  towards  our  right,  within  the1  skirt 
of  woods  in  front  of  Heintzehnan's  corps,  but  beyond  the  range 
of  our  artillery.  Arrangements  were  at  once  made  to  meet  the 
anticipated  attack  in  that  quarter;  but  though  the  column  was 
long,  occupying  more  than  two  hours  in  passing,,  it  disappeared 
and  was  not  again  heard  of.  The  presumption  is,  that  it  retired 
by  the  rear  and  participated  in  the  attack  afterwards  made  on 
our  left.  About  3  P.M.,  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery  opened  on 
Kearney's  left  and  Couch's  division,  speedily  followed  up  by  a 
brisk  attack  of  infantry  on  Couch's  front.  The  artillery  was 
replied  to  with  good  effect  by  our  own,  and  the  infantry  of 
Couch's  division  remained  lying  on  the  ground  until  the  advan 
cing  column  was  within  short  musket-range,  when  they  sprang 
to  their  feet  and  poured  in  a  deadly  volley,  which  entirely  broke 
the  attacking  force,  and  drove  them  in  disorder  back  over  their 
own  ground.  This  advantage  was  followed  up  until  we  had  ad 
vanced  the  right  of  our  lines  some  seven  or  eight  hundred 
yards,  and  rested  upon  a  thick  clump  of  trees,  giving  us  a 
stronger  position  and  a  better  fire.  Shortly  after  4  o'clock,  the 
firing  ceased  along  the  whole  front,  but  no  disposition  was 
evijicod  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  to  withdraw  from  the  field. 
Caldwell's  brigade,  having  been  detached  from  Richardson's 
division,  was  stationed  upon  Couch's  right  by  General  Porter, 
to  whom  he  had  been  ordered  to  report.  The  whole  line  was 
surveyed  by  .the  General,  and  everything  held  in  readiness  to 
meet  the  coming  attack.  At  6  o'clock  the  enemy  suddenly 
opened  upon  ('ouch  and  Porter  with  the  whole  strength  of  his 
artillery,  and  at  once  began  pushing  forward  his  columns  of 
attack,  to  carry  the  hill.  Brigade  after  brigade  formed  under 
cover  of  the  woods,  started  at  a  run  to  cross  the  open  space 
and  charge  our  batteries,  but  the  heavy  fire  of  our  guns, 
with  the  cool  and  steady  volleys  of  our  infantry,  in  every  case 
sent  them  reeling  back  to  shelter,  and  covered  the  ground  with 
their  dead  and  wounded.  In  several  instances  our,  infantry 
withheld  their  fire,  until  the  attacking  column,  which  rushed 
through  the  storm  of  cannister  and  shell  from  our  artillery,  hud 
reached  within  a  few  yards  of  our  lines.  They  then  poured  in  a 
single  volley,  and  dashed  forward  with  the  bayonet,  capturing 
prisoners  and  colors,  and  driving  the  routed  columns  in  confu 
sion  from  the  field.  About  7  o'clock,  as  fresh  troops  were 
accumulating  in  front  of  Porter  and  Couch,  Meagher  and 
Sickels  were  sent  with  their  brigades  as  soon  as  it  was  con 
sidered  prudent  to  withdraw  any  portion  of  Sumner's  and 
Heintzelman's  troops,  to  reinforce  that  part  of  the  line,  and 


LIFE    OF  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAX.  99 

hold  the  position.  These  brigades  relieved  such  regiments?  of 
Porter's  corps  and  Couch's  division,  as  had  expended  their 
ammunition,  and  batteries  from  the  reserve  were  pushed  forward 
to  replace  those  whose  boxes  were  empty.  Until  dark  the 
enemy  persisted  in  his  efforts  to  take  the  position  so  tenaciously 
defended,  but  despite  his  vastly  superior  numbers,  his  repeated  and 
desperate  attacks  were  repulsed  with  fearful  loss,  and  darkness 
ended  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill,  though  it  was  not  until  after 
nine  o'clock  that  the  artillery  ceased  its  fire.  During  the  whole 
battle,  Commodore  Rodgers  added  greatly  to  the  discomfiture 
of  the  enemy,  by  throwing  shell  among  his  reserves  and  advan 
cing  columns.  As  the  army,  in  its  movement  from  the  Ciucka- 
hominy  to  Harrison's  Landing,  was  continually  occupied  in 
marching  by  night  and  fighting  by  day,  its  commanders  found 
no  time  or  opportunity  for  collecting  data  which  would  enable 
them  to  give  exact  returns  of  casualties  in  each  engagement. 
The  aggregate  of  our  entire  losses  from  the  26th  of  June  to  the 
1st  of  July,  inclusive,  was  ascertained  after  arriving  at  Harrison's 
Landing,  to  be  as  follows  : 

List  of  killed,  wounded  and  missing  in  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  from  the  26th  of  Ju?ie  to  the  1st  of  July,  1862,  inclusive. 
Corps.  Killed.   Wounded.  Missing. 

1.  McCall's  division 253 

2.  Sumner's 187 

3.  Qeintzelman's 189 

4.  Keyes' 69 

5.  Porter's 620 

6.  Franklin's 245 

Engineers 

Cavalry 19 


Total 1,582         7,709        5,958        15,249 


WHY   HARRISON'S  LANDING  WAS  SELECTED. 

"  Although  the  result  of  the  battle  of  Malvern  was  a  com 
plete  victory,  it  was  nevertheless  necessary  to  fall  back  still 
further,  in  order  to  reach  a  point  where  our  supplies  could  be 
brought  to  us  with  certainty.  As  before  stated,  in  the  opinion 
of  Captain  Rodgers,  commanding  the  gunboat  flotilla,  this  could 
only  be  done  below  City  Point.  Concurring  in  his  opinion,  t 
selected  Harrison's  bar  as  the  new  position  of  the  army.  The 
exhaustion  of  our  supplies  of  food,  forage  and  ammunition,  made 
it  imperative  to  reach  the  transports  immediately.  The  greatei 
portion  of  the  transportation  of  the  army  having  been  started 
for  Harrison's  Landing  during  the  night  of  the  30th  of  June  and 
the  1st  of  July,  the  order  for  the  movement  of  the  troops  wa 
at  one.e  issued  upon  the  final  repulse  of  the  enemy  at  Malvera 
Hill.  The  order  prescribed  a  movement  by  the  left  and  rear, 


100  LIFE    OF   MA  J  Oil -GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

General  Keyes's  corps  to  cover  the  manoeuvre.  It  was  not  car 
ried  out  in  detail  as  regards  the  divisions  on  the  left,  the  roada 
being  somewhat  blocked  by  the  rear  of  our  trains.  Porter  and 
Couch  were  not  able  to  move  out  as  early  as  had  been  antici 
pated,  and  Porter  found  it  necessary  to  place  a  rear-guard  be 
tween  his  command  and  the  enemy.  Colonel  Averill,  of  the 
Third  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  was  entrusted  with  this  delicate 
duty.  lie  had  under  his  command  his  own  regiment,  and  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Buchanan's  brigade  of  regular  infantry  and  one 
battery.  By  a  judicious  use  of  the  resources  at  his  command, 
he  deceived  the  enemy,  so  as  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the  left 
wing  without  being  attacked,  remaining  himself  on  the  previous 
day's  battle-field  until  about  seven  o'clock  of  the  2d  of  July. 
Meantime  General  Keyes,  having  received  his  orders,  commenced 
vigorous  preparations  for  covering  the  movement  of  the  entire 
army  and  protecting  the  trains.  It  being  evident  that  the  im 
mense  number  of  wagons  and  artillery-carriages  pertaining  to 
the  army  could  not  move  with  celerity  along  a  single  road,  Gen 
eral  Keyes  took  advantage  of  every  accident  of  the  ground  to 
open  new  avenues  and  to  facilitate  the  movement.  He  made 
preparations  for  obstructing  the  roads  after  the  army  had  passed, 
so  as  to  prevent  any  rapid  pursuit,  destroying  effectually  Turkey 
P> ridge  on  the  main  road,  and  rendering  other  roads  and  ap 
proaches  temporarily  impassible  by  felling  trees  across  them. 
He  kept  the  trains  well  closed-up  and  directed  the  march  so  that 
the  troops  could  move  on  each  side  of  the  roads,  not  obstruct 
ing  the  passage,  but  being  in  good  position  to  repel  an  attack 
from  any  quarter.  His  dispositions  were  so  successful  that,  to 
use  his  own  words  :  '  I  do  not  think  more  vehicles  or  more  pub 
lic  property  were  abandoned  on  the  march  from  Turkey  Bridge 
than  would  have  been  left  in  the  same  state  of  the  roads,  if  the 
army  had  been  moving  toward  the  enemy  instead  of  away  from  him. 
And  when  it  is  understood  that  the  carriages  and  teams  belong 
ing  to  this  army,  stretched  out  in  one  line,  would  extend  not  far 
from  forty  miles,  the  energy  and  caution  necessary  for  their  safe 
withdrawal  from  the  presence  of  an  enemy  vastly  superior  in 
numbers  will  be  appreciated.'  The  last  of  the  wagons  did  not 
reach  the  site  selected  at  Harrison's  bar  until  after  dark  on  the 
3d  of  July,  and  the  rear-guard  did  not  move  into  their  camp 
until  every  thing  was  secure.  The  enemy  followed  up  with  a 
email  force,  and  on  the  3d  threwr  a  few  shells  at  the  rear-guard, 
but  were  quickly  dispersed  by  our  batteries  and  the  fire  of  the  gun 
boats.  Great  credit  must  be  awarded  to  General  Keyes  for  the 
skill  and  energy  which  characterized  his  performance  of  the  im 
portant  and  delicate  duties  entrusted  to  his  charge.  High  praise 
is  also  due  to  the  officers  and  men  of  the  First  Connecticut  Artil- 
*ery,  Colonel  Tyler,  for  the  manner  in  which  they  withdrew  all 
the  heavy  guns  during  the  seven  days,  and  from  Malvern  Hill. 
Owing  to  the  crowded  state  of  the  roads,  ihe  teams  could  not  be 
brought  within  a  couple  of  miles  of  the  position  ;  but  the^a 


LIFE    JF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

energetic  soldiers  removed  the  guns  by'banrd  for  that  distance, 
leaving  nothing  behind.  ,*'•  •  '/"*•':  *' '  '-\  : 

"  On  the  1st  of  July  I  received  the' following  'from  the  Presi 
dent  : 

"  4  WASHINGTON,  July  1st,  1862—3.30  P.M. 
"'Major- General  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN  : 

•"It  is  impossible  to  reinforce  you  for  your  present  emergen 
cy.  If  we  had  a  million  of  men,  we  could  not  get  them  to  you 
in  time.  We  have  not  the  men  to  send.  If  you  are  not  strong 
enough  to  face  the  enemy,  you  must  find  a  place  of  security; 
and  wait,  rest  and  repair.  Maintain  your  ground  if  you  can,  but 
save  the  army  at  all  events,  even  if  you  fall  back  to  Fortress 
Monroe.  We  still  have  strength  enough  in  the  country,  and 
will  bring  it  out.  "  'A.  LINCOLN.'  " 

"  In  the  despatch  from  the  President  to  me,  on  the  2d  of  July, 
he  says  : 

"  '  If  you  think  you  are  not  strong  enough  to  take  Richmond 
just  now,  I  do  not  ask  you  to.  Try  just  now  to  save  the  army 
material  and  personnel,  and  I  will  strengthen  it  for  the  offensive 
again  as  fast  as  I  can.  The  Governors  of  eighteen  (18)  States 
offer  me  a  new  levy  of  three  hundred  thousand,  which  I  accept.'  " 

"  On  the  3d  of  July,  the  following  kind  despatch  was  received 
from  the  President : 

"  '  WASHINGTON,  July  3d,  1862—3  P.M. 
"'Major- General  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN: 

"  '  Yours  of  5.30  yesterday  is  just  received.  I  am  satisfied 
that  yourself,  officers,  and  men  have  done  the  best  you  could. 
All  accounts  say  better  fighting  was  never  done.  Ten  thousand 
thanks  for  it.  "  'A.  LINCOLN.'  " 

HIS  ADDRESS  TO  THE  ARMY. 

On  the  fourth  of  July  the  following  address  was  issued 
to  the  troops : 

"HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  CAMP  NEAR 

"  HARRISON'S  LANDING,  July  4th,  1862. 
"  SOLDIERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  : — Your  achieve 
ments  of  the  last  ten  days  have  illustrated  the  valor  and  en 
durance  of  the  American  soldier.  Attacked  by  superior  forces, 
and  without  hope  of  reinforcements,  you  have  succeeded  in 
changing  your  base  of  operations  by  a  flank  movement,  alwaya 
regarded  as  the  most  hazardous  of  military  expedients.  You 
have  saved  all  your  material,  all  your  trains  aud  all  your  guns, 


OF   MA^OR-GENERAL- McCLELLAN. 

except  a  few' lost  in  hattle,  taking  in  return  guns  and  colors 
-frons.  .the  ,erj$rny.  Upon  jyour  march,  you  have  been  assailed 
;dfuy'a&eVday*?vHh  decora  to  fury,  by  men  of  the  same  race  and 
'nation,  skilfully  massed  and  led.  Under  every  disadvantage  of 
number,  and  necessarily  of  position  also,  you  have  in  every  con 
flict  beaten  back  your  foes  with  enormous  slaughter.  Your 
conduct  ranks  you  among  the  celebrated  armies  of  history.  No 
one  will  now  question  that  each  of  you  may  always  with  pride 
say  :  '  I  belong  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.'  You  have 
reacted  the  new  base,  complete  in  organization  and  unimpaired 
in  spirit.  The  enemy  may  at  any  moment  attack  you.  We  are 
prepared  to  meet  them.  I  have  personally  established  your 
lines.  Let  them  come,  and  we  will  convert  their  repulse'into 
a  final  defeat.  Your  Government  is  strengthening  you  with 
the  resources  of  a  great  people.  On  this,  our  nation's  birth 
day,  we  declare  to  our  foes,  who  are  rebels  against  the  best  in 
terests  of  mankind,  that  this  army  shall  enter  the  capital  of  the 
so-called  Confederacy ;  that  our  national  Constitution  shall 
prevail,  and  that  the  Union,  which  can  alone  insure  internal 
peace  and  external  security  to  each  State,  '  must  and  shall  be 
preserved,'  cost  what  it  may  in  time,  treasure,  and  blood. 

"  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN." 

LETTER  TO  THE  PRESIDENT. 

On  the  same  day  he  wrote  as  follows  to  the  President : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTCMAO, 
"  HARRISON  BAR,  JAMES  RIVER,  July  4£/i,  ]862. 
"  To  THE  PRESIDENT  : 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  despatch 
of  the  2d  instant. 

"  I  shall  make  a  stand  at  this  place,  and  endeavor  to  give  my 
men  the  repose  they  so  much  require. 

"After  sending  my  communication  on  Tuesday,  the  enemy 
attacked  the  left  of  our  lines,  and  a  fierce  battle  ensued,  lasting 
until  night.  They  were  repulsed  with  great  slaughter. 

"Had  their  attack  succeeded,  the  consequences  would  have 
been  disastrous  in  the  extreme.  This  closed  the  hard  fighting 
•which  had  continued  from  the  afternoon  of  the  26th  ult.,  in  a  daily 
series  of  engagements  wholly  unparalleled  on  this  continent  lor 
determination  and  slaughter  on  both  sides.  The  mutual  loss  in 
killed  and  wounded  is  enormous — that  of  the  enemy  certainly 
greatest.  On  Tuesday  morning,  the  1st,  our  army  commenced 
its  movement  from  Hawaii's  to  this  point,  our  line  of  defence 
there  being  too  extended  to  be  maintained  by  our  weakened 
force!.  Our  train  was  immense,  and  about  4  j'.  M.  on  the  2d  ;v 
beavj  storm  of  rain  began,  which  continued  during  ihe  entire 
day  and  until  tho  forenoon  of  yesterday.  The  roads  became 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  1Q3 

horrible.  Troops,  artillery  and  wagons  moved  on  steadily,  and 
our  whole  army,  men  and  material,  was  finally  brought  safely 
into  this  camp.  The  last  of  the  wagons  reached  here  at  noon  yes 
terday.  The  exhaustion  was  very  great,  but  the  army  preserved 
its  morale,  and  would  have  repelled  any  attack  which  the  enemy 
•was  in  condition  to  make.  We  now  occupy  a  line  of  heights 
about  two  miles  from  the  James,  a  plain  extending  fr.m  there 
to  the  river.  Our  front  is  about  three  miles  long.  These  heights 
command  our  whole  position,  and  must  be  maintained.  The  gun 
boats  can  render  valuable  support  upon  both  flanks.  If  the  enemy 
attack  us  in  front,  we  must  hold  our  ground  as  we  best  may,  and 
at  whatever  cost.  Our  positions  can  be  carried  only  by  over 
whelming  numbers.  The  spirit  of  the  army  is  excellent ;  strag 
glers  are  finding  their  regiments,  and  the  soldiers  exhibit  the 
best  results  of  discipline.  Our  position  is  by  no  means  impreg 
nable,  especially  as  a  morass  extends  on  this  side  of  the  high 
ground  from  our  centre  to  the  James  on  our  right.  The  enemy 
may  attack  in  vast  numbers,  and,  if  so,  our  front  will  be  the  scene 
of  a  desperate  battle,  which,  if  lost,  will  be  decisive.  Our  army 
is  fearfully  weakened  by  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners.  I  cannot 
now  approximate  to  any  statement  of  our  losses,  but  we  were  not 
beaten  in  any  conflict.  The  enemy  were  unable,  by  their  utmost 
efforts,  to  drive  us  from  the  field.  Never  did  such  a  change  of 
base,  involving  a  retrograde  movement,  and  under  incessant  at 
tacks  from  a  most  determined  and  vastly  more  numerous  foe, 
partake  so  little  of  disorder.  We  have  lost  no  guns,  except 
twenty-five  on  the  field  of  battle,  twenty-one  of  which  were  lost 
by  the  giving  way  of  McCalPs  division  under  the  onset  of  supe 
rior  numbers.  Our  communications  by  the  James  river  are  not 
secure.  There  are  points  where  the  enemy  can  establish  them 
selves  with  cannon  or  musketry  and  command  the  river,  and 
where  it  is  not  certain  that  our  gunboats  can  drive  them  out. 
In  case  of  this,  or  in  case  our  front  is  broken,  I  will  still  make 
every  effort  to  preserve  at  least  the  personnel  of  the  army,  and 
the  events  of  the  last  few  days  leave  no  question  that  the  troops 
will  do  all  that  their  country  can  ask.  Send  such  reinforcements 
as  you  can  ;  I  will  do  what  I  can.  We  are  shipping  our  wounded 
and  sick,  and  landing  supplies.  The  Navy  Department  should 
co-operate  with  us  to  the  extent  of  its  resources.  Captain  Rod- 
gers  is  doing  all  in  his  power  in  the  kindest  and  most  efficient 
manner.  When  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  are  known,  it 
will  be  acknowledged  by  all  competent  judges  that  the  move 
ment  just  completed  by  this  army  is  unparalleled  in  the  annals 
of  war.  Under  the  most  difficult  circumstances,  we  have  pre 
served  our  trains  :ur  guns,  our  material,  and,  above  all,  our 
honor 

"  G.  B.   McCLKLT.AN, 

"Major-General" 


104  LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN. 

LETTERS  FROM  THE  PRESIDENT. 

"  '  WASHINGTON,  July  5th.  1862—9  A.M. 

•''•  MAJOR- GrENERAL  GEORGE  B.    McCLELLAN, 

"  'Commanding  Army  of  Potomac: 

"  'A  thousand  thanks  for  the  relief  your  two  despatches  of  12 
ftr.d  1  P.M.,  yesterday,  gave  me.  Be  assured,  the  heroism  and 
skill  of  yourself  and  officers  and  men,  is  and  forever  will  be  ap 
preciated. 

"'If  you  can  hold  your  present  position,  we  shall  hive  the 
enemy  yet.  "  'A.  LINCOLN.'  " 

"  '  WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
"  '  WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  July  4th,  1862. 

" '  I  understand  your  position,  as  stated  in  your  letter,  and  by 
General  Marcy.  To  reinforce  you  so  as  to  enuble  you  to  resume 
the  offensive  within  a  month,  or  even  six  weeks,  is  impossible. 
In  addition  to  that  arrived  and  now  arriving  from  the  Potomac 
(about  10,000,  I  suppose),  and  about  10,000  1  hope  you  will 
have  from  Burnside  very  soon,  and  about  5,000  from  Hunter 
a  little  later,  I  do  not  see  how  I  can  send  you  another  man 
within  a  month.  Under  these  circumstances  the  defensive  for 
the  present  must  be  your  only  care.  Save  the  army  first  where 
you  are,  if  you  can,  and  secondly  by  removal  if  you  must.  You, 
on  the  ground,  must  be  the  judge  as  to  which  you  will  attempt, 
and  of  the  means  for  effecting  it.  I  but  give  it  as  my  opinion 
that,  with  the  aid  of  the  gunboats,  and  the  reinforcements  men 
tioned  above,  you  can  hold  your  present  position,  provided,  and 
so  long  as  you  can  keep  the  James  river  open  below  you.  If 
you  are  not  tolerably  confident  you  i-an  keep  the  James  rivet 
open,  you  had  better  remove  as  soon  as  possible.  I  do  not  re 
member  that  you  have  expressed  any  apprehension  as  to  the 
danger  of  having  your  communication  cut  on  the  river  below 
you  ;  yet  I  do  not  suppose  it  can  have  escaped  your  attention. 
"  '  Yours  very  truly,  "  'A.  LINCOLN. 

"  '  P.S. — If  at  any  time  you  feel  able  to  take  the  offensive,  you 
are  not  restrained  from  doing  so.  "  'A.  L.'  " 

On  July  7th,  General  McClellan  telegraphed  as  follows 
to  the  President : 

"HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"  BERKELEY,  July  1th,  1862—8.30  A.M. 

"As  the  boat  is  starting  I  have  only  time  to  acknowledge  the 
receipt  of  despatch  by  General  Marcy.  Enemy  have  not 
attacked.  My  position  is  very  strong,  and  daily  becoming  more 
so.  If  not  attacked  to-day  1  shall  laugh  at  them.  I  have  been 
anxious  about  my  communications.  Had  a  long  consultation, 
about  it  with  Flag-Officer  Goldsborough  last  night.  He  ia 
confident  he  can  keep  the  river  open  He  should  have  all 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAX.  1Q5 

gunboats  possible.  Will  see  him  again  this  morning.  My  men 
in  splendid  spirits,  and  anxious  to  try  it  again.  Alarm  yourself 
as  little  as  possible  about  me,  and  don't  lose  confidence  in  this 
army.  "  G.  B.  MC(JLELLAN,  Major-General  " 

GENERAL  McCLELLAN  GIVES  THE  PRESIDENT 
HIS  VIEWS  ON  THE  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR. 

Expecting  an  attack,  however,  as  a  necessity  to  the 
enemy,  and  feeling  the  critical  nature  of  the  position, 
General  McClellan  on  the  same  day  addressed  to  the 
President  the  following  letter  : 

"HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  CAMP  NEAR 
4<  HARRISON'S  LANDING,  VA.,  July  1th,  1862. 

"  MR.  PRESIDENT  :  You  have  been  fully  informed  that  the  rebel 
army  is  in  the  front,  with  the  purpose  of  overwhelming  us  by 
attacking  the  positions  or  reducing  us  by  blocking  our  river 
communications.  I  cannot  but  regard  our  condition  as  critical, 
and  I  earnestly  desire,  in  view  of  possible  contingencies,  to  lay 
before  your  Excellency,  for  your  private  consideration,  my  gen 
eral  views  concerning  the  existing  state  of  the  rebellion,  al 
though  they  do  not  strictly  relate  to  the  situation  of  this  army 
or  strictly  come  within  the  scope  of  my  official  duties.  These 
views  amount  to  convictions,  and  are  deeply  impressed  upon 
my  mind  and  heart.  Our  cause  must  never  be  abandoned — it 
is  the  cause  of  free  institutions  and  self-government.  The 
Constitution  and  the  Union  must  be  preserved,  whatever  may 
be  the  cost  in  time,  treasure,  and  blood.  If  Secession  is  suc 
cessful,  other  dissolutions  are  clearly  to  be  seen  in  the  future. 
Let  neither  military  disaster,  political  faction  nor  foreign  war 
shake  your  settled  purpose  to  enforce  the  equal  operation  of  the 
laws  of  the  United  States  upon  the  people  of  every  State. 

"The  time  has  come  when  the  Government  must  determine 
upon  a  civil  and  military  policy  covering  the  whole  ground  of 
our  national  trouble.  The  responsibility  of  determining,  de 
claring  and  supporting  such  civil  and  military  policy,  and  of 
directing  the  whole  course  of  national  affairs  in  regard  to  the 
rebellion,  must  now  be  assumed  and  exercised  by  you,  or  our 
cause  will  be  lost.  The  Constitution  gives  you  power  even  for 
the  present  terrible  exigency. 

"  This  rebellion  has  assumed  the  character  of  a  war,  as  such  it 
should  be  regarded,  and  it  should  be  conducted  upon  the  highest 
principles  known  to  Christian  civilization.  It  should  not  be  a 
war  looking  to  the  subjugation  of  the  people  of  any  State  in 
any  event.  It  should  not  be  at  all  a  war  upon  population,  but 
against  armed  forces  and  political  organization.  Neither  con 
fiscation  of  property,  political  executions  of  persons,  territorial 


106  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLfiLLAN. 

organizations  of  States,  or  orcible  abolition  of  slavery,  should 
be  contemplated  for  a  moment.  In  prosecuting  the  war  all  pri 
vate  property  and  unarmed  persons  should  be  strictly  protected, 
subject  only  to  the  necessity  of  military  operations.  All  pri 
vate  property  taken  for  military  use  should  be  paid  or  receipted 
for ;  pillage  and  waste  should  be  treated  as  high  crimes  ;  all 
unnecessary  trespass  sternly  prohibited,  and  offensive  demeanor 
by  the  military  toward  citizens  promptly  rebuked.  Military 
arrests  should  not  be  tolerated,  except  in  places  where  active 
hostilities  exist,  and  oaths  not  required  by  enactments  consti 
tutionally  made,  should  be  neither  demanded  nor  received. 
Military  government  should  be  confined  to  the  preservation  of 
public  order  and  the  protection  of  political  right.  Military 
power  should  not  be  allowed  to  interfere  with  the  relations  of 
(servitude,  either  by  supporting  or  impairing  the  authority  of  the 
master,  except  for  repressing  disorder,  as  in  other  cases.  Slaves 
contraband  under  the  Act  of  Congress,  seeking  military  protec 
tion,  should  receive  it.  The  right  of  the  Government  to  ap 
propriate  permanently  to  its  own  service  claims  to  slave  labor 
should  be  asserted,  and  the  right  of  the  owner  to  compensation 
therefor  should  be  recognized. 

"  This  principle  might  be  extended  upon  grounds  of  military 
necessity  and  security  to  all  the  slaves  of  a  particular  State, 
thus  working  manumission  in  such  State ;  and  in  Missouri,  per 
haps  in  Western  Virginia  also,  and  possibly  even  in  Maryland, 
the  expediency  of  such  a  measure  is  only  a  question  of  time. 

"A  system  of  policy  thus  constitutional,  and  pervaded  by  the 
influences  of  Christianity  and  freedom,  would  receive  the  sup 
port  of  almost  all  truly  loyal  men,  would  deeply  impress  the 
rebel  masses  and  all  foreign  nations,  and  it  might  be  humbly 
hoped  that  it  would  commend  itself  to  the  favor  of  the  Al 
mighty. 

"  Unless  the  principles  governing  the  future  conduct  of  our 
struggle  shall  be  made  known  and  approved,  the  elfort  to  ob 
tain  requisite  forces  will  be  almost  hopeless.  A  declaration  of 
radical  views,  especially  upon  slavery,  will  rapidly  disintegrate 
our  present  armies. 

"  The  policy  of  the  Government  must  be  supported  by  con 
centrations  of  military  power.  The  national  forces  should  not 
be  dispersed  in  expeditions,  posts  of  occupation,  and  numerous 
armies  ;  but  should  be  mainly  collected  into  masses  and  brought 
to  oear  upon  the  armies  of  the  Confederate  States.  Those 
armies  thoroughly  defeated,  the  political  .structure  which  they 
support  would  soon  cease  to  exist. 

"In  carrying  out  any  system  of  policy  which  you  may  form, 
you  will  require  a  commander-in-chief  of  the  army — one  who 
possesses  your  confidence,  understands  your  views,  and  who  is 
competent  to  execute  your  orders,  by  directing  the  military 
forces  of  the  naiou  to  "the  accomplishment  of  the  objects  by 


LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLEI  LAN.  1QT 

you  proposed.  I  do  not  ask  that  place  for  myself.  I  am  willing 
to  serve  you  in  such  position  as  you  may  assign  me,  and  I  will 
do  so  as  faithfully  as  ever  subordinate  served  superior. 

"  1  may  be  on  the  brink  of  eternity,  and,  as  I  hope  forgive 
ness  from  my  Maker,  I  have  written  this  letter  with  sincerity 
toward  you  and  from  love  for  my  country. 

"Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"GEORGE    B.    McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General,  Commanding" 

MORE    OFFICIAL    DESPATCHES. 

During  the  period  that  the  army  was  encamped  at 
Harrison's  Landing,  the  following  despatches  among 
others  passed  between  the  Commanding  General  and  the 
Washington  authorities : 

FROM  GKXERAL  MCCLELLAN. 

"BERKELEY,  July  llth,  1862. — 3  P.M. — We  are  very  strong 
here  now  so  far  as  defensive  is  concerned.  Hope  you  will  soon 
make  us  strong  enough  to  advance  and  try  it  again." 

"  SAME,  July  l'2th — Men  resting  well,  but  begining  to  be  im 
patient  for  another  fight.  I  am  more  and  more  convinced  that 
this  army  ought  not  to  be  withdrawn  from  here,  but  promptly 
reinforced  and  thrown  again  upon  Richmond.  If  we  have  a 
little  more  than  half  a  chance,  we  can  take  it.  I  dread  the 
effects  of  any  retreat  upon  the  morale  of  the  men." 

"  SAME.  July  Yltli. — It  appears,  manifestly,  to  be  our  policy 
to  concentrate  here  every  thing  we  can  possibly  spare  from  less 
important  points,  to  make  sure  of  crushing  the  enemy  at  Rich 
mond,  which  seems  clearly  to  be  the  most  important  point  in 
Rebeldom.  Nothing  should  be  left  to  chance  here.  I  would 
recommend  that  General  Burnside,  with  all  his  troops,  be  ordered 
to  this  army,  to  enable  it  to  assume  the  offensive  as  soon  as 
possible." 

"  SAME,  July  ISth. — Am  anxious  to  have  determination  of 
Government  that  no  time  may  be  lost  in  preparing  for  it. 
Hours  are  very  precious  now,  and  perfect  unity  of  action 
necessary." 

"  SAME,  July  28th. — Reinforcements  reaching  Richmond 
from  South.  My  opinion  is  more  and  more  firm  that  here  is  the 
defence  of  Washington,  and  that  I  should  be  at  once  re 
inforced  by  all  available  troops,  to  enable  me  to  advance. 
Retreat  would  be  disastrous  to  the  army  and  the  cause.  I  am 
confident,  of  that." 

"  SAME,  July  oQth. — I  hope  that  it  may  soon  be  decided  what 
TS  to  be  done  by  this  army,  and  that  the  decision  may  be  to  rein 
force  it  at  once.  We  are  losing  much  valuable  time,  and  that 
at  a  moment  when  energy  and  decision  are  sadly  needed." 


108  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

After  giving  an  account  of  the  affair  at  Coggin'g  Point, 
where  the  enemy  planted  light  batteries  and  annoyed  our 
right  flank  by  firing  across  the  river,  a  telegram  to 
General  Halleck,  dated  August  2d,  says : 

"  Sent  party  across  river  yesterday  to  the  Coles  house,  destroyed 
it  and  cut  down  the  timber;  will  complete  work  to-day,  and 
also  send  party  to  Coggin's  Point,  which  1  will  probably  occupy. 
1  will  attend  to  your  telegraph  about  pressing  at  once  ;  will 
Bend  Hooker  out.  Give  me  Burnside  and  I  will  stir  these  people 
up.  1  need  more  cavalry." 

''SAME,  August  3d. — A  few  thousand  more  men  would  place 
us  in  condition  at  least  to  annoy  and  disconcert  the  enemy  very 
much." 

GENERAL  HALLECK  TO  GENERAL  MCCLELLAN. 

"  WASHINGTON,  July  30£7i. — A  despatch  just  received  from 
General  Pope  says  that  deserters  report  that  the  enemy  is 
moving  south  of  James  river,  and  that  the  force  in  Richmond 
is  very  small.  I  suggest  he  be  pressed  in  that  direction,  so  as 
to  ascertain  the  facts  of  the  case." 

"SAME,  July  3(M/i. — In  order  to  enable  you  to  move  in  any 
direction,  it  is  necessary  to  relieve  you  of  your  sick.  The  Sur 
geon-General  has  therefore  been  directed  to  make  arrangements 
for  them  at  other  places,  and  the  Quartermaster-General  to  pro 
vide  transportation.  I  hope  you  will  send  them  away  as  quickly 
as  possible,  and  advise  me  of  their  removal." 

To  carry  out  General  Halleck's  first  order,  of  July  30th, 
it  was  necessary  first  to  gain  possession  of  Malvern  Hill, 
which  was  occupied  by  the  enemy,  apparently  in  some 
little  force,  and  controlled  the  direct  approach  to  Rich 
mond.  Its  temporary  occupation,  at  least,  was  equally 
necessary  in  the  event  of  a  movement  upon  Petersburg, 
or  even  the  abandonment  of  the  Peninsula.  It  appears 
that  Hooker  failed  in  the  first  movement  on  Malvern  Hill, 
in  consequence  of  the  incompetency  of  guides,  but  that  on 
August  5th  he  succeeded. 

At  an  early  hour  of  the  morning  of  August  1st,  the 
rebels  opened  upon  our  encampments  at  Harrison's  Land 
ing  with  batteries  in  position  on  the  other  side  of  the  river, 
but  after  a  brisk  fire  from  our  land  batteries  and  the  guns 
of  the  fleet,  the  enemy's  cannon  were  silenced. 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR  GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

On  the  second,  General  Halleck  telegraphed  to  General 
McClellan  as  follows : 

" August  2.— You  have  not  answered  my  telegram  of  July  30th, 
about  the  removal  of  your  sick.  Remove  them  as  rapidly  as  pos- 
lible,  and  telegraph  me  when  they  will  be  out  of  your  way.  The 
President  wishes  an  answer  as  early  as  possible." 

GENERAL  MCCLELLAN  TO  GENERAL  HALLECK. 
"August  3. — Answer  already  sent.  It  is  impossible  for  me  to 
decide  what  cases  to  send  off,  unless  I  know  what  is  to  be  done 
with  this  army.  Were  the  disastrous  measures  of  retreat  adopted, 
all  the  sick  who  cannot  march  and  fight  should  be  despatched  by 
water.  Should  the  army  advance,  many  of  the  sick  could  be  of 
service  at  the  depot.  If  it  is  to  remain  here  any  length  of  time, 
the  question  assumes  still  a  different  phase.  If  I  am  kept  longer 
in  ignorance  of  what  is  to  be  effected,  I  cannot  be  expected  to 
accomplish  the  object  in  view.  In  the  meantime  I  will  do  all  in 
my  power  to  carry  out  what  I  conceive  to  be  your  wishes." 

GENERAL  HALLECK  TO  GENERAL  MCCLELLAN. 
" August  3. — It  is  determined  to  withdraw  your  army  from  the 
Peninsula  to  Acquia  Creek.  You  will  take  immediate  measures 
to  effect  this,  covering  the  movement  the  best  you  can.  Its  real 
object  and  withdrawal  should  be  concealed  even  from  your  own 
officers.  The  entire  execution  of  the  movement  is  left  to  your 
discretion  and  judgment.  You  will  leave  such  forces  as  you 
may  deem  proper  at  Fortress  Monroe,  Norfolk,  and  other  places, 
xvhich  we  must  occupy." 

GENERAL  McCLELLAN  PROTESTS  AGAINST 
LEAVING  THE  PENINSULA. 

Although  firmly  impressed  with  the  conviction  that  the 
withdrawal  of  the  army  from  Harrison's  Landing,  where 
its  communications  had  been  made  secure  by  the  co-opera 
tion  of  the  gunboats,  would  have  at  that  time  the  most 
disastrous  effect  upon  the  cause,  he  proceeded  to  obey  the 
order.  He  however  on  the  fourth  addressed  the  following 
to  General  Halleck  : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"  BERKELEY,  August  4,  1862. — 12  M. 

"Your  telegram  of  last  evening  is  received.  I  must  confess 
that  it  has  caused  me  the  greatest  pain  I  ever  experienced,  for 
I  am  convinced  that,  the  order  to  withdraw  this  army  to  Acquia 
creek  will  prove  disastrous  to  our  cause.  I  fear  it  will  be  a 
fatal  blow.  Several  days  are  necessary  to  complete  the  prepara 
tions  for  so  important  a  movement  as  this,  and  while  they  are  in 


110  LIFE   OF   MAJOR  GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

progress,  I  beg  that  careful  consideration  may  be  ghen  to  my 
statements. 

"  This  army  is  now  in  excellent  discipline  and  condition.  We 
hold  a  uebouche  on  both  banks  of  the  James  river,  so  that  we 
are  free  to  act  in  any  direction  ;  and  with  tTie  assistance  of  the 
gunboats,  I  consider  our  communications  as  now  secure. 

"We  are  twenty-five  (25)  miles  from  Richmond,  and  are  not 
likely  to  meet  the  enemy  in  force  sufficient  to  fight  a  battle  un 
til  we  have  marched  fifteen  (15)  to  eighteen  (1 8)  miles,  which 
brings  us  practically  within  ten  (10)  miles  of  Richmond.  Our 
longest  line  of  land  transportation  would  be  from  this  point 
twenty-five  (25)  miles,  but  with  the  aid  of  the  gunboats  we  can 
supply  the  army  by  water  during  its  advance,  certainly  to 
within  twelve  (12)  miles  of  Richmond. 

"  At  Acquia  creek  we  would  be  seventy-five  (75)  miles  from 
Richmond,  with  land  transportation  all  the  way. 

"  From  here  to  Fortress  Monroe  is  a  march  of  about  seventy 
(70)  miles,  for  I  regard  it  as  impracticable  to  withdraw  this 
army  and  its  material,  except  by  land. 

"The  result  of  the  movement  would  thus  be  a  march  of  one 
hundred  and  forty-five  (145)  miles,  to  reach  a  point  now  only 
twenty-five  (25)  miles  distant,  and  to  deprive  ourselves  entirely 
of  the  powerful  aid  of  the  gunboats  and  water  transportation. 

"  Add  to  this  the  certain  demoralization  of  this  army  which 
would  ensue,  the  terrible  depressing  effect  upon  the  people  of 
the  north,  and  the  strong  probability  that  it  would  influence 
foreign  powers  to  recognize  our  adversaries  ;  and  these  appear 
to  me  sufficient  reasons  to  make  it  my  imperative  duty  to  urge 
in  the  strongest  terms  afforded  by  our  language,  that  this  order 
may  be  rescinded,  and  that  far  from  recalling  this  army,  it  may 
be  promptly  reinforced  to  enable  it  to  resume  the  offensive. 

"  It  may  be  said  that  there  are  no  reinforcements  available. 
I  point  to'Burnside's  force  ;  to  that  of  Pope,  not  necessary  to 
maintain  a  strict  defensive  in  front  of  Washington  and  Harper's 
Ferry  ;  to  those  portions  of  the  army  of  the  west  not  required 
for  a  strict  defensive  there.  Here,  directly  in  front  of  this  army, 
is  the  heart  of  the  rebellion ;  it  is  here  that  all  our  resources 
should  be  collected  to  strike  the  blow  which  will  determine  the 
fate  of  the  nation. 

"  All  points  of  secondary  importance  elsewhere  should  be 
abandoned,  and  every  available  man  brought  here  ;  a  decided 
victory  here,  and  the  military  strength  of  the  rebellion  is 
crushed.  It  matters  not  what  partial  reverses  we  may  meet 
with  elsewhere  ;  here  is  the  true  defence  of  Washington  ;  it  is 
here,  on  the  banks  of  the  James,  that  the  fate  of  the  Uniou 
should  be  decided. 

"  Clear  in  my  convictions  of  right,  strong  in  the  conscious 
ness  that  I  ho  -3  ever  been,  and  still  am,  actuated  solely  by  the 
'ove  of  my  country,  kn  nving  that  no  imbitious  or  selfish  motives 


LIFE  OP  MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAff. 

have  influenced  me  from  the  commencement  of  this  war,  I  do 
now,  what  I  never  did  in  my  life  before,  I  entreat  that  this  order 
may  be  rescinded. 

"  If  my  counsel  does  not  prevail,  I  will  with  a  sad  heart  obey 
your  orders  to  the  utmost  of  my  power,  directing  to  the  move 
ment,  which  I  clearly  foresee  will  be  one  of  the  utmost  delicacy 
and  difficulty,  whatever  skill  I  may  possess.  Whatever  the 
result  may  be — and  may  God  grant  that  I  am  mistaken  in  my 
forebodings — I  shall  at  least  have  the  internal  satisfaction  that 
I  have  written  and  spoken  frankly,  and  have  sought  to  do  the 
best  in  my  power  to  avert  disaster  from  my  country. 

"  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 
"  Major- General  Commanding. 
v Major-  General  H.  W.  H ALLEGE, 

"  Commanding  United  States  Army." 

This  produced  the  following  despatch  and  letter  from 
General  Halleck  : 

"  WASHINGTON,  August  5th,  1862 — 12  M. 
"  You  cannot  regret  the  order  of  the  withdrawal  more  than  I 
did  the  necessity  of  giving  it.  It  will  not  be  rescinded,  and  you 
will  be  expected  to  execute  it  with  all  possible  promptness.  It 
is  believed  that  it  can  be  done  now  without  serious  danger.  This 
may  not  be  so,  if  there  should  be  any  delay.  I  will  write  you 
my  views  more  fully  by  mail.  "  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

"  Major  General,  Commanding  United  States  Army. 
"Major-General  G.  B.  MCCLELLAN." 

LETTER  FROM  GENERAL  HALLECK. 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

"  WASHINGTON,  August  5th,  1862. 

"  GENERAL  : — Your  telegram  of  yesterday  was  received  this 
morning,  and  I  immediately  telegraphed  a  brief  reply,  promising 
to  write  you  more  fully  by  mail. 


confidence,  to  make  the  order  immediately  on  my  arrival  here, 
but  I  determined  not  to  do  so  until  I  could  learn  your  wishes 
from  a  personal  interview.  And  even  after  that  interview,  I 
tried  every  means  in  my  power  to  avoid  withdrawing  your  army, 
and  delayed  my  decision  as  long  as  I  dared  to  delay  it. 

"  I  assure  yoa,  General,  it  was  not  a  hasty  and  inconsiderate 
act,  but  one  that  caused  me  more  anxious  thoughts  than  any 
other  of  my  life.  But  after  full  and  mature  consideration  of  all 
the  pros  and  cons,  I  was  reluctantly  forced  to  the  conclusion 


112  LIFE  OF  MAJOR-QBNERAL  McCLELLAN. 

that  the  order  must  be  issued — there  was  to  my  mind  no  alter 
native. 

"Allow  me  to  allude  to  a  few  of  the  facts  in  the  case. 

"  You  and  your  officers  at  one  interview  estimated  the  enemy's 
forces  in  and  around  Richmond  at  two  hundred  thousand  men. 
Since  then,  you  and  others  report  that  they  have  received  and 
are  receiving  large  reinforcements  from  the  South.  General 
Pope's  army,  covering  Washington,  is  only  about  forty  thousand. 
Your  effective  force  is  only  about  ninety  thousand.  You  are 
thirty  miles  from  Richmond,  and  General  Pope  eighty  or  ninety, 
with  the  enemy  directly  between  you,  ready  to  fall  with  his  su 
perior  numbers  upon  one  or  the  other  as  he  may  elect ;  neither 
can  reinforce  the  other  in  case  of  such  an  attack. 

"  If  General  Pope's  army  be  diminished  to  reinforce  you, 
Washington,  Maryland,  and  Pennsylvania  would  be  left  uncov 
ered  and  exposed.  If  your  force  be  reduced  to  strengthen  Pope, 
you  would  be  too  weak  to  even  hold  the  position  you  now  occupy, 
should  the  enemy  turn  round  and  attack  you  in  full  force.  In 
other  words,  the  old  Army  of  the  Potomac  is  split  into  two  parts, 
with  the  entire  force  of  the  enemy  directly  between  them.  They 
cannot  be  united  by  land  without  exposing  both  to  destruction, 
and  yet  they  must  be  united.  To  send  Pope's  forces  by  water  to 
the  Peninsula,  is,  under  present  circumstances,  a  military  impos 
sibility.  The  only  alternative  is  to  send  the  forces  on  the  Penin 
sula  to  some  point  by  water,  say  Fredericksburg,  where  the  two 
armies  can  be  united. 

"  Let  me  now  allude  to  some  of  the  objections  which  you  have 
urged;  you  say  that  the  withdrawal  from  the  present  position 
will  cause  the  certain  demoralization  of  the  army,  'which  is  now 
in  excellent  discipline  and  condition.' 

"  1  cannot  understand  why  a  simple  change  of  position  to  a 
new  and  by  no  means  distant  base  will  demoralize  an  army  in 
excellent  discipline,  unless  the  officers  themselves  assist  in  that 
demoralization,  which  I  am  satisfied  they  will  not. 

"Your  change  of  front  from  your  extreme  right  at  Hanover 
Court-House  to  your  present  condition,  was  over  thirty  miles, 
but  I  have  not  heard  that  it  demoralized  your  troops,  notwith 
standing  the  severe  losses  they  sustained  in  ejecting  it. 

•'A  new  base  on  the  Rappahannock  at  Fredericksburg  brings 
you  within  about  sixty  miles  of  Richmond,  and  secures  a  rein 
forcement  of  forty  or  fifty  thousand  fresh  and  disciplined  troops. 

"The  change  with  such  advantages  will,  I  think,  if  properly 
represented  to  your  army,  encourage  rather  than  demoralize  your 
troops.  Moreover,  you  yourself  suggested  that  a  junction  might 
be  effected  at  Yorktown,  but  that  a  flank  march  across  the 
isthmus  would  be  more  hazardous  than  to  retire  to  Fortress 
Monroe. 

"You  will  remember  that  Yorktown  is  two  or  three  milea 
further  than  Frodericksburg  is.  Besides,  the  latter  is  between 


LIFE  OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN.  H3 

Richmond  and  Washington,  and  covers  Washington  from  any 
attack  of  the  enemy. 

"  The  political  effect  of  the  withdrawal  may  at  first  be  un 
favorable  ;  but  I  think  the  public  are  beginning  to  understand 
its  necessity,  and  that  they  will  have  much  more  confidence 
in  a  united  army  than  in  its  separated  fragments. 

"  But  you  will  reply,  why  not  reinforce  me  here,  so  that  I 
can  strike  Richmond  from  my  present  position  ?  To  do  this, 
you  said,  at  our  interview,  that  you  required  thirty  thousand 
additional  troops.  I  told  you  that  it  was  impossible  to  give  you 
so  many.  You  finally  thought  that  you  would  have  some 
chance  of  success  with  twenty  thousand.  Bat  you  afterwards 
telegraphed  me  that  you  would  require  thirty-five  thousand,  as 
the  enemy  was  being  largely  reinforced. 

"  If  your  estimate  of  the  enemy's  strength  was  correct,  your 
requisition  was  perfectly  reasonable  ;  but  it  was  utterly  impossi 
ble  to  fill  it  until  new  troops  could  be  enlisted  and  organized, 
which  would  require  several  weeks. 

"  To  keep  your  army  in  its  present  position  until  it  could  be 
so  reinforced,  would  almost  destroy  it  in  that  climate. 

"The  months  of  August  and  September  are  almost  fatal  to 
whites  who  live  on  that  part  of  James  river  ;  and  even  after 
you  received  the  reinforcements  asked  for,  you  admitted  that 
you  must  reduce  Fort  Darling  and  the  river  batteries  before  you 
could  advance  on  Richmond. 

"  It  is  by  no  means  certain  that  the  reduction  of  these  fortifi 
cations  would  not  require  considerable  time — perhaps  as  much 
as  those  at  Yorktown. 

"  This  delay  might  not  only  be  fatal  to  the  health  of  your 
army,  but  in  the  meantime  General  Pope's  forces  would  be  ex 
posed  to  the  heavy  blows  of  the  enemy,  without  the  slightest 
nope  of  assistance  from  you. 

"  In  regard  to  the  demoralizing  effect  of  a  withdrawal  from 
the  Peninsula  to  the  Rappahannock,  I  must  remark  that  a  large 
number  of  your  highest  officers,  indeed  a  majority  of  those 
whose  opinions  have  been  reported  to  me,  are  decidedly  in  favor 
of  the  movement.  Even  several  of  those  who  originally  advo 
cated  the  line  of  the  Peninsula,  now  advise  its  abandonment. 

"  I  have  not  inquired  and  do  not  wish  to  know,  by  whose 
advice  or  for  what  reasons  the  army  of  the  Potomac  was 
separated  into  two  parts  with  the  enemy  between  them.  I 
must  take  things  as  I  find  them. 

"  I  find  the  forces  divided,  and  I  wish  to  unite  them.  Only 
one  feasible  plan  has  been  presented  for  doing  this.  If  you,  or 
any  one  else,  had  presented  a  better  plan,  I  certainly  should 
have  adopted  it.  But  all  of  your  plans  require  reinforcements, 
which  it  is  impossible  to  give  you. 

"  It  is  very  easy  to  ask  for  reinforcements,  but  it  is  not  so 
easy  to  give  them  when  you  have  no  disposable  troops  at  your 
command 


LIFB   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLANV 

"  I  have  written  very  plainly  as  I  understand  the  case,  and  I 
hope  you  will  give  me  credit  for  having  fully  considered  the 
matter,  although  I  may  have  arrived  at  very  different  conclusions 
from  your  own. 

"  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  H.  W.  HALI.ECK,  General-in-Chief. 
'Major-General  GEORGE  B.  MOCLELLAN, 

"  Commanding,  etc.,  Berkeley,  Virginia." 

GENERAL  MCCLELLAN  TO  GENERAL  HALLECK. 

"  MALVERN  HILL,  August  btli. — This  is  a  very  advantageous 
position  to  cover  an  advance  on  Richmond,  and  only  fourteen 
and  three-quarter  miles  distant,  and  I  feel  confident  that  with  re 
inforcements  I  would  inarch  this  army  there  in  five  days." 

"  SAME,  August  5th. — I  am  sending  off  sick  as  rapidly  as  our 
transports  will  take  them.  I  am  also  doing  every  thing  in  my 
power  to  carry  out  your  orders,  to  push  reconnoissances  towards 
the  rebel  capital,  and  hope  soon  to  find  out  whether  the  reports 
regarding  the  abandonment  of  that  place  are  true." 

GENERAL  HALLECK  TO  GENERAL  MCCLELLAX. 

"  WASHINGTON,  August  6th,  3  A.M. — I  have  no  reinforcements 
to  send  you." 

Farther  telegrams  followed  from  General  McClellan  to 
General  Halleek,  and  vice  versa,  General  Halleck  urging 
General  McClellan  to  ship  his  sick  first,  and  then  batteries 
and  troops  more  rapidly,  and  General  McClellan  insisting 
that  he  is  doing  so  as  fast  as  the  means  of  transportation 
at  his  disposal  permitted,  and  strengthening  his  statement 
by  the  reports  of  his  subordinates  that  there  has  not 
been  an  hour  of  unnecessary  delay. 

•   GENERAL  MCCLELLAN  TO  GENERAL  HALLECK. 

"August  12#7i,  11  P.M. — It  is  positively  the  fact  that  no  more 
men  sould  have  been  embarked  hence  than  have  gone,  and 
that  no  unnecessary  delay  has  occurred.  I  am  sure  you  have 
been  misinformed  as  to  the  availability  of  the  vessels  on  hand. 
There  shall  be  no  unnecessary  delay;  but  I  cannot  manufacture 
vessels.  I  slate  these  difficulties  from  experience,  and  because  it 
appears  to  me  that  we  have  been  lately  working1  at  cross-pur 
poses,  because  you  have  not  been  properly  informed  by  those 
around  you,  who  ought  to  know  the  inherent  difficulties  of  such 
an  undertaking.  It  is  not  possible  for  any  one  to  place  this 
urmy  where  you  wish  it,  ready  to  move,  in  less  than  a  month. 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCKELLAN.  1J5 

If  Washington  is  in  danger  now  this  army  can  scarcely  arrive 
in  time  to  save  it.  It  is  in  much  better  position  to  do  so 
from  here  than  from  Acquia.  Our  material  can  only  be  saved 
by  using  the  whole  army  to  cover  it,  if  we  are  pressed.  If 
sensibly  weakened  by  detachments,  the  results  might  be  the 
loss  of  much  material  and  many  men.  I  will  be  at  the  telegraph 
office  to-morrow  morning." 

GENERAL  HALLECK  TO  GENERAL  MCCLELLAN. 

"August  I4£h,  1.40  A.M. — I  have  read  your  despatch.  There 
is  no  change  of  plans.  You  will  send  up  your  troops  as  rapidly 
as  possible.  There  is  no  difficulty  in  landing  them.  According 
to  your  own  accounts,  there  is  now  no  difficulty  in  withdrawing 
your  forces.  Do  so 'with  all  possible  rapidity." 

General  McClellan  says  that  before  he  had  time  to  de 
cipher  and  reply  to  this  despatch,  the  telegraph-operator  in 
Washington  informed  him  that  General  Halleck  had  gone 
out  of  the  office  immediately  after  writing  this  despatch, 
without  leaving  any  intimation  of  the  fact  to  me,  or  wait 
ing  for  any  further  information  as  to  the  object  of  my  jour 
ney  across  the  Bay.  As  there  was  no  possibility  of  other 
communication  with  him  at  that  time,  I  sent  the  following 
despatch  and  returned  to  Harrison's  Landing : 

"CHERRY  STONE  INLET,  August  14th,  1.40  A.M. — Your  orders 
will  be  obeyed.  I  return  at  once." 

EVACUATION  OF  HARRISON'S  LANDING. 

By  the  morning  of  the  sixteenth  c.11  the  troops  and  ma 
terial  were  en  route  both  by  land  and  water,  and  late  in 
the  afternoon  of  the  same  day,  when  the  last  man  had 
disappeared  from  the  deserted  camps,  General  McClellan 
himself  bade  farewell  to  Harrison's  Landing.  On  the 
night  of  the  seventeenth  the  troops  were  all  safely  across 
the  Chi)3kahominy,  except  the  rear-guard,  and  that  crossed 
early  on  the  following  morning.  General  Porter's  corps 
proceeded  directly  to  Newport  News  and  on  the  twen 
tieth  sailed  for  Acquia  Creek,  and  on  the  twenty-first 
Heintzelman's  corps  sailed  from  Yorktown,  and  on  the 
twenty-third,  Franklin's  corps.  Immediately  on  reaching 


LIFE  or  MAJOR-GENERAL  MCCLELLAN. 

Portress  Monroe,  General  McClellan  gave  directions  for 
Btrengthening  the  defences  of  Yorktown,  and  leaving  Gen 
eral  Keyes  with  his  corps  to  attend  to  the  work.  On  the 
evening  of  the  twenty -third  he  sailed  for  Acquia  Creek, 
where  he  arrived  at  daylight  on  the  following  morning. 

THE  SERVICES  OP  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  PO 
TOMAC. 

On  the  eighteenth,  General  McClellan  sent  the  following 
appeal  to  General  Halleck : 

"  Please  say  a  kind  word  to  my  Army,  that  I  can  repeat  to 
them  in  General  Orders,  in  regard  to  their  conduct  at  Yorktown, 
Williamsburgh,  West  Point,  Hanover  Court-House,  and  on  the 
Chickahominy,  as  well  as  in  regard  to  the  Seven  Days  and  the 
recent  retreat.  No  one  has  ever  said  any  thing  to  cheer  them  but 
myself.  Say  nothing  about  me  ;  merely  give  my  men  and  officers 
credit  for  what  they  have  done.  It  will  do  you  much  good,  arid  will 
strengthen  you  much  with  them,  if  you  issue  a  handsome  order 
to  them  in  regard  to  what  they  have  accomplished.  They  de 
serve  it." 

As  no  reply  was  received  to  this  communication,  and 
no  order  was  issued  by  the  General-in-Chief,  he  concluded 
the  suggestion  did  not  meet  with  his  approbation. 

On  closing  his  Peninsular  campaign,  he  thus  expressed 
his  opinion  of  his  gallant  army  : 

"  From  the  commencement  to  the  termination  of  this  most 
arduous  campaign,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  always  evinced 
the  most  perfect  subordination,  zeal,  and  alacrity  in  the  per 
formance  of  all  the  duties  required  of  it. 

''The  amount  of  severe  labor  accomplished  by  this  army  in 
the  construction  of  intrenchments,  roads,  bridges,  etc.,  was  enor 
mous  ;  yet  all  the  work  was  performed  with  the  most  gratifying 
cheerfulness  and  devotion  to  the  interests  of  the  service. 

"  During  the  campaign,  ten  severely-contested  and  sanguinary 
battles  had  been  fought,  besides  numerous  smaller  engagements, 
in  which  the  troops  exhibited  the  most  determined  enthusiasm 
and  bravery.  They  submitted  to  exposure,  sickness,  and  even 
death,  without  a  murmur.  Indeed,  they  had  become  veterans 
in  their  country's  cause,  and  richly  deserved  the  warm  commen 
dation  of  the  Government." 


LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  H? 

GENERAL  McCLELLAN  AT  ALEXANDRIA. 

Upon  arriving  at  Acquia  Creek,  General  McClellan  tele 
graphed  to  Washington  for  further  orders,  and  on  the 
twenty-sixth  proceeded  to  Alexandria  and  immediately 
adopting  measures  to  ascertain  the  state  of  affairs  at  the 
front,  was  enabled  to  transmit  much  information  as  to  the 
movements  of  Pope's  army,  which  the  authorities  were 
unable  to  receive  direct  from  the  commander  of  the  Army 
of  Virginia.  Among  other  telegrams  that  passed  were 
the  following  : 

GENERAL  MCCLELLAN  TO  GENERAL  HALLECK. 

"ALEXANDRIA  August  27th — 10  A.M. — I  have  sent  orders  to 
Franklin  to  prepare  to  march  with  his  corps  at  once,  and  to  re 
pair  here  in  person,  to  inform  me,  as  to  his  means  of  transpor 
tation." 

GENERAL  HALLECK  TO  GENERAL  MCCLELLAN. 

"August  21th — 1  can  get  no  satisfactory  information  from  the 
front,  either  of  the  enemy  or  of  our  troops.  There  seems  to 
have  been  great  neglect*  and  carelessness  about  Manassas. 
Franklin's  corps  should  march  in  that  direction  as  soon  as 
possible." 

GENERAL  MCCLELLAN  TO  GENERAL  HALLECK. 

" August  27£/i— 1.35  P.M.— I  learn  that  Taylor's  brigade,  sent 
this  morning  to  Bull  Run  Bridge,  is  either  captured  or  cut  to 
pieces.  That  the  force  against  them  had  many  guns  and  about 
5,000  infantry,  receiving  reinforcements  every  minute.  Also, 
that  Gainesville  is  in  possession  of  the  enemy.  Please  send  some 
cavalry  out  towards  Drainsville  via  Chain  Bridge  to  watch  Lew- 
insville  and  Drainsville,  and  go  as  far  as  they  can.  If  you  will 
give  me  even  one  squadron  of  good  cavalry  here,  I  will  ascer 
tain  the  state  of  the  case.  I  think  our  policy  now  is  to  make 
these  works  perfectly  safe,  and  mobilize  a  couple  of  corps  as 
soon  as  possible,  but  not  to  advance  them  until  they  can  have 
their  artillery  and  cavalry.  I  have  sent  for  Colonel  Tyler,  to 
place  his  artillerymen  in  the  fforks.  Is  Fort  Marcy  securely 
held  ?" 

"August  21th — 2.30  P.M. — If  there  is  any  cavalry  in  Washing 
ton  it  should  be  ordered  to  report  to  me  at  once.  I  still  think 
that  we  should  first  provide  for  the  immediate  defence  of  "Wash 
ington  on  both  sides  of  the  Potomac.  I  am  not  responsible  for 
the  past  and  cannot  be  for  the  future  unless  I  receive  authority 


118  LIFE   OP  MAJOR-GENfiBAL  McCLELLAIT. 

to  dispose  of  the  available  troops  according  to  my  judgment. 
Please  inform  me  at  once  what  my  position  is.  1  do  not  wish 
to  act  in  the  dark." 

"August  11th  —  6  P.M.  —  I  now  have  at  my  disposal  here  about 
10.000  men  of  Franklin's  corps,  about  2,800  of  General  Tyler's 
brigade,  and  Colonel  Tyler's  1st  Connecticut  Artillery,  which  I 
recommend  should  be  held  in  hand  for  the  defence  of  Washing 
ton.  If  you  wish  me  to  order  any  part  of  this  force  to  the  front, 
it  is  in  readiness  to  march  at  a  moment's  notice  to  any  point  you 
may  indicate." 

"August  28th  —  4.10  P.M.  —  Pope  must  cut  through  to-day,  or 
adopt  the  plan  I  suggested.  I  have  ordered  troops  to  garrison 
the  works  at  Upton's  Hill.  They  must  be  held  at  any  cost.  As 
soon  as  I  can  see  the  way  to  spare  them,  I  will  send  a  corps 
of  good  troops  there.  It  is  the  key  to  Washington,  which 
cannot  be  seriously  menaced  as  long  as  it  is  held." 

GENERAL  HALLECK  TO  GENERAL  MCCLELLAN. 

"August  ISth  —  The  principal  thing  to  be  feared  now  is  a 
cavalry  raid  into  this  city,  especially  in  the  night  time.  Please 
send  some  of  your  officers  to-day  to  see  that  every  precaution 
is  taken  at  the  forts  against  a  raid,  also  at  the  bridge." 

GENERAL  MCCLELLAN  TO  GENERAL  HALLECK. 

"August  29/'7i  —  10.30  A.M.  —  Franklin's  corps  is  in  motion. 
Started  about  6  A.M.  I  can  give  him  but  two  squadrons  of 
cavalry.  Franklin  has  but  forty  rounds  of  ammunition,  and  no 
\vagons  to  move  more.  I  do  not  think  he  is  in  a  condition  to 
accomplish  much,  if  he  'meets  with  serious  resistance.  I  should 
not  have  moved  him  but  for  your  pressing  order  of  last  night." 

"August  '29th  —  1  P.M.  —  Shall  I  do  as  seems  best  to  me  with 
all  the  troops  in  this  vicinity,  including  Franklin,  who  I  really 
think  ought  not  under  present  circumstances,  to  advance  beyond 
Auandale  ?" 


"August  29£ft  —  10.30  P.M.  —  By  referring  to  my  telegrams  you 
will  see  why  Franklin's  corps  halted  at  Ariandale.  His  small 
cavalry  force,  all  1  had  to  give  him,  was  ordered  to  push  on  as 
far  as  'possible  toward  Manassas.  It  was  riot  safe  for  him  to 
move  beyond  Anandale,  under  the  circumstances,  until  we'  knew 
what,  was  at  Vienna. 

^  "  I  am  responsible  for  both  these  circumstances,  and  do  not 
s^e  that  either  was  in  disobedience  to  your  orders.  Please  give 
distinct  orders  with  reference  to  Franklin's  movements  to-mor- 
low.  I  desire  definite  instructions,  as  it  is  not  agreeable  to  me 
to  be  accused  of  disobeying  orders,  when  I  have  simply  exercised 
the  discretion  yDu  committed  to  me." 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  119 


"August  29to—  11  P.M.—  N  jt  hearing  from  you,  I  have  sent 
orders  to  General  Franklin  to  place  himself  in  communication 
with  General  Pope  as  soon  as  possible,  and  at  the  same  time 
cover  the  transit  of  Pope's  supplies;  and  1  am  having  inspec 
tions  made  of  all  the  forts  around  Washington." 

On  the  same  day  the  President  telegraphed  : 

"What  news  from  direction  of  Manassas  Junction?     What 

generally  ?" 

To  which  the  following  reply  was  sent  : 

"  CAMP  NEAR  ALEXANDRIA, 

"August  29th,  1862—2.45  P.M. 

"  The  last  news  I  received  from  the  direction  of  Manassas  was 
from  stragglers  to  the  effect  that  the  enemy  were  evacuating 
Centreville~  and  retiring  towards  Thoroughfare  Gap.  This  by 
no  means  reliable. 

"  I  am  clear  that  one  of  two  courses  should  be  adopted  :  1st. 
To  concentrate  all  our  available  forces  to  open  communications 
with  Pope;  2d.  To  leave  Pope  to  get  out  of  his  scrape,  and  at 
once  use  all  our  means  to  make  the  Capital  perfectly  safe. 

"  No  middle  ground  will  now  answer.  Tell  me  what  you  wish 
me  to  do,  and  I  will  do  all  in  my  power  to  accomplish  it.  I 
wish  to  know  what  my  orders  and  authority  are.  I  ask  for 
nothing,  but  will  obey  whatever  orders  you  give.  I  only  ask  a 
prompt  decision,  that  I  may  at  once  give  the  necessary  orders. 
It  will  not  do  to  delay  longer. 

"  G.  B.  MCCLELLAN,  Major-General." 

To  this  the  President  replied,  that  he  considered  the 
first  of  the  two  courses  suggested  by  the  General  the  proper 
one,  but  he  did  not  wish  to  control,  and  would  leave  all 
to  General  Halleck,  aided  "by  your  counsels." 

On  the  thirtieth  of  August  an  order  was  issued  by  the 
War  Department  to  the  effect  that  General  McClellan 
would  command  that  portion  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
that  had  not  been  sent  forward  to  General  Pope's  com 
mand,  the  Army  of  Virginia. 

The  following  despatches  were  sent  on  the  following 
day  and  the  day  after  : 

"August  3(M7i—  11.30  A.M.  —  Ever  since  General  Franklin  re 
ceived  notice  that  he  was  to  inarch  from  Alexandria,  he  has  been 
endeavoring  to  get  transportation  from  the  Quartermaster  at 


120  LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAH. 

Alexandria,  but  he  has  uniformly  been  told  there  was  none  dis 
posable,  and  his  command  inarched  without  wagons. 

"General  Sumner  endeavored  by  application  to  the  Quarter 
master's  Department  to  get  wagons  to  carry  his  reserve  ammu 
nition,  but  without  success,  and  was  obliged  tc  inarch  with  what 
he  could  carry  in  his  cartridge  boxes." 

GENERAL  H ALLEGE  TO  GENERAL  MCC/LELLAN. 

"August  SO^/i — 1.45  P.M. — Ammunition,  and  particularly  for 
artillery,  must  be  immediately  sent  forward  to  Centreville  for  Gen 
eral  Pope.  It  must  be  done  with  all  possible  despatch." 

GENERAL  MCCLELLAN'S  REPLY. 

"August  30£7i — 2.10  P.M.— I  know  nothing  of  the  calibres  of 
Pope's  artillery.  All  1  can  do  is  to  direct  rny  ordnance  officer 
to  load  up  all  the  wagons  sent  to  him. 

'•  I  can  do  nothing  more  than  give  the  order  that  every  avail 
able  wagon  in  Alexandria  shall  be  loaded  at  once. 

'*  1  have  no  sharpshooters  except  the  guard  around  my  camp. 
I  have  sent  off  every  man  but  those,  and  will  now  send  them  -as 
you  direct.  I  will  also  send  my  only  remaining  squadron  of 
cavalry  with  General  Sumner.  I  can  do  no  more;  you  now  have 
every  man  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  who  is  within  my  reach." 

GENERAL  MCCLELLAN  TO  GENERAL  HALLECK. 

"August  30th — 10.30  P.M. — I  have  sent  to  the  front  all  my 
troops,  with  the  exception  of  Couch's  division,  and  have  given 
the  orders  necessary  to  insure  its  being  disposed  of  as  you  di 
rected. 

44 1  cannot  express  to  you  tb.e  pain  and  mortification  I  have 
experienced  to-day,  in  listening  to  the  distant  sound  of  the  firing 
of  my  men.  As  I  can  be  of  no  further  use  here,  I  respectfully  ask 
that,  if  there  is  a  probability  of  the  conflict  being  renewed  to 
morrow,  I  may  be  permitted  to  go  to  the  scene  of  battle  with  my 
staff,  merely  to  be  with  my  own  men,  it'  nothing  more.  They  will 
fight  none  the  worse  for  my  being  with  them.  If  it  is  not  deemed 
best  to  entrust  me  with  the  command  even  of  my  own  army,  I 
simply  ask  to  be  permitted  to  share  their  fate  on  the  field  of 
battle. 

"  Please  reply  to  this  to-night.  I  have  been  engaged  for  the 
last  few  hours  in  doing  what  I  can  to  make  arrangements  for 
the  wounded.  I  have  started  out  all  the  ambulances  now  landed. 
As  1  have  sent  my  escort  to  the  front,  I  would  be  glad  to  take 
some  of  Gregg's  cavalry  with  me,  if  allowed  to  go." 

GENERAL  HALLECK'S  REPLY. 

"August  3lst,  9.18A.M. — I  have  just  seen  your  telegram  of  last 
night.  The  substance  was  stated  to  me  when  received,  but  I 
did  not  know  that  you  asked  for  a  reply  immediately.  I  cannot 


LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAST. 

answer  without  seeing  the  President,  as  General  Pope  is  in 
command,  by  his  orders,  of  the  Department. 

"  I  think  'Jouch's  division  should  go  forward  as  rapidly  aa 
possible,  and  find  the  battle-field/' 

GENERAL  MCCLELLAN  TO  GENERAL  HALLECK. 

"August  3lsl. — Under  the  War  Department  order  of  yester 
day,  I  have  no  control  over  any  thing  except  my  staff,  some  one 
hundred  men  in  my  camp  here,  and  the  few  remaining  near 
Fortress  Monroe.  I  have  no  control  over  the  new  regiments  ; 
do  not  know  where  they  are,  or  any  thing  about  them,  except 
those  near  here.  Their  commanding  officers  and  those  of  the 
works  are  not  under  me.  Where  I  have  seen  evils  existing  under 
my  eye,  I  have  corrected  them." 

GENERAL  HALLECK'S  KEJOINDER. 

"August  31s£ — 10.7  P.M. — Since  receiving  your  despatch  rela 
ting  to  command,  I  have  not  been  able  to  answer  any  not  of  abso 
lute  necessity.  I  have  not  seen  the  order  as  published,  but  will 
write  to  you  in  the  morning.  You  will  retain  the  command  of 
every  thing  in  this  vicinity. 

"  I  beg  of  you  to  assist  me  in  this  crisis  with  your  ability  and 
experience.  I  am  entirely  tired  out." 

GENERAL  MCCLELLAX  TO  GENERAL  HALLECK. 

"  CAMP  NEAR  ALEXANDRIA,  August  31s£ — 11.30  P.M. — I  recom 
mend  that  no  more  of  Couch's  division  be  sent  to  the  front,  that 
Burnside  be  brought  here  as  soon  as  practicable,  and  that  every 
thing  available  this  side  of  Fairfax  be  drawn  in  at  once — in 
cluding  the  mass  of  the  troops  on  the  railroad.  I  apprehend 
that  the  enemy  will,  or  have  by  this  time,  occupied  Fairfax 
Court-House,  and  cut  off  Pope  entirely,  unless  he  falls  back  to 
night  via  Sangster's  and  Fairfax  Station. 

"  I  think  these  orders  should  be  sent  at  once.  I  have  no  con 
fidence  in  the  dispositions  made  as  I  gather  them.  To  speak 
frankly,  and  the  occasion  requires  it,  there  appears  to  be  a  total 
absence  of  brains,  and  I  fear  the  total  destruction  of  the  army. 
I  have  some  cavalry  here  that  can  carry  out  any  orders  you  may 
have  to  send.  The  occasion  is  grave,  and  demands  grave  inea- 
Bii res.  The  question  is  the  salvation  of  the  country.  I  learn 
that  our  loss  yesterday  amounted  to  (15,000)  fifteen  thousand. 
We  cannot  afford  such  losses  without  an  object. 

"It  is  my  deliberate  opinion  that  the  interests  of  the  nation 
demand  that  Pope  should  fal]  back  to-night,  if  possible,  and  not 
one  moment  is  to  be  lost.  I  will  use  all  the  cavalry  I  have  to 
watch  our  right.  Please  answer  at  once.  I  feel  confident  that 
you  can  rely  upon  the  information  I  give  you.  I  shall  be  up  all 
night,  and  ready  to  obey  any  orders  you  give  me." 


122  klFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

GENERAL  HALLECK  TO  GENERAL  MCOLELLAN. 

"September  1st — 1.30  A.M.— Retain  remainder  of  Couch's  forces 
and  make  arrangements  to  stop  all  retreating  troops  in  line  of 
works,  or  where  you  can  best  establish  an  entire  line  of  defence. 
I  must  wait  for  more  definite  information  before  I  can  order  a 
retreat,  as  the  falling  back  on  the  line  of  works  must  necessarily 
be  directed,  in  case  of  a  serious  disaster." 

'LITTLE  MAC"  REQUESTED    TO    USE    HIS  IN 
FLUENCE  WITH  THE  ARMY. 

On  the  first  of  September,  McClellan  had  an  interview 
with  the  President  and  the  General-in-Chief,  the  former 
of  whom  requested  him  to  use  his  influence  to  ensure  a 
cordial  co-operation  between  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
and' General  Pope,  as  he  could  accomplish  such  an  object 
and  no  one  else  could.  McClellan  told  the  President  that 
no  such  measure  was  necessary;  that  every  man  in  the 
army  was  loyal ;  and  that  each  one,  officer  and  soldier, 
would  do  his  best.  But  the  President  still  insisted.  In 
obedience  to  the  request  the  following  despatch  was  sent 
to  General  Porter.  At  the  time  this  affair  was  grossly 
misrepresented,  and  was  quoted,  in  more  than  one  quar 
ter,  as  a  proof  that  the  army  was  disloyal. 

''WASHINGTON,  September  1,  1862. 

"  I  ask  of  you,  for  my  sake,  that  of  tho  country,  and  the  old 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  that  you  and  all  my  friends  will  lend  the 
fullest  and  most  cordial  co-operation  to  General  Pope,  in  all  the 
operations  now  going  on.  The  destinies  of  onr  country,  the 
honor  of  our  arms,  are  at  stake,  arid  all  depends  now  upon  the 
cheerful  co-operation  of  all  in  the  field.  This  week  is  the  crisis 
of  our  fate.  Say  the  same  thing  to  my  friends  in  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  and  that  the  last  request  I  have  to  make  of  them 
is,  that,  for  their  country's  sake,  they  will  extend  to  General 
Pope  the  same  support  they  ever  have  to  me. 

"  I  am  in  charge  of  the  defences  of  Washington,  and  am 
doing  all  I  can  to  render  your  retreat  safe,  should  that  become 
necessary.  "  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN." 

General  Porter  replied  that  all  the  friends  of  McClellaa 
would  cordially  co-operate  with  General  Pope,  and  would 
ever  give  their  constant  support  in  the  execution  of  his 
plans. 


LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  123 

THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OP  "BULL  RUN." 

That  night  the  disastrous  campaign  of  Pope  culminated 
in  the  retreat  of  the  whole  Federal  army  on  Washing 
ton.  In  this  extremity,  the  eyes  of  the  nation  turned 
again  towards  McClellan.  A  large  portion  of  the  press 
recalled  the  fact  that  he  had  saved  the  capital  once  before, 
and  insisted  that  he  of  all  others  was  most  competent  to 
save  it  again.  The  popular  mind,  perhaps,  even  outran 
the  newspapers.  The  telegraphs  which  had  gone  forth 
from  Washington,  representing  him  sitting  alone  in  his 
tent,  the  battle  raging  within  hearing,  while,  as  we  have 
seen,  he  had  begged  in  vain  to  be  allowed  to  go  to  the 
front,  even  without  a  command,  had  touched  the  hearts 
of  men  profoundly.  For  the  masses  of  the  people  had 
never  lost  confidence  in  McClellan.  On  the  contrary, 
they  regarded  him  as  the  victim  of  the  politicians.  They 
said  that  he  had  been  prevented  from  renewing  on  a 
larger  scale  the  victories  of  Western  Virginia,  only  by 
the  clamor  of  men  who  knew  nothing  of  military  affairs, 
but  who  had  possessed  the  power  to  frustrate  his  plans. 
Had  he  been  allowed  fully  to  prepare  himself,  they  urged; 
had  no  premature  movements  been  made  ;  had  the  whole 
campaign  commenced  at  once,  and  the  rebels  been  attacked 
fiom  every  quarter  simultaneously,  victory  would  have 
been  certain.  In  the  army,  these  opinions  were  held 
almost  unanimously.  The  men  who  had  been  with  Mc 
Clellan  at  Yorktown,  and  Fair  Oaks,  and  Hanover  Court 
House,  at  Seven  Oaks,  and  Savage's  Station,  and  Malvern 
Hill,  had  unbounded  faith  in  their  leader.  In  their  talk 
around  their  camp-fires  and  in  letters  to  their  families  at 
home,  they  delighted  to  recount  especially  the  wonders  of 
the  seven  days  battles  ;  how,  at  every  halting  place,  they 
found  their  general  had  selected  the  very  best  point  at 
which  to  make  a  stand  ;  how  his  forethought  in  other 
respects  had  attended  them  through  all  that  desperate 


124  I'IFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

week ;  how  he  had  always  a  kind  word,  and  sometimes 
manly  tears,  for  the  wounded  in  the  hospitals  ;  how  he  had 
stirred  the  blood  even  of  the  most  dispirited  with  his 
memorable  address  on  the  fourth  of  July. 

The  American  soldier,  too,  is  the  most  intelligent  of  all 
soldiers ;  and  when  he  spoke  and  wrote  in  this  strain,  it 
was  the  opinion  of  no  ignorant  observer.  In  the  present 
emergency  the  judgment  of  the  army  was,  that  McClellan 
was  the  one  to  rescue  the  republic.  Wounded  men, 
going  home  to  die,  hundreds  of  miles  away,  when  they 
heard  of  the  disastrous  defeat  of  "the  second  Bull  Run," 
told  those  around  them  that  McClellan  alone  could  save 
the  country,  and  that  if  he  was  not  restored  to  command, 
the  cause  was  lost.  These  opinions  in  the  army  never 
developed  into  mutiny ;  for  the  American  soldier  is  still 
a  citizen,  and  does  not  forget  what  he  owes  to  the  law. 
But  they  were  known  to  exist.  It  was  known,  also,  that 
neither  officers  nor  privates  had  felt  any  confidence  in 
Pope  ;  that  they  had  gone  into  battle  more  than  once, 
conscious  of  being  about  to  be  sacrificed  by  unskilful  dis 
positions  ;  and  that,  though  they  ha.d  manfully  and 
loyally  done  their  duty  on  the  field,  and  would  do  it  again, 
under  similar  circumstances,  if  ordered,  yet  that  they 
would  fight,  without  heart,  and  perhaps  be  defeated, 
when  under  a  more  popular  commander,  victory  would 
be  assured. 

WHAT    HISTORY    WILL    SAY. 

It  is  now  known  that  these  opinions,  on  the  part  of  the 
army,  were  fully  justified  by  facts.  We  need  only  appeal 
to  the  official  papers,  in  the  preceding  {Jages,  to  show  that 
McClellan,  if  he  had  not  been  thwarted,  would  have  taken 
Richmond,  perhaps  in  May,  certainly  in  June.  This  was 
the  belief,  at  the  time,  of  the  Prince  de  Joinville,  whose 
position  as  a  foreigner,  whose  high  character  as  a  man, 
and  whose  presence  as  a  participant  in  the  campaign, 


LIFE   OP  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAlf. 

gives  to  his  verdict  something  of  the  impartiality  of  his 
tory.  A  letter  from  General  Keyes,  not  quoted  in  these 
pages,  written  from  the  army,  and  urging  Senator  Harris 
to  use  his  influence  to  have  reinforcements  sent  forward, 
is  conclusive  as  to  the  causes  wrhy  the  Peninsular  cam 
paign  was  a  failure.  Throughout  it  all,  McClellan  had 
been  sacrificed,  and,  with  him,  the  country.  In  coming 
to  this  conclusion,  it  is  not  necessary  to  impugn  the  mo 
tives  of  the  administration.  No  fair  mind  questions  the 
sincerity  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  or  of  his  chief  advisers.  But 
it  could  not  be  supposed  that  men  who  were  ignorant  of 
military  affairs  should  be  able  to  control  a  vast  campaign 
without  many  and  serious  blunders.  It  was  natural,  also, 
that  the  executive  should  be  nervously  sensitive  as  to  the 
safety  of  Washington  ;  for,  with  the  Capital  in  possession 
of  the  rebels,  their  recognition  by  foreign  governments 
would  be  almost  certain.  But  how  best  to  protect  Wash 
ington  was  a  military  problem,  and  it  was  a  dangerous 
error  to  think  that  a  military  problem  could  be  best  solved 
by  mere  civilians.  Now  and  then,  in  the  world's  history, 
a  man  is  born  a  great  military  genius ;  an  Alexander,  a 
Julius  Caesar,  a  Napoleon  ;  or,  in  a  lesser  degree,  a  Tur- 
rene,  a  Maryborough,  a  Wellington  ;  but  in  the  long  run, 
and  especially  since  the  invention  of  gunpowder,  nations 
have  found  that  it  is  wisest  to  commit  military  operations 
to  educated  military  men.  This  opinion,  however,  was 
not  general  in  1862,  particularly  in  certain  influential  cir 
cles  in  Washington.  Men,  high  in  position,  and  who  had 
the  ear  of  the  President,  maintained,  openly,  after  Fort 
Donelson,  that  they  could  march  with  fifty  thousand  men 
from  the  Potomac  to  Richmond  and  New  Orleans ;  and 
there  were  tens  of  thousands  throughout  the  nation,  and 
among  them  many  leading  journalists,  who  entertained 
and  expressed  substantially  similar  sentiments. 

Events  have  shown  that  they  were  wrong.     Of  all  the 


126  LIFK    OF   MAJOR-MINERAL   McCLELLAN. 

prominent  actors  in  that  earlier  period  of  the  rebellion, 
McClellan  seems  to  have  estimated  most  correctly  the 
difficulties  of  the  situation.  Had  his  original  plan  of  a 
campaign  been  adhered  to,  and  had  the  men  he  asked  for 
been  given  to  him  to  carry  it  out,  the  rebellion  would 
probably  have  been  crushed  in  18G2  or  1863.  But  just 
when  he  was  preparing  the  advance  on  Richmond,  enlist 
ments  were  stopped  as  unnecessary,  though  he  moved 
with  smaller  forces  than  he  thought  advisable  ;  and  then, 
months  later,  when  he  had  been  compelled  to  fall  back  on 
Harrison's  Landing  for  the  want  of  these  very  men,  he 
was  told  that  the  whole  campaign  must  be  abandoned  be 
cause  it  was  impossible  to  reinforce  him.  Perhaps,  con 
sidering  bow  much  both  the  people  and  the  Government 
had  to  learn  after  fifty  years  of  virtual  peace,  these  errors 
were  unavoidable  ;  but  the  army,  which  had  never  shared 
these  delusions,  cannot  be  blamed  for  justifying  McClellan, 
as  it  is  now  clear  impartial  history  will  justify  him.  If 
any  thing  more  was  wanted  to  confirm  the  soundness  of 
this  view,  it  was  soon  furnished  by  the  Antietam  cam 
paign,  in  which,  with  amazing  celerity,  within  less  than 
three  weeks  in  all,  McClellan  not  only  reorganized  the  de 
moralized  troops  of  Pope,  but,  no  longer  controlled  by 
others,  repeated,  on  a  larger  scale,  the  rapid  victories  of 
Western  Virginia. 

It  is  deeply  to  be  regretted  that  the  same  mistaken 
judgment,  which  had  rejected  his  counsels  at  Harrison's 
Landing,  and  which  had,  for  a  time,  removed  him  from  the 
chief  command,  should  again,  a  few  weeks  later,  displace 
him,  as  we  shall  see.  For,  to  say  nothing  else,  the  nation 
lost,  by  that  act,  all  the  experience  which  McClellan  had 
been  acquiring  for  a  year.  If  to  the  vigor  of  the  Antie 
tam  campaign  he  had  continued  to  add  the  wariness  which 
had  always  distinguished  him,  there  would  have  been 
little  else  left  to  desire. 


LIFE  OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN.  127 


THE  END  OF  THE  POPE  CAMPAIGN— "  LITTLE 
MAO"  AGAIN  IN  COMMAND. 

On  the  morning  of  the  second  of  September,  the  Presi 
dent  and  General  Halleck  informed  General  McClellan  that 
our  army  was  in  full  retreat  for  Washington,  and  instructed 
him  to  prepare  for  their  reception  and  to  go  out  and 
meet  the  returning  troops,  take  command  of  them  and 
place  them  in  the  best  position.  An  order  was  then 
issued  by  the  War  Department,  announcing  that  "by 
direction  of  the  President,  Major-General  McClellan  will 
have  command  of  the  fortifications  at  Washington  and  of 
all  the  troops  for  the  defence  of  the  capital. 

This  order  actually  placed  him  again  in  command  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  No  time  was  lost  by  the 
gallant  chieftain  in  acceding  to  the  instructions,  and  in  a 
few  hours  he  had  not  only  informed  General  Pope  what 
disposition  he  wished  made  of  troops  as  they  arrived 
within  our  lines  of  defence,  but  had  himself  crossed  the 
river  and  advanced  to  meet  the  retreating  soldiers,  and 
by  his  cheering  voice  encouraged  them,  and  at  the  same 
time  assured  them  that  they  were  approaching' a  havea 
of  safety  of  which  he  was  the  master  pilot.  The  enemy 
soon  became  aware  that  they  had  their  old  foe  to  confront 
them,  and  two  days  later  they  relinquished  the  pursuit 
and  moved  towards  the  Upper  Potomac,  with  the  evident 
intention  of  crossing  the  stream  and  carrying  out  their 
long-cherished  plan  of  invading  the  North,  and  devasta 
ting  the  fertile  and  highly  cultivated  valleys  of  Maryland 
and  Pennsylvania.  General  McClellan  immediately  or 
dered  his  troops,  fatigued  as  they  were  by  the  hardships 
and  sufferings  which  they  recently  endured  during  the 
memorable  Pope  campaign,  to  intercept  the  enemy.  The 
fact  that  their  old  commander  was  again  at  his  post  reia- 
8 


128  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

vigorated  their  wearied  frames  and  revived  their  spirits, 
which  had  naturally  drooped  under  the  repeated  defeats, 
and  although  the  ranks  had  been  sadly  depleted  in  the 
numerous  battles  and  skirmishes  which  were  fought  du 
ring  the  retreat,  without  a  moment's  unnecessary  delay  the 
army  was  in  motion. 

THE    MARYLAND    CAMPAIGN. 

General  McClellan  left  Washington  on  the  seventh, 
having  temporarily  transferred  the  command  of  the 
defences  of  the  capital  to  General  Banks,  arid  after 
cautious  marching,  made  so  by  the  inability  to  ascertain 
whether  the  enemy  actually  intended  to  invade  Pennsyl 
vania  or  to  march  on  Washington  from  the  North,  on  the 
fourteenth,  four  of  the  corps  on  the  right  wing  and 
centre,  arrived  at  South  Mountain,  and  the  balance  of  the 
army  was  within  supporting  distance.  During  the  entire 
march  the  army  was  moved  in  such  order,  that  it  might 
be  concentrated  at  any  time.  On  the  thirteenth  the  right 
wing  and  the  centre  passed  through  Frederick,  from 
which  place  the  enemy  had  just  retired  towards  Harper's 
Ferry,  thus  making  it  necessary  for  General  McClellan  to 
force  the  passes  through  the  mountain  ranges  and  gain 
possession  of  Boonsboro'  and  Rohrersville,  before  he 
could  extend  relief  to  Colonel  Miles,  commanding  at 
Harper's  Ferry.  On  the  thirteenth  he  came  into  posses 
sion  of  an  order  issued  four  days  previous  by  General 
Lee,  prescribing  the  manner  in  which  the  different 
Divisions  of  his  army  should  move. 

Before  leaving  Washington,  General  McClellan  sug 
gested  that  the  troops  at  Harper's  Ferry  should  be  with 
drawn  to  the  North  side  of  the  Potomac,  but  as  the 
recommendation  was  not  observed,  it  was  too  late  when 
the  matter  was  left  to  his  discretion  to  do  any  thing  but 
attempt  to  relieve  them.  J.-nniediate  arrangements  were 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAX. 

made  for  that  purpose,  and  the  left  was  ordered  to  move 
through  Crampton's  Pass,  while  the  centre  and  right 
marched  upon  Burner's  Pass  in  front  of  Middletown.  On 
the  thirteenth  Colonel  Miles  sent  word  that  he  could  hold 
out  with  certainty  two  days  longer,  in  answer  to  which 
three  copies  of  the  following  were  sent  by  three  different 
couriers  on  three  different  routes. 


"  MIDDLETOWN,  September  14tfi,  1862. 

"COLONEL:  —  The  army  is  being  rapidly  concentrated  here. 
We  are  now  attacking  the  pass  on  the  Hagerstown  road  over  the 
Blue  Ridge.  A  column  is  about  attacking  the  Bnrkettsville  and 
Boonsboro'  pass.  You  may  count  on  our  making  every  effort 
to  relieve  you.  You  may  rely  upon  my  speedily  accomplishing 
that  object.  Hold  out  to  the  last  extremity.  If  it  is  possible, 
reoccupy  the  Maryland  Heights  with  your  whole  force.  If  you 
can  do  that,  I  will  certainly  be  able  to  relieve  you.  As  the 
Catoctin  Yalley  is  in  our  possession,  you  can  safely  cross  the 
river  ut  Berlin  or  its  vicinity,  so  far  as  opposition  on  this  side 
of  the  river  is  concerned.  Hold  out  to  the  last. 
"  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

'  i  Major-  Gene  ral  Commanding." 

"  Colonel  D.  S.  MILES." 

On  the  previous  day  he  had  sent  a  despatch  to  General 
Franklin,  advising  him  of  the  enemy's  movements,  and 
instructing  him  to  relieve  Colonel  Miles  as  soon  as  possi 
ble.  "If  you  effect  this,"  he  wrote,  "you  will  order  him 
to  join  you  at  once  with  all  his  disposable  troops,  first 
destroying  the  bridges  over  the  Potomac,  if  not  already 
done,  and  leaving  a  sufficient  garrison  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  passing  the  ford.  You  will  then  return  by 
Rohrersville  on  the  direct  road  to  Boonsboro',  if  the  main 
column  has  not  succeeded  in  its  attack.  If  it  has  suc 
ceeded,  take  the  road  to  Rohrersville,  to  Sharpsburg  and 
Williamsport,  in  order  either  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  Hill 
and  Longstreet  towards  the  Potomac,  or  prevent  the  re- 
passage  of  Jackson.  My  general  idea  is  to  cut  the  enemy 
in  two  and  beat  him  in  detail." 

Again,  on  th;  14th,  he  sent  the  following  : 


130  LiyE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAff. 

"HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THK  POTOMAC, 

"  FREDERICK,  September  14£7i,  1862 — 2  P.M. 
"  MAJOR-GENERAL  FRANKLIN  : 

"  Your  despatch  of  12.30  just  received.  Send  back  to  hurry 
up  Couch.  Mass  your  troops  and  carry  Burkettsville  at  any 
cost.  We  shall  have  strong  opposition  at  both  passes.  As 
last  as  the  troops  come  up,  I  will  hold  a  reserve  in  readiness  to 
support  you.  If  you  find  the  enemy  in  very  great  force  at  any 
of  these  passes,  let  me  know  at  once,  and  amuse  them  as  best 
you  can,  so  as  to  retain  them  there.  In  that  event,  I  will  prob 
ably  throw  the  mass  of  the  army  on  the  puss  in  front  of  here. 
If  I  carry  that,  it  will  clear  the  way  for  you,  and  you  must  fol 
low  the  enemy  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

"  GEORGE  B.  MCC/LELLAN, 

"Major-  General  Commanding.'' 

THE  BATTLES  OF  CRAMPTON'S  GAP  AND 
SOUTH  MOUNTAIN—  GENERAL  McCLELLAN'S 
OFFICIAL  REPORT. 

Here  follows  General  McClellan's  official  reports  of  the 
battles  of  Cranipton's  Gap  and  South  Mountain : 

"  General  Franklin  pushed  his  corps  rapidly  forward  towards 
Crampton's  Pass,  and,  at  about  12  o'clock  on  the  14th,  arrived 
at  Burkettsville,  immediately  in  rear  of  which  he  found  the 
enemy's  infantry  posted  in  force  on  both  sides  of  the  road,  with 
artillery  in  strong  positions  to  defend  the  approaches  to  tho 
puss.  Slocum's  division  was  formed  upon  the  right  of  the  road 
leading  through  the  gap,  and  Smith's  upon  the  left.  A  line 
formed  of  Bartlett's  and  Torbett's  brigades,  supported  by  New 
ton,  whose  activity  was  conspicuous,  advanced  steadily  upon 
the  enemy,  at  a  charge,  on  the  right.  The  enemy  were  driven 
from  their  position  at  the  base  of  the  mountain,  where  they 
were  protected  by  a  stone  wall,  steadily  forced  back  up  the 
slope,  until  they  reached  the  position  of  their  battery  on  the 
road,  well  up  the  mountain.  There  they  made  a  stand.  They 
were,  however,  driven  back,  retiring  their  artillery  in  echelon, 
•intil,  after  an  action  of  three  hours,  the  crest  was  gained,  and 
the  enemy  hastily  fled  down  the  mountain  on  the  other  side. 

"On  the  left  of  the  road  Brooks's  and  Irwin's  brigades,  of 
Smith's  division,  formed  for  the  protection  of  Slocum's  flank, 
charged  up  the  nr-ountain  in  the  same  steady  manner,  driving 
the  enemy  before  them  until  the  crest  was  carried.  Four  hun 
dred  prisoners,  from  seventeen  different  organizations;  seven 
hundred  stand  of  arms,  one  piece  of  artillery,  and  three  colors, 
were  captured  by  our  troops  in  this  brilliant  action.  It  was 
conducted  by  General  Franklin  in  all  its  details. 

"  The  loss  in  General  Franklin's  corps  was  one  hundred  and 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAX. 

fifteen  killed,  four  hundred  and  sixteen  wounded,  and  two 
missing.  The  enemy's  loss  was  about  the  same.  The  enemy's 
position  was  such  that  our  artillery  could  not  be  used  with  any 
effect.  Tli2  close  of  the  action  found  General  Franklin's  ad 
vance  in  Pleasant  Valley,  on  the  night  of  the  14th,  within 
three  and  one-half  miles  of  the  point  on  Maryland  Heights, 
where  he  might  on  the  same  night,  or  on  the  morning  of  the 
15th,  have  formed  a  junction  with  the  garrison  of  Hurper'a 
Ferry,  had  it  not  been  previously  withdrawn  from  Maryland 
Heights." 

At  midnight  the  following  despatch  was  sent  to  Gen 
eral  Franklin : 

"  BOLIVAR,  September  15£7i — 1  A.M. 
"General  Franklin  : — GENERAL  : — 

"The  Commanding  General  directs  that  you  occupy  with  your 
command  the  road  from  Rohrersville  to  Harper's  Ferry,  placing 
a  sufficient  force  at  Rohrersville  to  hold  that  position  in  case  it 
should  be  attacked  by  the  enemy  from  Boonsboro'.  Endeavor 
to  open  communication  with  Colonel  Miles  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
attacking  and  destroying  such  of  the  enemy  as  you  may  find  in 
Pleasant  Valley.  Should  you  succeed  in  opening  communica 
tion  with  Colonel  Miles,  direct  him  to  join  you  with  his  whole 
command,  with  all  the  guns  and  public  property  that  ho  can 
carry  with  him.  The  remainder  of  the  guns  will  be  spiked  or  de 
stroyed  ;  the  rest  of  the  public  property  will  also  be  destroyed. 
You  will  then  proceed  to  Boonsboro',  which  place  the  Com 
manding  General  intends  to  attack  to-morrow,  and  join  the  main 
body  of  the  army  at  that  place.  Should  you  find,  however,  that 
the  enemy  have  retreated  from  Boonsboro'  towards  Shurpsburg, 
you  will  endeavor  to  fall  upon  him  and  cut  off  his  retreat. 
"By  command  of  "  MAJOR-GKNERAL  MCCLELLAN. 

"Geo.  D.  Buggies,  Colonel,  and  Aide-de-Camp." 

On  the  15th  the  following  were  received  from  General 
Franklin  : 

"AT  THE  FOOT  OF  MOUNT  PLEASANT, 
"  IN  PLEASANT  VALLEY,  THREE  MILES  FROM  ROHRERSVILLE, 

"  September  15£7i — 8.50  A.M. 

"  GENERAL  : — My  command  started  at  daylight  this  morning, 
and  I  am  waiting  to  have  it  closed  up  here.  General  Couch 
arrived  about  ten  o'clock  last  niffht.  I  have  ordered  one  of 
his  brigades  and  one  battery  to  Rohrersville  or  to  the  strorgert 
point  in  its  vicinity.  The  enemy  is  drawn  up  in  line  of  buttle 
abou';  two  miles  to  our  front,  one  brigade  in  sight.  As  soon  as 
I  am  sure  that  Rohrersville  is  occupied  I  shall  move  forward  1o 
attack  the  enemy.  This  may  be  two  hours  from  now.  If 


132  L1FE    OF   MAJOR-GENEBAL   McCLELLAX. 

Harper's  Ferry  has  fallen,  and  the  cessation  of  firing1  makes  me 
ieur  that  it  has,  it  is  my  opinion  that  I  should  be  strongly  rein 
forced.  "  W.  B.  FRANKLIN, 

"Major -General  Commanding  Corps. 

"'GENERAL  G.  B.  MCCLELLAN." 

"September  ~L5th — -11  A.M. 

"GENERAL: — I  have  received  your  despatch  by  Captain 
O'Heefe.  The  enemy  is  in  large  force  in  my  front,  in  two  line? 
of  battle,  stretching  across  the  valley,  and  a  large  column  of 
artillery  and  infantry  on  the  right  of  the  valley,  looking  towards 
Harper's  Ferry.  They  outnumber  me  two  to  one.  It  will  of 
course  not  answer  to  pursue  the  enemy  under  these  circumstances. 
1  shall  communicate  with  Burnside  as  soon  as  possible.  In  the 
meantime  I  shall  wait  here  until  I  learn  what  is  the  prospect  of 
reinforcement.  I  have  not  the  force  to  justify  an  attack  on  the 
force  I  see  in  front.  I  have  had  a  very  close  view  of  it,  and  its 
position  is  very  strong.  "  Respectfully, 

"W.  B.  FRANKLIN,  Major-General. 

"  GENERAL  G.  B.  MCCLELLAN,  Commanding ." 

"Col.  Miles  surrendered  Harper's  Ferry  at  8  A.M.  on  the  15th, 
as  the  cessation  of  the  firing  indicated,  and  Gen.  Franklin  was 
ordered  to  remain  where  he  was  to  watch  the  large  force  in 
front  of  him,  and  protect  our  left  and  rear  until  the  night  of  the 
16th,  when  he  was  ordered  to  join  the  main  body  of  the  army  at 
Keedysville,  after  sending  Couch's  division  to  Maryland  Heights. 
"While  the  events  which  have  just  been  described  were  taking 
place  at  Crampton's  Gap,  the  troops  of  the  centre  and  right 
wing,  which  had  united  at  Frederick  on  the  13th,  were  engaged 
in  the  contest  for  the  possession  of  Turner's  Gap. 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  13th,  General  Pleasanton  was  or 
dered  to  send  McReynolds's  brigade  and  a  section  of  artillery 
in  the  direction  of  Gettysburg,  and  Rush's  regiment  towards 
Jefferson,  to  communicate  with  Franklin,  to  whom  the  Sixth 
United  States  cavalry  and  a  section  of  artillery  had  previously 
been  sent,  and  to  proceed  with  the  remainder  of  his. force  in  the 
direction  of  Middletown,  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  After  skir 
mishing  with  the  enemy  all  the  morning  and  driving  them  from 
ee  ~eral  strong  positions,  he  reached  Turner's  Gap  of  the  South 
Mountain,  in  the  afternoon,  and  found  the  enemy  in  force,  and 
apparently  determined  to  defend  the  pass.  He  sent  back  for 
infantry  to  General  Burnside,  who  had  been  directed  to  support 
him,  and  proceeded  to  make  a  reconnoissance  of  the  position. 

"The  South  Mountain  is  at  this  point  about  one  thousand 
feet  IL  height,  and  its  general  direction  is  from  northeast  to 
southwest.  The  National  Road  from  Frederick  to  Hagerstown 
crosses  it  nearly  at  right  angles,  through  Turner's  Gap,  a  de 
pression  which  is  some  four  hundred  feet  in  depth.  The  nioun- 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  133 

tain  on  the  north  side  of  the  turnpike  is  divided  into  two  crests 
or  ridges,  by  a  narrow  valley,  which,  though  deep  at  the  pass, 
becomes  a  slight  depression  at  about  a  mile  to  the  north.  There 
are  two  country-roads,  one  to  the  right  of  the  turnpike  and  th<3 
ether  to  the  left,  which  give  access  to  the  crests  overlooking 
the  main  road.  The  one  on  the  left,  called  the  '  Old  Sharps- 
burg  Road,'  is  nearly  parallel  to  and  about  half  a  mile  distant 
from  the  turnpike,  until  it  reaches  the  crest  of  the  mountain, 
\vhen  it  bends  off  to  the  left.  The  other  road,  called  the  '  Old 
Hagerstown  Road,'  passes  up  a  ravine  in  the  mountains,  about 
a  mile  from  the  turnpike,  and  bending  to  the  left  over  and  along 
the  first  crest,  enters  the  turnpike  at  the  Mountain  House,  near 
the  summit  of  the  pass.  On  the  night  of  the  13th,  the  positions 
of  the  different  corps  were  as  follows  : 

"  Reno's  corps  at  Middletown,  except  Redman's  division  at 
Frederick. 

Hooker's  corps  on  the  Monocacy,  two  miles  from  Frederick. 

Sumner's  corps  near  Frederick. 

Banks's  corps  near  Frederick. 

Sykes's  division  near  Frederick. 

Franklin's  corps  at  Buckeyestown. 

Couch's  division  at  Licksville." 

The  orders  from  head-quarters  for  the  march  on  the  14th 
were  as  follows  : 

"\Wi,  11.30  P.M.— Hooker  to  march  at  daylight  to  Mid 
dletown. 

"13M,  11.30  P.M.— Sykes  to  move  at  6  A.M.  after  Hooker,  on 
the  Middletown  and  Hagerstown  road. 

"  14<7i,  1  A.M. — Artillery  reserve  to  follow  Sykes  closely. 

"  13M,  8.45  P.M. — Turner  to  move  at  7  A.M 

"  14th,  9  A.M. — Sumner  ordered  to  take  the  Shookstown  road 
to  Middletown. 

"  13£/i,  6.45  P.M. — Couch  ordered  to  move  to  Jefferson  with 
his  whole  division. 

"  On  the  14th,  General  Pleasanton  continued  his  reconnois- 
sance.  Gibson's  battery,  and  afterward  Benjamin's  battery  (of 
Reno's  corps)  were  placed  on  high  ground  to  the  left  of  the 
turnpike,  and  obtained  a  direct  fire  on  the  enemy's  position  in 
the  gap." 

General  Cox's  division,  which  had  been  ordered  np  to 
support  General  Pleasanton,  left  its  bivouac  near  Mid 
dletown  at  6  A.M.  The  first  brigade  reached  the  scene 
of  action  about  9  A.M.,  and  was  sent  up  the  Old  Sharps- 
burg  road  by  General  Pleasanton  to  feel  the  enemy,  and 
ascertain  if  he  held  the  crest  on  that  side  in  strong  force. 


134  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GEKERAL  MctfLELLAN. 

"This  was  soon  found  to  be  the  case,  and  General  Cox  having 
arrived  with  the  other  brigade,  and  information  having  been  re 
ceived  from  General  Reno,  that  the  column  would  be  supported 
by  the  whole  corps,  the  division  was  ordered  to  assault  the 
position.  Two  20-pourider  Parrots  of  Simmons's  battery,  and 
two  sections  of  McMullan's  battery  were  left  in  the  rear,  in 
position  near  the  turnpike,  where  they  did  good  service  during 
the  day  against  the  enemy's  batteries  in  the  gap.  Colonel 
Scammon's  brigade  was  deployed,  and,  well  covered  by  skir 
mishers,  moved  up  the  slope  to  the  left  of  the  road,  with  the 
object  of  turning  the  enemy's  right,  if  possible.  It  succeeded 
in  gaining  the  crest  and  establishing  itself  there,  in  spite  of  the 
vigorous  efforts  of  the  enemy,  who  was  posted  behind  stone  walls 
and  in  the  edges  of  timber,  and  the  fire  of  a  battery  which  poured 
in  canister  and  case  shot  on  the  regiment  on  the  right  of  the 
brigade.  Colonel  Crook's  brigade  marched  in  columns  at  sup 
porting  distance.  A  section  of  McMullan's  battery,  under 
Lieutenant  Croome  (killed  while  serving  one  of  his  guns),  wu? 
moved  up  with  great  difficulty,  and  opened  with  canister  at 
very  short  range,  on  the  enemy's  infantry,  by  whom,  after  having 
done  considerable  execution,  it  was  soon  silenced  and  forced  to 
withdraw. 

"  One  regiment  of  Crook's  brigade  was  now  deployed  on 
Scammon's  left,  and  the  other  two  in  his  rear,  and  they  several 
times  entered  the  first  line  and  relieved  the  regiments  in  front 
of  them  when  hard  pressed.  A  section  of  Sumner's  battery 
was  brought  up  and  placed  in  the  open  space  in  the  woods,  where 
it  did  good  service  during  the  rest  of  the  day.  The  enemy 
several  times  attempted  to  retake  the  crest,  advancing  with 
boldness,  but  were  each  time  repulsed.  They  then  withdrew 
their  battery  to  a  point  more  to  the  right  and  formed  columns 
on  both  our  flanks.  It  was  now  about  noon,  and  a  lull  occurred 
in  the  contest  which  lasted  about  two  hours,  during  which  the 
rest  of  the  corps  was  coming  up.  General  Wilcox's  division 
was  the  first  to  arrive.  When  he  reached  the  base  of  the  moun 
tain,  General  Cox  advised  him  to  consult  General  Pleasantou 
as  to  a  position.  The  latter  indicated  that  on  the  right,  after 
wards  taken  up  by  General  Hooker.  General  Wilcox  was  in  the 
act  of  moving  to  occupy  this  ground,  when  he  received  an 
order  from  Ueneral  Reno  to  move  up  the  Old  Sharpsburg  road 
and  take  a  position  to  its  right,  overlooking  the  turnpike.  Two 
regiments  were  detached  to  support  General  Cox,  at  his 
request.  One  section  of  Cook's  battery  was  placed  in  position 
near.the  turn  of  the  road  (on  the  crest),  and  opened  fire  on  th * 
enemy's  batteries  across  the  gap  ;  the  division  was  proceeding 
to  deploy  to  the  right  of  the  road,  when  the  enemy  suddenly 
opened  at  150  yards  with  a  battery  which  enfiladed  the  road  at 
this  point,  drove  off  Cook's  cannoneers  with  their  limbers,  and 
caused  a  tempoiary  panic  in  which  the  guns  were  nearly  lost. 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  135 

But  the  Seventy-ninth  New  York  and  Seventeenth  Michigan 
promptly  rallied,  changed  front  under  a  heavy  fire,  and  moved 
out  to  protect  the  guns  with  which  Captain  Cook  had  remained. 
Order  was  soon  restored  and  the  division  formed  in  line  on  the 
right  of  Cox,  and  was  kept  concealed  as  much  as  possible, 
under  the  hill-side,  until  the  whole  line  advanced.  It  was  ex 
posed  not  only  to  the  fire  of  the  battery  in  front,  but  also  to 
that  of  the  batteries  on  the  other  side  of  the  turnpike,  and  lost 
heav  ly. 

"  Shortly  before  this  time,  Generals  Burnside  and  Keno  ar 
rived  at  the  base  of  the  mountain,  and  the  former  directed  the 
latter  to  move  up  the  divisions  of  Generals  Sturgis  and  Rodman 
to  the  crest  held  by  Cox /and  Wilcox,  and  to  move  upon  the 
enemy's  position  with  his  whole  force  as  soon  as  he  was  informed 
that  General  Hooker  (who  had  just  been  directed  to  attack  on 
the  right)  was  well  advanced  up  the  mountain.  General  Reno 
then  went  to  the  front  and  assumed  the  direction  of  affairs,  the 
positions  having  been  explained  to  him  by  General  Pleasanton. 
Shortly  before  this  time,  I  arrived  at  the  point  occupied  by 
General  Burnside,  and  my  head-quarters  were  located  there 
until  the  conclusion  of  the  action.  General  Sturgis  had  left  his 
camp  at  1  P.M.,  and  reached  the  scene  of  action  about  3£  P.M. 
Clark's  battery  of  his  division  was  sent  to  assist  Cox's  left,  by 
order  of  General  Reno,  and  two  regiments  (Second  Maryland 
and  Sixth  New  Hampshire)  were  detached  by  General  Reno  and 
sent  forward  a  short  distance  on  the  left  of  the  turnpike.  His 
division  was  formed  in  rear  of  Wilcox's,  and  Rodman's  division 
was  divided,  Colonel  Fairchilds's  brigade  being  placed  on  the  ex 
treme  left,  and  Colonel  Harland's,  under  General  Rodman's 
personal  supervision,  on  the  right. 

"  My  order  to  move  the  whole  line  forward  and  take  or  silence 
the  enemy's  batteries  in  front,  was  executed  with  enthusiasm. 
The  enemy  made  a  desperate  resistance,  charging  our  advancing 
lines  with  fierceness,  but  they  were  everywhere  routed,  and  fled. 
Our  chief  loss  was  in  Wilcox's  division.  The  enemy's  battery 
was  found  to  be  across  a  gorge,  and  beyond  the  reach  of  our 
infantry,  but  its  position  was  made  untenable,  and  it  was  hastily 
removed,  and  not  again  put  in  position  near  us.  But  the  bat 
teries  across  the  gap  still  kept  up  a  fire  of  shot  and  shell. 

"  General  Wilcox  praises  very  highly  the  conduct  of  the 
Seventeenth  Michigan  in  this  advance,  a  regiment  which  had 
been  organized  scarcely  a  month,  but  which  charged  the  ad 
vancing  enemy  in  flank  in  a  manner  worthy  of  veteran  troops, 
ai.d  also  that  of  the  Forty-fifth  Pennsylvania,  which  bravely 
met  them  in  front.  Cook's  battery  now  re-opened  fire  ;  Stur- 
gis's  division  was  moved  to  the  front  of  Wilcox's,  occupying  the 
new  ground  gained  on  the  further  side  of  the  slope,  and  his 
artillery  opened  on  the  batteries  across  the  gap.  The  enemy 
made  aa  effort  to  turn  our  left  about  dark,  but  were  repulsed  by 


LIFE    OF  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

Fairchilds's  brigade  and  Clark's  battery.  At  about  seven  o'clock 
the  enemy  made  another  effort  to  regain  the  lost  ground,  attack 
ing  along  Sturgis's  front,  and  part  of  Cox's;  a  lively  fire  was 
kept  up  until  nearly  nine  o'clock,  several  charges  being  made  by 
the  enemy  and  repulsed  with  slaughter,  and  we  finally  occupied 
the  highest  part  of  the  mountain.  General  Reno  was  killed 
just  before  sunset,  while  making  a  reconnoissance  to  the  front, 
and  the  command  of  the  corps  devolved  upon  General  Cox. 
In  General  Ileno  the  nation  lost  one  of  its  best  General  officers. 
He  was  a  skilful  soldier,  a  brave  and  honest  man. 

"There  was  no  firing  after  ten  o'clock,  and  the  troops  slept  on 
their  arms,  ready  to  renew  the  fight  at  daylight,  but  the  enemy 
quietly  retired  from  our  front  during  the  night,  abandoning  their 
wounded,  and  leaving  their  dead  in  large  numbers  scattered 
over  the  field.  While  these  operations  were  progressing  on  the 
left  of  the  main  column,  the  right,  under  General  Hooker,  was 
actively  engaged.  His  corps  left  the  Monocacy  early  in  the 
morning,  and  its  advance  reached  the  Catoctin  Creek  about 
1  P.M.  General  Hooker  then  went  forward  to  examine  the  ground. 

"  At  about  one  o'clock  General  Meade's  division  was  ordered 
to  make  a  diversion  in  favor  of  Reno. 

"The  division  left  Catoctin  Creek  about  2  o'clock,  and  turned 
off  to  the  right  from  the  main  road,  on  the  Old  Hagerstown 
road,  to  Mount  Tabor  Church,  where  General  Hooker  was,  and 
deployed  a  short  distance  in  advance,  its  right  resting  about  one 
and  one-half  miles  from  the  turnpike.  The  enemy  fired  a  few 
shots  from  the  battery  on  the  mountain-side,  but  did  no  con 
siderable  damage.  Cooper's  battery  B,  First  Pennsylvania 
artillery,  was  placed  in  position  on  high  ground,  at  about  H| 
o'clock,  and  fired  at  the  enemy  on  the  slope,  but  soon  ceased  by 
order  of  General  Hooker;  and  the  position  of  our  lines  pre 
vented  any  further  use  of  artillery  by  us  on  this  part  of  the  field. 
The  First  Massachusetts  cavalry  was  sent  up  the  valley  to  the 
right,  to  observe  the  movement,  if  any,  of  the  enemy,  in  that 
direction,  and  one  regiment  of  Meade's  division  was  posted  to 
watch  a  road  coming  in  the  same  direction.  The  other  divisions 
were  deployed  as  they  came  up,  General  Hatch's  on  the  left,  and 
General  Ricketts's,  which  arrived  at  5  P.M.,  in  the  rear.  General 
Gibbon's  brigade  was  detached  from  General  Hatch's  division 
by  General  Burnside,  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  demonstration 
on  the  enemy's  centre,  up  the  main  road,  as  soon  as  the  move, 
nients  on  the  righ^and  left  had  sufficiently  progressed.  The  First 
Pennsylvania  rifles,  of  General  Seymour's  brigade,  were  sent  for 
ward  as  skirmishers  to  feel  the  enemy,  and  it  was  found  that  he  was 
in  force.  Meade  was  then  directed  to  advance  his  division  to  the 
right  of  the  road  so  as  to  outflank  them,  if  possible,  and  then 
to  move  forward  and  attack,  while  Hatch  was  directed  to  tako 
with  his  division  the  crest  on  the  left  of  the  Old  Hagerstowo 
road,  Rickitts's  division  being  held  in  reserve.  Seymour'* 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GEXERAL   McCLELLAN. 

brigade  was  sent  up  to  the  top  of  the  slope  on  the  right  of  the 
ravine  through  which  the  road  runs,  and  then  moved  along  the 
summit  parallel  to  the  road,  while  Colonel  Gallagher's  and 
Colonel  McGilton's  brigades  moved  in  the  same  direction  along 
the  slope  and  in  the  ravine.  The  ground  was  of  the  most  dif 
ficult  character  for  the  movement  of  troops,  the  hill-side  being 
very  steep  and  rocky,  and  obstructed  by  stone  walls  and  timber. 
The  enemy  was  very  soon  encountered,  and  in  a  short  time  the 
action  became  general  along  the  whole  front  of  the  division. 
The  line  advanced  steadily  up  the  mountain  side,  where  the 
enemy  was  posted  behind  trees  and  rocks,  from  which  he  was 
gradually  dislodged.  During  this  advance  Colonel  Gallagher, 
commanding  the  Third  brigade,  was  severely  wounded,  and  the 
command  devolved  upon  Lieutenant-Colonel  Robert  Anderson. 

"  General  Meade,  having  reason  to  believe  that  the  enemy 
were  attempting  to  outflank  him  on  his  right,  applied  to  General 
Hooker  for  reinforcements.  General  Duryea's  brigade,  of  Rick- 
etts's  division,  was  ordered  up  ;  but  it.  did  not  arrive  until  the 
close  of  the  action.  It  was  advanced  on  Seymour's  left,  but 
only  one  regiment  could  open  fire  before  the  enemy  retired  and 
darkness  intervened.  General  Meade  speaks  highly  of  General 
Seymour's  skill  in  handling  his  brigade  on  the  extreme  right, 
securing,  by  his  manoeuvres,  the  great  object  of  the  movement, 
the  outflanking  of  the  enemy.  While  General  Meade  was  gal 
lantly  driving  the  enemy  on  the  right,  General  Hatch's  division 
was  engaged  in  a  severe  contest  for  the  possession  of  the  crest 
on  the  left  of  the  ravine.  It  moved  up  the  mountain  in  the 
following  order  :  Two  regiments  of  General  Patrick's  brigade, 
deployed  as  skirmishers,  with  the  other  two  regiments  of  the 
same  brigade  supporting  them,  Colonel  Phelps's  brigade  in 
line  of  battalions  in  mass  at  deploying  distance,  General  Double- 
day's  brigade,  in  the  same  order,  bringing  up  the  rear.  Tho 
Tvventy-first  New  York  having  gone  straight  up  the  slope,  in 
stead  of  around  to  the  right,  as  directed,  the  Second  United 
States  sharpshooters  was  sent  out  in  its  place. 

"  Phelps's  and  Doubleday's  brigades  were  deployed  in  turn 
/as  they  reached  the  woods,  which  began  about  half  up  the 
mountain.  General  Patrick,  with  his  skirmishers,  soon  drew  the 
fire  of  the  enemy,  and  found  him  strongly  posted  behind  a  fence 
which  bounded  the  cleared  space  on  the  top  of  the  ridge,  having 
on  his  front  the  woods  through  which  our  line  was  advancing, 
and  in  his  rear  a  corn-field  full  of  rocky  ledges,  which  aftbrded 
good  cover  to  fall  back  to,  if  dislodged.  Phelps's  brigade  gal 
lantly  advanced,  under  a  hot  fire,  to  close  quarters,  and.  after  ten 
or  fifteen  minutes  of  heavy  firing  on  both  sides  (in  which  Gen 
eral  Hatch  was  wounded  while  urging  on  his  men)  the  fence  was 
carried  by  a  charge,  and  our  line  advanced  a  few  yards  beyond 
it,  somewhat  sheltered  by  the  slope  of  the  hill.  Doubleday's 
brigade,  now  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hoffman 


138  LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

(Colonel  Wainwright  having1  been  wounded,)  relieved  Phclps, 
and  continued  firing  for  an  hour  and  a  half;  the  enemy,  behind 
ledges  of  rocks  some  thirty  or  forty  paces  in  our  front,  making  a 
stubborn  resistance,  and  attempting1  to  charge,  on  the  least  ces 
sation  of  our  fire.  About  dusk,  Colonel  Christian's  '.rigade,  of 
Ricketts's  division,  came  up  and  relieved  Doubleday's  brigade, 
which  fell  back  into  line  behind  Phelps's.  Christian's  brigade 
continued  the  action  for  thirty  or  forty  minutes,  when  the  enemy 
retired,  after  having  made  an  attempt  to  flank  us  on  the  left, 
which  was  repulsed  by. the  Seventy-fifth  New  York  and  Seventh 
Indiana. 

"  The  remaining  brigade  of  General  Ricketts's  division  (Gen 
eral  Hartsuff's)  was  moved  up  in  the  centre,  and  connected 
Meade's  left  with  Doubleday's  right.  We  now  had  possession 
of  the  summit  of  the  first  ridge,  which  commanded  the  turnpike 
on  both  sides  of  the  mountain,  and  the  troops  were  ordered  to 
hold  their  positions  until  further  orders,  and  slept  on  their  arms. 
Late  in  the  afternoon  General  Gibbon,  with  his  brigade  and  one 
section  of  Gibbon's  battery  (B,  Fourth  artillery),  was  ordered  to 
move  up  the  main  road  on  the  enemy's  centre.  He  advanced  a 
regiment  on  each  side  of  the  road,  preceded  by  skirmishers,  and 
followed  by  the  other  two  regiments  in  double  column — the 
artillery  moving  on  the  road  until  within  range  of  the  enemy's 
guns,  which  were  firing  on  the  column  from  the  gorge. 

"  The  brigade  advanced  steadily,  driving  the  enemy  from  his 
positions  in  the  woods  and  behind  stone  walls,  until  they  reached 
a  point  well  up  towards  the  top  of  the  pass,  when  the  enemy, 
having  been  reinforced  by  three  regiments,  opened  a  heavy  fire 
on  the  front  and  on  both  flanks.  The  fight  continued  until  nine 
o'clock,  the  enemy  being  entirely  repulsed,  and  the  brigade,  after 
having  suffered  severely  and  having  expended  all  its  ammuni 
tion,  including  even  the  cartridges  of  the  dead  and  wounded, 
continued  to  hold  the  ground  it  had  so  gallantly  won,  until 
twelve  o'clock,  when  it  was  relieved  by  General  Gorman's  bri 
gade,  of  Sedgwick's  division,  Sumner's  corps  (except  the  Sixth 
Wisconsin,  which  remained  on  the  field  all  night).  General 
Gibbon,  in  this  delicate  movement,  handled  his  brigade  with 
as  much  precision  and  coolness  as  if  upon  parade,  and  the  bra 
very  of  his  troops  could  not  be  excelled.  The  Second  corps 
(Sumner's)  and  the  Twelfth  corps  ( Williams's)  reached  their  final 
positions  shortly  after  dark.  General  Richardson's  division  was 
placed  near  Mount  Tabor  Church,  in  a  position  to  support  our 
right,  if  necessary;  the  Twelfth  corps  aiid  Sedgwick's  division 
bivouacked  around  Bolivar,  in  a  position  to  support  our  centre 
and  left. 

"  General  Sykes's  division  oNvgulars.  and  the  artillery  reserve 
halted  for  the  night  at  Middletown.  Thus,  on  the  night  of  the 
14th,  the  whole  army  was  massed  in  the  vicinity  of  the  field  of 
battle,  in  readiness  tu  renew  the  action  the  next  day,  or  to  move 


LIFE   OP  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

in  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  At  daylight  our  skirmishers  wore  ad- 
ranced,  and  it  was  found  that  he  had  retreated  during  the  r.ight, 
leaving  his  dead  on  the  field,  and  his  wounded  uncared  for. 

"About  fifteen  hundred  prisoners  were  taken  by  us  during  the 
battle,  and  the  loss  to  the  enemy  in  killed  was  much  greater 
than  our  own,  and  probably  also  in  wounded.  It  is  believed 
that  the  force  opposed  to  us  at  Turner's  Gap  consisted  of  D.  II. 
Hill's  corps  (15,000),  and  a  part,  if  not  the  whole,  of  Longstreet'3 
and  perhaps  a  portion  of  Jackson's,  probably  some  thirty  thou 
sand  in  all. 

"  We  went  into  action  with  about  30,000  men,  and  our  losses 
amounted  to  1,568  aggregate, — 312  killed,  1,234  wounded,  and 
22  missing.  •'  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

"Major-General  Commanding  U.  S.  A" 

On  the  next  day  General  McClellan  received  the  follow 
ing  despatch  from  the  President. 

"  WAR  DEPARTMENT,  2.45  P.M. 

"  WASHINGTON,  September  15th,  1862. 

"Your  despatch  of  to-day  received.  God  bless  you  and  all 
with  you.  Destroy  the  rebel  army,  if  possible. 

"A.  LINCOLN. 
"To  Major- General  MCCLELLAX." 

THE  BATTLE  OF  ANTIETAM. 

On  the  night  of  the  battle  of  South  Mountain  the  corps 
commanders  were  ordered  to  advance  their  pickets  at  day 
light,  which  order  was  obeyed,  and  it  being  discovered 
that  the  enemy  had  retired,  pursuit  was  commenced  ;  the 
cavalry  under  Pleasanton,  and  the  corps  of  Sumner,  Hooker 
and  Mansfield  (the  latter  having  arrived  that  morning  and 
assumed  command  of  the  Twelfth),  by  the  National  turn 
pike  and  Boonsboro' ;  the  corps  of  Burnside  and  Porter, 
by  the  old  Sharpsburg  road  ;  and  Franklin,  to  move  into 
Pleasant  Valley,  occupy  Rohrersville,  and  endeavor  tc  re 
lieve'  Harper's  Ferry.  Generals  Burnside  and  Porter 
were  ordered  upon  reaching  the  Boonsboro'  and  Rhorers- 
ville  road,  to  reinforce  Franklin  or  to  move  on  Sharps- 
burg,  according  to  circumstances. 

Franklin  moved  towards  Brownsville,  but  finding  the 
enemy  in  force,  and  that  firing  had  ceased  at  Harper's 


140  LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

Ferry,  waited  for  reinforcements,  as  stated  in  his  despatch 
heretofore  published. 

Our  cavalry  overtook  the  rebel  cavalry  at  Boonsboro', 
made  a  brilliant  charge,  killing  and  wounding  a  number, 
and  capturing  250  prisoners  and  two  guns. 

General  McClellan  thus  describes  the  battle  of  Antietam 
,  in  his  official  report,  with  the  movements  previous  thereto : 

•  "  General  Kichardson's  division  of  the  Second  corps,  pressing 
the  rear-guard  of  the  enemy  with  vigor,  passed  Boonsboro'  and 
Reedysville,  and  came  upon  the  main  body  of  the  enemy,  occu 
pying  in  large  force  a  strong  position  a  few  miles  beyond  the 
latter  place. 

"  It  had  been  hoped  to  engage  the  enemy  during  the  15th. 
Accordingly,  instructions  were  given  that  if  the  enemy  were 
overtaken  on  the  march  they  should  be  attacked  at  once  ;  if  found 
in  heavy  force  and  in  position,  the  corps  in  advance  should  be 
placed  in  position  for  attack,  and  await  my  arrival.  On  reach 
ing  the  advanced  position  of  our  troops,  1  found  but  two  divi 
sions,  Richardson's  and  Sykes's,  in  position  ;  the  other  troops 
were  halted  in  the  road  ;  the  head  of  the  column  some  distance 
in  rear  of  Richardson. 

"The  enemy  occupied  a  strong  position  on  the  heights,  on  the 
west  side  of  Antietam  creek,  displaying  a  large  force  of  infantry 
and  cavalry,  with  numerous  batteries  of  artillery,  which  opened 
on  our  columns  as  they  appeared  in  sight  on  the  Keedysville 
road  and  Sharpsburg  turnpike,  which  tire  was  returned  by  Cap 
tain  TidbalPs  light  battery,  Second  United  States  artillery,  and 
Pettet's  battery,  First  New  York  artillery. 

"The  division  of  General  Richardson,  following  close  on  the 
heels  of  the  retreating  foe,  halted  and  deployed  near  Antietam 
river,  on  the  right  of  the  Sharpsburg  road.  General  Sykes, 
leading  on  the  division  of  regulars  on  the  old  Sharpsburg  road, 
came  up  and  deployed  to  the  left  of  General  Richardson,  on  the 
left  of  the  road. 

"Aiitietum  creek,  in  this  vicinity,  is  crossed  by  four  stone 
bridges — the  upper  one  on  the  Keedysville  and  Williamsport 
road;  the  second  on  the  Keedysville  and  Sharpsburg  turnpike, 
some  two  and  a  half  miles  below;  the  third  about  a  mile  below 
the  second,  on  the  Rohrersville  and  Sharpsburg  road  ;  and  the 
fourth  near  the  mouth  of  Antietam  creek,  on  the  road  leading 
from  Harper's  Ferry  to  Sharpsburg,  some  three  miles  below  the 
third.  The  stream  is  sluggish,  with  few  and  difficult  fords. 
After  a  rapid  examination  of  the  position,  I  found  that  it  was 
too  late  to  attack  that  day,  and  at  once  directed  the  placing  of 
the  batteries  in  position  in  the  centre,  and  indicated  the  bivouacs 
for  the  different  corps,  massing  them  near  and  on  both  sides  of 


LIFE   OP  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

the  Sharpsburg  turnpike.     The  corps  were  not  all  in  their  posi 
tions  until  the  next  morning  after  sunrise. 

"On  the  morning  of  the  16th,  it  was  discovered  that  the 
«nemy  had  changed  the  position  of  his  batteries.  The  masses 
Df  his  troops,  however,  were  still  concealed  behind  the  opposite 
heights.  Their  left  and  centre  were  upon  and  in  front  of  the 
Sharpsburg  and  Hagerstown  turnpike,  hidden  by  woods  and  ir 
regularities  of  the  ground  ;  their  extreme  left  resting  upon  a 
wooded  eminence  near  the  cross-roads  to  the  north  of  J.  Miller's 
farm  ;  their  left  resting  upon  the  Potomac.  Their  line  extended 
south,  the  right  resting  upon  the  hills  to  the  south  of  Sharpsburg, 
near  Shaveley's  farm. 

"The  bridge  over  the  Antietam,  described  as  No.  3,  near  this 
point,  was  strongly  covered  by  riflemen  protected  by  rifle-pits, 
stone  fences,  etc.,  and  enfiladed  by  artillery.  The  ground  in 
front  of  this  line  consisted  of  undulating  hills,  their  crests  in. 
turn  commanded  by  others  in  their  rean  On  all  favorable 
points  the  enemy's  artillery  was  posted,  and  their  reserves,  hidden 
from  view  by  the  hills,  on  which  their  line  of  battle  was  formed, 
could  manoeuvre  unobserved  by  our  army,  and  from  the  short 
ness  of  their  line  could  rapidly  reinforce  any  point  threatened 
by  our  attack.  Their  position,  stretching  across  the  angle 
formed  by  the  Potomac  and  Autietam,  their  flanks  and  rear 
protected  by  these  streams,  was  one  of  the  strongest  to  be  found 
in  this  region  of  country,  which  is  well  adapted  to  defensive 
warfare. 

"  On  the  right,  near  Keedysville,  on  both  sides  of  the  Sharps 
burg  turnpike,  were  Sumner's  and  Hooker's  corps.  In  advance, 
on  the  right  of  the  turnpike  and  near  the  Antietam  river, 
General  Richardson's  division  of  General  Sumner's  corps  were 
posted.  General  Sykes's  division  of  General  Porter's  corps  was 
on  the  left  of  the  turnpike  and  in  line  with  General  Richardson, 
protecting  the  bridge  No.  2,  over  the  Antietam.  The  left  of  the 
line,  opposite  to  and  some  distance  from  bridge  No.  3,  was 
occupied  by  General  Bnruside's  corps. 

"  Before  giving  General  Hooker  his  orders  to  make  the 
movement  which  will  presently  be  described,  I  rode  to  the  left 
of  the  line  to  satisfy  myself  that  the  troops  were  properly 
jiosted  there  to  secure  our  left  flank  from  any  attack  made  along 
the  left  bank  of  the  Antietam,  as  well  as  to  enable  us  to  carry 
Bridge  No.  3. 

"  I  found  it  necessary  to  make  considerable  changes  in  the 
position  Gt  General  Burnside's  corps,  and  directed  him  to  ad 
vance  to  a  strong  position  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the. 
bridge,  and  to  reconnoitre  the  approaches  to  the  bridge  carefully. 
In  fVont  of  General  Sumner's  and  Hooker's  corps,  near  Keedys- 
ville,  and  on  the  ridge  of  the  first  line  of  hills  overlooking  the 
Antietam,  and  between  the  turnpike  and  Fry's  house  on  the 
right  of  the  road,  were  placed  Captain  Taft's,  Langner's,  Von 
Kleizer's  and  Lieutenant  Weaver's  batteries  of  twenty-pouuder 


-[42  LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN. 

Parrott  guns.  On  the  crest  of  the  hill  in  the  rear  and  right  of 
D ridge  No.  3,  Captain  Weed's  three-inch  and  Lieutenant  Benja 
min's  twenty-pounder  batteries.  General  Franklin's  corps  and 
General  Couch's  division  held  a  position  in  Pleasant  valley  in 
front  of  Brownsville,  with  a  strong  force  of  the  enemy  in  their 
front.  General  Morell's  division  of  Porter's  corps  was  en  route 
from  Boonsboro',  and  General  Humphrey's  division  of  new 
troops  en  route  from  Frederick,  Maryland.  About  daylight  on 
the  16th  the  enemy  opened  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery  on  our  guns 
in  position,  which  was  promptly  returned ;  their  fire  was 
silenced  for  the  time,  but  was  frequently  renewed  during  the 
day.  In  the.  heavy  fire  of  the  morning,  Major  Arndt,  command 
ing  first  battalion  first  New  York  artillery,  was  mortally  wounded 
while  directing  the  operations  of  his  batteries. 

"  It  was  afternoon  before  I  could  move  the  troops  to  their 
positions  for  attack,  being  compelled  to  spend  -the  morning  in 
reconnoitring  the  new  position  taken  up  by  the  enemy,  examining 
the  ground,  finding  fords,  clearing  the  approaches,  and  hurrying 
up  the  ammunition  and  supply  trains,  which  had  been  delayed 
by  the  rapid  march  of  the  troops  over  the  few  practicable  ap 
proaches  from  Frederick.  These  had  been  crowded  by  the 
masses  of  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery  pressing  on  with  the 
hope  of  overtaking  the  enemy  before  he  could  form  to  resist  an 
attack,  Many  of  the  troops  were  out  of  rations  on  the  previous 
day,  and  a  good  deal  of  their  ammunition  had  been  expended  in 
the  severe  action  of  the  14th. 

"  My  plan  for  the  impending  general  engagement  was  to 
attack  the  enemy's  left  with  the  corps  of  Hooker  and  Mansfield, 
supported  by  Simmer's,  and  if  necessary  by  Franklin's  ;  and,  as 
soon  as  matters  looked  favorably  there,  to  move  the  corps  of 
Burnside  against  the  enemy's  extreme  right,  upon  the  ridge 
running  to  the  south  and  rear  of  Sharpsburg,  and  having  carried 
their  position,  to  press  along  the  crest  towards  our  right ;  and 
whenever  either  of  these  flank  movements  should  be  successful, 
to  advance  our  centre  with  all  the  forces  then  disposable. 

"About  2  P.M.  General  Hooker,  with  his  corps,  consisting  of 
General  Ricketts's,  Meade's  and  Doubleday's  divisions,  was 
ordered  to  cross  the  Antietam  at  a  ford,  and  at  bridge  No  1,  a 
short  distance  above,  to  attack  and,  if  possible,  turn  the  enemy's 
left.  General  Sumner  was  ordered  to  cross  the  corps  of  General 
Mansfield  (the  12th)  during  the  night,  and  hold  his  own  (the2<H 
corps  ready  to  cross  early  the  next  morning.  On  reaching  th^ 
vicinity  of  the  enemy's  left  a  sharp  contest  commenced  with  the 
Pennsylvania  reserves,  the  advance  of  General  Hooker's  corps, 
near  the  house  of  D.  Miller.  The  enemy  were  driven  from  the 
strip  of  woods  where  he  was  first  met.  The  firing  lasted  until 
after  dark,  when  General  Hooker's  corps  rested  on  their  arm 3 
on  ground  won  from  the  enemy. 

"During  the  night  General  Mansfield's  corps,  consisting  of 
Generals  Williams's  and  Green's  divisions,  crossed  tho  Antietam 


LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN.  143 

at  the  same  ford  and  bridge  that  General  Hooker's  troops  had 
passed,  and  bivouacked  on  the  farm  of  J,  Poffenberger,  about  a 
mile  in  rear  of  General  Hooker's  position.  At  daylight  on 
the  17th  the  action  was  commenced  by  the  skirmishers  of  the 
Pennsylvania  reserves.  The  whole  of  General  Hooker's  corps 
was  soon  engaged,  and  drove  the  enemy  from  the  open  field  in 
front  of  the  first  line  of  woods  into  a  second  line  of  woods 
beyond,  which  runs  to  the  eastward  of  and  nearly  parallel  to  the 
Sbiarpsburg  and  Hagerstown  turnpike. 

"  This  contest  was  obstinate,  and  as  the  troops  advanced  tho 
opposition  became  more  determined  and  the  number  of  tho 
enemy  greater.  General  Hooker  then  ordered  up  the  corps 
of  General  Mansfield,  which  moved  promptly  toward  the  scene 
of  action. 

"  The  first  division,  General  Williams's,  was  deployed  to  the 
right  on  approaching  the  enemy  ;  General  Crawford's  brigade  on 
the  right,  its  right  resting  on  the  Hagerstown  turnpike;  on  his 
left  General  Gordon's  brigade.  The  second  division,  General 
Green's,  joining  the  left  of  Gordon's,  extended  as  far  as  the 
burnt  buildings  to  the  north  and  east  of  the  white  church  on 
the  turnpike.  During  the  deployment,  that  gallant  veteran 
General  Mansfield  fell  mortally  wounded,  while  examining  the 
ground  in  front  of  his  troops.  General  Hartsuff,  of  Hooker's 
corps,  was  severely  wounded,  while  bravely  pressing  forward  his 
troops,  and  was  taken  from  the  field. 

"The  command  of  the  Twelfth  corps  fell  upon  General  Wil 
liams.  Five  regiments  of  first  division  of  this  corps  were  new 
troops.  One  brigade  of  the  second  division  was  sent  to  support 
General  Doubleday. 

"The  One-hundred-and-twenty-fourth  Pennsylvania  volun 
teers  were  pushed  across  the  turnpike  into  the  woods  beyond 
J.  Miller's  house,  with  orders  to  hold  the  position  as  long  as 
possible. 

"  The  line  of  battle  of  this  corps  was  formed,  and  it  became 
engaged  about  7  A.M.,  the  attack  being  opened  by  Knapp's 
(Pennsylvania,)  Cothran's  (New  York,)  and  Hampton's  (Pitts- 
burg)  batteries.  To  meet  this  attack  the  enemy  had  pushed  a 
strong  column  of  troops  into  the  open  fields  in  front  of  the  turn 
pike,  while  he  occupied  the  woods  on  the  west  of  the  turnpike 
in  strong  force.  The  woods  (as  was  found  by  subsequent  ob 
servation)  were  traversed  .by  outcropping  ledges  of  rock.  Sev 
eral  hundred  yards  to  the  right  and  rear  was  a  hill  which  com 
manded  the  debouche  of  the  woods,  and  in  the  fields  between 
was  a  long  line  of  stone  fences,  continued  by  breastworks  of 
rails,  which  covered  the  enemy's  infantry  from  our  musketry. 
The  same  woods  formed  a  screen  behind  which  his  movements 
were  concealed,  and  his  batteries  on  the  hill  and  the  rifle  works 
covered  from  the  fire  of  our  artillery  in  front. 

"  For  about  two  hours  the  battle  raged  with  varied  success, 
the  enemy  endeavoring  to  drive  our  troops  into  the  second  line 
of  wood,  and  ours  in  turn  to  get  possession  of  the  line  in  front 


144  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

"Our  troops  Ultimately  succeeded  in  forcing  the  enemy  back 
into  the  woods  near  the  turnpike,  General  Green  with  his  two 
brigades  crossing  into  the  woods  to  the  left  of  the  Dunbar 
church.  During  this  conflict  General  Crawford,  commanding 
first  division  after  General  Williams  took  command  of  the 
corps,  was  wounded  and  left  the  field. 

"  General  Green  being  much  exposed  and  applying  for  rein 
forcements,  the  Thirteenth  New  Jersey,  Twenty-seventh  In 
diana,  and  the  Third  Maryland,  were  sent  to  his  support  with  a 
Hection  of  Ivuapp's  battery. 

"At  about  nine  o'clock  A.M.  General  Sedgwick's  division  of 
General  Sumner's  corps  arrived.  Crossing  the  ford  previously 
mentioned,  this  division  marched  in  three  columns  to  the  support 
of  the  attack  on  the  enemy's  left.  On  nearing  the  scene  of  action 
the  columns  were  halted,  faced  to  the  front,  and  established  by 
General  Sumner  in  three  parallel  lines  by  brigade,  facing  toward 
the  south  and  west ;  General  Gorman's  brigade  in  front,  General 
Dana's  second,  and  General  Howard's  third,  with  a  distance 
between  the  lines  of  some  seventy  paces.  The  division  was 
tlun  put  in  motion  and  moved  upon  the  field  of  battle,  under 
fire  from  the  enemy's  concealed  batteries  on  the  hill  beyond  the 
*oads.  Passing  diagonally  to  the  front  across  the  open  space 
%nd  to  the  front  of  the  first  division  of  General  William s's 
•rorps,  this  latter  division  withdrew. 

"  Entering  the  woods  on  the  west  of  the  turnpike,  and  driving 
the  enemy  before  them,  the  first  line  was  met  by  a  heavy  fire  of 
musketry  and  shell  from  the  enemy's  breastworks  and  the  bat 
teries  on  the  hill  commanding  the  exit  from  the  woods  ;  mean 
time  a  heavy  column  of  the  enemy  had  succeeded  in  crowding 
back  the  troops  of  General  Green's  division,  and  appeared  in 
rear  of  the  left  of  Sedgwick's  division.  By  command  of  Gen 
eral  Sumner,  General  Howard  faced  the  third  line  to  the  rear 
preparatory  to  a  change  of  front  to  meet  the  column  advancing 
on  the  left;  but  this  line,  now  suffering  from  a  destructive  lire 
both  in  front  and  on  its  left,  which  it  was  unable  to  return, 
gave  way  towards  the  right  and  rear  in  considerable  confusion, 
and  was  soon  followed  by  the  first  and  second  lines. 

';  General  Gorman's  brigade,  and  one  regiment  of  General 
Dana's,  soon  rallied  and  checked  the  advance  of  the  enemy 
on  the  right.  The  second  and  third  lines  now  formed  on  the 
left  of  General  Gorman's  brigade,  and  poured  a  destructive  fire 
upon  the  enemy. 

"  During  General  Sumner's  attack,  he  ordered  General  Wil 
liams  to  support  him.  Brigadier-General  Gordon,  with  a  por 
tion  of  his  brigade,  moved  forward,  but  when  he  reached  the 
woods,  the  left  of  General  Sedgwick's  division  had  given  way  ; 
and  finding  himself,  as  t.ie  smoke  cleared  up,  opposed  to  the 
enemy  in  force  with  his  small  command,  he  withdrew  to  the 
rear  of  the  batteries  at  the  second  Hue  of  woods.  As  General 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN.  145 

Gordon's  troops  unmasked  our  batteries  on  the  left,  they  opened 
with  canister ;  the  batteries  of  Captain  Cothran,  First  New 
York,  and  I,  First  artillery,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Wood 
ruff,  doing  good  service.  Unable  to  withstand  this  deadly  fire 
in  front  and  the  musketry  fire  from  the  right,  the  enemy  again 
sought  shelter  in  the  woods  and  rocks  beyond  the  turnpike. 

il  During  this  assau.t  Generals  Sedgwick  and  Dana  were 
leriously  wounded,  and  taken  from  the  field.  General  Sedg 
wick,  though  twice  wounded,  and  faint  from  loss  of  blood,  re 
tained  command  of  his  division  for  more  than  an  honr  after  his 
first  wound,  animating  his  command  by  his  presence. 

"About  the  time  of  General  Sedgwick's  advance,  General 
Hooker,  while  urging  on  his  command,  was  severely  wounded 
in  the  foot  and  taken  from  the  field,  and  General  Meade  was 
placed  in  command  of  his  corps.  General  Howard  assumed 
Command  after  General  Sedgwick  retired. 

"The  repulse  of  the  enemy  offered  opportunity  to  re-arrange 
the  lines  and  re-organize  the  commands  on  the  right,  now  more 
or  less  in  confusion.  The  batteries  of  the  Pennsylvania  Re 
serve,  on  aigh  ground,  near  I.  Poffenburger's  house,  opened 
fire,  and  checked  several  attempts  of  the  enemy  to  establish 
batteries  in  front  of  our  right,  to  turn  that  flank  and  enfilade 
the  lines. 

"  While  the  conflict  was  so  obstinately  raging  on  the  right, 
General  French  was  pushing  his  division  against  the  enemy 
still  further  to  the  left.  This  division  crossed  the  Antietam  at 
the  same  ford  as  General  Sedgwick,  and  immediately  in  his  rear. 
'Passing  over  the  stream  in  three  columns,  the  division  marched 
about  a  mile  from  the  ford,  then  facing  to  the  left,  moved  in 
three  lines  towards  the  enemy:  General  Max  Weber's  brigade 
in  front;  Colonel  Dwight  Morris's  brigade  of  raw  troops,  un- 
drilled,  and  moving  for  the  first  time  under  fire,  in  the  second, 
and  General  KimbalPs  brigade  in  the  third.  The  division  was 
first  assailed  by  a  fire  of  artillery,  but  steadily  advanced,  driving 
in  the  enemy's  skirmishers,  and  encountered  the  infantry  in  some 
force  at  the  group  of  houses  on  Roulette's  farm.  General 
Weber's  brigade  gallantly  advanced  with  an  unwavering  front 
and  drove  the  enemy  from  their  position  about  the  houses 

"  While  General  Weber  was  hotly  engaged  with  the  first  line 
of  the  enemy,  General  French  received  orders  from  Genera] 
Sumner,  his  corps  commander,  to  push  on  with  renewed  vigoi 
to  make  a  diversion  in  favor  of  the  attack  on  the  right.  Leav 
ing  the  new  troops,  who  had  been  thrown  into  some  confusion 
from  their  march  through  corn-fields,  over  fences,  etc.,  to  form 
as  a  reserve,  he  ordered  the  brigade  of  General  Kirnball  to  the 
front,  passing  to  the  left  of  General  Weber.  The  enemy  was 
pressed  back  tc  near  the  crest  of  the  hill,  where  he  was  en 
countered  in  greater  strength  posted  in  a  sunken  road,  forming 
it  natural  rifle-pit  running  .n  a  northwesterly  direction.  In  a 


146  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

cornfield  in  rear  of  this  road  were  also  strong  bodies  of  the 
enemy.  As  the  line  reached  the  crest  of  the  hill  a  galling  fire 
was  opened  on  it  from  the  sunken  road  and  cornfield.  Here  a 
terrific  fire  of  musketry  burst  from  both  lines,  and  the  battle 
raged  along  the  whole  line  with  great  slaughter. 

"  The  enemy  attempted  to  turn  the  left  of  the  line,  but  were 
met  by  the  Seventh  Virginia  and  One-hundred-and-thirty-see- 
ond  Pennsylvania  volunteers  and  repulsed.  Foiled  in  this,  the 
enemy  made  a  determined  assault  on  the  front,  but  were  met 
by  a  charge  from  our  lines,  which  drove  them  back  with  severe 
loss,  leaving  in  our  hands  some  three  hundred  prisoners  and 
several  stand  of  colors.  The  enemy  having  been  repulsed  by 
the  terrible  execution  of  the  batteries  and  the  musketry  fire  on 
the  extreme  right,  now  attempted  to  assist  the  attack  on  Gen 
eral  French's  division  by  assailing  him  on  his  right  and  en 
deavoring  to  turn  this  flank,  but  this  attack  was  met  and 
checked  by  the  Fourteenth  Indiana  and  Eighth  Ohio  volun 
teers,  and  by  canister  from  Captain  Tompkins's  battery,  First 
Ehode  Island  artillery.  Having  been  under  an  almost  con 
tinuous  fire  for  nearly  four  hours,  and  the  ammunition  nearly 
expended,  this  division  now  took  position  immediately  below 
the  crest  of  the  heights  on  which  they  had  so  gallantly  fought, 
the  enemy  making  no  attempt  to  regain  their  lost  ground. 

"  On  the  left  of  General  French,  General  Richardson's  divi 
sion  was  hotly  engaged.  Having  crossed  the  Antietam  about 
9.30  A.M.  at  the  ford  crossed  by  the  other  divisions  of  Sumner's 
corps,  it  moved  on  a  line  nearly  parallel  to  the  Antietam,  and. 
formed  in  a  ravine  behind  the  high  grounds  overlooking  Rou 
lette's  house  ;  the  Second  (Irish)  brigade,  commanded  by  Gen 
eral  Meaghec,  on  the  right ;  the  Third  brigade,  commanded  by 
General  Caldwell,  on  his  left,  and  the  brigade  commanded  by 
Colonel  Brooks,  Fifty-third  Pennsylvania  volunteers,  in  support. 
As  the  division  moved  forward  to  take  its  position  on  the  field, 
the  enemy  directed  a  fire  of  artillery  against  it,  but,  owing  to 
the  irregularities  of  the  ground,  did  but  little  damage. 

"  Meagher's  brigade  advancing  steadily  soon  became  engaged 
with  the  enemy  posted  to  the  left  and  in  front  of  Roulette's 
house.  It  continued  to  advance  under  a  heavy  fire  nearly  to 
the  crest  of  the  hill  overlooking  Piper's  house,  the  enemy  being 
posted  in  a  continuation  of  the  sunken  road  and  cornfield  be 
fore  referred  to.  Here  the  brave  Irish  brigade  opened  upon  the 
enemy  a  terrific  musketry  fire. 

"All  of  General  Sumner's  corps  was  new  engaged  :  General 
Sedgwick  on  the  right ;  General  French  in  the  centre,  and  Gen 
eral  Richardson  on  the  left.  The  Irish  brigade  sustained  ila 
well-earned  reputation.  After  suffering  terribly  in  officers  and 
men,  and  strewing  the  ground  with  their  enemies  as  they  drove 
them  back,  their  ammunition  nearly  expended,  and  their  com 
mander,  General  Meagher,  disabled  by  the  fall  of  his  horse  shot 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN.  147 

tinder  him,  this  brigade  was  ordered  to  give  place  to  General 
Caldwell's  brigade,  which  advanced  to  a  short  distance  in  itg 
rear.  The  lines  were  passed  by  the  Irish  brigade  breaking  by 
company  to  the  rear,  and  General  Caldwell's  by  company  to  t!ie 
front  as  steadily  as  on  drill.  Colonel  Brooks's  brigade  now 
became  the  second  line. 

"The  ground  over  which  General  Richardson's  and  Frencl4 
divisions  were  fighting  was  very  irregular,  intersected  by  numer 
ous  ravines,  hills  covered  with  growing  corn,  enclosed  by  stone 
walls,  behind  which  the  enemy  could  advance  unobserved  upon 
any  exposed  point  of  our  lines.  Taking  advantage  of  this,  the 
enemy  attempted  to  gain  the  right  of  Richardson's  position  in  a 
cornfield  near  Roulette's  house,  where  the  division  had  become 
separated  from  that  of  General  French's.  A  change  of  front 
by  the  Fifty-second  New  York  and  Second  Delaware  volun 
teers,  of  Colonel  Brooks's  brigade,  under  Colonel  Frank,  and 
the  attack  made  by  the  Fifty-third  Pennsylvania  volunteers, 
sent  further  to  the  right  by  Colonel  Brooks  to  close  this  gap  in 
the  line,  and  the  movement  of  the  One-hundred-and-thirty- 
Becond  Pennsylvania  and  Seventh  Virginia  volunteers  of  Gen 
eral  French's  division,  before  referred  to,  drove  the  enemy  from 
the  cornfield  and  restored  the  line. 

"  The  brigade  of  General  Caldwell,  with  determined  gallantry, 
pushed  the  enemy  back  opposite  the  left  and  centre  of  this 
division,  but  sheltered  in  the  sunken  road,  they  still  held  our 
forces  on  the  right  of  Caldwell  in  check.  Colonel  Barlow,  com 
manding  the  Sixty-first  and  Sixty-fourth  New  York  regiments 
of  Caldwell's  brigade,  seeing  a  favorable  opportunity,  advanced 
the  regiments  on  the  left,  taking  the  line  in  the  sunken  road  in 
flank,  and  compelled  them  to  surrender,  capturing  over  three 
hundred  prisoners  and  three  stands  of  colors. 

"  The  whole  of  the  brigade,  with  the  Fifty-seventh  and  Sixty- 
sixth  New  York  regiments  of  Colonel  Brooks's  brigade,  who 
had  moved  these  regiments  into  the  first  Hue,  now  advanced 
with  gallantry,  driving  the  enemy  before  them  in  confusion  into 
the  cornfield  beyond  the  sunken  road.  The  left  of  the  division 
\vas  now  well  advanced,  when  the  enemy,  concealed  by  ati  inter 
vening  ridge,  endeavored  to  turn  its  left  and  rear. 

"Colonel  Cross,  Fifth  New  Hampshire,  by  a  change  of  front 
to  the  left  and  rear,  brought  his  regiment  facing  the  advancing 
line.  Here  a  spirited  contest  arose  to  gain  a  commanding 
height,  the  two  opposing  forces  moving  parallel  to  each  other, 
giving  and'  receiving  fire.  The  Fifth  gaining  the  advantage, 
faced  to  the  right  and  delivered  its  volley.  The  enemy  stag 
gered,  but  rallied  and  advanced  desperately  at  a  charge.  Being 
reinforced  by  the  Eighty-first  Pennsylvania,  these  regiments 
met  the  advance  by  a  counter  charge.  The  enemy  fled,  leaving 
many  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners,  and  the  colors  of  tha 
Fourth  North  Carolina,  in  our  hands. 


148  LIFS   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

"Another  column  of  the  enemy,  advancing  under  shelter  of 
a  stone  wall  and  cornfield,  pressed  down  on  the  rig-lit  of  the 
division;  but  Colonel  Barlow  again  advanced  the  Sixty-first 
and  Sixty-fourth  New  York  against  these  troops,  and  with  the 
attack  of  Kimball's  brigade  on  the  right  drove  them  from  this 
position. 

•'  Our  troops  on  the  left  of  this  part  of  the  line  having  driven 
the  eneitiy  far  back,  they,  with  reinforced  numbers,  made  a 
determined  attack  directly  in  front.  To  meet  this,  Colonel 
Barlow  brought  his  two  regiments  to  their  position  in  line,  and 
drove  the  enemy  through  the  cornfield  into  the  orchard  beyond, 
under  a  heavy  tire  of  musketry,  and  a  tire  of  canister  from  two 
pieces  of  artillery  in  the  orchard,  and  a  battery  further  to  the 
right,  throwing  shell  and  case  shot.  This  advance  gave  us 
possession  of  Piper's  house,  the  strong  point  contended  for  by 
the  enemy  at  this  part  of  the  line,  it  being  a  defensible  building 
several  hundred  yards  in  advance  of  the  sunken  road.  Th"  mus 
ketry  fire  at  this  point  of  the  line  now  ceased.  Holding  Piper's 
house,  General  Richardson  withdrew  the  line  a  little  way  to  the 
crest  of  a  hill,  a  more  advantageous  position.  Up  to  this  time 
the  division  was  without  artillery,  and  in  the  new  position  suf 
fered  severely  from  artillery  fire  which  could  not  be  replied  to. 
A  section  of  Robertson's  horse  battery,  commanded  by  Lieu 
tenant  Vincent,  Second  artillery,  now  arrived  on  the  ground 
and  did  excellent  service.  Subsequently  a  battery  of  brass 
guns,  commanded  by  Captain  Graham,  First  artillery,  arrived, 
and  was  posted  on  the  crest  of  the  hill,  and  soon  silenced  the 
two  guns  in  the  orchard.  A  heavy  fire  soon  ensued  between 
the  battery  further  to  the  right  and  our  own.  Captain  Graham's 
battery  was  bravely  and  skilfully  served,  but  unable  to  roach 
the  enemy,  who  had  rifled  guns  of  greater  range  than  our 
smooth-bores,  retired  by  order  of  General  Richardson,  to  save  it 
from  useless  sacrifice  of  men  and  horses.  The  brave  general 
was  himself  mortally  wouuded  while  personally  directing  its 
fira. 

"General  Hancock  was  placed  in  command  of  the  division 
after  the  fall  of  General  Richardson.  General  Meagher's 
brigade,  now  commanded  by  Colonel  Burke,  of  the  Sixty-third 
New  York,  having  refilled  their  cartridge-boxes,  was  again 
ordered  forward,  and  took  position  in  the  centre  of  the  lino. 
The  division  no\v  occupied  one  line  in  close  proximity  to  the 
ene  rjy,  who  had  taken  up  a  position  in  the  rear  of  Piper's 
house.  Colonel  Dwight  Morris,  with  the  Fourteenth  Con 
necticut  and  a  detachment  of  the  One-hundred-and-eighth 
New  York,  of  General  French's  division,  was  sent  by  General 
French  to  the  support  of  General  Richardson's  division.  This 
Command  was  now  placed  in  an  interval  in  the  line  between 
General  Caldwell's  and  the  Irish  brigades. 

"The  requirements  of  the  extended  line  of  battle  had   so 


LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  149 

engaged  the  artillery  that  the  application  of  General  Hancock 
for  artillery  for  the  division  could  not  be  complied  with  imme 
diately  by  the  chief  of  artillery  cr  the  corps  commanders  in  hia 
vicinity.  Knowing1  the  tried  courage  of  the  troops,  General 
Hancock  felt  confident  that  he  could  hold  his  position,  although 
suffering  from  the  enemy's  artillery,  but  was  too  weak  to  attack, 
as  the  great  length  of  the  line  he  was  obliged  to  hold  prevented 
him  from  forming  more  than  one  line  of  battle,  and,  from  his 
advanced  position,  this  line  was  already  partly  enfiladed  by  the 
batteries  of  the  enemy  on  the  right,  which  were  protected  from 
our  batteries  opposite  them  by  the  wood  at  the  Dunker  church. 

"  .Seeing  a  body  of  the  enemy  advancing  on  some  of  our 
troops  to  the  left  of  his  position,  General  Hancock  obtained 
Hexamer's  battery  from  General  Franklin's  corps,  which 
assisted  materially  in  frustrating  this  attack.  It  also  assisted 
the  attack  of  the  Seventh  Maine,  of  Franklin's  corps,  which,  with 
out  other  aid,  made  an  attack  against  the  enemy's  line,  and 
drove  in  skirmishers  who  were  annoying  our  artillery  and  troops 
on  the  right.  Lieutenant  Woodruff,  with  battery  I,  Second 
artillery,  relieved  Captain  Hexamer,  whose  ammunition  was 
expended.  The  enemy  at  one  time  seemed  to  be  about  making 
an  attack  in  force  upon  this  part  of  the  line,  and  advanced  a 
long  column  of  infantry  towards  this  division  ;  but  on  nearing  the 
position,  General  Pleasanton  opening  on  them  with  sixteeu 
guns,  they  halted,  gave  a  desultory  fire,  and  retreated,  closing 
the  operations  on  this  portion  of  the  field.  I  return  to  the  inci 
dents  occurring  still  further  to  the  right. 

"Between  12  and  1  P.M.,  General  Franklin's  corps  arrived  on 
the  field  of  battle,  having  left  their  camp  near  Orampton's 
pa  is,  at  6  A.M.,  leaving  General  Couch  with  orders  to  move  with 
hi;  division  to  occupy  Maryland  heights.  General  Smith's 
di  ision  led  the  column,  followed  by  General  Slocum's. 

•'  It  was  first  intended  to  keep  this  corps  in  reserve  on  the  east 
side  of  the  Antietam,  to  operate  on  either  flank  or  on  the 
centre,  as  circumstances  might  require  ;  but  on  nearing  Keedys- 
ville,  the  strong  opposition  on  the  right,  developed  by  the 
attacks  of  Hooker  and  Sumner,  rendered  it  necessary  at  once, 
to  send  this  corps  to  the  assistance  of  the  right  wing. 

"  On  nearing  the  field,  hearing  that  one  of  our  batteries,  (A.) 
Fourth  United  States  artillery,  commanded  by  Lieutenant 
Thomas,  who  occupied  the  same" position  as  Lieutenant  Wood 
ruff's  battery  in  the  morning,  was  hotly  engaged  without  sup 
ports.  General  Smith  sent  two  regiments  to  its  relief  from  Gen 
eral  Hancock's  brigade.  On  inspecting  the  ground,  General 
SnJtb  ordered  the  other  regiments  of  Hancock's  brigade,  with 
Frank's  and  Cowen's  batteries,  First  New  York  artillery,  to  the 
threatened  position.  Lieutenant  Thomas  and  Captain-  Cothran, 
commanding  batteries,  bravely  held  their  positions  against  th« 
advancing  enemy,  handling  their  batteries  with  skill. 


[50  LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN. 

"  Fmding  the  enemy  still  advancing,  the  Third  brigade,  of 
Smith's  division,  commanded  by  Colonel  Irwin,  Forty-ninth 
Pennsylvania  volunteers,  was  ordered  up,  and  passed  through 
Lieutenant  Thomas's  battery, .  charged  upon  the  enemy,  and 
drove  back  the  advance  until  abreast  of  the  Dunker  church.  As 
the  right  of  the  brigade  came  opposite  the  woods  it  received  a 
destructive  fire,  which  checked  the  advance  and  threw  the  bri 
gade  somewhat  into  confusion.  It  formed  again  behind  a  rise 
of  ground  in  the  open  space  in  advance  of  the  batteries. 

"  General  French  having  reported  to  General  Franklin  that 
his  ammunition  was  nearly  expended,  that  officer  ordered  Gen 
eral  Brooks,  with  his  brigade,  to  reinforce  him.  General  Brooks 
formed  his  brigade  on  the  right  of  General  French,  where  they 
remained  during  the  remainder  of  the  day  and  night,  frequently 
under  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery. 

"  It  was  soon  after  the  brigade  of  Colonel  Irwin  had  fallen 
back  behind  the  rise  of  ground  that  the  Seventh  Maine,  by  order 
of  Colonel  Irwin,  made  the  gallant  attack  already  referred  to. 

"The  advance  of  General  Franklin's  corps  was  opportune. 
The  attack  of  the  enemy  on  this  position,  but  for  the  timely 
arrival  of  his  corps,  must  have  been  disastrous,  had  it  succeeded 
in  piercing  the  line  between  Generals  Sedgwick's  and  French's 
divisions. 

"  General  Franklin  ordered  two  brigades  of  General  Slocum's 
division,  General  Newton's  and  Colonel  Torbert's,  to  form  in 
column  to  assault  the  woods  that  had  been  so  hotly  contested  before 
by  Generals  Sumner  and  Hooker.  General  Bartlett's  brigade  was 
ordered  to  form  as  a  reserve.  At  this  time  General  Sunnier, 
having  command  on  the  right,  directed  further  offensive  opera 
tions  to  be  postponed,  as  the  repulse  of  this,  the  only  remaining 
corps  available  for  attack,  would  peril  the  safety  of  the  whole  army. 

'*  General  Porter's  corps,  consisting  of  General  Sykes's 
division  of  regulars  and  volunteers,  and  General  Morell's 
division  of  volunteers,  occupied  a  position  on  the  east  si<!e  of 
Antietam  creek,  upon  the  main  turnpike  leading  to  Sharps 
burg,  and  directly  opposite  the  centre  of  the  enemy's  line 
This  corps  filled  the  interval  between  the  right  wing  and  Gen 
eral  Buruside'a  command,  and  guarded  the  muin  approach  from 
the  enemy's  position  to  our  trains  of  supply.  It  was  neces 
sary  to  watch  this  part  of  our  line  with  the  utmost  vigilance, 
lest  the  enemy  should  take  advantage  of  the  first  exhibition  of 
weakness  here  to  push  upon  us  a  vigorous  assault,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  piercing  our  centre  and  turning  our  rear,  as  well  as  to 
capture  or  destroy  our  supply  trains.  Once  having  penetrated 
this  line,  the  enemy's  passage  to  our  rear  could  have  met  with 
but  feeble  resistance,  as  there  were  no  reserves  to  reinforce  or 
close  up  the  gap. 

"Towards  the  middle  of  the  afternoon,  proceeding  to  the  right, 
I  found  that  Sumner's,  Hooker's,  and  Mansfield's  corps  had  met 
with  serious  losses.  Several  general  officers  had  been  carried 
from  the  field  severely  wounded,  and  the  aspect  of  affairs  was 


LIFE    OF  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  151 

any  thing  but  promising'.  At  the  risk  of  greatly  exposing  our 
centre,  I  ordered  two  brigades  from  Porter's  corps,  the  only 
available  troops,  to  reinforce  the  right.  Six  battalions  of 
Sykes's  regulars  had  been  thrown  forward  across  the  Antietam 
bridge  on  the  main  road  to  attack  and  drive  back  the  enemy's 
sharpshooters,  who  were  annoying  Pleasanton's  horse  batteries 
in  advance  of  the  bridge ;  Warren's  brigade,  of  Porter's  corps, 
was  detached  to  hold  a  position  on  Burnsido's  right  and  rear ;  so 
that  Porter  was  left  at  one  time  with  only  a  portion  of  Sykes's 
division  and  one  small  brigade  of  Morell's  division  (but  little 
over  three  thousand  men)  to  hold  his  important  position. 

"  General  Sumner  expressed  the  most  decided  opinion  against 
another  attempt  during  that  day  to  assault  the  enemy's  position 
in  front,  as  portions  of  our  troops  were  so  much  scattered  and 
demoralized.  In  view  of  these  circumstances,  after  making 
changes  in  the  position  of  some  of  the  troops,  I  directed  the 
different  commanders  to  hold  their  positions,  and  beu.g  satisfied 
that  this  could  be  done  without  the  assistance  of  the  two  bri 
gades  from  the  centre,  I  countermanded  the  order,  which  was 
in  course  of  execution. 

'•  General  Slocum's  division  replaced  a  portion  of  General 
Simmer's  troops,  and  positions  were  selected  for  batteries  in  front 
of  the  woods.  The  enemy  opened  several  heavy  tires  of  artillery 
on  the  position  of  our  troops  after  this,  but  our  batteries  soon 
silenced  them. 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  17th  General  Pleasant on,  with  his 
cavalry  division  and  the  horse  butteries,  under  Captains  Robert 
son,  Tidball,  and  Lieutenant  Haines,  of  the  Second  artillery,  and 
Captain  Gibson.  Third  artillery,  was  ordered  to  advance  on  the 
turnpike  towards  Sharpsburg,  across  bridge  No.  2,  and  support 
the  left  of  General  Simmer's  line.  The  bridge  being  covered  by* 
a  fire  of  artillery  and  sharpshooters,  cavalry  skirmishers  were 
thrown  out,  and  Captain  TidbalFs  battery  advanced  by  piece 
and  drove  off  the  sharpshooters  with  canister  sufficiently  to 
establish  the  batteries  above  mentioned,  which  opened  on  the 
enemy  with  effect.  The  firing  was  kept  up  for  about  two  hours, 
•when,  the  enemy's  fire  slackening,  the  batteries  were  relieved  by 
Randall's  and  Van  Reed's  batteries,  United  States  artillery. 
About  three  o'clock  Tidball,  Robertson,  and  Haines  returned  to 
their  positions  on  the  west  of  Antietam,  Captain  Gibson  having 
been  placed  in  position  on  the  east  side  to  guard  the  approaches 
to  the  bridge.  These  butteries  did  good  service,  concentrating 
their  fire  on  the  column  of  the  enemy  about  to  attack  General 
Hancock's  position,  and  compelling  it  to  find  shelter  behind  the 
hills  in  rear. 

"General  Sykes's  division  had  been  in  position  since  the  15th, 
exposed  to  the  enemy's  artillery  and  sharpshooters.  General 
Morell  had  come  up  on  the  16th,  and  relieved  General  Richard 
son  on  the  right  of  General  Sykes.  Continually,  under  the  vigi 
lant  watch  of  the  enemy,  this  corps  guarded  a  vital  point. 


152  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN. 

"The  position  of  the  batteries  under  General  Pleasanton  be 
ing  one  of  great  exposure,  the  battalion  of  the  Second  and  Tenth 
United  States  infantry,  under  Captain  Pollard,  Second  infantry, 
was  sent  to  his  support.  Subsequently  four  battalions  of  regular 
infantry,  under  Captain  Dryer,  Fourth  infantry,  were  sent  across 
to  assist  in  driving  off  the  sharpshooters  of  the  enemy. 

"The  battalion  of  the  Second  and  Tentk  infantry,  advancing 
far  beyond  the  batteries,  compelled  the  cannoneers  of  a  battery 
of  the  enemy  to  abandon  their  guns.  Few  in  numbers,  and  un 
supported,  they  were  unable  to  bring  them  off.  The  heavy  loss 
of  this  small  body  of  men  attests  their  gallantry. 

"  The  troops  of  General  Burnside  held  the  left  of  the  line 
opposite  bridge  No.  3.  The  attack  on  the  right  was  to  have 
been  supported  by  an  attack  on  the  left.  Preparatory  to  this 
attack,  on  the  evening  of  the  16th,  General  Burnside's  corps 
was  moved  forward  and  to  the  left,  and  took  up  a  position  nearer 
the  bridge. 

"  I  visited  General  Burnside's  position  on  the  16th,  and  after 
pointing  out  to  him  the  proper  dispositions  to  be  made  of  his 
troops  during  the  day  and  night,  informed  him  that  he  would 
probably  be  required  to  attack  the  enemy's  right  on  the  follow 
ing  morning,  and  directed  him  to  make  careful  reconnoissances. 

t%  General  Burnside's  corps,  consisting  of  the  divisions  of  Gen 
erals  Cox.  Wilcox,  Hodman,  and  Sturgis,  was  posted  as  follows: 
Colonel  Brooks's  brigade,  Cox's  division,  on  the  right,  General 
Sturgis's  division  immediately  in  rear.  On  the  left  was  General 
Hodman's  division,  with  General  Scammon's  brigade,  Cox's  di 
vision,  in  support. 

"  General  Wilcox's  division  was  held  in  reserve. 

"The  corps  bivouacked  in  position  on  the  night  of  the  lf>th. 

"  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  17th  I  ordered  General  Burn- 
side  to  form  his  troops,  and  hold  them  in  readiness  to  assault 
the  bridge  in  his  front,  and  to  await  further  orders. 

"  At  8  o'clock  an  order  was  sent  to  him  by  Lieutenant  Wilson, 
topographical  engineers,  to  carry  the  bridge,  then  to  gain  pos 
session  of  the  heights  beyond,  and  to  advance  along  their  crest 
upon  Sharpsburg  and  its  rear. 

"After  some  time  had  elapsed,  not  hearing  from  him,  I  de 
spatched  an  aid  to  ascertain  what  had  been  done.  The  aid  re 
turned  with  the  information  that  Uut  little  progress  had  been 
made.  I  then  sent  him  back  with  an  order  to  General  Burnside 
to  assault  the  bridge  at  once,  and  carry  it  at  all  hazards.  The. 
aid  returned  to  me  a  second  time  with  the  report  that  the 
bridge  was  still  in  the  possession  of  the  enemy.  Whereupon  I 
directed  Colonel  Sackett,  Inspector-General,  to  deliver  to  Gen 
eral  Burnside  my  positive  order  to  push  forward  his  troops  with 
out  a  moment's  delay,  and,  if  necessary,  to  carry  the  bridge  at 
the  point  of  the  bayonet ;  and  I  ordered  Colonel  Sackett  to  re 
main  with  General  Buruside  and  see  that  the  order  was  executed 
promptly. 


LIFB   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN.  353 

"After  these  three  hours'  delay,  the  bridge  was  carried  ai  one 
o'clock  by  a  brilliant  charge  of  the  Fifty-first  New  York  and 
Fifty-first  Pennsylvania  volunteers.  Other  troops  were  then 
thrown  over,  and  the  opposite  bank  occupied,  the  enemy  retreat 
ing  to  the  heights  beyond. 

"A  halt  was  then  made  by  General  Burnside's  advance  until 
3  P.M.,  upon  hearing  which  I  directed  one  of  my  aids,  Colonel 
Key,  to  inform  General  Burnside  that  I  desired  him  to  push  for 
ward  his  troops  with  the  utmost  vigor,  and  carry  the  enemy's 
position  on  the  heights  ;  that  the  movement  was  vital  to  our 
success ;  that  this  was  a  time  when  we  must  not  stop  for  loss  of 
life,  if  a  great  object  could  thereby  be  accomplished.  That  if, 
in  his  judgment,  his  attack  would  fail,  to  inform  me  so  at  once, 
that  his  troops  might  be  withdrawn  and  used  elsewhere  on  the 
field.  He  replied  that  he  would  soon  advance,  and  would  go  up 
the  hill  as  far  as  a  battery  of  the  enemy  on  the  left  would  per 
mit.  Upon  this  report,  I  again  immediately  sent  Colonel  Key 
to  General  Burnside  with  orders  to  advance  at  once,  if  possible, 
to  flank  the  battery,  or  storm  it  and  carry  the  heights;  repair 
ing,  that  if  he  considered  the  movement  impracticable,  to  inform 
me  so,  that  his  troops  might  be  recalled.  The  advance  was  then 
gallantly  resumed,  the  enemy  driven  from  the  guns,  the  heights 
handsomely  carried,  and  a  portion  of  the  troops  even  reached 
the  outskirts  of  Sharpsburg.  By  this  time  it  was  nearly  dark, 
and  strong  reinforcements  just  then  reaching  the  enemy  from 
Harper's  Ferry,  attacked  General  Burnside's  troops  on  their 
left  flunk,  and  forced  them  to  retire  to  a  lower  line  of  hills  nearer 
the  bridge. 

"  If  this  important  movement  had  been  consummated  two 
hours  earlier,  a  position  would  have  been  secured  upon  the 
heights,  from  which  our  batteries  might  have  enfiladed  the 
greater  part  of  the  enemy's  line,  and  turned  their  right  and  rear  ; 
our  victory  might  thus  have  been  much  more  decisive. 

"The  following  is  the  substance  of  General  Burnside's  opera 
tions,  as  given  in  his  report: 

"  Colonel  Crook's  brigade  was  ordered  to  storm  the  bridge. 
This  bridge,  No.  3,  is  a  stone  structure  of  three  arches  with 
stone  parapets.  The  banks  of  the  stream  on  the  opposite  side 
are  precipitous,  and  command  the  eastern  approaches  to  the 
bridge.  On  the  hill-side,  immediately  by  the  bridge,  was  a  stone 
fence  running  parallel  to  the  stream  ;  the  turns  of  the  roadway, 
as  it  wound  up  the  hill,  were  covered  by  rifle-pits  and  breast 
works  :>f  rails,  etc.  These  works,  and  the  woods  that  covered 
the  slopes,  were  filled  with  the  enemy's  riflemen,  and  batteries 
were  in  position  to  enfilade  the  bridge  and  its  approaches. 

"  General  Rodman  was  ordered  to  cross  the  ford  below  the 
bridge.  From  Colonel  Crook's  position  it  was  found  impossible 
to  carry  the  bridge. 

"  General  Sturgis  was  ordered  to  make  a  detail  from  his  di- 


154  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN. 

vision  for  that  purpose.  He  sent  forward  the  Second  Maryland 
and  the  Sixth  New  Hampshire.  These  regiments  made  several 
successive  attacks  in  the  most  gallant  style,  but  were  driven  back 

"  The  artillery  on  the  lefc  were  ordered 'to  concentrate  their  tire 
on  the  woods  above  the  bridge.  Colonel  Crook  brought  a  sec 
tion  of  Captain  Simmons's  battery  to  a  position  to  command  the 
bridge.  The  Fifty-first  New  York  and  Fifty-first  Pennsylvania 
•were  then  ordered  to  assault  the  bridge.  Taking  advantage  of 
a  small  spur  of  the  hills  which  ran  parallel  to  the  river,  they 
moved  towards  the  bridge.  From  the  crest  of  this  spur  they 
rushed  with  bayonets  fixed  and  cleared  the  bridge. 

"The  division  followed  the  storming  party,  also  the  brigade 
of  Colonel  Crook's  as  a  support.  The  enemy  withdrew  to  still 
higher  ground,  some  five  or  six  hundred  yards  beyond,  and  opened 
a  fire  of  artillery  on  the  troops  in  the  new  position  on  the  crest 
of  the  hill  above  the  bridge. 

"General  Hodman's  division  succeeded  in  crossing  the  ford 
after  a  sharp  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery,  and  joined  on  the 
left  of  Sturgis,  Scammon's  brigade  crossing  as  support.  Gen 
eral  Wilcox's  division  was  ordered  across  to  take  position  on 
General  Sturgis's  right. 

"  These  dispositions  being  completed  about  3  o'clock,  the  com 
mand  moved  forward,  except  Sturgis's  division,  left  in  reserve. 
Clark's  and  DurelPs  batteries  accompanied  Rodman's  division  ; 
Cook's  battery  with  Wilcox's  division,  and  a  section  of  Sim 
mons's  battery  with  Colonel  Crook's  brigade.  A  section  of 
Simmons's  battery  and  Mullenburgh's  and  McMullan's  batteries 
were  in  position.  The  order  for  the  advance  was  obeyed  by  the 
troops  with  alacrity.  General  Wilcox's  division,  with  Crook  in 
support,  moved  up  on  both  sides  of  the  turnpike  leading  from 
the  bridge  to  Sharpsbarg,  General  Rodman's  division,  supported 
by  Scammon's  brigade,  on  the  left  of  General  Wilcox.  The 
enemy  retreated  before  the  advance  of  the  troops.  The  Ninth 
New  York,  of  General  Rodman's  division,  captured  one  of  the 
enemy's  batteries  and  held  it  for  some  time.  As  the  command 
was  driving  the  enemy  to  the  main  heights  on  the  left  of  the 
town,  the  light  division  of  General  A.  P.  Mill  arrived  upon  the 
field  of  battle  from  Harper's  Ferry,  and  with  a  heavy  artillery 
fire  made  a  strong  attack  on  the  extreme  left.  To  meet  this  at 
tack  the  left  division  diverged  from  the  line  of  •.narch  intended, 
and  opened  a  gap  between  it  and  the  right.  To  fill  up  this  it 
was  necessary  to  order  the  troops  from  the  second  line.  During 
these  movements  General  Rc.dman  was  mortally  wounded. 
Colonel  Harland's  brigade,  of  General  Rodman's  division,  was 
driven  back.  Colonel  Scammon's  brigade,  by  a  change  of  front 
to  rear  on  his  right  flank,  saved  the  left  from  being  driven  com 
pletely  in.  The  fresh  troops  of  the  enemy  pouring  in,  and  the 
accumulation  of  artillery  against  this  command,  destroyed  all 
hope  of  its  being  able  to  accomplish  any  thing  more. 


LIFE    CF   MAJOR-GENERAL    McCLELLAIT.  155 

"It  was  now  nearlv  dark.  General  Sturgis  was  ordered  for 
ward  to  support  the  left.  Notwithstanding  the  hard  work  in 
the  early  part  of  the  day,  his  division  moved  forward  with  spirit. 
With  its  assistance  tbe"  enemy  were  checked  and  held  at  bay. 

"  The  command  was  ordered  to  fall  back  by  General  Cox,  who 
commanded  on  the  field  the  troops  engaged  in  this  affair  beyond 
the  Antietam.  The  artillery  had  been  well  served  during  the 
day.  Night  closed  the  long  and  desperately  contested  battle  of 
the  17th.  Nearly  two  hundred  thousand  men  and  five  hundred 
pieces  of  artillery  were  for  fourteen  hours  engaged  in  this  mem 
orable  battle.  We  had  attacked  the  enemy  in  a  position  selected 
by  the  experienced  engineer  then  in  person  directing  their  oper 
ations.  We  had  driven  them  from  their  line  on  one  flank,  and 
secured  a  footing  within  it  on  the  other.  The  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac,  notwithstanding  the  moral  effect  incident  to  previous 
reverses,  had  achieved  a  victory  over  an  adversary  invested  with 
the  prestige  of  recent  success.  Our  soldiers  slept  that  night 
conquerors  on  a  field  won  by  their  valor  and  covered  with  the 
dead  and  wounded  of  the  enemy. 

"  The  night,  however,  brought  with  it  grave  responsibilities. 
Whether  to  renew  the  attack  on  the  18th,  or  to  defer  it,  even 
with  the  risk  of  the  enemy's  retirement,  was  the  question 
before  me. 

"  After  a  night  of  anxious  deliberation  and  a  full  and  careful 
survey  of  the  situation  and  condition  of  our  army,  the  strength 
and  position  of  the  enemy,  I  concluded  that  the  success  of  an 
attack  on  the  18th  was  not  certain.  I  am  aware  of  the  fact 
that,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  a  general  is  expected  to  risk 
a  battle  if  he  has  a  reasonable  prospect  of  success;  but  at  this 
critical  juncture  I  should  have  had  a  narrow  view  of  the  condi 
tion  of  the  country  had  1  been  willing  to  hazard  another  battle 
with  less  than  an  absolute  assurance  of  success.  At  that  mo 
ment — Virginia  lost,  Washington  menaced,  Maryland  invaded — . 
the  national  cause  could  afford  no  risks  of  dei'eat.  One  battle 
lost,  and  almost  all  would  have  been  lost.  Lee's  army  might 
then  have  marched  as  it  pleased  on  Washington,  Baltimore, 
Philadelphia,  or  New  York.  It  could  have  levied  its  supplies 
from  a  fertile  and  undevastated  country;  extorted  tribute  from 
wealthy  and  populous  cities ;  and  nowhere  east  of  the  Alle- 
ghanies  was  there  another  organized  force  able  to  arrest  its  march. 

••  The  following  are  among  the  considerations  which  led  me 
to  doubt  the  certainty  of  success  in  attacking  before  the  19th  : 

"The  troops  were  greatly  overcome  by  the  fatigue  and  ex 
haustion  attendant  upon  the  long  continued  and  severely  con 
tested  battle  of  the  17th,  together  with  the  long  day  and  night 
marches  to  which  they  had  been  subjected  during  the  previous 
three  days. 

"  The  supply  trains  weie  in  the  rear,  and  many  of  the  troops 
had  suffered  from  hunger.  They  required  rest  and  refreshment. 


156  klFE    OF    MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN. 

"  One  division  of  Sumner's  and  all  of  Hooker's  corps,  on  the 
right,  had,  after  fighting  most  valiantly  for  several  hours,  been 
overpowered  by  numbers,  driven  back  in  great  disorder,  and 
much  scattered,  so  that  they  were  for  the  time  somewhat  de 
moralized. 

"  In  Hooker's  corps,  according  to  the  return  made  by  Gen 
eral  Meade,  commanding,  there  were  but  6,729  men  present  on 
the  18th  ;  whereas,  on  the  morning  of  the  22d,  there  were  13,- 
093  men  present  for  duty  in  the  same  corps,  showing  that  pre 
vious  to  and  during  the  battle  6,364  men  were  separated  from 
their  command. 

"  General  Meade,  in  an  official  communication  upon  this  sub 
ject,  dated  September  18,  1862,  says  : 

"'  I  enclose  a  field  return  of  the  corps  made  this  afternoon, 
which  I  desire  you  will  lay  before  the  commanding  general.  I 
am  satisfied  the  great  reduction  in  the  corps  since  the  recent 
engagements  is  not  due  solely  to  the  casualties  of  battle,  and 
that  a  considerable  number  of  men  are  still  in  the  rear,  some 
having  dropped  out  on  the  march,  and  many  dispersing  and 
leaving  yesterday  during  the  fight.  I  think  the  efficiency  of  the 
corps,  so  far  as  it  goes,  good.  To  resist  an  attack  in  our  pres 
ent  strong  position  I  think  they  may  be  depended  on,  and  I 
hope  they  will  perform  duty  in  case  we  make  an  attack,  though 
1  do  not  think  their  morale  is  as  good  for  an  offensive  as  a  de 
fensive  movement.' 

"  One  division  of  Sumner's  corps  had  also  been  overpowered, 
and  was  a  good  deal  scattered  and  demoralized.  It  was  not 
deemed  by  its  corps  commander  in  proper  condition  to  attack 
the  enemy  vigorously  next  day. 

"  Some  of  the  new  troops  on  the  left,  although  many  of  them 
fought  well  during  the  battle,  and  are  entitled  to  great  credit, 
were,  at  the  close  of  the  action,  driven  back,  and  their  morale 
impaired. 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  18th  General  Burnside  requested  me 
to  send  him  another  division  to  assist  in  holding  his  position  on 
the  other  side  of  the  Antietam,  and  to  enable  him  to  withdraw 
his  corps  if  he  should  be  attacked  by  a  s"  perior  force.  He  gave 
me  the  impression  that  if  he  were  attacked  again  that  morning 
he  would  not  be  able  to  make  a  very  vigorous  resistance.  I 
visited  his  position  early,  determined  to  send  General  Morell's 
division  to  his  aid,  and  directed  that  it  should  be  placed  on  this 
side  of  the  Antietam,  in  order  that  it  might  cover  the  retreat 
of  his  own  corps  from  the  other  side  of  the  Antietam,  should 
that  become  necessary,  at  the  same  time  it  was  in  position  to 
reinforce  our  centre  or  right,  if  that  were  needed. 

"  Late  in  the  afternoon  1  found  that,  although  he  had  not  been, 
attacked,  General  Burnside  had  withdrawn  his  own  corps  to  this 
side  of  the  Antietara,  and  sent  over  MorelFs  division  alone  to 
hold  the  opposite  side 


LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN.  157 

"  A  large  number  of  our  heaviest  and  most  efficient  batteries 
had  consumed  all  their  ammunition  on  the  16th  and  17th,  and  it 
was  impossible  to  supply  them  until  late  on  the  following  day. 

"  Supplies  of  provisions  and  forage  had  to  be  brought  up  and 
issued,  and  infantry  ammunition  distributed. 

"  Finally,  reinforcements  to  the  number  of  14,000  men — t 
say  nothing  of  troops  expected  from  Pennsylvania — had  no 
arrived,  but  were  expected  during  the  day. 

"  The  18th  was,  therefore,  spent  in  collecting  the  dispersed, 
giving  rest  to  the  fatigued,  removing  the  wounded,  burying 
the  dead,  and  the  necessary  preparations  for  a  renewal  of  the 
battle. 

"  Of  the  reinforcements,  Couch's  division,  marching  with 
commendable  rapidity,  came  up  into  position  at  a  late  hour  in 
the  morning.  Humphrey's  division  of  new  troops,  in  their 
anxiety  to  participate  in  the  battle,  which  was  raging  when  they 
received  the  order  to  march  from  Frederick  at  about  half-past 
three  P.M.,  on  the  17th,  pressed  forward  during  the  entire  night, 
and  the  mass  of  the  division  reached  the  army  during  the  fol 
lowing  morning.  Having  marched  more  than  twenty-three  miles 
after  half-past  four  o'clock  on  the  preceding  afternoon,  they 
were  of  course,  greatly  exhausted,  and  needed  rest  and  refresh 
ment.  Large  reinforcements  expected  from  Pennsylvania  never 
arrived.  During  the  18th  orders  were  given  for  a  renewal  of 
the  attack  at  daylight  on  the  19th. 

"  On  the  night  of  the  18th  the  enemy,  after  passing  troops  in 
the  latter  part  of  the  day  from  the  Virginia  shore  to  their  posi 
tion  behind  Sharpsburg,  as  seen  by  our  officers,  suddenly  formed 
the  design  of  abandoning  their  position,  and  retreating  across 
the  river.  As  their  line  was  but  a  short  distance  from  the  river, 
the  evacuation  presented  but  little  difficulty,  and  was  effected 
before  daylight. 

"  About  2,700  of  the  enemy's  dead  were,  under  the  direction 
of  Major  Davis,  assistant  inspector  general,  counted  and  buried 
upon  the  battle-field  of  Antietam.  A  portion  of. their  dead 
had  been  previously  buried  by  the  enemy.  This  is  conclusive 
evidence  that  the  enemy  sustained  much  greater  loss  than  we. 

"Thirteen  guns,  thirty-nine  colors,  upwards  of  fifteen  thou- 
Band  stand  of  small  arms,  and  more  than  six  thousand  prisoners, 
were  the  trophies  which  attest  the  success  of  our  army  in  the 
battles  of  South  Mountain,  Crampton's  Gap,  and  Antietam. 

"  Not  a  single  gun  or  color  was  lost  by  our  army  during  these 
battles.  "  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAND 

Major- General  Commanding." 

The  Maryland  victories  renewed  the  enthusiasm  and 
veneration  for  General  McClellan.  who  had  thus  with 
a  dispirited  army  conquered  the  flower  of  the  rebel  force. 


158  LIFE   OF   MAJOR- GENERAL   McCLELLAff. 

A  WORD  ABOUT  "ANTIETAM." 
The  battle  of  Antietam,  in  many  respects,  was  the  most 
remarkable  one  of  the  war.  It  was  the  only  one  which, 
up  to  that  period,  bore  any  resemblance  to  the  great  Euro 
pean  battles.  For  the  nature  of  our  country  is  such — its 
woods  are  so  thick  especially,  that  a  general  has  hardly 
ever  his  entire  battle-field  before  him.  But  on  this  occa 
sion,  McClellan  was  able  to  oversee,  in  person,  the  move 
ments  of  his  troops.  It  was  a  battle,  also,  begun  and 
finished  on  the  same  day.  More  than  this,  it  was  an  of 
fensive  battle,  not  a  defensive  one.  To  attack  an  enemy 
posted  on  a  defensible  hill,  and  drive  him  from  his  position, 
or  even  compel  him  to  evacuate  it,  is  much  more  difficult 
than  to  defend  a  hill  and  repulse  the  assault  of  an  antago 
nist.  The  odds  in  favor  of  those  thus  acting  on  the  de 
fensive,  are  generally  regarded,  by  military  men,  as  equal 
to  twenty  per  cent.  Eighty  thousand  men,  if  not  less,  are 
considered  sufficient  to  repel  a  hundred  thousand  under 
such  circumstances.  That  McClellan  achieved  a  victory, 
notwithstanding  the  disadvantage  of  being  the  attacking 
party,  is  a  point  not  always  sufficiently  considered.  At 
Fredericksburg,  and  elsewhere,  when  similar  assaults  were 
attempted,  our  brave  troops  were  compelled  to  fall  back. 
Other  great  victories,  which  we  have  won  in  this  war, 
have  been  won  principally  because  we  were  acting  on  the 
defensive. 

The  results  at  Antietam  would  have  been  far  more  de 
cisive,  but  for  circumstances  over  which  General  McClel 
lan  had  no  control.  Had  General  Hooker  not  been 
wounded,  early  in  the  day,  it  is  probable  that  he  would 
have  crushed  in  the  left  of  the  enemy,  doubled  it  back 
upon  the  centre  and  right,  and  so  cooped  up  almost  the 
entire  rebel  army  in  the  narrow  triangle  formed  by  Autie- 
tam  creek  and  the  Potomac.  ^  But  the  injury  to  that 
impetuous  officer,  and  the  consequent  repulse  of  his 
troops,  gave  Leo  time  to  hurry  up  reinforcements,  and 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR  GENERAL   MrCLELLAN.  159 

enabled  him,  by  constantly  ma<wng  more  and  more  troops 
on  the  threatened  point,  to  hold  oar  right  and  right-centre 
at  bay  for  hours.  Or  had  Burnside  advanced  to  assault 
the  rebel  right,  when  he  was  first  ordered,  the  result 
might  have  been  different,  for  the  rebels  would  have  been 
too  much  occupied  in  that  quarter  to  be  able  to  succor 
their  left.  The  delay  of  Burnside,  for  so  many  hours, 
changed  the  whole  fortunes  of  the  day.  It  has  been  said 
that  our  centre  should  have  been  advanced,  at  this  critical 
moment,  so  as  to  make  up,  if  possible,  for  the  precious 
time  thus  lost.  But  this  would  have  exposed  our  line  to 
be  pierced  by  the  enemy,  an  opportunity  of  which  Lee 
would  not  have,  failed  to  avail  himself.  The  reserves 
were  actually  drawn  upon  by  McClellan,  until  only  about 
four  thousand  were,  at  one  time,  left  to  hold  this  impor 
tant  position.  All  these  things  prevented  the  victory 
from  being  such  a  rout  for  the  enemy  as  Austerlitz  was, 
or  Jena,  or  Waterloo.  But  it  was  a  decisive  victory 
nevertheless.  It  put  the  finishing  blow  to  the  invasion, 
saved  Washington,  Baltimore  and  Philadelphia,  dissipated 
the  gloom  that  had  settled  over  twenty  millions  of  loyal 
people,  and  hurled  the  rebel  forces  shattered  back  into 
Virginia,  there  to  brood  over  their  defeat  for  nearly  a 
year,  before,  encouraged  by  the  failures  of  McClellan's 
successors,  they  could  summon  up  courage  to  renew 
the  attempt. 

Remembering  these  things,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say 
that  Antietam,  both  in  its  results  and  in  the  character  of 
the  struggle  itself,  yields  the  palm  to  no  battle  of  the  war. 
It  is  worthy  of  note,  that  Lee,  whose  ability  has  been  so 
much  praised  even  by  loyal  journalists,  lost  Gettysburg 
under  very  nearly  similar  circumstances  to  those  in  which 
McClellan  conquered  at  Antietam.  At  the  former  battle 
it  was  the  assailant  who  was  defeated.  At  the  latter  it 
was  the  assailant  who  won. 
10 


160  LIFE  OF  .MAJOR-GEXERAL   McCLELLAN. 


WHAT    THE    REBELS    HAD    EXPECTED. 

That  quick,  decided  success  would  attend  the  invasion 
was  the  confident  belief  of  every  Southern  officer  and  soldier. 
The  crossing  of  the  Potomac  had  been  long  held  out  to 
them  as  an  inducement  to  persevere  in  their  treasonable 
cause,  and  the  people  and  press  of  the  South  had  for 
months  urged  and  insisted  upon  the  promise  being  fulfilled. 
What  their  plans  were  in  the  event  of  a  successful  occupa 
tion,  may  be  gleaned  from  the  following  editorial,  published 
in  the  Richmond  Despatch,  of  the  seventeenth  of  Septem 
ber,  1862. 

"Let  not  a  blade  of  grass,"  says  the  editor,  "or  a  stalk  of 
corn,  or  a  barrel  of  flour,  or  a  bushel  of  meal,  or  a  sqck  of  salt, 
or  a  horse,  or  a  cow,  or  a  hog,  or  a  sheep,  be  left  wherever  they 
move  along.  Let  vengeance  be  taken  for  all  that  has  been  done 
until  retribution  itself  shall  stand  aghast.  This  is  the  country 
of  the  smooth-spoken,  would-be  gentleman,  McClellan.  He  has 
caused  a  loss  to  us,  in  Virginia,  of  at  least  thirty  thousand 
negroes,  the  most  valuable  property  that  a  Virginian  can  own 
They  have  no  negroes  in  Pennsylvania.  Retaliation  must  there 
fore  fall  upon  something  else.  A  Dutch  fanner  has  no  negroes, 
but  he  has  horses  that  can  be  seized,  grain  that  can  be  confis 
cated,  cattle  that  can  be  killed,  and  houses  that  can  be  burned. 
By  advancing  into  Pennsylvania  with  rapidity,  our  army  can 
easily  get  possession  of  the  Pennsylvania  Central  Railroad,  and 
break  it  down  so  thoroughly  that  it  cannot  be  repaired  in  six 
months.  They  have  already  possession  of  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  railroad  and  the  York  River  railroad.  By  breaking  down 
these  and  the  railroad  from  Philadelphia  to  Baltimore,  they  will 
completely  isolate  both  Washington  and  Baltimore.  No  rein 
forcements  can  reach  them  from  either  North  or  West,  except 
by  the  Potomac  and  the  bay." 

When  these  prophecies  of  victory  and  confident  boast 
ings  were  made,  it  was  not  supposed  that  General  Mc- 
Clellan  would  be  the  leader  of  the  hosts  against  which 
they  would  be  called  upon  to  contend  ;  and  when  the  fact 
was  announced  to  the  half-clad  soldiers  of  the  rebel  army, 
the  confidence  in  success  with  which  they  had  started  upon 
their  march  Northward,  was  changed  to  apprehensions  of 
defeat,  which  were  realized  to  the  utmost. 


LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

The  protracted  sojourn  which  General  Lee  had  promised 
to  his  followers,  was  unexpectedly  terminated  by  the  fatal 
check  he  received  at  South  Mountain  and  Antietam,  and 
when  our  cavalry  on  the  morning  of  the  nineteenth  reached 
the  bank  of  the  Potomac,  they  discovered  that  nearly  all 
the  enemy's  forces  had  cro&sed  into  Virginia  during  the 
night,  their  rear  escaping  under  cover  of  eight  batteries, 
placed  in  strong  positions  upon  the  elevated  bluffs  on  the 
opposite  bank.  General  Porter,  commanding  the  Fifth 
Corps,  ordered  a  detachment  under  General  Griffin  to 
cross  the  river  at  dark  and  carry  the  enemy's  batteries. 
This  was  gallantly  done  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy; 
several  guns,  caissons,  etc.,  were  taken,  and  their  supports 
driven  back^half  a  mile. 

The  information  obtained  indicated  that  the  mass  of  the 
enemy  had  retreated  towards  Winchester.  To  verify  this, 
and  to  ascertain  how  far  the  enemy  had  retired,  General 
Porter  was  authorized  to  detach  from  his  corps,  on  the 
morning  of  the  twentieth,  a  reconnoitering  party  in  greater 
force.  This  detachment  crossed  the  river  at  Shepherds- 
town,  and  advanced  about  a  mile,  when  it  was  attacked 
by  a  large  body  of  the  enemy  lying  in  ambush,  and  driven 
back  across  the  river  with  considerable  loss.  This  recon- 
noissance  showed  that  the  enemy  was  still  in  force  on  the 
Virginia  bank  of  the  Potoma-c,  prepared  to  resist  our  fur 
ther  advance. 

On  the  nineteenth,  General  Stuart  made  his  appearance 
at  Williamsport  with  some  four  thousand  cavalry  and  six 
pieces  of  artillery.  General  Couch  marched  at  once  with 
his  division,  and  a  part  of  Pleasanton's  cavalry,  with 
Franklin's  corps,  within  supporting  distance,  to  Williams- 
port,  and  attacked  the  enemy,  but  they  mafle  their  escape 
across  the  river. 

General  McClellan  then  despatched  the  following  report 
to  the  General-in-Chief: 


1(32  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"  SIIARPSBURO,  September  19/Ti,  1862. 

"I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  Maryland  is  entirely  freed 
from  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  who  has  been  driven  across  th ) 
Potomac.     No  fears  need  now  be  entertained  for  the  safety  of 
Pennsylvania.     I  shall  at  once  occupy  Harper's  Ferry. 
"  GEORGE  B.  McCLELLAN, 

"Major-  General  Cojnmanding. 
"Major- General  H.  "W.  HALLECK, 
"  Commanding  United  States  Army.1' 

On  the  following  clay  he  received  this  answer  : 

"  WASHINGTON,  September  20th,  1862.— 2  P.M. 
"  "We  are  still  left  entirely  in  the  dark  in  regard  to  your  own 
movements    and  those  of  the  enemy.     This  should  not  be  so. 
You  should  keep  me  advised  of  both,  so  far  as  you  know  them. 

"  II.  W.  HALLECK. 
"  General-in-Chief. 

"  Major-  General  G.  B.  MCCLELLAN." 
To  which  General  McClellan  replied  : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  TTIE  POTOMAC, 
"Near  Sharpsburg,  September  2Wh,  1862—8  P.M. 

"  Your  telegram  of  to-day  is  received.  I  telegraphed  you 
yesterday  all  I  knew,  and  had  nothing  more  to  inform  you  of 
until  this  evening.  Williams's  corps  (Banks's)  occupied  Mary 
land  Heights  at  1  P.M.  to-day.  The  rest  of  the  army  is  near 
here,  except  Couch's  division,  which  is  at  this  moment  engaged 
with  the  enemy  in  front  of  Williamsport  ;  the  enemy  is  retiring, 
via  Charlestown  and  Martinsburg,  on  Winchester.  Ho  last 
night  re-occupied  Williamsport  by  a  small  force,  but  will  be  out 
of  it  by  morning.  I  think  he  has  a  force  of  infantry  near 
Shepherdstown. 

"  I  rennet  that  you  find  it  necessary  to  couch  every  despatch 
I  have  the  honor  to  receive  from  you  in  a  spirit  of  fault-finding, 
and  that  you  have  not  yet  found  leisure  to  say  one  word  in  com 
mendation  of  the  recent  achievements  of  this  army,  or  even  to 
allude  to  them. 

''I  have  abstained  from  giving  the  number  of  guns,  colors, 
small  arms,  prisoners,  etc.,  captured,  until  I  could  do  so  with 
some  accuracy.  1  hope  by  to-morrow  evening  to  be  able  to 
give  at  least  an  approximate  statement. 

"  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

"  Major -General  Commanding^ 
"Majs>r- General  HALLECK, 

"  General-in-Cliief,   Washington." 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR  GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

General  McClellan  also  suggested,  that  as  Lee  must 
procure  his  supplies  from  Richmond,  General  Banks 
should  send  out  a  cavalry  force  from  Washington  to  cut 
off  his  communications. 

Maryland  Heights  were  occupied  by  General  Williams'a 
corps  on  the  same  day.  and  on  the  twenty-second.  General 
Sumner  took  possession  of  Harper's  Ferry,  and  fortified  it 
and  the  adjacent  heights. 

WHY  THE  REBEL  ARMY  WAS  NOT  PURSUED. 

To  have  followed  the  enemy  would  have  been  madness. 
Our  losses  in  the  two  Maryland  battles  had  sadly  reduced 
the  numbers  of  the  rank  and  n*le  ;  the  brave  fellows,  who 
were  left,  although  ready  to  obey  whatever  order  their 
beloved  commander  might  give  them,  were  exhausted  by 
the  fatigues  they  had  been  compelled  to  endure  since 
leaving  Washington  ;  a  renewal  of  clothing  was  iit 
and  the  means  of  transportation  were  inadequate  to  fur 
nish  even  a  single  day's  subsistence  in  advance. 

On  the  twenty-second,  General  McClellan  telegraphed 
to  General  Halleck,  informing  him  that  as  soon  as  pos 
sible  the  army  should  be  re-organized,  as  it  was  necessary 
for  its  efficiency  that  the  skeleton  regiments  should  be  filled 
up  at  once,  and  officers  appointed  to  supply  the  existing 
vacancies. 

On  the  twenty-third  he  telegraphed  that  Lee's  army  was 
still  opposite  to  his  position,  and  that  there  were  indica 
tions  that  heavy  reinforcements  were  moving  toward? 
them  on  the  Winchester  road.  He  also  reported  th« 
disposition  he  had  made  of  his  troops  to  guard  against  t 
recrossing.  General  McClellan  then  continues  ; 


"  HEAD-QUARTERS.  ARMY  OF  THK 
SHEPHERBSTOWN-,  September  23rd,  1862—9.30  A.M. 
"As  I  mentioned  to  you  before,  our  army  has  been  very  much 
reduced  by  casualties  in  the  recent  battles,  and  in  my  judgment 
all  the  reinforcement*  of  old  troops  that  can  possibly  b"? 
pensed  with  around  Washington  and  other  places  should  b« 


164:  LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN. 

instantly  pushed  forward  by  rail  to  this  army.  A  defeat  at  this 
juncture  would  be  ruinous  to  our  cause.  I  cannot  think  it 
possible  that  the  enemy  will  bring  any  forces  to  bear  upon 
Washington  till  after  the  question  is  decided  here ;  but  if  he 
should,  troops  can  soon  be  sent  back  from  this  army  by  rail  to 
reinforce  the  garrison  there." 

"  G.  B.   McCLELLAN, 

' 'Major- General  Commanding. 
11  MAJOR-GENERAL  HALLECK  : 

"  General-in-Chief,  Washington." 

On  the  21th  he  made  the  following  report : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
"September  '21th,  1862—30  A.M. 

"All  the  information  in  my  possession  goes  to  prove  that  the 
main  body  of  the  enemy  is  concentrated  not  far  from  Martins- 
burg,  with  some  troops  at  Charlestown  ;  not  many  in  Winchester. 
Their  movements  of  late  have  been  an  extension  towards  our 
right  and  beyond  it.  They  are  receiving  reinforcements  in 
Winchester,  mainly,  I  think,  of  conscripts — perhaps  entirely  so. 

"  This  army  is  not  now  in  condition  to  undertake  another 
campaign,  nor  to  bring  on  another  battle,  unless  great  advan 
tages  are  offered  by  some  mistake  of  the  enemy,  or  pressing 
military  exigencies  render  it  necessary.  We  are  greatly  deficient 
in  officers.  Many  of  the  old  regiments  are  reduced  to  mere 
skeletons.  The  new  regiments  need  instruction.  Not  a  day 
should  be  lost  in  filling  the  old  regiments — our  main  dependence 
« — and  in  supplying  vacancies  among  the  officers  by  promotion. 

"  My  present  purpose  is  to  hold  the  army  about  as  it  is  now, 
rendering  Harper's  Ferry  secure  and  watching  the  river  closely, 
intending  to  attack  the  enemy  should  he  attempt  to  cross  to 
this  side. 

"  Our  possession  of  Harper's  Ferry  gives  us  the  great  ad 
vantage  of  a  secure  debouche,  but  we  cannot  avail  ourselves  of 
it  until  the  railroad  bridge  is  finished,  because  we  cannot  other 
wise  supply  a  greater  number  of  troops  than  we  now  have  on  the 
Virginia  side  at  that  point.  When  the  river  rises  so  that  the 
enemy  cannot  cross  in  force,  I  purpose  concentrating  the  army 
somewhere  near  Harper's  Ferry,  and  then  acting  according  to 
circumstances,  viz:  moving  on  Winchester,  if  from  the  position 
and  attitude  of  the  enemy  we  are  likely  to  gain  a  great  advan 
tage  by  doing  so,  or  else  devoting  a  reasonable  time  to  the  or 
ganization  of  the  army  and  instruction  of  the  new  troops, 
preparatory  to  an  advance  on  whatever  line  may  be  determined, 
In  any  event,  I  regard  it  as  absolutely  necessary  to  send  new 
regiments  at  once  to  the  old  corps,  for  purposes  of  instruction, 
and  that  the  old  regiments  be  filled  at  once.  1  have  no  fears  as 
to  an  attack  on  Washington  by  the  Hue  of  Mauassas.  Holding 
Harper's  Ferry  as  I  do,  they  will  not  run  thy  risk  of  an  attack 


LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN. 

on  their  flank  and  rear  while  they  have  the  garrison  of  Washing, 
ton  in  their  front. 

"  I  rather  apprehend  a  renewal  of  the  attempt  in  Maryland 
should  the  river  remain  low  for  a  great  length  of  time,  and 
should  they  receive  considerable  addition  to  their  force.  I 
would  be  glad  to  have  Peck's  division  as  soon  as  possible.  I 
am  surprised  that  S'gei's  men  should  have  been  sent  to  Western 
Virginia  without  my  knowledge.  The  last  I  heard  from  you  on 
the  subject  was  that  they  were  at  my  disposition.  In  the  last 
battles  the  enemy  was  undoubtedly  greatly  superior  to  us  in 
number,  and  it  was  only  by  very  hard  fighting  that  we  gained 
the  advantage  we  did.  As  it  was,  the  result  was  at  one  period 
very  doubtful,  and  we  had  all  we  could  do  to  win  the  day.  If 
the  enemy  receives  considerable  reinforcements  and  we  none,  it 
is  possible  that  I  may  have  too  much  on  my  hands  in  the  next 
battle.  My  own  view  of  the  proper  policy  to  be  pursued  is  to 
retain  in  Washington  merely  the  force  necessary  to  garrison  it, 
and  to  send  every  thing  else  available  to  reinforce  this  army. 
The  railways  give  us  the  means  of  promptly  reinforcing  Wash 
ington  should  it  become  necessary.  If  I  am  reinforced,  as  1 
ask,  and  am  allowed  to  take  my  own  course,  I  will  hold  myself 
responsible  for  the  safety  of  Washington.  Several  persons 
recently  from  Richmond  say  that  there  are  no  troops  there  ex 
cept  conscripts,  and  they  few  in  number.  I  hope  to  give  you 
details  as  to  late  battles  by  this  evening.  I  am  about  starting 
again  for  Harper's  Ferry.  "  G.  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

'  'Major-  General  Commanding. 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  H ALLEGE, 

" General-in- Chief,  Washington" 

The  work  of  reorganizing  the  army  and  placing  it  in  a 
condition  for  active  service  was  begun  by  its  commander 
at  the  earliest  practicable  moment,  the  different  fords 
along  an  extent  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  at  the 
same  time  being  guarded,  and  reconnoissances  being  made 
by  our  cavalry,  which,  although  sadly  reduced  in  strength, 
and  in  the  number  of  horses,  performed  much  important 
service.  When  Stuart  made  his  celebrated  raid  around 
our  lines  and  into  Pennsylvania,  not  more  than  eight 
hundred  Union  cavalrymen  could  be  mounted  for  pursuit. 

GENERAL  McCLELLAN  ORDERED  TO  CROSS 
THE  POTOMAC. 

On  the  5th  of  October,  the  division  of  General  Cox 
I  about  5,000  men)  was  ordered  from  his  command  to 


LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

Western  Virginia,  and  two  days  later  he   received  the 
following  telegram . 

"  WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  October  6th,  1862. 

"I  am  instructed  to  telegraph  you  as  follows:  The  President 
directs  that  you  cross  the  Potomac  and  give  battle  to  the 
enemy,  or  drive  him  south.  Your  army  must  move  now,  while 
the  roads  are  good.  If  you  cross  the  river  between  the  enemy 
and  Washington,  and  cover  the  latter  by  your  operation,  you 
can  be  reinforced  with  30,000  men.  If  you  move  up  the  valley 
of  the  Sheuandoah,  not  more  than  12,000  or  15,000  can  be  sent 
to  you.  The  President  advises  the  interior  line  between  Wash 
ington  and  the  enemy,  but  does  not  order  it.  He  is  very  de 
sirous  that  your  army  move  as  soon  as  possible.  You  will 
immediately  report  what  line  you  adopt,  and  when  yon  intend 
to  cross  the  river ;  also  to  what  point  the  reinforcements  are  to 
be  sent.  It  is  necessary  that  the  plan  of  your  operations  be 
positively  determined  on,  before  orders  are  given  for  building 
bridges  and  repairing  railroads.  I  am  directed  to  add,  that,  the 
Secretary  of  War  and  the  geueral-in-chief  fully  concur  with  the 
President  in  these  instructions.  "  H.  W.  HALLKCK, 

"  General-in-  Chief. 

"Major-General  MCCLELLAN." 

STUART'S  REBEL  RAID. 

On  the  10th  of  October,  Stuart  crossed  the  Potomac 
with  two  thousand  cavalry  and  a  battery  of  horse  artil 
lery,  on  a  raid  into  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania.  General 
McClellan,  upon  hearing  of  the  daring  feat,  immediately 
made  such  dispositions  of  his  troops — Cavalry,  Artillery, 
and  Infantry — as  he  thought  would  ensure  the  capture  or 
destruction  of  the  rebel  cavalry,  but,  unfortunately,  all  the 
orders  he  had  given  were  not  carried  out,  and  Stuart 
escaped. 

SCARCITY  OF  ARMY  SUPPLIES  AND    HORSES 

At  the  time  General  McClellan  received  the  order  of 
October  6th,  to  cross  the  river  and  attack  the  enemy,  the 
army  was  wholly  deficient  in  cavalry,  and  a  large  part  of 
his  troops  were  in  want  of  shoes,  blankets,  and  other 
indispensable  articles  of  clothing,  notwithstanding  all  the 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR  GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

"jforts  that  had  been  made  since  the  battle  of  Antietam, 
and  even  prior  to  that  date,  to  refit  the  army  with  clothing. 
as  well  as  horses.  In  referring  to  this  scarcity  and  its 
causes,  the  General  remarks  as  follows  : 

"  T  at  once  consulted  with  Colonel  Ingalls,  the  chief  quarter 
master,  who  believed  that  the  necessary  articles  -could  be  sup 
plied  in  about  three  days.  Orders  were  immediately  issued  to 
the  different  commanders  who  had  not  already  sent  in  their 
requisitions,  to  do  so  at  once,  and  all  the  necessary  steps  were 
forthwith  taken  by  me  to  insure  a  prompt  delivery  of  the  sup 
plies.  The  requisitions  were  forwarded  to  the  proper  depart 
ment  at  Washington,  and  I  expected  that  the  articles  would 
reach  our  depots  during  the  three  days  specified  ;  but  day  after 
day  elapsed,  and  only  a  small  portion  of  the  clothing  arrived. 
Corps  commanders,  upon  receiving  notice  from  the  quartermasters 
that  they  might  expect  to  receive  their  supplies  at  certain  dates, 
sent  the  trains  for  them,  which,  after  waiting,  were  compelled  to 
return  empty.  Several  instances  occurred  where  these  trains 
went  back  and  forth  from  the  camps  to  the  depots,  as  often  as 
four  or  five  different  times,  without  receiving  their  supplies,  and 
I  was  informed  by  one  corps  commander  that  his  wagon  train 
had  travelled  over  150  miles,  to  and  from  thetlepots,  before  he 
succeeded  in  obtaining  his  clothing. 

"  The  corps  of  General  Franklin  did  not  get  its  clothing  until 
after  it  had  crossed  the  Potomac,  and  was  moving  into  Virginia. 
General  Heyuolds's  corps  was  delayed  a  day  at  Berlin,  to  com 
plete  its  supplies,  and  General  Porter  only  completed  his  on 
reaching  the  vicinity  of  Harper's  Ferry. 

"  I  made  every  exertion  in  my  power,  and  my  quartermasters 
did  the  same,  to  have  these  supplies  hurried  forward  rapidly;  and 
I  was  repeatedly  told  that  they  had  filled  the  requisitions. at  Wash 
ington,  and  that  the  supplies  had  been  forwarded.  But  they  did 
not  come  to  us,  and  of  course  were  inaccessible  to  the  army.  I 
did  not  fail  to  make  frequent  representation  of  this  condition  of 
things  to  the  general-in-chief,  and  it  appears  that  he  referred  the 
matter  to  the  Quartermaster  General,  who  constantly  replied 
that  the  supplies  had  been  promptly  ordered.  Notwithstanding 
this,  they  did  not  reach  our  depots." 

Colonel  Ingalls,  Chief  Quartermaster,  in  his  report  upon 
this  subject,  says  : 

"  There  was  great  delay  in  receiving  our  clothing.  The  or 
ders  were  promptly  given  by  me  and  approved  by  General 
Meigs,  but  the  roads  were  slow  to  transport,  particularly  the, 
Cumber/and  Valley  road. 

"  For  instance,  Jlolhing  ordered  to  Ilagerstown  011  the  7th  ot 


LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAlf. 

October  for  the  corps  of  Franklin,  Porter,  and  Reynolds,  did 
hot  arrive  there  until  about  the  18th,  and  by  that  time,  of 
course,  there  were  increased  wants  and  changes  in  position 
of  troops.  The  clothing  of  Sumner  arrived  in  great  quantities 
near  the  last  of  October,  almost  too  late  for  issue,  as  the  army 
was  crossing  into  Virginia.  We  finally  left  50,000  suits  at 
Harper's  Eorry,  partly  on  the  cars  just  arrived,  and  partly  in 
store." 

» 
The   condition  of  the   cavalry  was    another  cause  of 

great  annoyance  arid  delay ;  and,  to  show  how  sadly  they 
were  in  need  of  horses,  we  give  the  following  extract 
from  the  official  report  on  the  subject,  of  Colonel  Ingalls, 
Chief  Quartermaster.  He  says  : 

"  Immediately  after  the  battle  of  Antietam,  efforts  were  made 
to  supply  deficiencies  in  clothing  and  horses.  Large  requisi 
tions  were  prepared  and  sent  in.  The  artillery  and  cavalry 
required  large  numbers  to  cover  losses  sustained  in  battle,  on 
the  inarch,  and  by  diseases.  Both  of  these  arms  were  deficient 
when  they  left  Washington.  A  most  violent  and  destructive 
disease  made  its  appearance  at  this  time,  which  put  nearly 
4,000  animals  out  of  service.  Horses  reported  perfectly  well 
one  day  would  be  dead-larne  the  next,  and  it  was  difficult  to 
foresee  where  it  would  end,  or  what  number  would  co.ver  the 
loss.  They  were  attacked  in  the  hoof  and  tongue.  No  one 
seemed  able  to  account  for  the  appearance  of  this  disease. 
Animals  kept  at  rest  would  recover  in  time,  but  could  not  be 
worked.  I  made  application  to  send  West  and  purchase  horses 
at  once,  but  it  was  refused,  on  the  ground  that  the  outstanding 
contracts  provided  for  enough,  but  they  were  not  delivered 
sufficiently  fast,  nor  in  sufficient  numbers,  until  late-  in  October 
and  early  in  November.  I  was  authorized  to  buy  2,500  late  in 
October,  but  the  delivery  was  not  completed  until  in  November, 
after  we  had  reached  Warrenton." 

CORRESPONDENCE  WITH  GENERAL  HALLECK. 

Knowing  the  solicitude  of  the  President  for  an  early 
movement,  and  sharing  with  him  fully  his  anxiety  for 
prompt  action,  on  the  21st  of  October,  General  McClellan 
telegraphed  to  the  General-in-Chief  as  follows : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"  October  list,  18C2. 

"  Since  the  receipt  of  the  President's  order  to  move  on  the 
enemy,  I  have  been  making  every  exertion  to  get  this  army  sup 
plied  with  clothing  absolutely  necessary  for  marching. 


LIFE   OP  MAJOR-GENERAL    McCLELLAN. 

"  This,  T  am  happy  to  say,  is  now  nearly  accomplished.  I  have 
al-so,  during  the  same  time,  repeatedly  urged  upon  you  the  im 
portance  of  supplying  cavalry  and  artillery  horses  to  replace 
those  broken  down  by  hard  service,  and  steps  have  been  taken 
to  insure  a  prompt  delivery. 

"Our  cavalry,  even  when  well  supplied  with  horses,  is  much 
interior  in  numbers  to  that  of  the  enemy,  but  in  efficiency  has 
proved  itself  superior.  So  forcibly  has  this  been  impressed  upon 
our  old  regiments  by  repeated  successes,  that  the  men  are  fully 
persuaded  that  they  are  equal  to  twice  their  number  of  rebel 
cavalry. 

"  Exclusive  of  the  cavalry  force  now  engaged  in  picketing  the 
river,  I  have  not  at  present  over  about  one  thousand  (1000) 
horses  for  service.  Officers  have  been  sent  in  various  directions 
to  purchase  horses,  and  I  expect  them  soon.  Without  more 
cavalry  horses  our  communications,  from  the  moment  we  march, 
would  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  large  cavalry  force  of  the  enemy, 
and  it  would  not  be  possible  for  us  to  cover  our  flanks  properly, 
or  to  obtain  the  necessary  information  of  the  position  and  move 
ments  of  the  ejiemy,  in  such  a  way  as  to  insure  success.  My 
experience  has  shown  the  necessity  of  a  large  and  efficient 
cavalry  force. 

"Under    the    foregoing   circumstances,  I    beg   leave   to    ask 
whether  the  President  desires   me  to  march  on  the  enemy  at 
once,  or  to  await  the  reception  of  the  new  horses,  every  possible 
step  having  been  taken  to  insure  their  prompt  arrival. 
"  GEORGE  B.  McC/LBLLAN," 

' '  Major-  Gen eral  Commanding. 
"  Major -General  H.  "W.  HALLECK, 
" General-in- Chief,  Washington." 

On  the  same  day  General  Halleck  replied  as  follows : 

"  WASHINGTON,  October  2lst,  1862—3  P.M. 

"  Your  telegram  of  12  M.  has  been  submitted  to  the  President. 
He  directs  me  to  say  that  he  has  no  change  to  make  in  his  order 
of  the  6th  instant. 

"  If  you  have  not  been,  and  are  not  now,  in  condition  to  obey 
it,  you  will  be  able  to  show  such  want  of  ability.  The  President 
does  not  expect  impossibilities  ;  but  he  is  very  anxious  that  all 
this  good  weather  should  not  be  wasted  in  inactivity^  Telegraph 
when  you  will  move,  and  on  what  lines  you  propose  t'o  march. 
"  H.  W.  HALLECK,  General-in-  Chief." 

From  the  tenor  of  this  despatch,  General  McClellan  con 
ceived  that  it  was  left  to  him  to  decide  whether  or  not  it 
was  possible  to  advance  with  safety  at  that  time,  a  re 
sponsibility  which  he  says  "  I  exercised  with  the  more 


170  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

confidence,  in  view  of  the  strong  assurances  of  his  trust  in 
me  as  commander  of  that  army,  with  which  the  President 
had  seen  fit  to  honor  me."  Horses  were  still  wanting, 
and  he  designated  the  1st  of  November  as  the  earliest 
date  upon  which  he  could  commence  the  forward  move 
ment.  To  advance  before  that  date  he  considered  would 
be  attended  with  the  highest  degree  of  peril,  with  great 
suffering  and  sickness  among  the  men,  and  with  imminent 
danger  of  being  cut  off  from  supplies  by  the  superior 
cavalry  force  of  the  enemy,  and  with  no  reasonable  pros 
pect  of  gaming  any  advantage  over  him. 

A   CONVINCING    RESPONSE. 

General  Halleck  having  expressed  his  opinion  that  there 
had  been  no  such  want  of  supplies  in  the  army  as  to  pre 
vent  an  advance,  General  McClellan  responded  in  the 
following  convincing  language  : 

"  I  have  found  it  impossible  to  resist  the  force  of  my  own  con 
victions,  that  the  commander  of  an  army  who,  from  the  time  of 
its  organization,  has  for  eighteen  months  been  in  constant  com 
munication  with  its  officers  and  men,  the  greater  part  of  the  time 
engaged  in  active  service  in  the  Held,  and  who  has  exercised  thia 
command  in  many  battles,  must  certainly  be  considered  com 
petent  to  determine  whether  his  army  is  in  proper  condition  to 
advance  on  the  enemy  or  not;  and  he  must  necessarily  possess 
greater  facilities  for  forming  a  correct  judgment  in  regard  to  the 
wants  of  his  men,  and  the  condition  of  his  supplies,  than  the 
general-in-chief  in  his  office  at  Washington  city.  The  move 
ment  from  Washington  into  Maryland,  which  culminated  in  the 
battles  of  South  Mountain  and  Antietam,  was  not  a  part  of  an 
offensive  campaign,  with  the  object  of  the  invasion  of  the 
enemy's  territory  and  an  attack  upon  his  capital,  but  was 
defensive  in  its  purposes,  although  offensive  in  its  character,  and 
would  be  technically  called  a  'defensive-offensive  campaign.' 

"  It  was  undertaken  at  a  time  when  our  army  had  experienced 
severe  defeats,  and  its  object  was  to  pceserve  the  national  capital 
and  Baltimore,  to  protect  Pennsylvania  from  invasion,  and  to 
drive  the  enemy  out  of  Maryland.  These  purposes  were  fully 
and  finally  accomplished  by  the  battle  of  Antietam,  which 
brought  the  army  of  the  Potomac  into  what  might  be  termed  an 
accidental  position  on  the  upper  Potomac.  Having  gained  the 
immediate  object  uf  the  campaign,  the  first  thing  to  be  done  was 


LIFE    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN.  if] 

to  insure  Maryland  from  a  return  of  the  e-nemy ;  the  second,  to 
prepare  our  own  army,  exhausted  by  a  series  of  severe  battles, 
destitute  to  a  great  extent  of  supplies,  and  very,  deficient  in 
artillery  and  cavalry  horses,  for  a  definite  offensive  movement, 
and  to  determine  upon  the  line  of  operations  for  a  further  ad 
vance.  At  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Antietam  the  Potomac  was 
very  low,  and  presented  a  comparatively  weak  line  of  defence 
unless  watched  by  large  masses  of  troops.  The  re-occupation 
of  Harper's  Ferry,  and  the  disposition  of  troops  above  that 
point,  rendered  the  line  of  the  Potomac  secure  against  every 
thing  except  cavalry  raids.  No  time  was  lost  in  placing  the 
army  in  proper  condition  for  an  advance,  and  the  circumstances 
which  caused  the  delay  after  the  battle  of  Antietam  have  been 
fully  enumerated  elsewhere.  I  never  regarded  Harper's  Ferry 
or  its  vicinity  as  a  proper  base  of  operations  for  a  movement 
upon  Richmond.  I  still  considered  the  line  of  the  Peninsula  as 
the  true  approach,  but,  for  obvious  reasons,  did  not  make  any 
proposal  to  return  to  it. 

"On  the  6th  of  October,  as  stated  above,  T  was  ordered  by 
the  President,  through  his  general-in-chief,  to  cross  the  Potomac 
and  give  battle  to  the  enemy,  or  drive  him  south.  Two  lines 
were  presented  for  my  choice  : 

"  1st.  Up  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  in  which  case  I  was 
to  have  12,000  to  15,000  additional  troops. 

"  2d.  To  cross  between  the  enemy  and  Washington — that  is, 
east  of  the  Blue  Ridge — in  which  event  I  was  to  be  reinforced 
with  30,000  men. 

"  At  first  I  determined  to  adopt  the  line  of  the  Shenandoah, 
for  these  reasons  :  The  Harper's  Ferry  and  Winchester  railroad 
and  the  various  turnpikes  converging  upon  Winchester  afforded 
superior  facilities  for  supplies.  Our  cavalry  being  weak,  this 
line  of  communication  could  be  more  easily  protected.  There 
was  no  advantage  in  interposing  at  that  time  the  Blue  Ridge 
and  the  Shenandoah  between  the  enemy  and  myself.  At  the 
period  in  question  the  Potomac  was  still  very  low,  and  I  appre 
hended  that,  if  I  crossed  the  river  below  Harper's  Ferry,  the 
enemy  Vould  promptly  check  the  movement  by  re-crossing  into 
Maryland,  at  the  same  time  covering  his  rear  by  occupying  in 
strong  force  the  passes  leading  through  the  Blue  Ridge  from 
the  southeast  into  Shenandoah  valley.  I  anticipated,  as  the  re 
sult  of  the  first  course,  that  Lee  would  fight  me  near  Winches 
ter,  if  he  could  do  so  under  favorable  circumstances  ;  or  else 
that  he  would  abandon  the  lower  Shenandoah,  and  leave  the 
army  of  the  Potomac  free  to  act  upon  some  other  line  of  opera 
tions.  If  he  abandoned  the  Shenandoah,  he  would  naturally 
fall  back  upon  his  railway  communications.  I  have  since  been 
confirmed  in  the  belief  that,  if  I  had  crossed  the  Potomac  be 
low  Harper's  Ferry  in  the  early  part  of  October,  General  Lee 
would  have  re-crossed  into  Maryland. 


If 2  LIFE   OF  MAJOR- GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

"  As  above  explained,  the  army  was  not  in  condition  to  move 
until  late  in  October,  and  in  the  meantime  circumstances  had 
changed.  The  period  had  arrived  when  a  sudden  and  great  rise 
of  the  Potomac  might  be  looked  for  at  any  moment;  the  season 
of  bad  roads  and  difficult  movements  was  approaching,  which 
would  naturally  deter  the  enemy  from  exposing  himself  very  far 
from  his  base,  and  his  movements  all  appeared  to  indicate  a  fall 
ing  back  from  the  river  towards  his  supplies.  Under  these  cir 
cumstances,  I  felt  at  liberty  to  disregard  the  possibility  of  the 
enemy's  re-crossing  the  Potomac,  and  determined  to  select  the 
line  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  feeling  convinced  that  it  would  se 
cure  me  the  largest  accession  of  force,  and  the  most  cordial 
support  of  the  President,  whose  views,  from  the  beginning,  were 
in  favor  of  that  line. 

"  The  subject  of  the  defence  of  the  line  of  the  upper  Poto 
mac,  after  the  advance  of  the  main  army,  had  long  occupied  my 
attention.  I  desired  to  place  Harper's  Ferry  and  its  depend 
encies  in  a  strong  state  of  defence,  and  frequently  addressed  the 
general-in-chief  upon  the  subject  of  the  erection  of  field-works 
and  permanent  bridges  there,  asking  for  the  funds  necessary  to 
accomplish  the  purpose.  Although  I  did  my  best  to  explain, 
as  clearly  as  I  was  able,  that  I  did  not  wish  to  erect  permanent 
works  of  masonry,  and  that  neither  the  works  nor  the  perma 
nent  bridges  had  any  reference  to  the  advance  of  the  army,  but 
solely  to  the  permanent  occupation  of  Harper's  Ferry,  I  could 
never  make  the  general-in-chief  understand  my  wishes,  but  was 
refused  the  funds  necessary  to  erect  the  field-works,  on  the 
ground  that  there  was  no  appropriation  for  the  erection  of  per 
manent  fortifications  ;  and  was  not  allowed  to  build  the  per 
manent  bridge,  on  the  ground  that  the  main  army  could  not  be 
delayed  in  its  movements  until  its  completion.  Of  course  I 
never  thought  of  delaying  the  advance  of  the  army  for  that 
purpose,  and  so  stated  repeatedly." 

ASKS  HOW    THE    UPPEK   POTOMAC  IS   TO   BE 
GUARDED. 

On  the  25th  of  October  General  McClellan  sent  to  the 
General-in-Chief  the  following  telegram  : 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"  October  25£/i,  18G2— 10.45  P.M 

"  As  the  moment  is  at  hand  for  the  advance  of  this  army,  a 
question  ar'ses  for  the  decision  of  the  general-in-chief,  which, 
although  perhaps  impliedly  decided  by  the  President  in  his  let 
ter  of  thp.  13th,  should  be  clearly  presented  by  me,  as  1  do  not 
regard  it  as  in  my  province  to  determine  it. 

"  This  question  is  the  extent  to  which  the  line  of  the  Poto- 


LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  ^73 

mac  should  be  guarded,  after  the  army  leaves,  in  order  to  cover 
Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  from  invasion  by  large  or  small 
parties  of  the  enemy. 

"  It  will  always  be  somewhat  difficult  to  guard  the  immediate 
line  of  the  river,  owing  to  its  great  extent  and  the  numerous 
passages  which  exist. 

"  It  has  long  appeared  to  me  that  the  best  way  of  covering 
this  line  would  be  by  occupying  Front  Royal,  Strasburg,  Ward- 
ensville  and  Moorefield,  or  the  debouches  of  the  several  valleys 
in  which  they  are  situated. 

"  These  points,  or  suitable  places  in  their  vicinity.,  should  be 
strongly  intrenched  and  permanently  held.  One  great  advan 
tage  of  this  arrangement  would  be  the  covering  the  Baltimore 
and  Ohio  railroad,  and  an  essential  part  of  the  system  would  be 
the  construction  of  the  link  of  railway  from  Winchester  to 
Strasburg,  and  the  rebuilding  of  the  Manassas  Gap  railway 
bridge  over  the  Shenandoah. 

"The  intrenchment  of  Manassas  Junction  would  complete 
the  system  for  the  defence  of  the  approaches  to  Washington 
and  the  upper  Potomac.  Many  months  ago  I  recommended 
this  arrangement ;  in  fact,  gave  orders  for  it  to  be  carried  into 
effect.  I  still  regard  it  as  essential  under  all  circumstances. 

"  The  views  of  the  chief  engineer  of  this  army,  in  regard  to 
the  defences  and  garrison  of  Harper's  Ferry  and  its  defences, 
are  in  your  possession. 

"  The  only  troops  under  my  command,  outside  of  the  organi 
zation  of  th*e  army  of  the  Potomac,  are  the  Maryland  brigade, 
under  General  Kenley  ;  the  Fifty-fourth  Pennsylvania.  Colonel 
Voss ;  Twelfth  Illinois  cavalry,  and  Colonel  Davis's  Eighth 
New  York  cavalry ;  total  2,894  infantry,  one  battery,  and  about 
900  cavalry  men. 

"  There  are  also  two  of  my  regiments  of  cavalry  (about  750 
men),  guarding  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  railroad  between  Han 
cock  and  Cumberland. 

"  As  I  have  no  department,  and  command  simply  an  active 
army  in  the  field,  my  responsibility  for  the  safety  of  the  line  of 
the  Potomac  and  the  States  north  of  it  must  terminate  the  mo 
ment  I  advance  so  far  beyond  that  line  as  to  adopt  another  for 
my  base  of  operations.  The  question  for  the  general-in-chief  to 
decide,  and  which  1  regard  as  beyond  my  province,  is  this  : 

"  1st.  Shall  the  safety  of  Harper's  Ferry  and  the  line  of  the 
Potomac  be  regarded  as  assured  by  the  advance  of  the  army 
south  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  the  line  left  to  take  care  of  itself  ? 

"  2d.  If  it  is  deemed  necessary  to  hold  the  line,  or  that  here 
inbefore  indicated  in  advance  of  it,  how  many  troops  shall  be 
placed  there,  at  what  points  (and  in  what  numbers  and  of  what 
composition  at  each),  and  where  shall  they  be  supplied — i.  e,, 
from  the  army,  or  from  other  sources  ? 

"  Omitting  the  detached  troops  mentioned  above,  and  the 


[74  klFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.' 

email  garrisons  of  Boonsboro'  and  Frederick,  the  last  returns 
show  the  strength  of  this  army  for  duty  to  be  about  (116,000) 
one  hundred  and  sixteen  thousand  officers  and  men.  This  in 
cludes  the  divisions  of  Stoneman  and  WhipplQ,  but  does  not 
•nciud3  Heintzelman,  Sigel,  and  Bayard. 

"  If  Harper's  Fen  y  and  the  river  above  are  rendered  fully 
i»cure,  it  is  possible  that  the  active  army,  if  it  supplies  the  gar 
rison,  may  be  reduced  so  much  as  to  be  inadequate  to  the  pur 
poses  contemplated.  If  it  is  preserved  intact,  Maryland,  Penn 
sylvania,  and  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  railroad  may  be  unduly 
exposed. 

"  I  leave  the  decision  of  these  grave  questions  to  the  general- 
in-chief.  I  know  nothing  of  the  number  of  troops  at  Balti 
more,  etc. 

"  An  important  element  in  the  solution  of  this  problem  is  the 
fact  that  a  great  portion  of  Bragg's  army  is  probably  now  at 
liberty  to  unite  itself  with  Lee's  command. 

"  I  commence  crossing  the  river  at  Berlin  in  the  morning, 
and  must  ask  a  prompt  decision  of  the  questions  proposed 
herein.  "  GEORGE  B.  M.OCLEI,T,AN, 

"Major-  General  Comman ding." 

To  wbicb  he  received  the  following  reply  from  General 
Halleck  : 

"WASHINGTON,  October  26tfi,  1862—1.85  P.M. 

"  Since  you  left  Washington  I  have  advised  and  suggested  in 
relation  to  your  movements,  but  I  have  given  you  no  orders  ;  I 
do  not  give  you  any  now.  The  Government  has  entrusted  you 
with  defeating  and  driving  back  the  rebel  army  in  your  front. 
1  shall  not  attempt  to  control  you  in  the  measures  you  may 
adopt  for  that  purpose.  You  are  informed  of  my  views,  but 
the  President  has  left  you  at  liberty  to  adopt  them  or  not,  as 
you  may  deem  best. 

"  You  will  also  exercise  your  own  discretion  in  regard  to 
what  points  on  the  Potomac  and  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  rail 
road  are  to  be  occupied  or  fortified.  I  will  only  add  that  there 
is  no  appropriation  for  permanent  intrenchrnents  on  that  line. 
Moreover,  I  think  it  will  be  time  enough  to  decide  upon  fortify 
ing  Front  Royal,  Strasburg,  Wardensville,  and  Mooreh'eld, 
when  the  enemy  is  drivun  south  of  them,  and  they  come  into 
our  possession." 

On  the  29th,  General  McClellan  sent  the  following : 

"HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"October  29M,  1862—1.15  P.M. 

"On  the  25th  instant,  I  sent  you  a  despatch  requesting  you 
to  decide  what  steps  should  be  taken  to  guard  the  line  of  the 


LIFF    OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  175 

Potomac  when  this  army  leaves  here.  To  this  I  received  your 
reply  that  I  had  been  entrusted  by  the  President  with  defeating 
and  driving  away  the  rebel  army;  that  you  had  given  me  no 
orders  heretofore — did  not  give  me  any  then,  etc.  Under  these 
circumstances  I  have  only  to  make  such  arrangements  for 
guarding  this  extended  line  as  the  means  at  my  disposal  will 
permit,  at  the  same  time  keeping  in  view  the  supreme  necessity 
of  maintaining  the  moving  army  in  adequate  force  to  meet  the 
rebel  army  before  us. 

"  The  dispositions  I  have  ordered  are  as  follows,  viz  :  Ten 
thousand  men  to  be  left  at  Harper's  Ferry;  one  brigade  of  in 
fantry  in  front  of  Sharpsburg;  Kenley's  brigade  of  hifantry  at 
Williamsport ;  Kelley's  brigade,  including  Colonel  Campbell's 
Fifty-fourth  Pennsylvania  infantry,  at  Cumberland ;  and  be 
tween  that  point  and  Hancock.  I  have  also  left  four  small 
cavalry  regiments  to  patrol  and  watch  the  river  and  the  Balti 
more  and  Ohio  railroad  from  Cumberland  down  to  Harper's 
Ferry. 

"I  do  not  regard  this  force  as  sufficient  to  cover  securely 
this  great  extent  of  line,  but  I  do  not  feel  justified  in  detaching 
any  more  troops  from  my  moving  columns;  I  would,  therefore, 
recommend  that  some  new  regiments  of  infantry  and  cavalry  be 
sent  to  strengthen  the  forces  left  by  me. 

"  There  should  be  a  brigade  of  infantry  and  section  of  artil 
lery  in  the  vicinity  of  Cherry  run,  another  brigade  at  Hancock, 
an  additional  brigade  at  Williamsport,  one  regiment  at  Hagers- 
town,  and  one  at  Chambersburg,  with  a  section  of  artillery  at 
each  place,  if  possible.  This  is  on  the  supposition  that  the 
enemy  retain  a  considerable  cavalry  force  west  of  the  Blue 
Ridge;  if  they  go  east  of  it,  the  occupation  of  the  points 
named  in  my  despatch  of  the  25th  instant  will  obviate  the 
necessity  of  keeping  many  of  these  troops  on  the  river. 

"There  are  now  several  hundred  of  our  wounded,  including 
General  Richardson,  in  the  vicinity  of  Sharpsburg,  that  cannot 
possibly  be  moved  at  present. 

"  I  repeat,  that  I  do  not  look  upon  the  forces  I  have  been  able 
to  leave  from  this  afrmy  as  sufficient  to  prevent  cavalry  raids  into 
Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,  as  cavalry  is  the  only  description 
of  troops  adequate  to  this  service,  and  I  am,  as  you  are  aware, 
deficient  in  this  arm.  "  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

"Major-  General  Commanding. 
11  MAJOR-GENERAL  HALLECK, 

" General-in- Chief,  Washington." 

To  which  he  received  on  the  30th  this  reply : 

"  WASHINGTON,  October  30th,  1862—11.30  A.M. 
"  Your  telegram  of  yesterday  was  received  late  last  evening. 
The  troops  proposed  for  Thoroughfare  Gap  will  be  sent  to  that 
place  whenever  you  are  in  position  for  their  co-operation,  aa 


170  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

previously  stated,  but  no  new  regiments  can  be  sent  from  here 
to  the  upper  Potomac.  The  guarding  of  that  line  is  left  to 
your  own  discretion  with  the  troops  now  under  your  command. 

"  H.  W.  HALLECK,  General-in-Chief. 
"Major -General  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN." 

General  McClellan  accordingly  left  the  Twelfth  corps  a 
Harper's  Ferry,  detaching  one  brigade  to  the  vicinity  of 
Sharpsburg.  General  Morell  was  placed  in  command  of 
the  line  from  the  month  of  the  Antietam  to  Cumberland, 
and  General  Slocum  in  command  of  Harper's  Ferry  and 
the  line  east  of  the  mouth  of  the  Antietam. 

THE  ADVANCE  INTO  VIRGINIA. 

On  the  25th  of  October  the  pontoon  bridge  at  Berlin 
was  constructed,  there  being  already  one  across  the  Poto 
mac,  and  another  across  the  Shenandoah,  at  Harper's 
Ferry.  On  the  26th  two  divisions  of  the  Ninth  corps, 
and  Pleasanton's  .brigade  of  cavalry,  crossed  at  Berlin 
and  occupied  Lovettsville.  The  First,  Sixth,  and  Ninth 
corps,  the  cavalry,  and  the  reserve  artillery,  crossed  at 
Berlin  between  the  26th  of  October  and  the  2d  of  Novem 
ber.  The  Second  and  Fifth  corps  crossed  at  Harper's 
Ferry  between  the  29th  of  October  and  the  1st  of  No- 
vembor. 

The  plan  of  campaign  during  this  advance  was  to  move 
the  army  parallel  to  the  Blue  Ridge,  taking  Warrenton 
as  the  point  of  direction  for  the  main  army ;  seizing  each 
pass  on  the  Blue  Ridge  by  detachments,  as  we  ap 
proached  it,  and  guarding  them  after  we  had  passed  as 
long  as  they  would  enable  the  enemy  to  trouble  our  com 
munications  with  the  Potomac.  He  expected  to  unite 
with  the  Eleventh  corps  and  Sickles's  division  near 
Thoroughfare  Gap.  Harper's  Ferry  and  Berlin  wcro 
depended  upon  for  supplies  until  the  Manassas  Gap  rail 
way  was  reached  ;  when  that  occurred  the  passes  in  our 
rear  were  to  be  abandoned,  and  the  army  massed  ready 
or  action  or  movement  in  any  direction. 


LIFE  OF    MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAX.  177 

It  was  the  intention  of  the  commander  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  if,  upon  reaching  either  of  the  passes,  he 
found  that  the  enemy  were  in  force  between  it  and  the 
Potomac  in  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  to  move  into 
the  valley  and  endea  ^or  to  gain  their  rear. 

He  says  he  hardly  hoped  to  accomplish  this,  but  did 
expect  that  by  striking  in  between  Culpeper  Court-House 
and  Little  Washington,  he  could  either  separate  their 
army  and  beat  them  in  detail,  or  else  force  them  to  con 
centrate  as  far  back  as  Gordonsville,  and  thus  place  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  in  position  either  to  adopt  the 
Fredericksburg  line  of  advance  upon  Richmond,  or  to 
be  removed  to  the  Peninsula. 

Having  safely  crossed  the  Potomac,  the  various  corps 
moved  gradually  along  the  route  prescribed,  occupying 
village  after  village,  and  repulsing  the  enemy  wherever 
they  were  daring  enough  to  attempt  to  impede  the  march 
of  the  army. 

On  the  seventh  of  November,  the  following  was  the 
position  of  the  troops  : 

The  First,  Second  and  Fifth  corps,  reserve  artillery,  and 
general  head-quarters,  at  Warren  ton  ;  the  Ninth  corps  on 
the  line  of  the  Rappahannock,  in  the  vicinity  of  Water 
loo  ;  the  Sixth  corps  at  New  Baltimore ;  the  Eleventh 
corps  at  New  Baltimore,  Gainesville,  and  Thoroughfare 
Gap  ;  Sickles's  division  of  the  Third  corps,  on  the  Orange 
and  Alexandria  railroad,  from  Manassas  Junction  to  War- 
renton  Junction  ;  Pleasanton  across  the  Rappahannock  at 
Amissville,  Jefferson,  etc. ,  with  his  pickets  at  Hazel  river, 
facing  Longstreet,  six  miles  from  Culpeper  Court-House ; 
Bayard  near  Rappahannock  Station. 

The  army  was  thus  massed  near  Warrenton,  ready  to 
act  in  any  required  direction,  and  in  admirable  condition 
and  spirits.  Indeed,  General  McClellan  says  he  doubts 
whether  during  the  entire  period  he  had  the  honor  to  com- 


178  *<n?E   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN. 

mand  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  it  was  in  such  excellent 
condition  to  fight  a  great  battle.  The  best  information  in 
dicated  that  Longstrcct  was  immediately  in  front  near 
Culpeper;  Jackson,  with  one,  perhaps  both,  of  the  Hills, 
near  Chester  and  Thornton's  gaps,  with  the  mass  of  theii 
force  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge  ;  and  the  reports  from  Gen 
eral  Pleasanton  on  the  advance  indicated  the  possibility  of 
separating  the  two  wings  of  the  enemy's  forces,  and  either 
beating  Longstreet  separately,  or  forcing  him  to  fall  back 
at  least  upon  Gordonsville,  to  effect  his  junction  with  the 
rest  of  the  army. 

"LITTLE    MAC"    RELIEVED    FROM    COMMAND. 

The  well-concerted  plans  of  the  able  strategist  were, 
however,  to  meet  with  an  unexpected  impediment,  and 
the  expectations  of  his  officers  and  men  that  the  hour  of 
victory  was  again  at  hand,  were  to  be  suddenly  disap 
pointed.  Orders  had  been  issued  for  the  movements  on 
the  two  subsequent  days,  which  were  believed  would  lead 
to  a  brilliant  success,  or  series  of  successes,  when  an  officer 
arrived  from  Washington  with  an  order  dated  on  the  fifth, 
relieving  the  idol  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  from  his 
command,  and  directing  him  to  report  at  Trenton,  New 
Jersey,  and  designating  General  Burnside  as  his  successor. 
It  was  late  on  the  night  of  the  seventh,  when  he  received 
the  unexpected  order,  but  he  immediately  obeyed  its  pro 
visions.  Before  leaving  his  head-quarters,  he  penned  the 
following  modest  and  patriotic  address  to  his  Army  : 

HIS  FAREWELL  ADDRESS    TO  THE  ARMY   OP 
THE  POTOMAC. 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"  CAMP  NEAR  RKCTORTOWN,  Nov.  1th,  1862. 
"Officers  and  Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac: 

"An  order  of  the  President  devolves  upon  Major-General 
Burnside  the  jommand  of  this  army.  Tn  parting  from  you,  I 
cannot  exprr  =  Lhe  love-and  gratitude  I  bear  you.  As  an  army 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  179 

you  have  grown  up  under  my  care.  In  you  I  have  never  found 
doubt  or  coldness.  The  battles  you  have  fought\mder  my  com 
mand  will  proudly  live  in  our  nation's  history.  The  glory  you 
have  achieved,  our  mutual  perils  and  fatigues,  the  graves  of  our 
comrades  fallen  in  battle  and  by  disease,  the  broken  forms  of 
those  whom  wounds  and  sickness  have  disabled — the  strongest 
associations  which  can  exist  among  men — unite  us  still  by  an  in 
dissoluble  tie.  We  shall  ever  be  comrades  in  supporting  th«> 
Constitution  of  our  country  and  the  nationality  of  its  people. 
<;  GEORGE  13.  McOLBLLAH, 

"  Major-General,  U.  S.  A." 

HE  BIDS  ADIEU  TO  HIS  OFFICERS  AND  SOL 
DIERS,  AND  LEAVES  FOR  TRENTON. 

On  the  Sunday  evening  previous  to  his  departure,  the 
officers  assembled  atThis  tent  for  the  purpose  of  bidding 
adieu  to  their  gallant  leader,  and  from  the  eyes  of  many  of 
their  number  dropped  scalding  tears  of  sorrow  and  regret. 
The  following  day  he  reviewed  the  army  of  heroes  who 
had  followed  him  through  many  months  and  many  scenes, 
and  as  he  rode  along  their  lines,  pronouncing  the  last  fare 
well,  wild  and  unrestrained  huzzas  rent  the  air ;  and  they 
rushed  from  the  ranks  and  in  every  conceivable  manner 
gave  evidence  of  their  devotion  and  confidence,  and  of 
their  annoyance  and  regret  at  the  separation.  On  the 
tenth  he  took  the  railroad  cars  at  Warrenton,  and  upoa 
reaching  Warrenton  Junction  was  again  received  with 
the  most  gratifying  manifestations.  In  answer  to  the 
unanimous  request  for  a  parting  speech,  General  McClel- 
lan  said  :  "  I  wish  you  to  stand  by  General  Burnside  as 
you  have  stood  by  me,  and  all  will  be  well.  Good-bye." 

At  other  stations  on  the  road  he  was  also  greeted  with 
enthusiastic  cheering.  Reaching  Washington,  he  quietly 
went  to  the  Philadelphia  depot,  and  then  passing  through 
the  city  of  his  nativity  without  tarrying,  much  to  the  dis 
appointment  of  hosts  of  admirers,  he  proceeded  to  Trenton. 


OFFICIAL  REPORT  OF  THE  ARMt  OF  THE 
POTOMAC. 

We  cannot  conclude  the  sketch  of  General  McClelland 


180  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

active  service  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  better  than 
by  publishing  the  following  from  his  Report  to  the  War 
Department  • 

"This  Report  is,  in  fact,  the  history  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac. 

"  During  the  period  occupied  in  the  organization  of  that 
army,  it  served  as  a  barrier  against  the  advance  of  a  lately 
victorious  enemy,  while  the  fortifications  of  the  capital  were  in 
progress  ;  and  under  the  discipline  which  it  then  received  it 
acquired  strength,  education,  and  some  of  that  experience 
which  is  necessary  to  success  in  active  operations,  and  which 
enabled  it  afterwards  to  sustain  itself  under  circumstances 
trying  to  the  most  heroic  men.  Frequent  skirmishes  occurred 
along  the  lines,  conducted  with  great  gallantry,  which  inured 
our  troops  to  the  realities  of  war. 

"The  army  grew  into  shape  but  slowly;  and  the  delays  which 
attended  on  the  obtaining  of  arms,  continuing  lale  into  the 
winter  of  1861-'62,  were  no  less  trying  to  the  soldiers  than  to 
the  people  of  the  country.  Even  at  the  time  of  the  organiza 
tion  of  the  Peninsula  campaign,  some  of  the  finest  regiments 
were  without  rifles  ;  nor  were  the  utmost  exertions  on  the  part 
of  the  military  authorities  adequate  to  overcome  the  obstacles 
to  active  service. 

"  When,  at  length,  the  army  was  in  condition  to  take  the  field, 
the  Peninsula  campaign  was  planned,  and  entered  upon  with 
enthusiasm  by  officers  and  men.  Had  this  campaign  been 
followed  up  as  it  was  designed,  I  cannot  doubt  that  it  would 
have  resulted  in  a  glorious  triumph  to  our  arms,  and  the  per 
manent  restoration  of  the  power  of  the  government  in  Virginia 
and  North  Carolina,  if  not  throughout  the  revolting  States.  It 
•was,  however,  otherwise  ordered,  and  instead  of  reporting  a 
victorious  campaign,  it  has  been  my  duty  to  relate  the  heroism 
of  a  reduced  army,  sent  upon  an  expedition  into  an  enemy's 
country,  there  to  abandon  one  and  originate  another  and  new 
plan  of  campaign,  which  might  and  would  have  been  successful 
if  supported  with  appreciation  of  its  necessities,  but  which 
fiiled  because  of  the  repeated  failure  of  promised  support,  at 
the  most  critical,  and,  as  it  proved,  the  most  fatal  moments. 
That  heroism  surpasses  ordinary  description.  Its  illustration 
must  be  left  for  the  pen  of  the  historian  in  times  of  calm  reflec 
tion,  when  the  nation  shall  be  looking  back  to  the  past  from 
the  midst  of  peaceful  days. 

"  For  me,  now,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  my  comrades  were 
victors  on  every  field  save  one,  and  there  the  endurance  of  but 
little  more  than  a  single  corps  accomplished  the  object  of  the 
fighting,  and  by  securing  to  the  army  its  transit  to  the  James, 
left  to  the  enemy  a  ruinous  and  barren  victory. 


LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

"  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  first  reduced  by  the  with 
drawal  from  my  command  of  the  division  of  General  Blenker, 
which  was  ordered  to  the  Mountain  department,  under  General 
Fremont.     We  had  scarcely  landed  on  the  Peninsula  ^hen  it 
was  further  reduced  by  a  despatch  revoking  a  previous  order 
giving  me  command  at  Fortress    Monroe,  and  under  which  I 
had  expected  to  take  ten  thousand  men  from  that  point  to  aid 
in  our  operations.     Then,  when  under  fire  before  the  defences 
of  Yorktown,  we  received  the  news  of  the  withdrawal  of  Gen 
eral   McDowell's  corps  of  about  35,000  men.     This  completed 
the  overthrow  of  the  original  plan  of  the  campaign.     About 
one-third  of  my  entire  army  (five  divisions  out  of  fourteen,  one 
of  the  nine  remaining  being  but  little  larger  than  a  brigade)  was 
thus    taken  from  me.     Instead  of  a  rapid  advance  which  I  had 
planned,  aided  by  a  flank  movement  up  the  York  river,  it  was 
only  left   to   besiege  Yorktown.     That  siege  was  successfully 
conducted  by  the  army,  and  when  these  strong  works  at  length 
yielded  to    our  approaches,  the  troops  rushed  forward  to  the 
sanguinary   but   successful   battle   of   Williamsburg,  and   thus 
opened  an   almost   unresisted    advance  to   the   banks   of   the 
Chickahominy.     Richmond   lay   before   them    surrounded  with 
fortifications,  and   guarded    by  an  army  larger  than  our  own  ; 
but  the  prospect  did  not  shake  the  courage  of  the  brave  men 
who   composed   my  command.     Relying   still   on    the  support 
which  the  vastness  of  our  undertaking  and  the  grand  results 
depending   on   our   success  seemed   to   insure   us,   we   pressed 
forward.     The  weather  was  stormy  beyond  precedent ;  the  deep 
soil    of   the    Peninsula   was    at   times    one   vast    morass ;     the 
Chickahominy  rose  to  a  higher  stage  than  had  been  known  for 
years  before.     Pursuing  the  advance,  the  crossings  were  seized, 
and  the  right  wing  extended  to  effect  a  junction  with  reinforce 
ments  now  promised  and  earnestly  desired,  and  upon  the  arrival 
of  which  the  complete  success  of  the  campaign  seemed  clear. 
The  brilliant  battle  of  Hanover  Court-House  was  fought,  which 
opened  the  way  for  the  first  corps,  with  the  aid  of  which,  had 
it  come,  we  should  then  have  gone  into  the  enemy's  capital.     It 
never  came.     The  bravest  army  could  not  do  more,  under  such 
overwhelming  disappointment,  than  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
then  did.     Fair  Oaks  attests  their  courage  and  endurance  when 
they  hurled  back,  again  and   again,  the  vastly  superior  masses 
of  the  enemy.      But   mortal   men   could  not   accomplish  the 
miracle  that  seemed  to  have  been  expected  of  them.     But  one 
course  was  left — a  flank  march  in  the  face  of  a  powerful  enemy  to 
another  and  better  base — one  of  the  most  hazardous  movements 
in  war.     The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  holding  its  own  safety  and 
almost  the  safety  of  our  cause,  in  its  hands,  was  equal  to  the 
occasion.     The  seven  days  are  classical  in  American  history  ; 
those  days  in  which  the  noble  soldiers  of  the  Union  and  Con 
stitution  fought  an  outnumbering  enemy  by  day,  and  retreated 


182  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GLNERAL   McCLELLAff. 

from  successive  victories  by  night,  through  a  week  of  bat.tle, 
closing  the  terrible  series  of  conflicts  with  the  ever-memorable 
victory  of  Malvern,  where  they  drove  back,  beaten  and  shattered, 
the  entire  eastern  army  of  the  confederacy,  and  thus  secured 
for  themselves  a  place  of  rest  ar\d  a  point  for  a  new  advance 
upon  the  capital  from  the  banks  of  the  James.  Richmond  was 
still  within  our  grasp,  had  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  been  rein 
forced  and  permftted  to  advance.  But  counsels,  which  I  cannot 
but  think  subsequent  events  proved  unwise,  prevailed  in  Wash 
ington,  and  we  were  ordered  to  abandon  the  campaign.  Never 
did  soldiers  better  deserve  the  thanks  of  a  nation  than  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  for  the  deeds  of  the  Peninsula  campaign, 
and  although  that  meed  was  withheld  from  them  by  the  authori 
ties,  I  am  pursuaded  they  have  received  the  applause  of  the 
American  people. 

"  The  army  of  the  Potomac  was  recalled  from  within  sight  of 
Richmond,  and  incorporated  with  the  army  of  Virginia.  The 
disappointments  of  the  campaign  on  the  Peninsula  had  not 
damped  their  ardor  or  diminished  their  patriotism.  They  fought 
well,  faithfully,  gallantly,  under  General  Pope  ;  yet  were  com 
pelled  to  fall  back  on  Washington,  defeated  and  almost  de-^ 
moralized. 

"  The  enemy,  no  longer  occupied  in  guarding  his  own  capital, 
poured  his  troops  northward,  entered  Maryland,  threatened 
Pennsylvania,  and  even  Washington  itself.  Elated  by  his  recent 
victories,  and  assured  that  our  troops  were  disorganized  and  dis 
pirited,  he  was  confident  that  the  seat  of  war  was  now  perma 
nently  transferred  to  the  loyal  States,  and  that  his  own  exhausted 
soil  was  to  be  relieved  from  the  burden  of  supporting  two  hostile 
armies.  But  he  did  not  understand  the  spirit  which  animated 
the  soldiers  of  the  Union.  I  shall  not,  nor  can  I  living,  forget 
that  when  I  was  ordered  to  the  command  of  the  troops  for  the 
defence  of  the  capital,  the  soldiers,  with  whom  I  had  shared  so 
much  of  the  anxiety,  and  pain,  and  suffering  of  the  war,  had 
not  lost  their  confidence  in  me  as  their  commander.  They 
sprang  to  my  call  with  all  their  ancient  vigor,  discipline,  and 
courage.  I  led  them  into  Maryland.  Fifteen  days  after  they 
had  fallen  back  defeated  before  Washington,  they  vanquished  the 
enemy  on  the  rugged  height  of  South  Mountain,  pursued  him  to 
the  hard-fought  field  of  Antietam,  and  drove  him,  broken  and 
disappointed,  across  the  Potomac  into  Virginia. 

"  The  army  had  need  of  rest.  After  the  terrible  experience? 
of  battles  and  marches,  with  scarcely  an  interval  of  repose 
which  they  had  gone  through  from  the  time  of  leaving  for  th< 
Peninsula  ;  the  return  to  Washington  ;  the  defeat  in  Virginia  , 
the  victory  at  South  Mountain,  and  again  at  Antietam,  it  wa& 
not  surprising  that  they  were  in  a  large  degree  destitute  of  the 
absolute  necessaries  to  effective  duty.  Shoes  were  worn  out; 
blankets  were  lost ;  clothing  was  in  rags  •  in  short,  the  army  was 


LIFE  OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  McCLELLAN. 

unfit  for  active  service,  and  an  interval  for  rest  and  equipment 
was  necessary.  When  the  slowly-forwarded  supplies  came  to  us, 
I  led  the  army  across  the  river,  renovated,  refreshed,  in  good 
order  and  discipline,  and  followed  the  retreating  foe  to  a  position 
where  I  was  confident  of  decisive  victory,  when,  in  the  midst  of 
the  movement,  while  my  advance-guard  was  actually  in  contact 
with  the  enemy,  I  was  removed  from  the  command. 

"  I  am  devoutly  grateful  to  God  that  my  lust  campaign  with 
this  brave  army  was  crowned  with  a  victory  which  saved  the  na 
tion  from  the  greatest  peril  it  had  then  undergone.  I  have  not 
accomplished  my  purpose  if,  by  this  report,  the  army  of  the  Po 
tomac  is  not  placed  high  on  the  roll  of  the  historic  armies  of  the 
world.  Its  deeds  ennoble  the  nation  to  which  it  belongs.  Al 
ways  ready  for  battle,  always  firm,  steadfast,  and  trustworthy, 
I  never  called  on  it  in  vain  ;  nor  will  the  nation  ever  have  cause 
to  attribute  its  want  of  success,  under  myself,  or  under  other 
commanders,  to  any  failure  of  patriotism  or  bravery  in  that 
noble  body  of  American  soldiers. 

"No  man  can  justly  charge  upon  any  portion  of  that  army,  from 
the  commanding  general  to  the  private,  any  lack  of  devotion  to 
the  service  of  the  United  States  government,  and  to  the  cause  of1 
the  Constitution  and  the  Union.  They  have  proved  their  fealty 
in  much  sorrow,  suffering,  danger,  and  through  the  very  shadow 
of  death.  Their  comrades  dead  on  all  the  fields  where  we  fought 
have  scarcely  more  claim  to  the  honor  of  a  nation's  reverence 
than  their  survivors  to  the  justice  of  a  nation's  gratitude. 

"  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 
"Major -General,  United  States  Army" 

OVATIONS  TENDERED  AT  THE  NORTH. 

Upon  his  arrival  at  Trenton,  he  was  received  with  all 
«  • 

the  enthusiasm  which  the  people  of  that  city  could  give 
to  such  a  distinguished  General,  and  from  all  parts  of 
the  North  came  letters  and  verbal  messages  requesting 
his  presence  in  different  cities,  towns  and  hamlets,  and 
beseeching  that  he  would  afford  the  friends  and  relatives 
of  the  brave  soldiers,  who  fought  so  long  under  his  banner, 
an  opportunity  to  shake  him  by  the  hand. 

However,  these  complimentary  invitations  were  re 
fused  ;  but  subsequently,  upon  visiting  New  York  and 
some  of  the  points  from  whence  invitations  and  deputa 
tions  had  come,  he  was  tendered  ovations  of  the  most 
gratifying  character. 


A84  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

Up  to  the  present  time  (February,  1864)  General  Mc- 
Clellan  has  not  been  assigned  to  another  command,  but 
has  been  living  in  rural  retirement,  in  New  Jersey. 

RUMORS    OP    RETURN    TO    COMMAND— THE 
EFFECT    AT    GETTYSBURG. 

From  time  to  time  rumor  has  asserted  that  he  was  again 
to  be  ordered  to  the  field,  but,  to  the  disappointment  of 
his  friends  arid  admirers  in  civil  and  military  life,  the  re 
ports  have  been  without  foundation.  Especially  was  this 
disappointment  experienced  at  and  before  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg.  When  our  troops,  after  long  and  forced 
marches,  had  arrived  within  attacking  distance  of  the 
rebel  army,  and  every  arrangement  had  been  perfected 
for  an  early  conflict,  with  the  speed  of  an  electric  current, 
passed  from  regiment  to  regiment,  the  report  that  "  Little 
Mac"  had  been  sent  for  in  that  hour  of  the  country's  peril, 
to  lead  the  army  against  the  invaders.  Another,  and  ap 
parently  no  less  authentic  rumor,  had  it,  that  he  was  ad 
vancing  from  Harrisburg  at  the  head  of  a  large  body  of 
Pennsylvania  militia,  to  reinforce  the  Army  of  the  Potomac ; 
and,  consequent!}^  between  the  two,  the  men  confidently 
believed  that  their  favorite  leader  was  really  near  at  hand, 
and,  incited  by  the  belief,  fought  with  redoubled  determi 
nation  and  valor,  and  achieved  a  brilliant  victory.  It  is 
said  that  even  distinguished  generals,  remarking  the 
beneficial  effects  resulting  from  the  rumors,  aided  in  cir 
culating  the  deceptive  stories. 

THE  SOLDIERS'  LOVE  FOR  "  LITTLE  MAC." 

It  is  useless  to  deny  that,  although  the  soldiers  have 
implicit  confidence  in  his  gallant  successor,  they  still  look 
forward  to  the  day  when  they  believe  their  old  ?oni 
mander  will  return  ;  and  this  feeling  has  pervaded  their 
ranks  since  the  day  he  bade  them  farewell  in  the  val- 
loy  of  Virginia.  A  correspondent  of  a  Western  journal, 


LIFE   OP   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  185 

writing  some  months  since  from  Falmouth,  thus  con 
firms  the  statement:  "I  asked  Colonel ,"  he  writes, 

"  whether  the  stories  of  the  attachment  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  to  McClellan  were  true,  and  he  said  they 
certainly  were  true — that  the  Army  loved  General  Mc 
Clellan,  and  longed  to  have  him  again  for  their  Com 
mander,  and  that  there  was  a  positive  faith  among  the 
soldiers  that  it  would  be  his  destiny  yet  to  come  back  and 
lead  them.  The  feeling  for  him  was  especially  strong  in 
the  old  regiments  that  had  served  long  under  him,  and 
the  new  regiments  were  infected  with  it." 

Like  all  prominent  men,  in  whatever  sphere  they  dis 
play  unusual  ability  or  talent,  General  McClellan  has  his 
personal  and  political  enemies,  but  even  many  of  the 
latter  bear  testimony  to  his  sagacity,  industry,  energy  and 
perseverance.  When  General  Scott  designated  him  as  the 
proper  person  to  succeed  him  in  the  command  of  the 
armies  of  the  Union,  he  did  so  because  he  had  been  con 
vinced  by  constant  observation  of  the  superior  capacity 
of  the  young  officer  for  the  responsible  position. 

To  use  the  language  of  a  military  writer,  "  The  simple 
and  unostentatious  habits,  the  industrious,  diligent,  strict 
but  just  manner,  in  which  he  attends  to  the  regular  busi 
ness  of  his  army,  the  precision  of  his  orders,  the  inde 
fatigable  energy,  the  cool,  deliberate  courage  and  self-pos 
session  with  which  he  moves  and  directs  operations  under 
the  hottest  fire  ;  the  never-failing  word  of  encouragement 
and  cheer  in  the  battle,  and  of  consolation  in  the  hospital ; 
the  swiftness  with  which  he  moves ;  #ie  eagle-eye  that, 
always  calm,  surveys  the  situation  at  a  glance,  and  devises 
the  means  to  become  its  master ;  show  the  characteristic 
qualities  of  General  McClellan,  and  prove  that  they 
are  the  same  which  upon  the  heights  of  "  Cerro-Gordo," 
elicited  the  official  commendation  of  General  Scott ;  which 
at  the  battle  of  Contreras,  August  29th,  184T,  made  him 


186  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAIC. 

spring  forward  to  take  the  post  of  the  killed  commander 
of  a  howitzer  battery  and  tight  it  with  so  much  spirit  anc. 
ability,  that  General  Twiggs  recommended  him  for 
efficiency  and  gallantry,  and  for  which  he  was  immediately 
brevetted  first  Lieutenant  of  Engineers ;  which  at  the 
assault  upon  the  Castle  of  Chapultepec  made  Genera 
Worth  recommend  him  for  gallantry  of  conduct  and 
signal  service  as  an  engineer ;  which,  at  Mexico,  made 
him  push  the  first  officer  into  the  city,  entering  at  three 
o'clock  in  the  morning  at  the  head  of  his  sappers  and 
miners  under  the  most  dreadful  of  all  attacks,  the  firing 
from  the  windows  and  house-tops,  kept  up  by  twc 
thousand  released  convicts  ;  when  he  was  for  gallant  and 
meritorious  conduct  at  Chapultepec  and  Mexico  brevetted 
Captain,  an  honor  he  had  declined  when  conferred  upon 
him  on  the  12th  of  September;  'en-fin*  the  same  rare 
qualities  of  conspicuous  gallantry,  daring  and  professional 
excellence  by  which  George  B.  McClellan  had  won  his 
captaincy  upon  bloody  fields  before  he  was  twenty-two 
years  old." 

AN  IMPARTIAL  OPINION  OF  McCLELLAN. 

In  conclusion,  we  quote  the  following  summary  of  Gen 
eral  McClellan's  services.  It  is  from  "  The  Round  Table," 
a  weekly  journal  of  the  highest  character,  free  from  all 
partisan  bias,  and  sustained  by  a  corps  of  the  ablest  liter 
ary,  political,  and  military  writers.  It  condenses  into 
comparatively  few  words  the  gist  of  the  reports  we  have 
given,  and  will  unquestionably  be  the  verdict  of  history. 

"  It  was  charged  against  that  officer  (General  McClel 
lan)  that  when  he  held  the  position  of  General-in-Chief, 
ho  really  had  no  plans  adequate  to  the  occasion,  and  this 
belief,  more  than  any  thing  else,  led  to  the  acquiescence 
of  the  country  in  his  removal  from  the  supreme  control  of 
military  affairs.  Subsequent  revelations  have  proved  that 


LIFE   OP   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

te  had  a  continental  scheme  equal  to  the  occasion,  and 
which  would  in  all  probability  have  ended  the  rebellion, 
or,  at  the  worst,  the  close  of  the  year  1862  would  have 
found  us  where  we  now  are  at  the  close  of  1863. 

General  McClellan,  in  the  military  policy  he  had  marked 
out  for  himself,  determined  to  strike  at  five  strategic  points, 
or  rather  he  had  in  view  five  separate  campaigns,  any  one 
of  which  would  have  inflicted  a  heavy  blow  upon  the  rebel 
lion,  but  which,  combined  and  successful,  could  hardly  have 
failed  to  end  it.  He  first  equipped  an  army  with  the  object 
of  capturing  the  rebel  capital,  not  because  of  its  strategic 
importance,  but  from  the  moral  effect  such  capture  would 
have  produced  both  in  the  Confederacy  and  abroad.  He 
next  designed  and  prepared  for  an  expedition  to  capture 
Charleston,  not  on  account  of  its  strategic  importance,  but 
also  for  the  moral  effect  which  would  result  from  the 
possession  by  the  Union  forces  of  that  point  where  the 
rebellion  originated.  In  his  instructions  to  General  Buell, 
it  will  be  found  that  he  early  appreciated  the  importance 
of  immediately  occupying  East  Tennessee,  with  a  view  of 
isolating  the  South  Atlantic  from  the  Gulf  States,  and  get 
ting  possession  of  the  range  of  mountains  that  jut  into  the 
rebel  territory  and  permanently  divide  the  region  lying  be 
tween  the  Atlantic  and  the  Mississippi.  All  his  instruc 
tions  and  orders  to  General  Buell  had  this  object  clearly  in 
view.  The  capture  of  the  Tennessee  valley,  which  was 
subsequently  made,  was  no  part  of  his  plan,  and,  as  we  will 
presently  show,  was  a  questionable  benefit  to  the  Union 
cause.  Had  East  Tennessee  been  take*h  possession  of  in 
the  spring  of  1862,  and'  the  loyal  people  there  relieved 
from  the  tyranny  of  the  rebel  government,  the  dreadful 
battles  which  have  since  drenched  with  blood  the  soil  of 
Tennessee  and  Northern  Georgia  would  never  have  been 
fought,  nor  would  any  of  the  many  invasions  of  Kentucky 
by  Bragg  and  Morgan  have  occurred  The  war,  in  fact, 


388  MFE   <-F   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAX. 

would  have  been  half  ended  before  it  had  fairly  begun. 
Another  of  the  strategic  movements  planned  by  General 
McClellan  will  be  found  in  his  instructions  to  General  Butler 
previous  to  the  capture  of  New  Orleans.  This  document  is 
a  marvel  of  military  sagacity,  and  places  its  author  among 
the  first  cabinet  strategists  of  the  age.  He  did  not  desire 
the  capture  of  the  city  until  General  Butler  had  at  least 
twenty-eight  thousand  men  under  his  command.  He  pre 
dicted  that  Forts  St.  Philip  and  Jackson  were  the  only 
impediments  to  the  possession  of  the  city,  and  the  event 
proved  the  correctness  of  his  judgment.  But  the  taking  of 
New  Orleans  was  only  a  small  part  of  the  campaign  he  had 
marked  out.  Butler  was  directed  to  seize,  immediately  on 
entering  the  city,  the  avenues  of  approach  to  it ;  then  so 
much  of  Louisiana  as  was  necessary  to  support  New 
Orleans  and  keep  at  a  distance  the  rebel  armies ;  after 
which  he  was  instructed  to  take  possession  of  Natchez 
and  Jackson,  the  capital  of  Mississippi,  This  last  instruc 
tion,  as  we  see  by  what  subsequently  occurred  at  Yieks- 
burg,  Port  Hudson,  and  all  along  Southern  Mississippi, 
was  of  supreme  importance.  Had  General  Butler  been 
able  to  obey  orders  and  seize  the  capital  of  Mississippi, 
our  military  annals  might  not  have  been  made  glorious  by 
the  sieges  of  Yicksburg  and  Port  Hudson ;  but  within  three 
months  after  the  capture  of  New  Orleans  the  aspect  of  the 
military  map  of  the  Southwest  would  have  been  as  favor 
able  as  it  now  is,  after  the  hideous  waste  of  blood  and  trea 
sure  which  it  has  cost  to  rescue  that  part  of  the  country 
from  the  grasp  of  the  rebellion.  General  McClellan's  final 
object  in  the  movements  he  contemplated,  as  will  be  seen 
by  his  report,  was  the  deliverance  of  the  line  of  the  Mis 
sissippi  from  the  grasp  of  the  rebel  government. 

"  But  he  was  relieved  from  command  prematurely.  The 
time  had  not  arrived,  nor  had  the  preparations  been  made, 
for  moving  the  armies  he  had  designed  to  act  in  concert 


LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GEXERAL   McCLELLAN. 

against  the  rebellion  when  Mr.  Lincoln  took  from  him  the 
supreme  control  of  the  army  and  administered  military 
affairs   according  to  the  ideas  of  leading  members  of  the 
administration.     General  McClellan  did  not  design  tha 
the  grand  campaign  should  commence  till  April,  and  hi 
judgment  has  been  singularly  confirmed  by  the  history  of 
the  war  since  then.     All  the  movements  of  our  armies  in 
the  winter  of  1861,  and  the  early  spring  of  the  following 
year  were  premature.     Our  victories,  from  the  untimely 
fruit  they  bore,  were  really  disasters  in  disguise.     Even 
the  capture  of  Donelson,  and  the  army  it  contained,  is  to 
be  set  down  in  our  future  annals  as  the  most  serious  blow 
the  Union  cause  received  in  the  early  history  of  the  war. 
General  McClellan's  object  in  postponing  the  movements 
of  our  armies  until  the  early  part  of  April  was.  that  they 
could  all  be  simultaneous — that  in  one  fell  swoop  General 
Buell  should  capture  East  Tennessee ;   General  Sherman, 
Charleston  ;  General  Butler,  Xew  Orleans,  Vicksburg,  and 
Jackson :  General  Halleck,  the   line  of  the  Mississippi ; 
and  himself  the  rebel  capital.     Had  all  these  movements 
been  successful,  which  it  would  not  have  been  unreason 
able  to  expect,  there  would  have  been  no  rebellion  after 
July  4th,  1862.     Had  any  one  of  them  been  successful,  it 
would  have  been  a  cruel  blow  to  the  Confederacy.     But 
the  opening  of  the  campaign  in  the  West  in  January  and 
February,  the  capture  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  and 
the  operations  upon  the  upper  Mississippi — all  of  which 
were  against  the  advice  and  in  defiance  of  the  plans  of 
the  then   commander-in-chief  of  the  army — spoiled  the 
whole  grand  campaign.     The  rebellion  was  then  a  mere 
shell.     Davis  subsequently  acknowledged  in  his  message 
that  he  had  attempted  to  guard  too  many  points.     The 
Southern  army  was  composed  only  of  volunteers,  and  had 
the  attacks  been  simultaneous,  the  outer  walls  of  the  re 
bellion  would  nave  been  broken  down  with  comparative 


190  LIFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

ease.  he  capture  of  Ponelson  spoiled  every  thing.  The 
Union  armies  in  other  quarters  were  in  no  condition  for 
rapidly  following  up  the  blow.  The  rebels  became  thor 
oughly  alarmed.  The  same  February  that  saw  the  victory 
of  Donelson,  placed  upon  the  legislative  records  of  the 
Richmond  government  a  stringent  conscription  law.  New 
lines  of  defence  were  taken  up.  Every  man  that  could  be 
raised  was  pressed  into  the  ranks.  Every  thing  was  done 
that  military  science  and  the  keen  alarm  of  a  ready-witted 
military  people  could  suggest  to  make  the  Confederacy 
equal  to  the  next  emergency  that  should  be  forced  upon  it 
by  the  Union  Government. 

"  The  campaign  against  New  Orleans  also  opened  pre 
maturely.  General  Butler  had  barely  enough  troops  to  hold 
the  city,  and  was  unable  to  reap  the  fruits  of  his  victory. 
Instead  of  capturing  the  best  part  of  Louisiana,  and  occu 
pying  the  capital  of  Mississippi,  thus  severing  Texas  from 
the  Confederacy,  he  was  hardly  able  to  hold  his  own  in 
New  Orleans.  The  story  of  the  military  blunders,  result 
ing  in  the  costly  sieges  of  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson, 
would  never  have  had  to  be  written  had  the  plans  sug 
gested  by  General  McClellan  been  executed.  It  was 
found,  too,  when  the  movement  was  made  upon  Richmond, 
that  the  fatal  blunder  of  the  premature  opening  of  the 
campaign  in  the  West  and  in  the  Southwest  had  nerved 
the  rebellion  to  put  forth  every  effort  to  save  its  capital. 
Troops  were  hurried  from  all  parts  of  the  Confederacy  to 
beat  back  the  Union  forces — and  they  succeeded.  Nor 
was  any  advantage  gained  from  the  operations  along  the 
Atlantic  coast,  except  in  perfecting  the  blockade.  It  is  in 
these  points  that  history  will  justify  General  McClellan 
and  condemn  the  administration  for  setting  him  aside  at 
that  critical  period  of  the  war. 

"  The  limits  of  this  article  will  not  permit  us  to  discuss 
at  length  the  Peninsular  campaign.  It  is  enough  to  sav 


'LIFE   OP  MAJOfc-GENERAL  McCLELLAN. 

that  it  was  under  the  general  orders  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  and 
that  it  failed  ;  nor  have  we  any  thing  to  add  touching  the 
campaigns  which  followed  the  removal  of  General  Mc- 
Clellan  after  the  battle  of  Antietam.  It  is  enough  to  kno\r 
that,  after  the  dreadful  experiences  of  Fredericksburg, 
Chancellorville,  and  Gettysburg,  GenerahMeade  is  to-day 
where  General  McClellan  was  when  removed  from  com 
mand  of  that  army,  and  certainly  in  no  better  position. 
We  make  these  remarks  in  no  spirit  of  unkindness  to  the 
administration  of  Mr.  Lincoln  personally.  We  believe 
that  the  President  acted  from  patriotic  considerations,  and 
did  the  best  according  to  the  light  he  had.  Nor  do  we 
believe  that  the  party  who  spurred  him  on  to  set  aside 
the  well-considered  plans  of  the  General-in-Chief,  were 
animated  by  any  other  desire  than  a  purpose  to  serve  their 
country.  Subsequent  events  have,  however,  placed  them 
cruelly  in  the  wrong,  and  they  must  accept  the  verdict 
which  impartial  military  science  will  bestow  upon  them." 

GENERAL   McCLELLAN'S    LATEST  SPEECH. 

The  most  recent  date  upon  which  General  McClellan 
appeared  before  the  public,  was  on  the  eighteenth  of 
February,  1864.  An  official  reception  was  given  on  that 
day  by  the  municipal  authorities  of  the  city  of  New  York 
to  the  veterans  of  the  First  New  York  cavalry,  and  while 
the  proceedings  were  progressing  at  Jefferson  Market,  one 
of  the  members  of  the  regiment  jumped  upon  a  table  and 
shouted,  "Silence;  keep  still  a  moment."  The  others, 
not  inderstanding  his  purpose,  cried,  "  Get  down — keep 
still."  "  I  won't  keep  still,"  he  answered,  in  a  stentorian 
voice  :  "  Boys,  General  McClellan  is  coming  in." 

In  an  instant  there  was  such  a  scene  of  enthusiasm  as 
cannot  be  adequately  described.  Every  one  turned  to- 
watds  the  door ;  soldiers  literally  clambered  over  each 
other  and  the  tables,  cheering  in  the  wildest  manner.  As 
the  great  commander  passed  through  the  room,  they 
12 


192  LIFE   OF  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

caught  him  by  the  hands,  and  gathered  about  him  so  that 
he  could  scarcely  move.  Some  of  those  about  the  sides 
of  the  room  caught  the  American  flag  that  adorned  tho 
windows  and  waved  them,  cheering  in  the  most  enthu 
siastic  manner.  TIats  were  waved  in  the  air  in  all  direc 
tions,  and  there  was  one  unanimous  ^oice  of  glad  greet 
ing.  When  the  general  and  a  friend  who  came  with  him 
had  reached  the  officers,  and  been  heartily  welcomed  by 
them,  Colonel  McReynolds,  the  commanding  officer  of  the 
regiment,  arose  and  requesting  silence,  spoke  as  follows  : 

SPEECH  OF  COLONEL  McREYNOLDS. 

"  SOLDIERS  :  But  a  short  time  ago  the  chairman  of  this 
occasion  did  us  the  honor  to  refer  to  the  fact  that  the  First 
New  York  cavalry  were  the  last  on  the  Chickahominy 
and  the  first  to  reach  the  James  river.  It  was  a  proud 
announcement,  gentlemen,  and  it  was  true.  I  now  have 
the  honor,  and  the  great  pleasure,  to  announce  to  you  that 
the  noble  chieftain  who  led  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on 
that  occasion,  that  matchless  chieftain,  General  George  B. 
McClellan — (cheers  lasting  several  minutes) — I  do  not 
blame  you  for  your  enthusiasm — General  George  B. 
McClellan,  has  honored  you  with  his  presence.  (Renewed 
cheers.)  If  you  will  keep  still  for  a  moment,  I  have  no 
doubt  he  will  speak  to  you.  (Three  cheers.)" 

SPEECH  OF  GENERAL  McCLELLAN  TO  THE 
SOLDIERS. 

The  tumult  of  cheers  subsided  as  General  McClellan 
arose,  and  the  room  became  as  quiet  as  if  for  a  prayer 
He  then  spoke  as  follows  : 

"  MY  FRIENDS  AND  COMRADES  :  I  came  here  not  to  make 
a  speech  to  you,  but  to  welcome  you  home,  and  express  to 
you  the  pride  I  have  always  felt  in  watching  your  career, 
not  only  when  you  were  with  me,  but  since  I  left  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  while  you  have  been  fighting  battles  undei 


LIFE   OP  MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN.  193 

others,  and  your  old  commander.  I  can  tell  you  now, 
conscientiously  and  truly,  I  am  proud  of  you  in  every  re 
spect.  There  is  not  one  page  of  your  record — not  a  line 
of  it — of  which  you,  your  State  and  your  country  may  not 
be  proud.  I  congratulate  you  on  the  patriotism  that  so 
many  of  you  have  evinced  in  your  desire  to  re-enter  the 
service.  I  hope,  I  pray,  and  I  know  that  your  future 
career  will  be  as  glorious  as  your  past.  I  have  one  other 
hope,  and  that  is  that  we  may  yet  serve  together  some 
day  again." 

The  cheers  that  followed  this  speech  were  a  repetition 
of  the  previous  scene.  Officers  and  men  cried  out,  M  We'll 
follow  you  anywhere,  General !" 

SPEECH  OF  MAJOR  HARKINS. 

Major  D.  H.  Harkins  was  introduced,  and  said  :  "  Fel 
low-soldiers  :  I  feel  indeed  proud  that  we  have  been  so 
highly  honored  to-day,  not  only  by  the  Common  Council, 
the  Mayor  of  New  York,  and  by  the  people,  but  that 
we  have  had  the  distinguished  honor  of  being  addressed 
by  the  first  chieftain  of  this  age.  (Loud  cheers.)  The 
man,  who  is  not  only  the  pride  and  glory  of  our  country, 
but  who  has,  in  all  its  darkest  hours,  come  forth  as  its 
saviour,  and  lifted  us  out  of  destruction,  making  victory 
once  more  to  perch  upon  those  banners  that  had  been 
made  to  flee  before  the  banners  of  rebellion.  (Cheers.) 
The  name  of  General  George  B.  McClellan  (renewed 
cheers),  and  his  name  only,  could  bring  back  those  soldiers 
to  discipline,  and  make  them  again  an  organization  proud 
and  glorious.  (Great  cheers,  waving  of  flags  and  hats. )  It 
may  be  that  in  the  dark  hour  to  come,  if  it  is  to  come,  Gen 
eral  George  B.  McClellan  will  again,  like  another  saviour, 
came,  and  bring  victory  and  liberty  to  the  whole  United 
States.  (Cheers.)  I  will  say  for  the  First  New  York 
cavalry,  that  though  he  has  not  been  with  us  in  the  field,, 
he  has  been  in  our  hearts.  (Renewed  cheering.)  It  Ls  a 


194  MFE   OF   MAJOR-GENERAL   McCLELLAN. 

proud  thing  indeed  for  us  to  be  assembled  here,  the 
regiment  of  cavalry  in  the  United  States  service,  to  soo 
more  than  three-fourths  of  them,  after  their  arduous 
duties,  re-enlisted  for  the  war.  (A  voice,  "  Under  Gener  il 
McClellan."  Cheers.) 

GENERAL  McCLELLAN  SPEAKS  AGAIN. 

General  McClellan  now  arose  to  go.  This  caused 
another  burst  of  cheers,  which  was  succeeded  by  silence. 
The  General  said  :  "  Gentlemen,  now  I  shall  have  to  say 
good-bye  to  you  for  the  present,  and  in  doing  so,  I  sha'l 
propose  the  health  of  the  First  New  York  Cavalry." 
(Cheers.  Three  cheers  for  "Little  Mac.") 

With  undiminished  enthusiasm  the  soldiers  crowdel 
about  him  as  he  left  the  room  ;  many  followed  him  out 
to  the  street,  their  cheers  re-echoing  again  and  again. 

In  a  similar  manner,  General  McClellan  is  received, 
whenever  he  meets  any  of  the  soldiers  of  the  old  army 
of  the  Potomac.  The  enthusiasm  extends  to  the  ue\v 
recruits  also,  and  even  to  the  soldiers  of  the  Union 
generally. 


THE   END. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 
on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 


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subject  to  immediate  recall. 


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